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'This report, Adjuistment in Afdrica LessonsfwzCountry CaSe Studimes, provtide
-anassessment of structural adjustmient policies undertak-en by seven Afri-.
can countries in the mid-19I80s. The report is'a companion volume to the'
mainstud,. Ajustent in Afiicac Refonns, Reuts, and lthe Road A/madh produced by the Policy Research Departmnent.
This report is distinct from other studi.es on this subjec. Fir.

it. em-

phas-izes the'-specific economic and social circumstances, of each country
that led to the -adoption'of an adjustment program- Second, it measures.
and-analyzes the extent to whiich the adjustmentipolicites wvere,in fact, imple-men ted in each case. Finally, the report attempts to assess economic perforinan ce in. relation to the strength of the implementation of policy refonns. This research was iLnitiated to supplement the main smudy, which is'
more aggregated and covers-a cross-section of twet-ie
onres.
Th'e
motivation behind the research was. to capture the diversity of experiences
in implementing refonns..

The period covered by these case studies ends, for most countries,
.in
1991 Since, these studies wvere completed, there have been significant developments in each of the case study countries. A large devaluation of the
GFA franc took place in January 1994, removing one of the principal obstacles to the full interplay ofpolicy instruments requie
:foradjustmentin
the GFA zone countries. It is hoped -thatGbte d'Ivoire and Senegal, which
have been adversely affected by the overtluation of the CFA franc since
otcute,i
by
teseof adjustmienl
zase
tude,nc
The
1985, will enter
apriodovere
new period
Nigeria, owhich
has a new military government,h
has announced the abandonment ofios
iadjustimnentpolicons and reverted to its pre-1986 regime. Burundi has witnessed a bloody
coe d"tataand tievassassinationsofitselected presidentLGhanaandtKenya
held mlttiparty elections, but the incumbentswere returned to power.nAnd
Tnzliae
eprg
for multparty elections in 1995-
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These drastic changes in die political awnd economic environmen 1I.ive
created uncertainty about tlb e r
ctiLte
direction oreconomic policies. As thc
report notes, economic recoverywuLstill fragile in most of these countries,
and the ensuing uncertainty h;S made the sit.uation even more dircuhl.
The patl to ccononiic progress andl reviv-.l i,s now miuchlc blttet understood
in Afriica than at any time before, butnmanaging this change has proved diP
fiCUlt. ItS 110ped that thC process or political transition, wvhen completed,
will reinforce economic reforms in most countries and set hligh1 standards
of problity, accountability, and governa7nce.
The findings of tlis report reinforce those of the main .studyand other
studies of successful developing countries. Progress has been mixed, but
the countries tdathhave estibliished and ujaintained macroeconomicstabilitv, eliminated discrimination against agiiculture, and taken nmeasures to
remove antiexportbiaLs experienced the biggest turnarounds in their econ
mies. Despite these gains, per capita growhd rates remain fairly low; even if
susstained, theywould be insufficient tomakeadentin the rising incidence
of poverty.
Economic reforms should thus be seen as tie foundation-upon which
su:stainable and equitable developmentcan be built in Africa. Human capital investment, infrastructure improvements, better governance and, most
important, indigenous capacity building are the otherkey ingredients that,
together with economic policy reforms, will accelerate growth, alleviate
poverty, and protect the env,ironmentin Africa.
The World Bank's long-term perspective agenda remainms valid and, with
suitable modificanion to respond to changing circurmstances, will guiide the
B-ank's assistance to its member countries in Africa- This report confirms
the critical importance of good macroeconomic policies and inanagement
in the implementation of this agenda.

Edward V. KJaycox
Vice President
Aflica Region

Published by iRepository, 2021

https://ir.iba.edu.pk/faculty-research-books/13

Acknowledgments

This t-eport. has be'nefited fromi die review, comments, atnd suigge'stions of
many people-in thelWorldBank. Regional vice president E.dard VI
y
and the Africa Regrion Couintr-y Department'directors.Francisco Aguir-reSacasa, Kevin Cleaver; Francis Colacqo, Stephien Denning'. Oliivier L-afourcade,
Edwin Lim, and Kathierine Marshall w41ere the prime movers behiind this:
report and they broached thie origina] suggestion for carrying out couintry
case studies. Ajay Chihibber, Lawrence H-inkle, Fran vois Laporte, Peter
Miovic, Ujlrich- Thiumin, and Gene Tidrick'steered the study and provrided
extensive commients at various stages of the report..Christine Jones and
Migruel Kigruel were most helpful in the design and early stages of the study.
Pierre Landell-Mills and Michiael Walton w."ere the main discussants at die
Bankwide review of the report.
The reporthasaLso benefited from- the cornmentisand contributions of
iMar-k Baird. Deepak-Bhattasali, Carlos Priino Br-aga. Michiael Carter, Simion
Commander. Luc de WNulf, Bill Easterly, Brenidan Horton, Ravi K-anbur, WNill
Martin, Vrikriam Nelru Brian* Ngo, Steve O'Brien, Paul. Popiel, Sanja
Pradhan, Raed Safadi, Bill Shiav. Bension Varon, and Rich-ard Westebbe.
Theassistance oftlie coumntr teams of Burundi, COte d'lvoire, Ghana, Kenya,
Nigeria, Senegal, -and Tanzania is gratefully acknowledged.
Thie editorial production team for the report consi-sted of Nandita
Tannan, Sus-an Chase, and Andi Carlson.

ax
Published by iRepository, 2021

https://ir.iba.edu.pk/faculty-research-books/13

I~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Adjustment in seven
African countries .

-

-- Rahid Farueeand Ishrat Huaina

TheIVWorld ank repor-tAdjushtment in Afuica. Rqforms, RCem7LIts, and i/ic Roaid Ahea-d
(Now York: Oxroird University Presis, 1994) concltides thiat. there hias been
saC mprovem-ent in th over-all policy environment in the. twrenty-nine
*couintriest.iia.tLemib-arked onacljustnientpr-ogra.ins in the miid-98iO,butittha.tt
the imiprovemnents have been fiar fromi uniformi across couintries'and sectors.
Thec reortd
biggesta.lsofid
imiprovemients
have
beenprogras
in the macroe'conomic
sphere (except
-The
dint
thGe
re..formcn
work:s
Indcoutresand
policy
.
p ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
pxolicfixed
pnierfoiahc
haess been)
tlthtse
outcomes
*inareaswhere
countries wVith
exchiange rates
in diereaonablyugood
CFA franc zone)'and
in
agricultur-al been
policies.
There hias
also been some policy
(mnixed) progress
in deregulatinghave
reasonabl
good
heonversely,po
progressti
thas
been re-n
and liberalizing markets. But in other areas, reform has been more difficult,
with public enterprises and the finrancial system the mostresistant to ch-ange.,

Conditions and adjustment in the case study countries
The analyses of te seven countries exafrmined in this collection of cse stud-.
ies--Burundi, COte d'Ivoire, Ghiana, Kenya, Nigeria, Senegal, and Tanzainia-reinforce these findings. The case studies are intended to supplement
die cross-,couintry study with in-depthi analysis of a few country experiences.
The studies shed further light on the proceses -and outcomes.of reform
.~~~~~~~~~~~
.
. . .
programs in different African contexts. The selection of countnes was
guided by the desire to include as much variemtyast
possible wvth tregard to
"initial conditions" and adjustment processes and programs. In Ghana and
Tanzania economic condidions hitarock ottom before the adjustment prograi started. In Burundi, Cgte d'Ivoire, andNigeria thereowere serious distortions and pronounced declines in economic perfonnance, with Cbte
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ijL;oNi mmoi Cou!M4CAsc. Si'u;wis.

d'lvoire and Nigeria silTering floin 1lit "Dilicldisease' after lie coininod.
iftryboom of the late 170s. In Kenya ancl iSe-negal distordions havie been seriouis, but no pericod can he identifiedl as muos. critical; tfle two countries
have also biad-on again, off again-r cronns that mitigaled. te iimpact. Or
these distortions.
Along with initial condiLions, difLerentivation and processes ora.1.
jttstmenLin th;e jcven case ntidy countries influenced ihe progress o'rerormns
and die results aclievted. I lproveni

en Ln
in'domeslic economic peifbrmalnce-

increased domestic savings, higher expoirt earnings, greater doinlestik production, and so on-is tile kcy miiotivation for decisions:to initiatl an adjustmentprograim. Anotherconmnon clemiient in the calculus is thte expectation
of external resources fr6o m international filnacial insti.utions and: bilatelal
donors nd thie prospects for rescheduling det)L T
countlies varied

'ccondiLions in tihe seven

as rollows:

-In Nigeria a new government fotund Lldie country in tiu midst of an
economic decline, with,a large debt burden exacerbated by.a precipitous decline in oil prices-the main source of tlh country's foreign
exchange earnings. Tlhe motivation for reform seems to have stemmed
primarily from the desire to find a solution to die external debt prob
lems faced by the count y and the implicit expectation that the ca.sl
flow reliefwould free foreign exchange f[r domestic users.
In Ghana-the economic freeall was almost complete when the Rawlings
government assumed power in 1982. The driving force for reform
appears to have been the conviction thatpolicyreforms.wouldinmprove

die economy by eliminating corruption.
-In Tanzania as in Ghana, economic conditions had deteriorated dramatically before a refo nn program was launched. The- fundamental
policy changes that were instituted inay have been precipitated by an
upsurge in popular resentnent. The clhange in the top political leadership came wvidt an open admission that the previous economic policies had notworkled and thatalternative solutions needed to be found
for arresting tle economic collapse. Tanzania has always received
exceptionally high amounts of gross aid- flows; the availability of the
foreign aid flowswas, tlerefore, not the motivating factor behind tlhat
country's decision to follow the patl of adjusunent.
In Kenya the economic decline was not as pronounced or perceptible
as in other countries. In 1979 a sharp fall in the price of coffee and
a doubling of the price of imported oil forced Kenya to adopt a stabilization program to reduce the ensuing macroeconomic imbalances. Kenya decided to undertake structural adjustment to obtain
quick-disbursing finds from the World Bank at a time when die country wvas faced with serious foreign exchange shortages and payment
pressures.
Published by iRepository, 2021
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* Senegal w.us c:anfon tedl with a lin;ncmal ciisis in the0 lktCe 19470s, whe n
*i coirbhinai.iimn ot pot'. financial and investmnient. policies, worsend'
-to
eis
m O trdck, andl St ICeCLSSiV' drcoigh ts made KhJSttl.lClen I.ilaVOi(
le.,
t l'ietd(eCision In initiale
stricu.iral -,djiustm11ent.was app;arsent.ly mlaic in
tlle IRliedthat. it? caintiy's finaial ;nd CCOicflecliC iniachinc:s could

he resolve-d wit] linancial supp6nr Irion d' e International MIonetary
*und kIind the Wrd 13Bank.
* In C6i.u cllvoirC the interplay bmeween external and internal factors
led to in acriOcon.ojilic destbiliz ti on, lititi e govein m en Cs owsn di
agnosis was tal.t the cr isis ws resullt.
I 0fLtepo01rr1terms o t. cle ckc

ler-iora.tion and hint exteinal financing could tile them1 over lh eCrisis.
* Donors financed 80 perce.nt, of Buiriundi's investinent, program, and

dlie infliuence of Bretan Woods institutions on the design of a`djnst:- -inentwn<ls
most. z'silble. Aid seemed to be a key factor in d decision to
emibark on an -adjtjstjiientprogiram.

FPour ot.lic seven couintries legan tincir aculistmeznt1. program
liin the same
year, 1986. Ghana and Kenya started theiradjusnmentprogrami carlie. Gliana
in 1983 and Kena, in 1985 (although a lialf-lhearted stabilization program
was initiated earlier in Kenya). In. C5te d'Ivoire the adjustment; pr ogiam
actually started in 19S7, altlhoughl soIic attempts at stabilization were made
before tLat date.
The adjustment progriams in all seven countries attempted to eliminate
distortions-distortions sometimes created or exaccrbated by external or
internal shocks-which often prevent an efficient allocation of resources in
the economy. The programs also aimed atmobilizing resources to stimulate
the resumption of growth. Broadly speaking, the adjustment programs in all
seven cases -addressed distortions such as an overvalued exchange rate, high
current accouint and fiscal deficits, low factor mobility, restrictions on domestic and foreign trade, distorted pricing for tradables, and inefficientppublic
services. Adjwstment programis generally included reforms to:
E.stablish a market-detennined exchange rate.
- Bring fiscal deficits under control and rationalize public investment.
* Liberalize trade (for exaniple, by abolishing licenses and quantitative
restrictions) and tariff policy (by moving toward low and uniform tariff rates), liberalize agricultural prices and marketing, deregulate internal prices, and similar measures.
* Improve financial sector policy (to achieve competitive retums on financial assets, increase the marginal productivity of capital, and boost
the saving rate).
* Improve the efficiency of public enterprises and labor mar ets (to enhance the mobility of goods and labor and to make prices and wages
more flexible).
* Improve the coverage and quality of social services.
Published by iRepository, 2021
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coin tries lhv; succ cssldly ipleen-ei
111i;any of hle
policy reforms ondinedI u!mVe-duluing dluie exchange rule, clecontiolling
pi;cest .and liberailizing agr(iiiliir;il imarketing. Thtre lhIas .ilso loetn somlle

NMost of die

seven

P1rog4r1ss in IilIwllir.ing imports, liit. expilni'.incentives titIIer tIhrn lithe do%altied exchiatnge} ai.te (nanIely, (ittiy (dIrawbIleks rind insLi 11ional siippori. foIir
expovi. promotolion -In d inSt iran cc. gWWar-nIee.s) still hick bite. MoneintarY ;intl
fIscal.refrms%raranother- rt-a in wlicihli )rogross has teen mixed. T'le greatesi;,difliciltdieS. lhow(erve;I
,Nt!
h
heen in relollming public ent.erprises, tilt! 1f.
nanciuil Sect.Olr, and tlle civil scrvice.lowocial iecling, aldiough serialudly low

tO begin witLh, hasb-tcen largely P
Soiel spIndIn g,m oughk
alore
towfth
liegin
prdtoc.ed,atI
l
ii Uo rkettcfrmis
are juti;
beginning. Ghana an(d Tanzania lve a Fiairly gwocI raick record in si.istain.
-ing their prors;n, itt. dIe ol.ler five couinurties have ad li ILYicuhy 1InlAtin
Pro
1 gra;nl;lls,1Cnll
I
IC
1 111Cm
Ol'elOn1S1a
tlenPe1eTl0
iing the initial mnomlentinmand, for-them, the hiinplknenrtaon.of refbrmls has

beCen erratic.;C
Results of adjustment

The quesLions that.lave been raised miost rrequently abotli
the resuilts or
structural adjustnient pl-ogr'almis in Africa are.

H-las growth performance been adequate?
*l as supply r esponse been str ong?
* Do investmnen-to-GDl? ratios show improvemlient?
-* Have external flows been exce.ssive?
* Nave adjustmient. policies hurt the poor?
Itcrease in. growth
Except for COi.C d 'Ivoire. the case study countries had positive per capita CDIP
growtlh during the adjustment period 1986-91-growLtI higher than befor e
the crisis (before 1981) and, for most counties, mucli higlher taLln dUIing
the crisis (1981-86). The average growth rate of six countries in this sample
over the adjustmentL period has been 4.5 percent a year-not bad considering dliataverage growth in die preceding period was barely 1 percent. Burundi
and Kenya had fairly good initial conditions and maintained their previous
growvthi. The biggest turrnarounds were in Ghana (8.8 percentage points),
Nigeria (8 percentage poinus), and Tanzania (4 percentage points). Nigeria
achieved this growth despite the fact that ilte quality of its economic managenient faltered. Even Senegal registered a growth turnaround, thoughi a
small one, despite the handicap of an overvalued exchange rate. Cote d'Ivoire.
Awhich once had an impressive growth rate, cannot return to its precrisis rate
unless it resolves its exchange -ateproblems.
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.5

Thte sutpp4ly frierl)5.

Tlhe miost sinifRcan t contributor to domlleslic
tic- supply and output in the
gion is agriculture, and closely related to it is the export sector, which relies
heavily on agricilt.ural commodities, mining, and petroleum. Although the
data on agrcicltiral production and v%alue added do not always seem to tell
thesaime story,ill seven countries showed improvementin this sector-a trend
: corroborated by evidence on prices, food impoLts, aind food aid.' Food prices in real tertmn declined in Nigeia. Average food imports declined by 30 to 60
percent in Nigeria, Kenya, Tanzania, and Burundi and remained the same;
in Cate d'Iloire, Senegal, and Ghana. The index of food production per
capita has rsen in all countries except Tanania, where it declined slightly?'
In. Burundi food production per capita-seems to have siagated, but food
producdion a leastk-ept pace with the population growth .rate for the 1980s..
The volume of cash crop exports grew rapid!y in Ghana; Tanzania,
Senegal, Burundi, and Nigeria-but declined in C6te:d'Ivoire. New nontraditionalg
giculturatl exporis have emerged in almost every country in this
group, althoug the amounts are still modest This indicates that African.
farmers-do respond to price incentive.s and allocate labor to=activities yield-.r
ing better returns. In Nigeria there was a reverse migration of labor to rural
areas after 1986as the relative returns to farmning improved dramatically.The:
combination of the availability of land, erosion of urban employment opportunities, and improved producer incentives for agricultural production
have acilitated a supply-response in agriculture.The growti in agricultural production cannot be sustained by good incentives alone. Complementaryinvestmentsin rural infrastructure and small- scale irrigation; adequate availability of credit, fertilizers, and other-inputs;
and dissemination of new technology through research and extension are.
also needed to maintain this momentum. There is evidence, howvever, that
the aggregate agricultural supply response has been positive in countries that
implemented policies-to reverse the discrimination against agriculture. Ariother good indicatorof the supply re.spon.se is the behavior of total exports.
The most consistent finding that emerges from this stidy (and which is corroborated by otherstudies)is thatexportgrowth his been:remarkably high
despite declines in the terms oftrade,with exporLsnotonlyrecovering from' ;
die crisis period but also surpassing their precrisis level.
The country case studies also investigated whether there was any diversification-frm the main traditional commodities. Oil dominates Nigerian
exports so heavily, and the anecdotal evidence on Nigerian unofficial exports.
ofmanufactured goods to neighboing counties is so fragmentary, thatitisdifficultto arrive atany definite conclusion. But unlike thecasse in the early
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1980s, Nigerian goods ar-e now comnpeting with other iniports in die West
African markets. Ghana has more than doubled its exports in the pastseven
years despite a sharp fall in cocoa prices in thc world market, but gold exports have now replaced cocoa as thie number one export. At least 20 percent or Ghana's export earnings today come from produCts other than co-

coa, gold, and timber, compared with 8 percenta decade ago. Tanzania shows
the biggest documnented rise in nontraditional exports, and its unrecorded
exports are also large-according-to some estimates, $400 million tob$500
millionayeat, although the composition of these exors isonotknown. ote
d'lvoire, Kenya, and Senegal have export bases that are among: the most
diversified inAfnica, butthe changes during theiradjustmenthave been minor
and show no persistent trend. Burundi is the only country aunong the seven
to show heavy continuing reliance on coffee;-its-diversification efforts, ithough
started, have been negligible.
-

Investment response

The response of investment to adjustment policies has been generally slow
in the seven countries studied. De.spite increased inflows of foreign savings
to supplement the limited domestic savings, investment has recovered to
precrisis levels only in Tanzania
The precrisis investmentratios maynot have been sustainable in dtie first
place, and the investments may not have been efficient or productive. -In all
seven countries much of the investmentwas of dubious Worth, its efficiency
and producti-vity low. 'White elephant" projects, inflated contracts, flight
capital, and other associated ills became r-ampantbefore-and eventually contributed to-the crisis in each case. A major aim of adjustment programs has
been to weed out these undesirable investments (particularly in the public
sector). and to improve overall efficiency.
In the short run, a slowdourn in public investment -(in an attempt to reducebudgetdeficits and cutuneconomicprojects) is bound tO depress ovterall investment ratios. In almost all of the case study countries, public invest-ment.has fallen in relation to GDP But the efficiency of investment has
improved: roughly similarinvestmentratios generated one percentage point
of annual growvth in the crisis period buit close to five percentage points in
the adjustment period.
A crucial issue is whether private investment-will take up the slackl created by this slowdown in public investment. The evidence so faris hardly re.A..i.
fo
ngS~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
-assuring1 and this investment gap remains the daunting challenge for'African countries. The case studies confirm thevital importance of the stability,
contnuity, and credibility of policies for providing signals to domestic and
foreign economic actor.s. Of the seven countries, Ghanaand (until recently)
Kenyai ame closest.to meeting this objective, but botcould have achieved
Published by iRepository, 2021
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Adjustwmt in seven Afiitn eunbies .7
more. lrthe Ghanaian authorities' gencral attitude toward the pivate sector,
had been le.ss ambiguous, Ghana no doubtwould have seen a greater revival
ofprivate investnent In Kenya the lack of transparentpolicies and the genera! perception of capricious governance discouraged potential investors,
even though Kenya. had a more stable economic environment than other
countries in this sample.

Adjustnent prograns in tde seven countries are aiming to reform the
filnancial sector, end public enterpnse monopolies, and promote competiilve policies. But progress has not been impressive in thesetareas. The unfinish ed agenda ofreforms will, therefore, have to fos more deeplyon this set
of policy and institutional clhanges. Unless the domestic private. sector takes
of and shows that it can do business without undue government interference, the prospects forfordgn investment are likely to remain unattractive.
ExtemalfoWs

The flow of external resources has risen far four. of the seven countriesTanzania, Ghana, Kenya,and Burnmdi, in that order-duringthe adjustment.
penod. C6te d'Ivoire and Senegal have experienced declines in the ratio of
net external transfers to GDP. Only Nigeria has had negauve net floWs of
external resources. But even where external flows were rising, they were
* unable to compensate for terns of trade losses: allowing for terms of trade
* losses, six of the seven countries had declines in net external resource inflows, 'iith Tanzania the lone exception.
The central question is how much of the renewed growth of the adjusting countries can be ascribed to external factors (aid and terms of trade
changes) and howv much to policy reform. The case studies reached the following concluLsions:
Nigeria has done much better than terms of trade changes and increased externalflows would have suggested. And because Nigeriaatrans-

fers an amount equal to 5 percent of its GDP to its external creditors
everyyear, itsgrowth could have been even higherwereitnot so heavily
burdenedwith debL
eCte d'Ivoire has been hurt by terms of trade losses and a relative
decline in external flows-and by poor policies. C6te d'Ivoire is also
severely indebted, but ithas avoided a cash flow crunch by not paying
(most of) its creditors and by accumulating arrear.
-Kenya (untl recently), Ghana, Burundi, and Senegal areainongaselect.
group ofAfrican countries that are fuilly servicing their debt-all four.
have been hurt by terms of tade losses. The gross flows appear large
-ineach'of these cases. butwhen they are adjusted for the debt service
paid and terms of trade losses, the "net extemal resource availability
-indicator does not appear large. Kenya's growth record reflects:some
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positive inpact oradjustmlient. Clearly, Ghana's growth turnaround was
due far more to better policies tlan to the other changes.
Tanzania's growth can be ascribed to factors other tlanaid. Generally
-perceived as highly dependent on external donors, Tanzania has received very large sums oraid historically. But once debt servicing and
temis of trade losses ar accoun ted for, the real external resource flows
to Tanzania during its adjustment are no different in absolute terns
dtan those during its crisis. Whether even this level of external assistance is sustainable is hard to say. It is relevant to note thatin successful developing countries generally, domestic avings are the foundation for their development activities. External resources can only fill
the gaps temporarily-and to a limited extent.

Astraightfiorward:comparison of policy progress and turnaround in per
capita GDP growt1th .shows thatNigeria (despite recordingnetnegatnve transfers), Tanzania, Ghana,and Kenya had positive tuniaroundsalong with policy
progress Burundi and Senegal had moderate policy progress wivth a small
turnaround in per capita growth. C8te d'Ivoire dearly had negative per capita
growth with little policy progress, but also had a dedine in external flows.
To sum up, the-aid dependencyrsyndrome-is acomplex phenomenon that
makes generalizaton difficult- Although net external resource transfers to
Sub-Saharan Africa have almostdoubled asaproportion oftheregion's GDP,
nationalincomes have been lowveracross the region because oftermsi oftrade
shocks. A fulI accounting of these various measures shonvs a pkture that is
highly mixed-Although increasing domesticsavingis thepreferred course to
pu.rsue, doing so Ls not easy Domestic saving ratios improved marginally in
Nigeria, Kenya and Ghanaduring theadjustmentperiod, while they dedined
in C8te d'Ivoire and Burundi. There has been significant improvement in
Senegal and Tanzania, but the levels are still abysmally low. The scope for
improvement is substantiaL In Tanzania the auditor general estimated that
the combined financial losses of the state enterprise -sectoramounted to almostO percent of GDP. The story is similar in most ofthe other case study
countries. If action is tak-en to reduce these losses, the domestic saving rate
could aImost double. Fiscal deficits are the main reason for low saving rates
and any vigorous attempt to reduce fiscal deficits will also raise the saving
ratios. Making solid progress in reducing fiscal deficits is cruciai not only for
macroeconomic stability but also because the future viability of Sub-Saharan
Africa will depend on how quickly it turns domestic saving rates around.
Adjustme2nt and thepoor
An important finding of the World Bank's Policy Research Report Adjustwent in Africais that adju.stment has generally improved the welfare of the
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poor, but that not all die poor have bencfited, wvith the urban poor who
produce nontradables and consume tradables (a smrall group relative to thie
rural poor) likely to have been hurt. That report also notes that die growth
attained thus far is still not enough to reduce poverty and diat public expendiware programs still do not pay adequate attention to die basic services essential to improving the welfare of die poor.
Two kIey measures of the effects;of adjustment on the poor are income
changes and public spending on social services. Butprecise quantitative data
on these two measuresare available for only one of the countries in this siudy
(C6te d'Ivoire). The case studieshave neverthelessas:sembled the best available evidence from diverse sources (not always consistent).
The most vehement 'criticism of adjustment -programs has. been their
neglectofsodal sectors_ While the earlygenertion of these progranmsmight
nothave explidtlyaddressed'the.consequences of reforms onthe socialsec.tonS, th e subsequentawareness indsensitizadon of these iisues have anged
the scent Evidence presented in these case studies shows that cutsim social
exwpenditures were more pronounced. during the periods of crisis thai during those of adjustmient In none of tde seven countri~s is there any indicaton of significant dedlines in total real spending on educauion and health.
In Ghanaand.Tanzania the increase from the precrisis leveLs ofsocial ex-penditure has been impressive, although much needs to be done to improve the.
qualiy and delivery of services.
in all seven countries the majority of the poor live in rural areas, are
smnallholders and self-employed, and derive their incomes from producing
and mark-eting food and export crops. Because the rural terms of trade improved in six of the countries (G8te d'Ivoire in the second half of the 1980s
is an e-xception)-as a result oI devaluation; liberalized marketing, higher
producer pnces, and lower taxes-the rural poor appear to have benefited
from real income gains over an extended period. Some analysts would em-*
phasize that. the incresed availability of consumer goods has been part of
the reason for the supply response, particularly in Ghana and Tanzania.
Export crop producers, particularly nontrditional. e.xport crop producers,
have gained more than other agricultural producers. Real food prices to
* fanners have declined in many countries, but the marketed output has increased, replacing food imports in many cases The realincome gains to food
producers have varied according to the incremental proportion they sold to
the marlketafteradjustment and the kind offoodcrops theyproduced. Food
producer'sinNigeria, Tanzania, and Ghanaseem to have benefited the most
Burundi and Kenya have been self-sufficient in food and, therefore, the
foodcrop Farmers there have notgained much. The simationin C8te d'Ivoire
and Senegal is undear, because both these countries have increased their
reliance on food imports.

Published by iRepository, 2021

https://ir.iba.edu.pk/faculty-research-books/13
10

ADjus-nIENr iNAFRIcA:

Lssons FROM CouNmtvCasl' SmnInS

The impact Gunftlte urban poor does not appear to have !ieen tinambigiously unfavorable. In CGhan and Tanzania liJe uirban poor are better oIfial
ter adjustment, as consumer goocds have become available, real food prices
hiave declined, and infornmal sector activities have expanded. To vie extent.
lthat the urban poor were buying their essential goods (including food) in'
the black market before adjustmient, thier e has been no change in thiewel[hre of tliisgroup. In Cotc 'lvoire and Senegal thelurlban poorarewor-se ofI.
This would also seem to be Llle casc for tie unemployed, flxed-income earners, and minimum wage earners in Nigeria. Because here are no data on
Burundi and Kenya. itis unclearwh ethier the ral incomes of tie urban poor
worsened orinmproved.l
What the case studies tell us
To sum up, the seven case sturdies how that wheneveradjustiient programsns
have been pursuedvigorcusly, results havebeen clearly positive with respect
to both growth and alleviation of poverty-an outcome that is independent
of external flows. A consistentand successful.adjusmnentprogram has beenthe most important factor, and one of die key elements of successful adjust-

ment programs-was the motivation and strong commitment by the leadership ofthe countries to launch and sustain the programs in the face of harsh
external circumstances and intemal pressures. Other studies also show that
too frequent, abrupt, and unpredictable changes and reversals of polices
erode the credibility of.e progrms. intensify uncertaintes, and weaken
investor confidence. The stability, continuity, and predictability of policies.
play an important role in the success of reforms.

Notes
1.Th evidenceon agriculture and exports isbasedon the comparison ofdata for
the adjustment period wiih data for the precisis and crisis periods. Because weather
condi tions are the most important determinantofagricultural productionw e use fiveyear to seven-year averages to smooth the fluctuations from droughts or exceptionally

good weather.
2. The result for Tanzania is surprising, and the Food and Agriculture Organization data used forTanzanian food production do not appear to.be consistentwith the
import and retail price data. Food imports int Tanzania were about 300,000 tons on
average during 1981-85 Real consumer prices ofmaize, beans, and rice in the major
urban centers declined, and food aid for Tanzania fell-by nearly 70 percent. This suggests that per capita food production has risen, and the data in the case study support
this finding.
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Burundi: learning the lessons
PierreEnglehert and RichardHoffman

Burundi's development problems run deep. The country has a large and
undivefed sbsistence sector wiAth afiast-growing population adwa
institutional s-tnictures andl capacities. Burundi also suffers. from-rel-atively.
p~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Inflexible and oligopolisic markers,
-andfrom a public.sector that controls
the majority ofproductiv.e enterprises. Not onlyi arcluesonrbuton
to GOP superior to.that of industry and services, but it depends hig hly on a
single crop, coffee. As a result, Burundi is excessively e-xposed to the fluctuadions of a single mark-et, making diversification polidies typcally recomnmended by an adjustmnent programn difficult to implemenL.
In retrospect, thiegovernment's reform effort,initiated inl1986, was toooptimistic about how quickly the economy could be tryansFormed given the
initial limited commitment to th'e program, the. extent of struct-ural distordion s in the economy, and the sensitive sociopolitical environment. Other
signrificant factors that lmited effectiveness induded instabilityin Rwanda
and Zai:re, dedlining terms of trade, and periods of drought.
Destite. the initial difficulties, Burundi's adjustmentprogram has been
path-breaking and should be deemed successful ifonly in the sense that for
the first time it introduced dte notions and practice of more effective
macroeconomic managementh Indeed, fundamental change is underwayo
in Burundi. Takfen as a whole, the busiss 'climate. i Burundi has iftproved markedly in recent years.oMiost of the cumbersome procedures of
the past have been either eliminated or simplified. Te steim is considerably more transparent, thus promoting the competitve advantages of private firms in Burundiy And, in the sociat sector, access to health, education,
and potable water shows"l signs. of improvement despite
i
continued high
f
ubroepoeue
provd mrkely n rcen-yers.Mos ofie
populadion growth.
While su port for the adjustnent process may have been in doubt in
1g987-88, Bunudi hwasince reexamined its co
lmitmantto reforma nd come-
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awaywvitl a.renewed sense ofthie program's importance for economic developmient One ofdhe morciniportant lessons thaL has been learned is tiatthe
adjustmcnt program, while generously supported by the international community, is an undertakingwvhose success requires increased ownership by the
govemnienL Further progress will also depend on the continued liberalization of the econoTimy and the institLution,of appropriate incentives to encourage economic diversification. Perhaps as a further indication thaL change is
botl beneficial and inevitable, in the summer of 1993 the country held its
first democratic elections and the. outcome surprised almost everyone-the
mcumbent presidentia candidate, and his etlnic group'-s taditional hold
on important govermuent positions and the militaiy, lost to a rlatively unk-nown bank;er. Burundi's new govermmentnowthas Sub-Salharan Africa's first
female prime minister.
The setting before the adjustment program
Burundi has been a poor country wiith little natural endowsment anid an
diversifled economy since its independence from Belgium in 1962. Its per
capita GNP was $210 in 1990, making it one of the poorest countries in the
world. It is also one of the smallest countries, and its landlocked siuation
and hilly terrain have contributed to its traditional isolation and difficult
ecomomic situation., Tiere are only a limited number of travel routes and.
transport costs are high. Burundi is ata stage of developmentwsEhere agriculture is still the predominant engine of growth and source ofincome (more
than 50 percent of GDP) The secondary sector is liniited to 14 percent of
GDP and 6 percent of. exports. Burundi is, however, one of the few SubSaharan African countries tlhat is self-sufficent-in staple foods. Itis also ;'resding with a population growth rate of 3 percent and the second highest
population density in Sub-Saharan Africa after Rwanda. Life expectancy at
birth is 49 years. Only 34 percent of the adult population is literate. In ruraI
areas, only 35 percent of the population has access to safewater. In addition

to a low per capita income, Burundi suffers from an agtated political,and
social history. The country has witnessed several coups and major outbreaks
of ethnic violence between the majority Hum and the minority Tutsi, the
latter of which controlled most levels of the government and the productive
sectors of the economy. After ethnic fighting in 1988, then-president Pierre
Buyoyaappointed-anewgovernmentwrith equal HutmandTutsi representadon and, for the first time, a Hutu prime minister. A new constitution was
adopted in a referendum in March 1992, paxing the way for national elections in June 1993, in which Mr. Ndadaye, a Hutu, became the first democratically elected president since Independence.
Economic perfornance in the late 1970s was largely positive, stemming
from high coffee pnces, increased foreign aid, and political stability. GovPublished by iRepository, 2021
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eminlent activity in tJie producive- sectors expanded, botlh dithough direcL
increases in public spending and throulgh a pronounced increase in theJsize
ofthe public enterprisesector.' Bythe late] 970s, lhowever, the situation began
to change. There was an abrupt Fall in coffee prices and a doubling ofimport
prices (including higher oil-prices). which brought a drop in- domestic income and pressure on the balance ofpaymients and fiscal accounts. To conLpound the situation, adverse weather conditions contributed to lo%w agricul-tural output. The govemment responded by relying on discretionary
administrative measures to raton credit and foreign exchlange and resort-.
ing to external borrowing and increased txation of both domestic activiy
and international trade. The government also imposed administrative con-troLs to conain dlieextenmaldeficit-nddprotectdomesticindustry From 1981
to 1984 tie economicsituation-ventifrom bad-tooworse due tLoa further
deterioration
the terms of trade, the continuation of expansionary fisca;
and monetary. policies, and a prolongation of the drought

Real GDP growth, which had averaged 5percentayearduring 1978-81?
grew by less than 1 percent during 1982-4. In 1983 the external current
account deficit (excluding official transfers) reached 16.5 percent of GDP,
and the overall fiscal deficit (on a commitment basis and exduding gr-ants)
reached 13.7 percent of GDP (up from 13 percent the previous year and 2
percent iin 197S). Inflation reached 8.3 percent in 1983, and increased to
14.4 percent the followring year. Tle real effective exchange rate of the
Burundi franc (FBu) appreciated by 8 perceult in 19S3, penalizing agricultural exports and encouragig consumption of imported goods. Extemal
borrowiing, especially on nonconces&sional terus, accelerated: total debt as a
percentage of GDP doubled between 1982 -and-1984 and the debt service
ratio, which had -averaged 4.2 percent of exports of goods and nonfctor
services in the late 1970s, increased to 23 percent in 1985. The distortions
introduced through these measures reinforced the role of the state in the
economy and aggravated disincentives to private sector development These
measures. however, only served to highlightBurundi's major structural conctraints: excessive dependenre on coffee exports, the excessive and inefficientrole ofthe public sector, andinadequate incentives forsustained growth
in agriculture and industry. The need for stabilization and adjustment had
become evident The failure ofthe govemment'sinterventionistpoliciesand
the deterioratng economic situation prompted the govermentto approach
the WorId Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) forassistance.
It was not the first time that Burundi receiver!. balance of paynients support from one of the Bretton Woods institutior. The country has been a
member ofthe IMF since September 1967, and over the years has concluded
several stand-by arrangements and benefi ted from technical assistance in the
areas of foreign exchange, fiscal reform, and bank
isupervison.
The firstIMF
adjustment operation was approved in 1986 in conjunction wiith the World
Published by iRepository, 2021

https://ir.iba.edu.pk/faculty-research-books/13

14

ADJIuS MENT INAFR1G: LrsserSS FROnt COUNRY CASE SnIws.

Rank'sfirst adjust inen: crcditThc Internation-al Dcvelopment.Association's
(IDA) second ;u(ijilsiljient operation, equialient. to $S90million, followed in
July 1988. ancn crofinancing from] ap-an. Gerinany. and Saudiiirabia increLsed
the total envelope to S 1 7 niillion.'rThe two stil:ctil,adlLstinentecredits had
thlee principal objectives:. (1) improvthetic incentives for prodtiction by remo"ing constr-aints to growtha nd by. reClirecting LIhC economily totwtarl inore
reliance on mnarket forces and at greater outward orientation, (2) promiote
privattesector developmlentand investment, and (3) increase the efficienlC
of pulhlic resouirce utilization, especrially thruglh publllic enterprise rcfrmil
ar.cl improved public expcn(littire mnanagrement. In -addition to the W'orld
Bank's structtiral adjustment credits, the IMIF sulpported stabilization measires dhataimedc to correctthico veralued exchiange rate and pursue apolicy
ofadjustable exclhange rates: strengthen the balance of paymentsand increase
foreign reserlves; reIiuice the debtservice: decrewse domnestic financingofrtie
budget deficit to avoid crowdling oiLt the private sector's saccess to investment
credit sources; and increase budgetary revenues and public savings.
Lessons learned
OZwnership: imnproving intemalizaztion atnd irnapbrentaiion

From the start, the goveinment did not assume sufficient ownership orits
ow n progr am. It-failed to scensitize critical economic and polidcal actors to
the merits and requi'rements of the program and to sufficiently delegate
authority throughout the-administration foriks implementation. Much ofthe
limited internalizationwas-.also due to the delicatepolitical climate, one tliat
rendered administrative performance and teclnical assistance ineffctive
By l987tde political climate had so deteriorated tlat a qutsi-rupture ensued
among the major sociopolitical group.s, the churches, and donors. As a consequence, the government's commitment to implementing the first phase
of the program cooled considerably.

Despite Burundi's initial experience with adjustment, the government
was still only partially involved in the preparation of the second phase of the
programn. The second phase was designed soon aftera new government was
installed aftera coup in September 1987, so tie nnew team wraSintroduced to.
theprogramnwithouthaving the opportunity toanalyze tdle currenteconomic
situation or the impact of die initial effort. Ngotiations occun-ed before die
government hadt completed its analvsis ofsectoral policies and dle appropriateness of the latest five-year plan. The design of tde second phase suffered
not only from a lack-ofsubstantive participation by the adininistration, but:
also from the limited numberof experiencedpersonnel-under die For-mer

regime only a small number of civil servants had been privy to dte contents
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of andl autlotrized witli implementing thle first reform package. Tlie lkick of
aw,areness amnong thle piublici and civil servants created a cliniate of uncertaintvC
anddistrulStin the couintr, asLtO thle Iikelvimiplic.tzions of tile programi.
The result of linited ouwnership andl fr-cqtuenL tUrnoVer in government personnel placed a premium
on
the pedagogical role orWorld BWnk and IMF

supervision missions.
Earl von,

the

World

Batnkan

dtIMFplayed
the

a iajor

role in introduc-

ing the reform programt. o die countr-y-and effectively drafted

die

first three.

Policy Fr-anework Papes--in 1986, 1988, and 1989. WQith this significant
expertise came elenients that worked against govermment ownership of theprogram. As Lalidi (1989) points out, governments or developing countries
are unable to compete with die World Bank's and dte IMF's capacity to col-

lect data and analyze their economies. Tnus, they sometitnes abdicate their
responsbility in tlis doniain. and because they consider themselves less-than
full participants during die conceptuialization stage, proper internalization
is notacliieved. The government's commitment to the program was al.so un--

dermnined becatuse die W'.'orld Bank'saide-ni moir-espredominantly reflected.
the position ofmission staff, rather.than the outcome of discussionswith the
govemmenL
Only in November 1990 did the Wrorld Bank accept Lli prtngovernment.
goernmprin-a
accept die
ciple of cosigned aidc-m&moires with die government (although this pirinciple had already been applied to governient mizc4ns;isitng WNashington).
Furdter, consistent management of World Bank programs was denied due
to turnover of World Bank experts and their arying recommendations.
Another reason for poor owsnership was the government's eagemres to
move ahead with die program in order to receive balance of payments financing. Without considetingthe full policyimplicationsofsudc aprogram,n
the government's desire for quick-disbursing support overshadowed other
contentios policy isSues, in particular, the refonn of the public enterprie
sector. W1len the time camie to implement certain measures, the authorities
were unprepared to internalize and move ahead with reforms thatitfeltwere
imposed from the outside and wliich elicited internal resistance.
Anotherimportant reason for the governments limited internalization
Uws the circunmscribed participation that it imposed on key economic sectors-those thatcould have played an importan role in promoting die overall goals of 'Oie program in the country. For example, the government did
not involve dle private sector fully. whose response to the adjustment measuires could have been increased investment. Furthermore, the involvement
of other groups-the armt and the church-was sought onlyafter 1989 (and.
their support prov-ed to be quite valuable, as indicated in boxv! 2-1). Moreover, economic agents were not always informed of relevant measures- For
example, importers -were -not alerted to the automatic granting of import
licenses, and changes in .the transactions tax and price liberalization were-
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not announced, although miiost of die proposed prices lhad been officially
accepted. In Burundi this lack of awareness amnong Lhe general pulblic, business leaders; and civil set-van Ls abouL the objectives and likely implications of
the adjustment progrwn created a climatEc ofuncertainty and cast doubts on
the sustainability of the program.
The strained political climate also manifested itself in tde poor use of
technical assistance resources by the government. In some cases, experts were
eithernotqualified orsimply notused effectively. For example, experts hired
to reinforce the agency restructuring the private enterprise sector cculd not
apply their expertise effectively because strong government leadership was
Box 2.1 Adjustment and popular participation
in Burkina'Faso and Burundi
It took the government of Burkina Faso two ycars to decide to adopt a structural
adjustment policy. Once it did, it took more than two years to finalize a program.
One of the reasons for such protracted negotiatiocs w-as the government's desire
to have complete control over usLadjustment policies, to asse their full impact,
and to ensure the support ofthe population. Itwas mostlywith the latter point in
mind that the govermment convened the "Assises Nationales sir Ie Programme
d'Ajustement StructLrel" in May 1990. Some 2;O00 dcelgates from political partie,s, trade unions, and other social and professional groups (including agricul-.
tural producers and traditional groupings, such as churches and ethnic authorities) came together to answer the question: "Does Burkina need a structural
adjustment program?".
Delegates voted in favor of a structural adjustment program that would not
reduce the overall wage bill, and the conference gave the governmenta mandate
to continue negotiationsLwith the World Bank and the M "while preserving the
major gains of the people." The program eventually reflected the conference's
recommendation, and employment in the civil se,rvice was notreduced. There has
been little opposition to the program since, and the governmenthas not blamed
the World Bank or the IMF for the policies thathad been endorsed by the peoplc.
In. 1989, after embarking on the second phase of adjustment, the govermmenL
ofEBurundi became aware of the need to generate morewidespread'support forits
own program. In an effort to. increase general understanding, it expanded the
monitoring committee of the structural adjustimentprogram to indude the ministries of labor and civil service, organized seminars for the private sector, civil
servants, university students and faculty, and donors Fnally a countyivide infornmation campaign was launrched to explain the program to provincial administrators,high-rankingcivil servants, the army, economic agents, andlabor unions. The
World Bank organized a seminar on the adjustment program in September 1989
with participants from the public andprivate sectors, the army, and thechurch. As
a result, the government's participation in the design of the third phase was more
active and included a much wider group of people than previous phases.
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lacking and hecauise-privatizat.ion policy was nOLwell defined. And teclhnical
assistance was often supply-driven by donors and not tailored-to support -lie
goVernmnent's work program. The poor use of technical assistance also pre-.
venLed tie furiher development orinstitution-building cawpal)ilities. .
- Effectiveowvnerishipwas -alsoconstrainedbytie late establishmentof key
ministerial and teclnical committees. It ws not until the second operaition
that a permanent secretariat was established to monitor the progranm. The
technical conmnittee never became fully operational, reflecting the lack of
personnel and a breakdown in communication betwecn the perman.ent secretariat and sectoral ministries. The secretariat attempted to duplicate IAsks
that fell within the competence of the-planning ministly's macroeconomnics
unit, causing confusion on policy issues as diverging data analyses were generated.; Coordination between the secretariat and the World Bank's resident
mission was also inadequate; meetings were lield irregularly. .Although supervision by dle World Bank was probably adequate and sought=to bring areas
of difficulty to the attention of the authorities, government decisionmaking
and follow-through was slow.
Hard lessons about the consequences of limited internalization were
learned. In large part, these were the result ofvacillating commitment to and
insufficient management of dle govemment's own reform efforL.
Overcowing resistanceto thze redistibutionof eco-nomic opportunities

The adjusunentprogram, partcularlyits attempts to reduce policyrents and
rent-seekling behavior and encourage a more equitable redistribution of
wealth, faced strong resistance in Burundi. This was especally true in the
areaofpublic enterprise reform, where entrenched interestshad developed
primarilyalong ethniclines. Public enterpriseswere sometmes usedas platforms for acquiring wealth and power, and their.reforn implied that these
prvileges would be relinquished. The slow pace of reform reflects the
strengths ofvested interests, which feared loss of employment and the emprgence of a small elite group of private owners or a return to the dominance
by foreign investors that prevailed before Independence. In fact, the transition from a strong, state-controlled system towvard more indirect macroeconomicmanagementbased onmarketsignals requireda profound change
of attitude. As Manguelle (1991) asks in his book on cultural adjutstment in
Africa, 'Why would all powerful civil servats accept the emergence and
accumulation of fortunes other than theirs when they have the means to
preventit?" Indeed, until 1991, some key ministers and senior civil servants
were purposefully undermining the reform process.
InAfrica the fluidity of the concepts ofgovernance and accou-tabilityof the interaction betwveen the individual andauthority (or sate)-has seem-
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orgovemnance

ingly lowered l (lit
yIat'
and has b)een a jt.cnhinal .impediniient to development. The govermnn anLt may Ihave till(riStillItmd;acd the lil-

portalnce ofIclCli ultll v''iahZlts Itlo ihe puce n (IIdirection Ctirpullic anlerprise refonn and to efrorts Lo create .1
allmore vibrant, piivuate sector, In nimrny
African COuntries, government, accninl;thiliijy Ils IlisloriQilly been lililitedt,
ditle primarily 1.o stltes' Inniteid ltgiVtilmlcy I'poWCIvc?i1li, diciatoily l)htwI!Cfn
traditional cEil socicmyand the nasccn tiisc.o'mocdern AIican silatesIs been
a primal)y determ-linant of'.his siluiation. Tlie new sl;tle appuralns responddci
to questions or its legitimacy by vaviding civil control-that. is, by redUcing
its accountability to braclitional lemn ts afsociety. This sumac filtther weakened the noti,on of a benevolent stare and oppornmintics Ibr citil accountability and allowed personral interest.s to developt, u sing tlie slatews *asourcc
of wealtli and power (Migdal 1988). At. times, public enterprises provideLd
the means for obtaining such ends. Personal interests iliat.developed wvitllin
state sectors are understandably WaIry of efforts thati call
.ranend to- thell,i
privileges and a moies accountnibclerdisutibuition orIsociety's wealth, all in
the name ofpprodtictive efliciency. Bir.tiigai (1991) highilgilis this pointin
aWorld Bank review: "One result. of this state-society strule is the fear by
government officials ofindependent economic power;When the sitat is the
primary route to acctimulation, rent-seeking becomes an iinpor tant basis for
weakh,1J keeping control of financial resourcesvultimately with1 ilie suite, but.
hanstringing efficient production" (p. 31).
Tlhe political cliiniate of Burundi also had an impact on the success of:
refonn efforts. During the early refomi phase of the program, both fiscal
and public enterprise refomns suffered from destabilization in the country
when, under PresidentBagaza, restrictivepolicies toward individual freedoms
clashed with thie views of the Catholic church, major sociopolitical groups,
and donors. Consequently, the government's comnmitment Lo implementing the reform program waned. The Thlird Republic, instated in Septemnber
1987 under President Buyoya, had to contend with die tensions inherited
from the previous regime. The ethnic violence that erupted in August 1988
had a further destabilizing effect on the country,.relegating economic policy
considerations to tde back burner of national concemns and leading to a
reevaluation of the entire adjustnientprogram by-all actors.-the go'ernment,
the World Bank, the IRMF, and donors.
The lesson here is that in attemipting to restructure an economy--which
implies a redistribution of income and, alongwith it, power-a govemrment
mustrecognize notonly tde economic butalso dle social and political bondcs
that hold a society together. Ignoring these dimensions may limit the effectiveness of an otherwise well-planned refonn program. Policynmaklers should
not lose sight of the idiosyncratic nature ofAfrican states, since this can hold
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involvemient in produiciive

activities an(d ticir rehiactance to abandon them.
Reswrmrc transfers atd on.dUictialliev:
pan of the solutiion orpan of theprobWle'?
Adjustment support in the foml of extemnl financial aid can help alleviate
tihe transitional costs associated with an economy undergoirig structural refonns. But besides the beneficial aspects, several drawbacluk widt balance of

payments supports should be noted. First, itartificiafly boosts economic perfornnance-a sizable chunk of GDP growtlh being supported by foreign donor
financing-giving a false sense of extemal financial equilibrium. Second, it
can prevent adjuistment in the level and composition of the import sector.
Third, financialaid-can discourage governmentsfronm implementngreforni
policies aggressively, particularly if aid appears generous and forthcoming.
So after six years ofadjustmnent suppoirt what conclusions can be drawYn
about the benefits and drawbacks of'adjustnent lending in Burundi? The
findings suggest that overall resource transfers provided much-needed support for improving die country's financial equilibnium given the limits of
Burundi's economic potential, the extent of=its structural distortions, and
th'e inoppormune decline in world coffee prices. In retrospect, foreign aid to
Burundi has been generous. Total adjusktmentsupport (grants and loans) to
Burundi represented 13.S percent ofall official developmentassistance from
1986 to 1991 .4 In 1990 alone it was equivalent to as much as 22 percent of
foreign aid and constituted nearly 63 percent of foreignp echange receipts
from exports of all goods and .services. From l986 to 1991, adjustment supportaveraged 11 percent of imports of all goods and services, witlh a peak of
almost 18 percent in 1990. Durnng the first two;phases of the program, the
flact that Burundi notably increased its gross foreiggn reserves indicates that
during some periods it probably received more aid than necessary to maintaIn a minimum reserve level.Y Table 2.1 provides a summary of foreign aid
flows to Burundi during the adjustment period.
How does one measure the amount of external resources required to
offset balance of payments disequilibrium? One method1is to consider terms
of trade indicators. The impact of a countly's declining terms of trade can
be observed in a deteriorating external position. Depending on the methodology, the derived financing requirement can reflect commodity pnce
changes and therefore suggest levels of compensating external assistance.
That Burundi's export-to-import-price ratio had deteriorated during the adjustment period is clear: the terms of trade index in 1986 was 148 but registered only 70 in 1991. The effects of the drop' in world coffee prices is
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largely to blame. A simple calculation can help higlhlighit dic extent of the
change. Assuming di1aL coffee prices had remained at tileir 1986 prices, the
loss of foreign exchange revenuc (the difference betceen actual and assumed rev,enuie): comes to $316 million, or 27.5 percent of total official deassistance.
- velopnent
- Count eipartlfum Foreign' exchange received in the fonn of adjustment..
financing is made avilable to the economy for purchases of iMportedgoods,
which in turn generates local currency, or counterpart funds, for"govemnent

use. One of the problems ti.atarise from allocating counterpartfunds throuigh the public sector is that scarce domnestic resources can be freed up for purposes contrAry to die overall thrtust of an adjustment program. One of the.
main goals of die prog-am.in Burundi was to reduce die role of government
in the economiiy while promoting private sector development Yet counterTable 2.1 Indicators of external financing. 1980-91
1980- 198685
91

198091

191.9

163.6

ndkwor.

1986

1987

1988

1989

Net offidal development
a.istance(US$milions)

160.1

214.6

157.2

179.1 2122 228.4 135.2

1990: 1991

Percentage of exports

121.5 128.4. 161.9 148.5 210.9 271.6 1453. 173.8
13.3 . -19.0
14.5 16.4
19.1. 19.4- 13.2 16.9
43.3 30.6 .33.5 38.5 40.4 30.4 36.6
33.1

Percntage of GDP
Percapita($)
Stnijca adjusmnent

159.615.1
33.5

(percentage)
Of development

assistance
Of ,jorts(gnfs)
Of imports(gnfs)
Of GDP
CurrentaccountItDP.
exd. gr -s
Current account/GDP.
ind. grants
Fsca1'defcit(0P.
exd. grnt
Fsca deficitGDP,
ind. grants.
Terms oft-ade
(1980=100)
Netreserve
Grss reservesb
-Not

applimble.

15.1 . 11.0

8.1
8.7
5.9
1.3

35.9.
13.6
35

-8.6

-17.9

0.1

-8.6

-8. -16.8

13.4
28.3
12.0
L8

22

-14.5. -143

-20.8

-18.1

-6.0

16.4
8.0
2.1

-4.5-

13.8
30.4

-

-13.8

15.7

-14.7

-2.7

-53

-4.3

-4.9

-9.7 -12.9

-9.2.

-12.6

-11.4

-12.0

--

3.0

-5.1

-12.9

-8.8

-2.7

-4.7

-0.9

-8.6.

-5.9

-7-2

147.8

92.2
1.7
2.3

97.4
1.6
2.9

80.8
3.1
52

645
2.1
3.9

702. 102.4
3.1
1.7
5.5
2.4

92.1
23
3.9

97.3

23
3.4
Ii.

a. Gross disburso.ents.
b. Inmonths of impovls (goods and nonfactor servic
:..urce Goverrncert of Burndi.
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palL runds replaced local financing Frr development projects and permitted.
die goverment to finance public enterprise subsidies and militay expenditures (increasing nondevelopm ental expenditres). Counterpart fun also
encouraged additional investmients by the government and crowded out
private sector investment opportunitice Finally, tariffs for many public serviceswere maintained below long-nmi
arginal costs, dueinpartto the large
auountof external resources available to finance theworkingcapital ofpublic
enterprisesand the budget deficit. Itwasnot until late l989 thatso
iepublic
service tariEs (for example, uwater, electricity, and transportation) were adjusted. BecauLse theywvere subscidized bythe government, private sector entry
into these services was precluded. One possible solution is to attach conditionalities to using counterrt funds orintroue mechanisms for channelginthe funds directly to the private sector Writhout adequate attention to
how counterpart funds are used, there is the risk ofnullifying the potentially
positive impact of otherreform measures on economic growth and the quality of public serVices.
es.Another po tential problem with the offical lending proGmdiotio
cess pertains to the number and effectiveness of conditionalities. The experience in Bumrndi indicates thatlDAstructural adjustment credi tsprobably
contained an excessive number of conditions, that some were notmonitorable, and thatmany were worded in such a iay that their meaning
was left to differinginterpretations. Structral adjustmentcreditl contained;
45 conditions and structural adjustnent credit II contained 94.6Becaise the
wording of the conditions was at dimes unclear, reform was difficult-as was
made apparentin the case ofpublicenterpnsereform Conditions werevaguue
and centered almost exclusively on the initiaton of the liquidation procesand related studies. Few concrete actions or mechanisms vere everproposedon how the recommendations contained in the studies should be imple
mented. Furthemore, certain conditionalitiesareinherentlymore difficult
to monitor and en force than others.
The large number of conditionalities also led to problems for theWorld
Bankat the supervisory stage. In structural adjustment credit IL the number
ofconditionalities and their dispersion across sectors required thatmiSsionsc
be large enough to accommodate many ex-perts. The lack of World Bank
expertise in certain areas covered by conditionalities (partckularly public
enterprise, civil service reform, and the social action program) required
managing a sizable number of consultants whose advice was sometimes contradictory. E-xperience hasshown that conditions ofadjustmentloans.should
be limited and proritized for effective implementation. The next phase of
the govrem ents adjustmentprogram has attempted to apply these lessons
by restricting the number and nature of its conditions.
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Encoutagingwore effective coordinationJ amonig drnrsi
At the ouLset of the program, donor coordination was largely effective since
much of the cofinancing was of ajoint nature-financing from donors was
managed by the World Bank. Some problems did arise from the absence of
a link between adjwstment objectives and those objectives pursued-in the
contest of donor-financed project aid. Under the second phase, however,
cofinancing was parallel and was organized under the special program of
assisance for AErica Here donors administered their own financing buWt
respected ie conditionality agreements and dicbursementschedules ofthe.-WTorldBank. Furthermore, the reform agendawas sign ifcantly more ambitious than during the first phase. and more cofinuanciers were involved. TLhie
increased scope of the program and the grater need for-participation by,the donor communitywras compounded by thegoernmrent!slack of experience and ownership. For eammple, because the government did nut discussc
the public investnent or public expenditure programs regularlyuwith other
donors until early 1991. project design andfinancingremained largely "supply-driven," and in some cases, were inconsistent with macroeconomic or
sectoral objectives. The lackl of coordinaion also led to a high level of foreign assistance to Burundi, financig imports and favornng micreased demand
at the expense of economic stabilization.
The donor community played an important role in financing noniable
investments in the industial sector. lowering the technical efficency of
enterprises and increasing the capital inten.sityofinvesmenL For exnample,
in the case of the Moso Sugar Companyintemse lobbving by overseas equipmentproducers to finance related investmentcdouded economic and fnancialjudentL While most of the donors have exerted their influence more
carefuly since the late 1980s, the problem resurfaces occasionally.
W'hile it is probable that the problems associated -with poor coordinahon among donors could have beenalleviatedhad thegovernmentazumed
greaterowstnership ofthe adjustnmentprogram, thegovemmentis noteniirelW
guilty in this area-the IMiF and the World Bank-.have also found it difficult
to reach a consensus about the ex-tent of the adjustment program. For instance, as structnral adjustment credit 1H was being prepared, the macroeconomic framewvork- proposed by the World Bank was rejected by the IMF
as being too optimistic Midway, through the program, the opposite was true-;
*Thetwo institutions did not always discuss the potential tradeoffi between
the .stabilization and strucural adjustmentmeas-ures adequatelv. The IMFs
emphasis on revenue enhancement sometimes had an unintended impact
on private sector development; and the reform of the transactions tax recommended by the IMF did notaccotnt fully for
farifrefonn initiated at the
advice of the WorldBank. IMF program monitoring ceased at the end ofthe
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three-yeatr arrangement in December 1989, which also contribtted to fisca l
and exchange rate policv slippages.
The lesson lhere is that effective donor coordination, particularlv in a.n
aid-dependent country suci as Burundi. is an essential element for the successful implementation of a reform program.. With die tllird phase of die
progrm., an attempt is being made to improve die coordination process
among all donors to ensuire diat macroeconomic stabiliztiaon accounts sufficiently for the econom s .supply-side and private sector requirements, and
that project aid supports economic policy refonus. Several areas are targeted
for greatercoordination and greater transparenc. phasing out tied balance
of payments assistance to support die open gerneralized litensing system for
imports, creating conmmon management o[counter
t funds and reaching
agreement on :their allocation each year, imposing a momtoriLim on= the
financing ofnewv public investment in productive sectorsiand applying minimum economic rates of return systematically for all other public investment, implementing a harmonized approach to private sector development. and developing a coordinated strategy for dealing with the social
aspects of developmentL
-Improving
programtdesigi: die importanceof macro-micro Iinkgn

Thus far, the supply responsce under the adjustment program has been less

than anticipated-due largely to mixed signals from the government to the
private sector and to the rigidities that still prewail in the large public. enterprise sector. The core of.the problem. howvever, is deficiencies in program
design introduced at the start of the reform process.
A major limitation of the reforms was that they did notadequately address the linkage betwveen the macro (broad) scope of policies and the niicro (institutional) elements thatwere being targeted. Program policiesspolke
of ultimate goaLs thatwere to be achieved and offered broad instruments for
attaining them, but thev failed to account for second-generation (downstream) constraints that arose during impleinentation. For example. the
deregulation ofinterest rates (a macroeconomic policy) sought to improve
access to savings and credit but actually liberalized the financial sector be-,
cause of the indu-stry's high rate of concentraton and limited competiton
(a microeconomic problen). Similarly, macroeconomic policies on exchange
rates or price deregulation. wthich attempted to set the conditions [or liberalizing several sectors, wrere partly defeated by the quasi-monopolistic position ofpublic enterprises in these sectors (armicroeconomic issue), creating
mark;et distortions and impeding the supply response.
In the area ofprivate sectordevelopment, macroeconoomicprescriptions
(devaluation, and the:removal of quantitative restrictions and official price

Published by iRepository, 2021

-

https://ir.iba.edu.pk/faculty-research-books/13

24

Aju,I-SmwTr INAFRICA: LrN*osS FROM CousrnwY CASE S1uDiJIS

controls) proved insutficient for generating the desired supply response.
Wlhile tlese reforms coild.liave improved thc general business.enironmnent,
* dCpdt and extent or the reform and its long-tenn sistainability were
thc
questionable beckuse supportive measures (siticI as improvPed utlining in vital
business skills) were lacking. The importance of intersectoral linkages uwasignored. In the agricultural sector thisiwas particularIly trujewhere lieavyptublic
involVementand policy constraints remained. For example, littlc attention
wras given to organizational problems that impeded.productivity, stucl as die
poor quality of extension and tlie absence of improved agricultural inputs.
Consequlently, some %riable opportunities for the private sector failed tomaterialize. This problem is beginning to be addressed, for example, in die
coffee sector, dtrough privatization efTorLs.
The lesson hereis tdatsupply rcsponse isa function ofeffecti,e progr
design and an enabling macroeconomic environment One possible solution for achieming a more coherentand ellective program design, and estabi
lishing the link between policies and otitconies, is to introduce intermediate
targets,improve the coverage ofindicators (a more timely. detailed,and broad
data base), and reie%w iniplemenration and performance more frequently.
The design and implementation of the adjustment program
The sociopolitcil situation in Blurundi during the late 1980s played an inportant role in determining the formulation and the subsequentiuplemenration of the government's program. The sociopolitical dimnate during the
initial phase of the program was marked by tension, and, for the most part,
the reform agendawsm prepared by World Bank and IMF staffw%vith minimal
particpation from the government. The second phase of die refonn program *<wS ilegouated with a new and inexperienced leadership, and adherence to theprogram waCfurtlier undermined by ethnic fighting thaterupted
in 1988. The delicate sociopolitical situation contributed to the government's
initial lack of ownership, hampering the effectivteness ofreform design and.
implementation, and ultimately the success of the program.
Given the extent of tie financial- disequilibrium in Burundi prior to
adjustment and the nature of the structural distortions in the economy, the
program spelled outmacroeconomic reforms in the areas offiscal and monetarypolicy, exchange rate management, and pnce and external trade liberalization. Sectoral reforms were also designed for factor markets, financial
sector liberalization, public enterprises, the regulatory friamework, and social sector policies. For each area, this section presents the general setting
prior to the introduction of the reforms, outlines their design, and describes
die extent of their implementation.
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rs-cal lity azntd mjanagem-ent
Setting.At the onset ofadjustnent. the government was unable to contain

expenditures in general and nondevelopmentail expenditures in particular.
Ils institutional arrngements for bidget preparation and public expenditure
progr,namming were weak, and the .cvi service and the number o [administrative units within the.ininistries were bloated. Tlle fiscal situation was exacerbated bvyunstable colFee prices.-asectoroftiajorimportance to governient
revenue. On the expenditure side,recurrentcosts were underfinanced, while=
spending on hIigher education (at the expense of primar, and secondary
levls) and on hlospitals wuas excessive. MIilitary expenditures wsrere also high .

(about3 to 4percent of GDP).,and extemnaldebt from capital ex:penditures
on military items (generally outside the budget) represented another 3 to 4
percenL Direct and indirect subsidies to public enterprises further drained
tie budget, usually in the forn of elevated debt service-payments. And the
inefficiency ofinrlvsestments in publicprojectsgenerated operating deficts that
had to be covered partially by die budgeL Restoring sustainable economic
growth and dhe viabilitv of Burundi's financial equilibrium and external
position thus necessitated reducing the budget deficit significantly and improving the composition and quality of public expenditures.
Reforms. The first phase of the program introduced three public expenditure policies. First, tde governmentagreed to reduce the size of the public
investment program, but aLso to maintain allocations to the major sectors
(notably agriculture). It sought to conform to an invesmnent plan compatible with die availabiliy of resources and stabilization requirements,-and to
make foreign financing con cessional or grant-based Some measures sought
to reduce the scope of the large Moso Sugar Company project and to iin
prove its projected rate of return. Second, in the area of budgetary reform,
the government agreed to merge its ordinary budget and its extraordinary
budget into a unified budget systemri, dearlyidentifing and separating current revenue, current expenditures. and capital expenditures.financed by
both the budget and foreign aid. It also agreed to prepare a rolling threeyear public expenditure program, which included recurrent and capital
expenditures for each agency. Finally, to improYe capacity building the gov,emnment sought to strengthen the agencies responsible for preparing the
annual budgetattthe ministry of finance, and to establish asystem formonitoring proJect implemnentation.
The second phase continued to focus on the same three areas. Since
several ofthe measures of structural adjustment creditI hadnotbeen implemented sufficiendy, they wvere carried over into the next operation. Instru-
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ments for more effective and transparent budget execution and public expenditure progranming were set in place, again including a rolling threeyearpublic investment program forrationalizing public.minestment, satisfactorypubli e-xpenditure programs for fourmajorsectors (health, education,
agriculture, and transport), the consolidation of a unified budget, and a
:project monitoring system. In June 1991 the government prepared an action plan to enliance the efficency of the civil senice while limiting the creation of newpositions- to the social sector In the third phase, the govermentis seeking to increase the fundingof investment-related recurrentcosts
and to promote quality basic senices, thus improving the composition of
public expenditures.
Impekmentatio The size and structure of the public investment program
improved considerably under adjustment. The rolling three-year public investment program has now become an official implementation tool for investmentprogrammingand is adopted each year by the counrcilofministers.
The public investment progran process has helped scale down the size of
projects and promote more realistic sectoral objectives that recognize resource and debtservice conlstraints. The project selection process must still
be strengthened, however, since the government doesnotcosistently apply
the minimum rate-of-return cnterion in selecting project.
About three-quarters of capital expenditures in the public investment
programs go to economic infrastructure--30 percent to roads and between
30 and 40 percent to tie rural sector. Social infastructure receives between
10 and13 percentofinvestmenis, primanrlyforhealthand education. Within
current expenditures. maintenance costs are substantially underfinanced.
In agriculture, which accounts for 60 percent of underfinancing. large neglected items include the maintenance of livestock-infrastructure, and forestrY and irrigation facilities. Shortfalls in the health sector represent about
14 percent of the total underfinancmg. and include utilities, medicines,
equipment, and vehicles. Underfinancing of road maintenance represents
16 percent, and the remaining 10 percentisspread across othersectors&Yet
the overall sectoral composition of expenditures has improved. Relatively
large public investment projects in the productive sectors have gradually
shifted toward smaller investments targeted pmlyatimproving the qlitv of social services.
-Therationalization ofpublic excpenditures was delayedby the absence of
public expenditure-programs- In 1989 and 1990 World Bank staff-and resident technical adviserswere obliged to prepare the public expenditure programs, indicating that appropriate technical assistance had not yet been
identified. Onivin 1991 vasa harmonizedmethodologyvforpreparingpublic expenditure programs adopted. Until recentlygovernmen ex-penditures
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were insufficiently restructured, revealing a weak commitment to reducing.
public expenditures and dte poor management of counterpart funds generated from the substantial amount of balance of payments support received
from extemal donors. Thewage bill vas excessivein relation to expenditures
on goods and services, compromising the quality ofrapidly expanding public services. The accumulation of large counterpart funds by the npblic sector undermined one ofthe principal goals of the program-to reduce the role
.ofthe state in the economy. Counterpart funds replaced local financing for
developmentprojects, permittng the government to allocate freed-up local
resources.to finance public enterprise subsidies and militry expenditires.
Recurrent costs were.also not budgeted adequately. Thus,-some existmig assets have deteriorated rapidly and require expensive rehabilittion,.a'
project that could have been avoided had mtenance cost been budgeted
regularly. Donor policies that generally precude aid financig of recurrent
costs have encouraged rehabilitation ovtermaintenance. Another reason for
low recurrentbbudgets is that investments are sometimes selectedwithout sufficient recognition of the capacity of the government or users to assume
maintenance costs.
The managementofpublicdebthasalso beenan importantpartofpublic
expenditure reform. Burundi's external debtpoliy since 1986 has been to
contract loans exclusively. on concessional terms. Nevertheless, because investments financed by previous borrowings did-not generate the -necessary
receipts to cover the correspondingdebtservice, andbecause the vorld price
for coffee sharply decined, servicing obligations are.nowmore than 40 percentofforeign exchange eanings.Thelargenumber of public expenditures
created in the late 1970s and early 1980s has now become a significantburden, impairing Burundi's future borrowing capacity. But improvementhas
been notecEaverageloan terms have fLllen from5.4percentin l982 toabout
:1.0 percent in 1990, while the grant element has increased from 35 to-7:
percent for the same period- Despite the successive devaluations of the
Burundi franc which wforsen the external debt burden,. the government
continues to service its foreign debt obligations on schedule.
The budgetreform process progressed satisfactorily once an vIFadviser
was named in Tuly 1989. A unified budget.was.adopted in 1992, combining.
all central government expenditures, whether financed with domestic or
externalresources.Howvever,previous.efforts to tacklebudgetreform and:to
strengthen the capacity of the ministries of finance and planning metwiith
little success. High staff turnover in the administration during 1986-89 negatively affected reform implementation as it did training for preparation of
the public expenditure programn component. Implernentation was also delayed because reform called forsubstantial changes in theway sectoral ministrieswere to program theirexpenditures. Foreign technicalassistance,which:
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was to tadvise and facilitate the reform procesis, afailed to adequately play its
trainer role and oftcn secmed to operate outside the context of the administration. The consolidation ofall budgetary autlhority under die ministry of
Finance in 1992 (which wasl previously shared with tde ministy of planning)
has been a major institutional improvement. butin practice much needs to
be done to improve buidget preparation.
The govertment has been successful in revenuc collection, leav.ing little
room for further revenue increases withoutjeopardizing productive sectols.
The volume of noncoffee receipts rose in real terms fronm FBu 9.3 biliton in

1983-85 to FBtu1 1.4billion in 1987-90. This growth is essentially due to the
transaction tax reform, an increase in indirect taxes on beer and nonalcohEolichbeverages, and an expansion fthestatistia tax base.D evaluations have
also enhianced revenue from import taxes, despite tariff reductions. (For a
discussion of taxation, see box 2.2.)
Under the third phase of die reform program, measures in public resource management have already been introduced, such as the consolidation ofafl budgeayauthorityumder the ministry offinance Samisfictorv 1.99294 public expenditLure progr.ms covering agricultuLre. education, health, and
tra
rtand representing about 80 percent of public expenditures, havre
now been completed The publicinvestmentprogram is being revised to inm-provetrnsparency in the breakdown offinaucing among loans, grants, and
public savings. In May 1992 the government established an interministerial
commission to supervise the public investment program process. and to ensure thatnew criteria for project evaluation and selectaon are applied-that
is, that projects provide a 10 percent internal rate of return, help alleviate
povertyiand generate employmenLtMeasures to curtailpublic expenditures
are already under way. including plans to reduce subsidies to public enterprises, curtail nondevelopmental recurrent expenditure, and monitor civil
service recruitment
'MonetaryPolicy

Stting. Prior to adjustment, the monetary sector reflected the dirigiste
spproach adoptedby the govemment-overregulationandinterestrates that
: failed to reflect the supplyand demand formoneyand provide, thenecessay
incentives for pritvte investment. Monetary and credit policies depcnded
primarily on the evolution of the budget defidt and the coffee sector, which
absorbed more than 30 percent of total credit and generated large oscillations in money supply. Since 1931 broad monev increased im line with the
trend in nominal CDP (about 10 percent annually). World Bank credit to
parastatals rose significantly in the early 1980s; credfit to the private sector
(other than parastatals) declined by 25 percent in the same period. Despite .
an arry of monetary and credit policy instruments in the early 1980s, govPublished by iRepository, 2021
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emment budgetary policies were expansive and the level ofdomestic liquidity high. Interest rates were finally dianged in August 1986, after re maining
the same in nominal terns since October 1981.

Reforws. Monetary reforn sought to reduce inflation, strengthen the
balance ofpaynments, and promote resource mobilization through stable real

Box 2.2 Investment incentives and marginal eectivet

rates

Taxation plays a dual role in the Burundi economr it generates revenue needed
to support govrnment spending consistcntwith macroeconomic stability and it
influences production decisions by creating a wedge between social (c onomic).;

and private,-returns on investments. Tax cxemptions affectcompetition and elflciency.Although tax collection isadequate, thesystemnofdirecttaationinllunindi
has been found to distortinvestmentdecisions The issue athand is the impactof
Various taxes on incentives. On avre
during the adjustment period, receipts
from corporate income tax and other taxes accounted Cr only about 14 percent
of total tax revenue, implyingmthat there isscope forreformingcorporate taxation
Mei!hout creating significant>

fiscal losses.

What is the general tax situation in Burundi? First, implementation of the tax,
code is uneven. Exemptions are unevenly applied, and administration is weak. A
pattern of tax evasion and uneven implementation of the fiscal provisions is C.videnLThesedistortions canaffectdeciionLstoinvestin capitalassets,Thenetiimpact: '
of these taxes can be quantified in the marginal effective tax rate,which is definea
as the difference between -the gross of tax and thc net of tax real returns to. an
investment, expressed as a prcertage of the gross return. The higherlthe marginal effective tax rate, the higher the rate of effective taxation becomes. The
primary goal of tbe marginal cffictive tax rate analysis is to describe the overall
effects ofa tax system on marginalinvestmentincentives In a recentstudy Zodrow
(1990) rusing marginal effective tax rates, has shown that (i) debt financing is
fav-ored overequit financing, particularly wbere thereis inflation andwhere assecs appreciate slowly, (ii) trade taxes on capital goods significantly lower capital
income and discourage investment; and (iii) taxation of rcalized nominal capital
gains raises effective taxation on investments financed with retained earnings.
Duringa recentdialoguewidithe private ,sector, thegovermnentwasxmade aware
of the'problems causced by the distorted and heavy tax burden and indicated its'
willingness to reforrn the tax system. The basic thusLt of reforms should be the
developnent of a tax regime thatdocs not favorcertain activitiesoverothers (tariffs and the imnestment code already serIe
that pnose)
seie tat
urpoe -1I fact, some reforms
have already been implemented by the government following IMF recommendations. Among the anticipated reforms are (i) a lowerrate of corporate income tax
,tohelp attract new investments; (ii) a revision of the turnover and dividend tax;
(iii) a reduction in the capital gains tax; (iv) simplification of the rental income
tax system; and (v) rcversal of the tax-exemptstatus ofgovermment securities as it
tends to distort the interest rate structure.
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targets forcredit to

interestrates. The policy fiamework papers setmonetary

the econoniyand govenmmenL Thle intermlediate objective ofnmonetazy policy
was to control broad money (M2=).Total domestic credit wms to decline by
16.9 percentin 1986 and 16.1 percentin 1987, grow by 1.4percentin 1988,
and fall agin -by 15 percent in 1939 (table 2.2). These figLures essentially rtflected a contracdon in credit to the govermuent (prinmarily to public enterprise.s), which was to fal by 20 percent on average from 1986 to 1988. The
Table 2.2 Program targets and actual performance, 1986-91
1986
1987
1988
1989
- 1990.
Indicator

Prog.

AcL

Ping. AcL

Prog.

Ac.

Ping.

3.3

4.0

5.5

4.0

4.9

4.5.

1.8

9.0

7.1

8.0

4.5

5.0

11.7

-16.9

-2.6 -16.1

4.9

1.4

8.7 -15.0

4.9g

-23.5

-6.2 -226 3.3

Pecenrngegrwth
GDP
4.0
consumer
pnices
10.0
Dorniesdc

crdie
-menlt

14.3 -115

AcL

Prg.

1.5 -%5.
4.5

-12.7

.

-1991

*AL. htg.

AcL

3.5

4.6-

4.9-

7.0

4.0

8.9

12.1

..

-B.2

..- 4.9

a4

PrivatE.
sector

-Eport
volume
Import
volume

6.6

33

6.5

0.2

15.6

12.9

-

5.0

10.7

5.3 -7.4

5.4

13.4

6.4

-5.7

5.7. 0.8

4.0

-5.4

14.4

.

17.2

..

17.7

-0.1

-8.4

8.1

-5.8

4.8

16.7

9.5

-7.2

7.3

203

4.1

93

.

As parentage of GDP (unless noted otherwise)
Current
account
dekice
-3.4 -8.6 -6.5 -17.9 -7.0 -14.5 -[8.I -14.3 -17.6 -20.8 -17.4 -18.2
Debt sernice
rabo'
163
Govemment.

revenued

19.2

21.7

19.6 49.0

193 36.4 39.8 462 32.9 45.4 322 32.2

15.3

17.6 13.5

16.0

15.4 21.4

18.1

19.2

15.7 (9.2

16.8

Governmnt
* penlthee

Overall
defi-i
Fixed
investment
Private
- Pubic
Domestic
savings

23.4 23.8 24.0 30.4 22.8 26.6 30.5 -27.8
6.4 -16.8

A.1

-8.5

15.7
2.
29
128

14.0 19.2 20.9
2.6. 5.7 4.5
11.4 135 16.4

7.2

1.1

7.1

6.9

-6.6 -(1.2
19.8
6.9
12.9

15.1 20.1
1.77 . 4.
13.4 I5.5

7.4

1.6

Notavailable.
a. Expressed as percentage of beginning.-opernod money stodc
b. Including grants.
c Ratio of debt sewvce to expors of goods and nortaor services.
d. Excfudin grants.
t Total expenditure.

COn'a comrnmient basis and ex:luding grts.

Saurce: World Bait and 1M F data; Government of Bundi..:
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3.5

-9.6

24.

-7.0 -13.A

-5.0 42A

16.9 21.5
1.9 4.8
15.0 16.2
3.3

291.2

26.2 29.1

5.0

1B.4 21.5
2.8 5.1
15.7 15.9
-2.6

16.7
2.5
14.2

5.2. -2.1

-
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aim was tO make credit available lo tdic private sector, with credit growth
targeted. to increase by 9.6 percent on ave-age over the s;me period.'
I- mement afio.L The governmenm's monetary policy was passive and conservative under the adjustmnent program. Creditpolicies fell soniewliatshort
of expectations, althouglh the overall trend was in keeping with tC objectives of the program.. Overall credit to the economy fell in 1986 by. 2.6 percent, then dimbed by 7.8 percent betveen 1987 and 1991- (Lable 2.3). -Despite the expansion, most of the increase reflected additional credit to the
private sector, not to the government. Credit tO the governmentrCell by 6.7
percent; creditto the private sectorincreased by 10.9 percentI The supply of
broad money (M2) maintained steady bit slow growth over the period, increasing by8.3 percent. In real tenns, however, creditand moneysupplywerestagnant fronm 1986 to 1990.

Overall, the real money supply was held in check and-helpedi keep n-flation low during the late 1980s. But the failure to -furthercut the level of
credit to the government was due primarily to greater than expected fiscaldefcits, and net credit to the government exceeded agreed upon targeLs,

which in the initial phase of the adjustment program crowded out credit
available to the private sector. Butsince 1988, credit to the private sector has
piclked up considerably.
Deposit and borrowing real interest rates generally remained positive.
Re.strictions oninterestrateshave progressivelybeen removed,and mostbankl
deposit rates and loans are now "proximawely determined by mark-et conditions" (IMF 1992a). The structure of the central bank's refinance rates has
been simplified since May 1991, anda uniform rate.of 10 percenthas been
applied- The monthly auctions of treasury cerdficates, introduced in 1988,
provide a benchmark for the mark-et-based determination of interestIrates.
Table 2.3 Summary of monetary indicators, 1986-91
(onnualpercentae diongeg unlessnotedotherwise)
indicator

1986

1987

1988

1989

-2.6
-6.2
I 1..
-0.4
3.3

4.9
3.3
0.8
1.4
0.2

8.7
-115.

. 4.9
-t2.7
3.4
2.0
14.4

5.4
1.7
0.19

1.5
9.3

1990

1991

Credirt w
-Eeonany.
Govemment
Public enterprises
Coffee sector
Prvate sector
Money and quasimoney(M2)
NorninalGDP
M2/GDp'
.

.

4.6
-1.1
0.18

72
5.0
12.9

.

0.18

a.Annual change as peretage or beginning-d-pernd broad money.
b.Ratio o M2 toGDP.
Source:. Gevemmentof Bunndi.
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12.1
13.7
0.17

.

12.A
-8.2
3.0
4.1
172.
133
9.5
0.18

8.4
-4.9

-4.4
3.1
17.7
12.9
12.7
0.17
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Financial savings increased substantially duiiing the program, albeit fri-om an
initially low biase. Teiinn deposits rose by 143 percent between 1986 and 1989,
compared witih 22 percent. between 1982 and 1986. The best. performnance
was registered by the rural savings cooperatives, whose deposits increatsed by
nearly 600 percent between 1986 and 1988.
GoveimmenL stuppor-t for public enterprises is one reason tiaL putblic
sector credit continues unabatled, with a relatively small share going to LteC
private sector. Benefiting from large indirectsubsidies, publicenterprises havc
accumulated cash reserves that in turn give theni much borrowing power widh
domestic bankls. Thie fact diat until early 19g1 banls were able6to lend to public
enterprises virtually risk-free impeded privaLc secLor aiccess to credit for pro
ductive investmiienes. The third phase of the adjustment program calls for a
more radical approach to public enterprise reforn meascures for privatizing
public enterprises (or reliabilitating or liquidating, them) and a-subceiling oncaedit to public enterprises. These reforms should increase tlheavailability-of
credit to tie private sector and create a more growtii-oriented credit policy.
Exchange rate mnanagemtent
Settng. At the onset of adjustment, Burundi faced an external financial
disequilibrium and deteliorating international price competitiveness. Froni
:1976 to April 1992, the country had a fixed exchange rate system, whereby
the FBu was first pegged to the U.S. dollar and later to die special drawing
right (SDR).9 By 1986, despite continuous deterioration of itscurrentaccount
and an inflation level above those of its trading partners and SDR basket
currencies, the government had notdevalued the FBu since its initial peg to
the SDR in 1983. Furtlermore, by being linked to the SDR, Burundi's currency fluctuated with the U.S. dollar against otlher currencies as it appreciated to unprecedented levels in 1984 and 1985.10 Betveen 1980 andJune
1986, the real effective exchange rate of the FBu appreciated by 23.6 percenL Equallyimportantwas that the exchange rate had evolved independent
of developments in Burundi's economy, but was tied instead to economic
nolicies that were pursued in industrial states, primarily the United States.
The central bank authorized all payments abroad and received all foreign
exchange. Commercial bank-s were prohibited from trading in foreign currencies and-were required to apply to the central bank to make external
payments. In addition to the official-exchange mechanism, foreign exchange
was also traded substantially on theparallel (black) markeet, comprising border
trade, smuggling, and gold exports and trading.'1
Refornm Reform sought to improve the competitiveness of nontraditional exports and import substitution activities by promoting a return, to ex-
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and an efficienU alalocation of rcsources. In the mecdiu

to long term, the exchange rate can conipensaew for a iising demand in orl-

eign exclhange when the current accountLis liberalized and lower taiffs arcf
adopted. A country with large current. account deficits and signifcalnt. conpensatory.capital flows (hlichl are not sustainable in Ltle long ru-tn) can use
devaluation to maintain equilibriuimii between supply and demand foi- foi-.
eign excliange. Exchange rate adjustment (under the domain of tihCe IMF)
and successive devaluations wvere made throughlout the refoni peiiod in
conjunction With thie World Bank-supported strictural adjustment credits..While devaluations were tiggered to promote overall coipetitveness, they
iwere necesslwy in the latter part of die l 980s Lo compensate for the fall in
world coffee prices-and die telrms Of trade loss. The=coffee sector incurred:
losses because domestic production, processing, and transportation costs ex-.
ceeded tihe international sales price. In the absence of measiures to cut domestc cosLs direcdty (the; government rejected a reduction in producer
prices on political grounds), devuaton was required. Devaluation was also
encouraged to facilitate the eventual move to convertibility. The move to an
open general license for goods, Utansportation, and insurance iva planned
to liberalize service payments
d to stimulate the development of nontraditional exports.'3

-

Impkemntatio By 1987 the real effective exchange rate had returned to
its 1980 level (table 2.4). Further devaluations followed, enhancing Burundi's
competitiveness. By 1990 the' real effective exchange rate had declined by
another 28 percent (IMF 1992b). Froin 1986 to 1991, 25 exchange rate adjustnents helped realign the overvalued FBu, leading.to a nominal effective
devaluation of 40 percent and a real effective devaluation of about 33 percent in relation to the SDR..
One method for gauging the effectiveness of the devaluations&is an effectiveness index, defined as the cumulative ex post clasticity of the real effective exchange iate to the nominal effective exchange rate for different
periols after the devaluation (Frenkel ard Klein 1992). Aratio of T one"would

Table 2.4 Real effective exchange rates, 1980-9 1
(1 980= 100)

Item

.

Real efleciive exchange rate
Terms of trade
Resource balance
(percentage of GDP)
Consrant
Current
Source; Government of Bunundi.
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1986

1987

1988

1989

1990

1991

116.4
102.4 -147.8

99.8
922

87.9
97.4

89.1.
80.8

77.4
64.5

77.8
70.2

-11.6
-15.8

-9.6.
-13.4

-6.6
-13.5

-9.6
-20.3

.-8.6
-t183

1980-85

1273

-11.4
-14.0

-11.4
.4-l0.5
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sh1ow tlihtt a nonlandl devaluation has translated rully into a real dev,alutation;
an index ofr zero" would indicate the total erosion orthc nominal devaluation hy inflation. Burtndi's efrectiveness index was 0.76 f[or tlec 12 mnonths
followingjuly. 1986. 0.49 ror the 12 niontlhs following March 1988, and 0.15
for the 12 inonils following December 1989. Thuls, on-halrto three-fouirtlhs
f the inagnittde of the devaluation effectively translated into tlh real exchlange r-ate. Devaluations dicd not trigger price rises slfficient, to cancel outmulch of their effect.
The imptct of the devaluations on bilateratl exclhange M.tes (a measure
of Buruncdi's competi]tivenress it inivindual trade partmers) varied conside:rnably. From 1985 to late 1989, the FBu depreciated in real termns b113.
percent to the dollar, 40.1 percent to the deutsche miar k, 46 pecent to thie
yen. and 38.9 percent to dthe Frenclh fr-anc (Frenklel and Klein 1992; IMF
I1992b). Table 2.5 shows dite proportion of trade wYitl arious-countries. Yet
the magnitude of the real depreciation coinpared to regional trading partners was less, essentially because sich countriesas Tanzania and Kenya also
devaltted their own currencies. However, Burtundi's devaluations at least
prevented what.would have othernise been anr excessive appreciation of the.
FBu in relation to regional trading partners. The zaire and Rwadese franc
depredated in real terms.

Table-23. Direction of trade, 1984-90
(percentage oftctd trade)
Regonrorcounty
Exports
Africa
Zaire
.Keya
Rwanda
Asia
Europe

.

Germany
France
North America

Others
Imports
Africa

Zambia
XEnYa:
Zimbabwe
Asia
-

Europe

.

-

.

Gernmany

France.

.
Belgium/Luxembourg
-North America
-Others
Source: Govemment of Burundi.
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1984

.1985

1986

1987

1988

1989

1990

7.8
1.6
3.5
1.4
6.4
81.8
34.1
0.3
1.6

8.0
1.3
135
2.8
3.082-0
54.5

7.6
1.5
1.4
2.1
2.3
80.9
53.6
1.7
6.7

188.2
29
3.3
5.5
4.0
64.2
30.0
.6.7
7.5

7.8
3;
1.0
2.8
5.4
83.7
26.9
3.1
0.6

14.5
47
-6.5
1.8
5.1
72.5
15.2
6.4
7.3

8.8
- 312
2.2
1.0
2.2
76.9
13.7
9.6
11.7

2.4

.I0

2.5

6.1

2.4

0.6

-0.3

10.7
3.1
2.7
57.8

10.5
4.1
2.6
0.9

13.2
3.4
2.8
1.6

13.3
-2,4
3.0
2.2

12.0

22.8

26.8

27.3

25.7

273

60.0
11.8
9.8
19.1
S26
2.2

57.8
13.1

54.8
9.7

54.8
13.6

123

.2

16.8
2.7
2.0

15.5
3.7
2.4

53.7
12.9
9.9
14.5
1.5
5.6

2.6
1.9
3.4
1.8
29.9
49.7
8.8
14.0
IC.7
5.8
2.0

1-2
6.1

12,7
0.9
26.8
1.2
27.1
. 53.8
11.7
12.3
18.7
6.0
2.4

83
18.9
2.2
2.6.

.

2.8
.

2.5
2.5
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-Although these acdjusrtmients improved the comnpetitiveness of some tiraditional exports (hides) and nontraditional exports (fruits and vegetables,
garmients, rice, and tobacco), tlieydid not fully reflect the tenris of trade loss
incnrred from the decline in world coffee prices at the end of die decade.
Real depreciation w*as gre.ter against currencies of industrial countries than
againLsthtose of regional trading partners. Finally, exchange rateadjtustment
was linked miore to pressure from the Bretton Woods institutions thin to the,
government's own response to economic and financial constraints. The
government recognized these shortcomingss and requested l.MF asistance
to establish anew foreign exchange systenm that better reflected the pattern
of the country s international trade. As. a fornmal element of the extended'sructurid adjustment faciity program. a new scheme of nore automatic
exchange rate adjutmnents wasc put in place in April 1992. The FBu-is nowr
pegged to a trade-veighted basket of currencies. The peg is to be reviewed
dailyand'adjusted flexiblybased on movementsin keyvfinancial and economic
-indicators (for example, the evolution of monetary-and credit aggregates.
foreign exclhange reserves, trends in inflation,, trends in: nominal and real
effective ex-change rates, the parallel ex-change rate, and international coffee prices). This system provides the same degree of flexibility as a-floating
arrangement, but does notrequire mnajor changes in the organization of
Burunca* foreign exchange market. The arrangement takes into account
the imbalance in the paymenus and receipts of foreign exchange, and the
oligopolistic structure of the commercial banking system, which precludes
introducing an interbank mark-et at this juncture. 4 The latest significant
- change took place from April toJune 1992, when the FBu depred-ated by
about 11 percent (in foreign curreny terms) compared to the basket.
The ultimate success of a devaluation depends on its.impact on domectic inflation, and tlus on the relative prices of Burumdi and its major trading. partners. In Burundi. monetary management was, passive yet cor,szavtite, as domestic creditwas generally kept under control and credit to the
government declined between 1986 ad 1991. Money-supply was stable
while quasi-money grew slowly. Fiscal deficits were not generally finanrced
irough money creation. The simultaneous deregulation of the.import sector (by lowering barriers and increasing competition) helped conrmol prices
by reducing importers' profit margins and kleep inflation down. Inflation fell
from an average of 9.2 percent for the 1980-85 period to 6.9 percent for thie
1986-91 period.

Trade liberalization.
Setting. A study of the protection system prior to adjustmentidentified a
-wide spread in customs tariffs (68 to 336 percent) quantitative restrictions
(quotas for most products and a ban on imports that comreted with locally
Published by iRepository, 2021
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nianufactured products), importregulations, foreign exchange controls, and

compulsory advance deposits vAth the central bank. Imports were subjected
to three different types of tar ctstoms duties. a statistics tax, and a tsactions tax. These taxes, combined with an incoherent tariff structure that
consisted of a wide range of rates. contributed to an excessive and inconsistent system of protection. Importers complained (until mid-1 990) ofadministrative harssment and constraints. All commercial imports required licenses. Such distortions helped fosterapublic import-substitutionindulstria
sector that was inefficient and absorbed a large part of national savings and
loan resources. The introduction of the open general license inMay 1992addressed these problems.
.Reforms. Sequenced with the first series of devaluations, structural adjuLstment credit.I reforms sought to liberlize the trade regime. First. import li
cemses were to be granted automatically for most products (except for cotton textiles, glass, and pharnaceutical products). In addition, regulationson importers were to be eased to acilitate competition. A simplified tariff
structure was also proposed to reduce the number of duies from 3 to 2, the
number of duty rates from 57 to 5, and the spread from 50 to 15 percent in
1986 to 40 to 20 percent in 1989 (keeping luxury goods at 100 percent). A
maximum surcharge of 30 percent for three years could be applied to protect infant industries.
The second phase of the program called for reforming the tariff structure further. liberalizing the import oflocally manufactured products .(eliminating. the remaining quantitative restrictions), increasing the ceiling on
importlicensesgranted by commercial banlks, and requiringthat the central
bank pay interest on the FBu 10 million that foreign importers are obliged
-to deposit as a guarantee aginst illegal business practices.. To promote exports, the progm called for adopting simplified drawback procedures for
import taxes, authorizing the deduction of marketing expenses incurred
*abroad.and simplifyiing administrative procedures for businessmen traveling abroad. An office forweights and measureswas to be set up, and a study
on potential exporL; was to be carried out
In retrospect. tariff reductions and the liberalization of
importlicensingwvere slowerand lessprofound than anticipated.WUhile quotas were abolished and the tariff structure simplified as planned, ariffs on
luxury goods remained, and those on intermediate and equipment goods
fell more slowly than programmed. Yetat the .same time, the transactions tax
rate, a tax applying to one of three stagesimports, pro duction,.orservicewas increased as part of a revenue enhancement package of the stabilization
program and canceled out some of the impact oflowertariffis. Capital goods,
*mpLewntation.

.
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which had previously been exempt, became taxable in 1988. On the whole,
the adjusnnentprogram reduced the effective protection primarily by eliminatingnontariffbarniers, butnotbyasmuch as had originallybeen projected.
Until mid-1990 importers continued to complain about administrative.
harassment and constrains. All commercial imports required licenses. Au-.
thority to grantimportand export licenses has been delegated progressively
to the commercial banks, partcularly since 1990. An open general license
was introduced in May 1992, delegating full authonrty to commercial banks;
to issue import licenses and-provide necessary. foreign exchange. The import profession is now considerably. more open and the ange of eligible
productsivider. 5 Substantialaid flows havenowmadeforeign exclange amply
available in Bu ndiThe effects of tade liberlizaion are dearly having an:
impact on import substituton firms. Requests for protection have increased
since 1989, particularlyfrom enterprises producing soap, matches, andshoes
(box 2.3). Several distortions due to the improper classification ofproducLs
have also been corrected. Howver, the impact of the reform has been somewhat limited because more than 50 percent of imports enterth:
country
essentially duty-free because they are aid-financed. All. quantitative -estictions on imports were abolished in August 1990.
Under the third phase, additional reforms in trade and triffs are being
introduced to improve tariff administration and further reduce effective
protection andantiexportbias. The governmentplans to cutrnaximum tar
iffratesfirom 40 to 30 percentfornonIuxygoods, andfromI 100 to 70 percent
forluxurygoods. Tonmake thereform revenue-neutral, thegovernmenetwill
substantialy reduce exemptions and introduce an excise tax on such goods
as alcohol and tobacco. Within broad sectors, taiff rates are also to be har-monized. When the reforms have taken hold, Burundi will have one of Sub
Saharan Africa's most liberal trade regimes.

Prices and market dergulation
Setting. Prior to the program, all prices of imported and locally manufactured goodswere subject to controls exercised by the ministry of commerce
and industry. Prices wtrere set on a cost-plus basis, with the manufacturer receivinganetprofitmargin of 10 to 20 percent. Price controls sought to prevent producers and traders from reaping excessive profit in a monopolistic
market, but they had serious drawbacks. The cost-plus formula discouraged
importers from looking for the cheapest.source of supply. ManuFacturers,
assured of a fixed profit margin, had little incentive to reduce costs and increase efficiency and quality. A unit of aboutO staffin the ministry of commerce and industry was responsible for reviewing all prices submitted for
approval and for making periodic inspections.
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The export crop subsector has traditionally been the ilost rCguIlatted.
sector of the economy. Piices forinputs and producer pricesoorexpor-tcrops
arue fixed (except for rice). Govermniiient pnce policies tend to subsidize inpULS while taxing output prices, wlhiclh discourages output. while promoting
the inefficient use of inputs. Moreover, overlregulation of the agriculture
sector inhibits producers from responding adequately to world prices.
Reforms. Recognizing thaL.price controls were not compatible wvith liber-

alization and a rational allocation or-resources, dlie government decided to
Box 23 Enterprises and devaluations
In order to obtain inforrnation on the impact of the devahiauion on-economic

activity in Burundi, an enterprise- survey%ws conducted in 1990 under the guidance of the 'Wrld Bank recsidcnt mission in Bujiunburra. Coveringabout 50 enter-.
prises, the surveylooked for information on the evolution of economic activity in
the private and parastaal .sectors, dte currentLbusiness dimate in tie modem sector,
and the prevailing view among entreprencurs on exchange rate policy.
The overall impression that emerged from the responses is that there was a sigrificant increase in economic activit. Nevertheless, 55 percent of entrepreneurs
had a negative assessment of the effects of the devaluations; even though 60 percent of the enterprises had displayed a positive trend in sales between 1985 and
1990. In fact, the prreailing gloomyv,iewr of the devaluations suggests thatcxchange
rate adjustmenes functioned as expected. New firms created after the beginning.
of the adjustment.program have a significantly better opinion of the devaluation
than older Finns Positive opinions increased from 10 percent of the firms created
between 1980 and 1985 (the years of overvaluation), to 33 percent of the firms.
created before 1980, to 50 percentof the firms created since 1986. This observation suggests a relationship betwveen a firm's creation date and its perfo; rnance
under adjustment firmws thathad benefited from thestrongestdistortions.suffered
most from the devaluations.
SAVONOR, Burtndi's leading soap producer, provides an example of the latter Traditionally importing many of the company's inputs, the management
claimed thatthecompany had bcen sevcrelyhurtby the devaluations,which pushed
its production costs upward, an increase that could not be oflset by an increase in
domestic sale prices. Domestic prices were even pushed down as a result of competition from small-scale manufacturers in the informal sector that did not pay
taxes and relied solely on domestic inputs.Thc company faced direct competition
from more efficient producers that used cheap local inpuLs, and consumers increasingly shifted from SAVONOR to domesticallv produced substitutes. Fortunately the company adjusted to its new environment. It replaced its imported
components with domestically produced palm oil, reduced its production costs,
regained some of its competitive edge, and contributed to the country's adjustment process.
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deregulate prices at the outset of the progtrain and address both producer
and consunmer prices. The government agreed to continue to let foodcrop
producer prices be mnatrket-determnined, and to establish prices for cash crops
at levels sufficient to provide incentives for increasing production and quality, taking into account the evolution of international prices. The government agreed that iws consumer price control .system, whliichi had previously
seta fixed profiltnmrginfior manufacturers, hanmpered the procesbs of relative price adjustment-and it thus chose to liberalize these pricesalong-with
those for imports- Products forwhich importation was liberalizedwould not
be subject to controls, and onlycertain strategicproducts, such sflour, sugar,
and powdered milk, would be submitted to a temporary pice ceiling ifacute
shortages occurred.
Reforms supported understructural adjustment creditlI sought to introduce an automaticsyv.stemnforadjustingproducer prices for cash crops to spur
improved quality of products and expanded production.. Srucnxd adjiustmentcreditII included measures to improve efficiencyin the coffee subsector.
reduce subsidies on fertilizers, encourage higherproducer Prices in agriculture, liberalize the rce sector, reform the sugarsector, and undertakeeastudy
of the country's comparative advantages.
Implementation Aln au toma tic system for adjusting producer prices was
not implemented under structural adjustment credit 1. Although measures
to improve the quality of certan export crops and to increase theirproductidon were partiaIly successful, progress toward improving international marketing arrangements and maintaining competitive producer prices has not
been satisfactory. Measures to liberalize dle rice sectorand restructure the
sugar complex urere implemented. A long-term fertilizer policywas not formulated as planned, but is now being formulated as part of an agriculturaI
services projecL
Coffee prices, which were to be adjusted regularly after cost of living assessmentrswere made for each region, remained below their 1980 level in real
terms (byas mlich as 20 percentin 1989). Nominal producerprices increased
from FBu 125/kg (in 1985) to FBu 160/kg (during 1986-88) to FBu 175/kg
(during 1989-91). Decisions aboutproduction and producer prices continued to be made administratively. The government determined both producer
prices and the amount ofplants (freely distributed to peasants) that were to
be produced in the nurseries. Concurrently, the compulsory controls on the
plantatons (forexample,uprootingwas forbidden) preventedfaerse from
shifting to crops with higher retums. Yet the decline in producerprices aLso
reflected the larger collapse of world prices. Based on the total -value and
quantity of coffee exports, the world price for a kilo of Burundi's coffee fell
from FBu 426 in 1986 to FBu 288 in 1990, a 32.4 percent decline.
.
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The price paid to tea planters aLso declined in real terms (5 percent
annually) during the adjustment period, precipitating a shortage of manpower for harvesting. This decline occurredwhile world prices for tea climbed
froniFBu 172/kg (1986) to FBu 382/kg (1990). Cotton suffered from si-mitar policy-induced problems: real producer prices fell by 13 percent from
1986 to 1989. while world prices expressed in FBu rose by.44 percent In
additdon, cotton was imposed upon Farmers as a "compulsory crop" in certain regions. The impact of mandatory planting regulations w-as serious.
Sanctions induded lieloss of access to publicly held land, acritical necessity
since little acreage is available to expand production. Consequently, the
overregulation of the agricultural sector prevented producer pnces.for export crops from moving with world.prices and limited the.supply response
possible from a dynamic exchange rate policy.
Despite attempts .at deregulation, the markets for most crops remained
monopolistic or quasi-monopolLsticas public enterpnses continued to dominate dhesesectors.Forexamplein the cotton sector, the Cotton Management
Company markets all production, and the Cotton Textile Company of
Burundi purchases 90 percent of the Cotton Management Company's output. The coffee sectoraLso remains dominated by public enterprises, despite
recentreforms. As of1991 the coffee parastatal, Burundi Office oflndustrial
Cultures, had forsaken its operational activities and extended its regulatory
functionsbybecoming the Office du Caf6,amixed-apital companyinwhich
the shareholders represent groups from the industry.and the govrernment
(34 percent) In addition, the Burundi Coffee Company no longer enjoys a
monopoly over coffee exports In 1991, 30 percent of the.crop was sold to
private exporters through public auction. Nevertheless, full-fledged liberalization and privatization are still a long way off, and the sector remains monopolistic.As for tea, there is no private mark-eting as yet. The high concentration in these markets, dominated bya fewpublic enterprises, prevents real
competition. Thus, effective deregulation remains elusive.
Virtually no policy change occurred at the farmgate level, and the few
changes that did take placewere sterilized partlyby the monopolistic nature
of these markets. However, the boom in nontraditional exports (rice and
tobacco) offers an interesting contrast to the lack; oftsuccess in the more visible areas of coffee, tea, and cotton. The liberalization ofrice prices and the
introduction of private rice hullers led to price increases of about20 percent
between 1989 and mid-1990, turning Burundi from a net importer to a net
exporter of rice. Increases in the production of tobacco (which rose from
nothing in 1987 to FBu 223 million in 1990) also reflect price incentives, as
well as he. technical and input support offered by the Burundi Tobacco
Company to fa[mers under contraCLt
The successful liberalization ofthe agricultural sector is critical for longterm development in Butnmdi. In May 1992, based on the lessons of stuc-
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tural adjustmentcredits I and 11, the upfront conditionality of structural adjtustment credit Ill included several new measures to address tnarketand price
deregulation. The regulatory framework for smallholders Was simplified,
through,.among other things, the eli'mination of goven tmen t constraints on
mandatory crops and the quantityand types of inputs to be applied; government-administered producer prices for traditional export crops and gricul-.
tural inputs were eliminated; and public en terprise monopoly rights for pur-.chasing, mnark-eting, and processing agricultural productswere abolished. In,
addition, amoratorium was imposed on all newpublic sectorinvestments in:.
the tea, rice, and palm oil sectors, and transparent criteria for allocating

aviailable public lands and resolving land on ership disputes were established.
Factormarket kberalizati ow laborand -wages
Setting The structure of Burundi's labor market reflects the coutry's
lo1W GDP, large rural population, and sizable govemment sector. The struc-:
ture of the country's active labor force has changed little since 1979. About
94 percent are employed in the primary sector, 2 percent in the secondary,
and 3 percent in the tertiary (tabli 2.6). Nonsalaried workers represent 94
percent of the active population (80 percent of those older than 10), while
wage earners make up only 5 percent of the active population. The private
sector provides 29 percent of all salaried employment.

During the first part ofthe 1980s, the costperjob created in the modem'
sector reached a high level-between $60,000 and $70,000 (1981 prices)
This level reflects the high concentration ofpublic investment in infrastructure and the bias of past policies agai"nstlabor-intensive.investmenL In teris
ofwiages, the nominal minimum wage in the two principal cities (Bujumbura
and Gitega) grew atabout 7.2 percentperyear, which, because inflation grew
faster, probably did notprevent some erosion in workerst purchasing power.
In addition to .wages, employers bear substantial social charges, ranging
between 30 and 60 percent of the wage bill.
Atthe onset of-adjustment, the expansion ofwsage laborin Birundi faced
many constraints. Freedom ofmovrnement-was restricted. Labor mobility was
restrained, preventing rural labor from moving into urban centers. The
Table 2.6 Comparative structure of the active labor force, 1990
(petcnt)

Sector
Primary
Secndary
Terttry

Burnad

94.0
1.8
34.

a. Low-incore countiesin Afric.L
Source: Inrbatonal Labour Ofice-PECTA (1990).
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93.0
3.0
4.0
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80.0
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Low-inccrne
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8.0
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ministry or labor had to approve all hliring, whether in the public or private

sector. Social regulations were numerous, generating considerable red tape.
Private employers were responsible for 100 percent of the cost of medical
insurance of their emlployees, which made hliring labor expensive, and indirectly privileged capital-intensive investments (particularly in parastatals in

which aid-financed capital goods were transferred frequently to the enterprises without payment). The government is die most important employer,
accounting for nearly 40 percent of enmployment in die modem sector.

Refomns- Labor mark-et deregulation was not the primary-focuts of either
striuctnal adjustment creditI or lI. Although structural adjustment credit-I
did not contain specific employment measures, it did provide incentivPe_s for
using labor extensively-one of Burundi's comparative advantages. For example, the investment codeuwas amended to reducc incentives for large and
highly capital-intensive projects, promoting small and medium-size enter-m
pnses instead. The program called for liftng tariffexemptions and remoVing import prohibitions, as wsell AS measures favoring employmenL
Structural adjustment credit II included direct measures for deregulating the labor market by revising labor legisladon to allow entrepreneurs
to recruit theirpersonnel directlywithoutapproval by the labor department;
reonenting die- role of the placement commission toward superising the
technical staff of the labor department, and reviewing the effects of employ-

mentpolitcy and strengthening the labor department's.capacity to assess the
skill requirements of employers. Supplementary measures incduded the abolition of the flat-rate wage tax and of administrative constraints on the mobility of labor.
Imrpemnentation. Some employment reform measures under structural
adjustmentcreditsI and II were fullyimplemented (fiscallyrelateddmeasures),
but many were implemented only partially (institutonal strengthening of...
the ministry of labor). The ministry of labor preferred to control the labor
market rather than promote and review employment policy, impeding the
effectve liberalization of the sector. Moreover, the measures included in the
structural adjustment credits were undoubtedly not those of highestpriority
for the sector. Again, this was not a question of overall design of the program, since certain constraints not captured by the program appear to have
hindered adjustment efforts, including the cost oflabor and overregulation.
The rigidities of the economy, resource immobility, and the small impact of
devaluation on price restructuring hanned the employment market, a situation aggravated by constraints inherent in the employment sector itself.
Recent trends suggest that the employment market has notyet adapted to
the adjustmentprocesses. Unemployment has risen fivefold since the begin-
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ning of the decadc, affecting unskilled and semiskilled labor, duie in part to

a suppl)y-demnand mismatch caused by an inatdequate skills niix.'
On a more positive note, the efforLs uncler structual adjustment credits
-I and II helped rela.Lx conditions for foreign l.tbor .md eliminatted.sone fiscal
disincentives to emnploymnent. Feasibility stLudies for a priva-te health insuirance schemlle were also completed. The government eliminatted the obligation tliat plivate and mixedl public-privaite enterprises ol)tain priOr .pprova%ll
fiom the niinistrv of l bor for reciuitment, and it liberalized conditions for
recruitment in public enterprises-they are required to establishl a transparent mechanism for announcing vacancies and recruiting. Private and

parastatal firms with private capital were authori.ed to recC-itt freely, provided that die persons iwhom dtev hired were registered with the-ministry ofr.
laborand were Bturundi nationals. Emplovees still cannot be dismissed iwith- out government approval. In January 1992 the government also autlhorized
the establishment of private placement offices'and approved the creation of
a national confederation of labor unions, tunattached to any political party.
Efforts to liberalize the laormark-et have been positive. For e,xample, in
1990 the average salary in the private sector for managers, accoumtants, and
comnputer specialists -as somewhat higher tian in the public sector-trigering resignations by civil servants to seek employment in the private sector. Wklithin tie private sector, salay growth in ban;king and insurance hLas
been the most pronounced. Whlile overall salaties in the modern sector in-

creased by only 14 percent from 1989 to 1990, the nominal increase in banlking and insurance was 54 percent In 1990 and 1991, job offe-s in business
grew at the most rapid rate.
Yet the bias toward capital-intensive investment persists. due to several
factorslThe cost of creating emplovment has remained high. preventing a
substantial increasein private employment, due essentiallyto red tape in labor
regulations and the comparatively high cost of labor.' The bias also exists in
the public enterprise sector because aid-financed capital investmenus tend
to be either free or highly subsidized. And several enterprises seem to havetaken advantage of the investment codewsithoutcreating the promised additional jobs. Nonsalary costs (such as social securiity and medical instrance)
represent 3 0 to 60 percent ofbase salaries, and formal sector labor compensation is still about four times that ofthe informal sector. The labor code has
not-yet been reformed completely, and many employers and employees are
still unaware of the new and more liberal regulations. Private employers bear
the entire burden of medical insurance. Excessive regulations are still perva-

sive,

and taxes, particularly on foreig n-oned private enterpses,

are high.

Under the third phase of the program, tie government is seeking further reforms to reduce the costs of employing labor, thus proomoting production techniques in the modem sector that'more accu.rately reflect
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Burundi's comparative advantage in abundant and relatively inexpensive
labor. To this end the government has proposed a new draft labor code and
measuires to deregulate thie fonal sector and reduice die disparityb13erween
itand tlein fomialsector. Italso delincatesgeneral principles t-hatlcave room
for collective, bargaining, and it eliminates many regulations thatwould di.scourage employnent.
The labor code will be revised furdler to introduce flexibility into
nondisciplinatrylayoffsand for teimpporay employmnentand apprenticeships.
The new labor code is expected to be adopted in late 1993. The revised code
calls for a cost-sharing ar-rangement to replace the requiirement dtat private employers cover 100 percent of costsc of medical care foremployees; it willalso ease regulations on dismissal, and eliminate mandatory;wages for variouis professional groups (with the exception of die minimum wage for unskilled labor).
The financialsector
Setting. Burundi's financial sector is fairly diersified for a country its size.
It consists of the central bank, 5 commercial banks, 3 other deposit-taking
institutions, 2 well-managed and solvent development banks, 4 insurance
companies, a network of 75 savings cooperatives and 3 credit cooperatives,
several special indsprimarilyforhome financingandguarantee operations,
and 2 social security institutions. Government participation in the equity of
financial institutions is pervasive and is either direct or through public sector entities. The government holds a 42 percent share in the capital of the
tvo largest and'oldest commercial banks (Credit Bank of Bujumbura and
Commercial Bank ofBurundi) ,vith foreign parentbanks (SociQ6tGenrale
de Belgique and Banqui Bruxelles Lambert) holding 49 percent of the capital-Altlough Burundi hasarelatively largenumberof financial institutions,
financal intermediation remains very lowu, attributable to tthe low per capita
income of the countr)y the lowmonetization oFthe economy, and the lack of
competition among financial institutions.
The major constraints on Burundi's financial sectorindude insufficient
orientation toward productive investments and a de facto discrimination
against small private sector borrowers. The financial sector is plagued by a
lackl of financial depth, even in comparison wvith other Sub-Saharan countries the central baink does nothave full control over.moneyand creditgrowth,
and the legal and regulatory framework for nonbank fmancial intermediaries, insurance companies, and social ecurity institutiorns is deficient. W7hile
efforts tomobilize domestic creditresources throughvariousguarantee fund.s
date back to 1976, theywere eventually harmonized into a single National
Guarantee Fund in 1986 because they proved inadequate. The credit system
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is burdened by an overlly connplex adimiinistirtive and regulatory framework,
insufficiently adapted to tile incrieasing soplhistication ordomestic financial
institutions. Prior to the ad jitsunent period, tie requir emilent that a11 credit
requests ofriiore than FBli 3 ini llion (about S25,000) be approved in advance
by tlie central bank fieqtenndy led to dela.ys (and uncertainty) for potential
borrowers. Tlhe capital markLet could not finction efficiently becauise credits
were to be classified as discotl table or nondiscotmtable withi different lending rates, and various regulations were imiposed on eah colicier cial bank

such as minimum liquidity amomiin is.
Refrms. The govelrnmentsougrht to improve credit and monetaxy policies in dlie financial sector in order-to maike the financial intermediation-

process more efficient, raise die level of funding for productive purposes,
and improve resource mobilization: by banks and financial institutions.
The first phase of tie adjustment progrm propo.sedraising the authorized creditceiling orcoinmnercial banks by more than 300 percent Lo FBu 1 0
million and reinforcing the guarntee fund to promote small and mediumsize enterprises. Furthennore, an ad hoc committee wvas to address-discnmnation implicitin the distinction betwveen discountable and nondiscoumnable
credits, the compulsory ratios, and the structure of interest rates.
In the second phase. the government sought to liberalize interest rates
and replace credit rationing writh a more indirect but efficient way to m-anage creditand liquidity. itwould establish a simplified intereststructure with
only two rediscount rates-one preferential and the other nonpreferential.
The central bank-would periodicallyadjust the discountrate while otherrates
would be mark}et-determined, and the goovernment called for simplilfing
credit regulations. Moreover, public enterprises would be allowed to reduce
their deposit requirements in the central bankand invest their excess liquidity in alternative financial assets that would yield greater profitability. The
*agendaaLso called for eliminating central bank-approval for loans ofless than
FBu 10 million, as well as for the issue of treasury certificates and the establishment. of reserve requirenments.
Imptenirentation- In general, the reforns have been slowv and incomplete.
Their design suffered from an inadequate analysis and understanding of
die sector's financial structure, position, and perforimance, and they were
formulated without sufficient recognition of monetary credit and regulatory policies.

As part of structural adj'ustment credit I, the guarantee. fund was reactivated and interest rates were brought up to real positive leveLs. Yet overregulation and oligopolistic behavior (induding informal rate-fixing among
bank;s) continued to limit competition among financial institutions. Credit
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Bank or ujunibura'simonopoly on. obligatory savings, constraints on where
public enterprises could deposi.trhcir finds, thlc strict regulation of interest
rates, and discriminatory treasrly certificate policies-.all continued to preventLan efficient allocation u. financial resoulces.
Tb e government and thelecentral lb.mnk progressively introduced iii ore
flexible intercst ra;te policy, linking interest rates to the raites obt'ained during the treasury certificate auctions..Dcnominations of thiese certificates were:
reduced to enc,urage morc poten tial buyers, and the cencitl bank refinanced
them at rates more attractive tian their recliscount rate. Intcrest Irates. on tern
-andsavings deposits were liberalized. More efficientand less'discriminatoly
to mranage bank liquidity.wer e introduced, ancd aIhe monopoly
- nstruments
i
-ofdie partatal -savings institution, Savings Bank of Bu-rundi, over the compulsory savings deposits of wage earners was eliminated. Interest rates, hiow%ever, did not become fully mark-et-determined.
The monopolistic nature of thic financial system has prevented rcal competition and has hampered the effective liberalization of the financial market. Credit Bank of Bujunibbua and C:ommercial Bank of Burundi alone
account for about 80 percent of lending. This situation is conmpounded by
the hiigh concentration of credit recipients. For example,. at one big commercial bank, the S largest users of credit account fior 40 percent of loans
outstanding, and the 20 largest account for 68 percent.
- Burundi's-economic development requires a more competitive, sound,
diversified, and institutionally strong financial sector. Institutions must be
run according to sound commercial principles, and the government should.
disengage itself from die equity capital of financial institutions. Institutions
whose long-tenn viability is doubtful should be closed down; other institutonssshould be merged orrestructured. The next phase oftlhe governments
reform agenda calls for strengthening the institutional capacity of the central bank to supervise the financial sector, and creatng and implementing
new creditpolicies. Institution-building effortswill target banks for strengthening, and weed out nonviable institutions. Additional measures call for
refonning the taxation system to remove savings disincentives and dte exces-sivetaxation ofinvesunent in equity capital. Further reforms in the legal and
regulatory environment seek to foster competition among financial institutons, ensure theirsolvency, and remove impediments to financial innovation.
Public enterpises

Setting. Economic managementatthe outsetoftheadjustmentprogram,
particularly. industrial and commercial policy, was highly centralized and
diligiste. This was a time when command economies were prevalent in Africa. Many public enterprises were created betveen 1978 and 1981, to pro-
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vide, among odter dtings, public services, export sector management, and
manufacturing goods (filling the gap created by a nonexistent private sec,
tor). Public enterprises accounted foi 40 percent of gross fixed capital formation, 42 percent of foreign public debt, and 58. percent of debt service
and contiibuited only 16 percent of the formal labor force and about 6 percent of GDP.' 7 Directly or indirectly, they controlled all of Burundi's cash
crops and 60 percent of its formal manufacturing. At the design level, the;
lack of feasibility studies led to unsuitable decisions about product types,
technoloy and pproduction capacity. The situation was further aggravated
by poor management, little attention to rate-of-return critena, inadequate
monitonrng by the government and an inappropriate pricing system.:
Burundi's public enterprises create several distortions in the country's
economy, specifically in resource allocation. Although labor is relatively
abundantandinexpensive in Burundi, inivestments in public enterprisesare
highly capital-intensive. Yetreturn.s to capital are disappointing, with the sector
registering substantial losses. The.sector also captures 25 percent of die
govemment's total expenditure, whether through subsidies or forgone revenue. Its debt represents 28 percent of all public debt However, public enterprises pay only a fraction of dle service on their debt, the rest.being serviced by the national budget In addition, an excessive share of public
ized
enterprise investmenntsare debt-financed, with equity financinga
'At least 75 percent of public enterprise assets have been financed by-loans,
35percentshort-term. Thegovernmentalso routinely covers public enteripnse
losses and exempts them from custom duties and some of their tax burden.
Public enterprises also create significant subsectoral distortions. In the
coffee subsector, for example, the administered pricing system allowed the
coffee parastatals to receive large margins unrelated to costS orperfonnance.
Public enterprises in the coffee subsector also subsidized inputs up to 100
percenL Byencorginglarge-scale, agroindustnal projectsin thiL and other
subsectors, donors, who financed 83 percent of investments in the agricultur-al sector, supported these distortions. Distortions also exist in the tanport and water subsectors in the form of unrealistically low prices. for services The public enterprise that provides passenger transport services relies.
on regular budgetary subsidies that allow it to set fires at levels that do not
guarantee the company's sustainability. In the waterand electriciysubsectors,
REGIDESCO cannot generate sufficient funds to finance, operate, and
maintain its infrastructure. This exceissive and inefficient presence in the
productive subsectors obvioussly impedes long-run adjustmnent efforts.
Rfteforms. Structural adjustment credit I sought to increase the efficiency

of public resource allocation by reforming the public enterprise sector. The
World Bank wanted to reduce the number ofpublic enterpnses and improve
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die mnangement of those that remiained. The nain objective of public enterpl;se refon1 was thus to lilimit gover-nment participation to only those enterprises thatprovidevital public services oroperate in strategicsectors (box 2.4).

Enterprises deemed beyond redemption would be liquidated. Others could
be rehabilitated under the discipline ofVprogranm contracts," and under the
overall supervision or the senrice in clharge of monitoring public enterprisc
reformi. Studies were also to be conducted to identify enterprises that could
viablybe privatized and to establish a privaizaldion progrm aIa later date. New
public enterprises vould be limited to economicallyqiable activities forwhichi
private investment ws not forthcoming. Specifically, structural adjusunent
credit I proposed closing four enterprises, reintegating thlree in public a
ministration- rehabilitating five through program contracts, designing andimplementing program contracts for six, revieing enterprises in the trade:
and tourism sectors for rehabilitation in a second phase, and preparing a
Box 2.4 -The privatization process
Under the privatization legal fiamework, the government has to choose beicwen
three basic privatization approachcs: (i) privatizaton of management through
contracts in which private companies are paid to manage publicly owned asets
(ii) privatization of management through leasing arrangements orconcesssionsin
which a private company pays the government for the usce of publicy owned arset5r and (iii) privatization of ownership of the compan-y.
' The govcrnment is committed to withdraw progressively from the productive
sectors to make room for prvate invectors to improve profitability through more
effective management Public agroindustries,however, present a specific challenge
as they provide income for tens of thousands ofsmallholder farners. Therefore,.
the government favors a progressive and controlled transfer from public'to private ownership consistent with ongoing development projects
te
hsupporting
agroindustries- The government is convinced thathasty decisions on sociallysen-1
sitive issues could stall or even derail the ongoing democratization of Burundi
institutions. As a result, management orperfonnance contracts are considered as
a first (although transitional) step toward other forms of privatization. For the
public agroindustries, performance or management contracts will be concluded
in 1992. The Moso Sugar Company management contract with a private firm was
approved in March 1992, the OTH performance contract is currcn tly*under revicw
byte government, and COGERCO's currentincentive ystem,which isbased on
actual performance, will be used as the basis for a formal performan ce contract
In the coffee sector, leasing ofpublic assets is currently under experimentation
for the management of coffee-astiing stations (SOESAL) and coffec-hulling
factories (SODECO). Some of the manageMentcompanics already have majority
private ownership and it is cxpected that tinemill be fully privatized in the futurc
For the divestiture of ownership, the gov:rnment favors a .process that will promote ownership among domestic owners.-
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diagnostic report to assess the potential demand for public enterprses by the
private sector. Beuse implementation progress understructural adjustment
credit l WLas slow, the samemeamL-sures were carried over to structural adjustment
creditll-the fourliquidatonswere to be completedt progran contractswere
to be signed for 13 enterprises, aprivatizationprogram was to beagreed upon,
and performance monitoring wias to be reinforced.

Inqkentation. Programu contracts developed after detailed diagnostic
studies and audits on a case-by-case basis were unsuccessful because of tie
time and cost required to undertike. detailed studies on a systematic basis
From 1986 to 1991, only four enterprises signed program contracts with the
govemment. Thus, inJanuary 1991 thegovemment adopted a-more-comprehensive approach, dassifying public enterprnses into categores according to whether they were to be rehabilitated, privatized, or liquidated, and
formulating a specific timetable and action plan for each. Since- then, 10
enterprises have been liquidated and 5 have been privatized; bids for
privatizing the capital or management of another 4 have been issued, and
subsidies have declined by 12 percent
In the third phase, the govemment is seeking to enhance competition
in key sectors by promoting private sector entry, tlus increasing the probability of a stronger supply response, and reducing the financial burdenmof
public enterprises on the government Rehabili-tanon, privatization, and liquidadon are expected to continue. A moratorium will be imposed on new
investments in public enterprises targeted for privatization or liquidation.
As part of the unified budget process, the public investment program .will
c-apture the investments of public enterprises that receive direct or indirect
subsidies, and investments will require prior approval from the minister of
finance. The government will no longer extend its guarantee of lendig to
the public enterprises; subsidies to commercial and industrial public enterpriseswill be eliminated. When structural adjustment credit III reforms are
complete, at least 55 percent of the government's currentpublic enternse
portfolio is expected to be under private management, an additional 30.5
percentwill be entirelyprivatized, and 14.5 percentwiil havebeen liquidated
orreintegrated into the administration. The service in charge oftmoniwonng
public enterprise reform will also be restructured.
The reglatoryfrtmework
Setting. After a period of emphasizing large public sector projects as an
instrument for industrial growth, the government recognized that further
industrial developmentappropriate to the co:untry's scaleand needs should
largely involve privately owned, small and medium-size enterprises. In the
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past, priivwte sector development was constrained in patrt by cultural values,
but the inrgor impedliment to creating small and.medium-size enterprises
was tlel myriad regtula.tions that discoutraged entrepre-neutial initiadive.I.A;dministrative regulations liinclered businesses in many critical areas, induding the length ortinic requir-ed for en terpmise creattion (see box 2.5 on incorporation) and initial operations (industrial and commercial licensing). The
cumbersomne regulatory franeworkl redtuced thle supply response of dile private sector to such measures as price deregulation mnd trde liberalizadtion.
Commnercial activities suffered not only from thle difficulties associated
with the creation of new firms, but also from bisiness laws that were not conducive to profitable business.ventures. Many laws are obsolete, dating from
the colonial peiiod. Corporate law suffers from a lack-of clai ty and coherence, and the Ihierarlthv of textS is unclear. For ex0ample, itwo decrecs govern
bank-ruptcy laws, but neither one is applied, largely because they are too
Box 2S The hurdles of enterprise creation
The process of enterprise creation was a lengthy and complicated affir, and the
h-urdles for the aspiring enitrepreneur were ma-ny. The. typical process went as
follos-, First, prior authorization had to be obtained from the ministry ofjustice.
Refusal was possible on many grounds, including.the possibility that the company
would run against. the ill-defined concept of "general interesLt Docunrmntation
that was rcquired by the ministry included: proof of identity, three copics of the
.statutes, an extractofjudicial and police records for all partners, a documcnt deliveredb a trbunal statingthat noneof the partnershad experienced bankruptcy,
ccrtification from a bank that equity had been paid in, and an assesment of the
value of contribution in kind delivered by appraisers. The minister ofjustice did
not grant incorporation w ithout a favorable written response from the technical
ministries whose approval he had requeste d.
The statutesof the company had to be ratified and signed in the presence of a
civil servant, the directeurdunotariatzofwhich thercUa onlyone. Once theabove
conditions were satisfied, the minister's approval was delivered through an ordinance. Testatusc of the company then had to be recorded at the departnent of
judicial affairs of the ministry ofjustice, which in turn wsLS rcsponsible for publishing it in thc Official Bulletin of Burundi. Finally, the company's existence had to
be registered atthe commercial rcgistry. Relativelyheavy feeswerc associated with
this procedure.
Once thesc steps were completed, the company had legal StattLS but still could
notengagc in btsiness activities, asecondary process ofaccreditaiion wasrequired
thatinvoitvd obtainingatradercard and accreditation as an importerorexporter.
'Without these, a firm could not legally engage iTi commerce, import raw materials, or export Each permit required more paperwork, often duplicating information given at the time of incorporation.
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complex. Bankrupt buLsinesses usually close without formal notification, thiusL
creditors cannot easily recuperate outstanding debts.
Refomrs and inplementation. Structural adjustment credits I and II did not
impose specific conditionalities on the regulatory framework. Nevertheless,
the government has recognized that the framiework- must be expanded and
has identified various constraints that hinder its development. In May 1990
a World Bank mission made recommendations about dte regulatory framework, and the government simplified its procedures in October of dhe same
year. Since then, the regulatory system lhas been revised several times in an
effort to liberalize business activities. A new law alloWs businesses to register their corporate statutes in one step, and tie authorization of the minister ofjiustice for incorporation is no longer required. A trader's card is still
required, but its delivery is conditional solely upon registraton at he com-mercal registry. Accreditaion-of importers and exporters was maintained,
but the need for central bank approval was lifted. The ministry of commerce
and industry can still deny or delay accreditation, however, and the paper- .
wfork remains complex.
Indications suggest that reform of the regulatory framewvork is progressing well. Thus, structural adjustment credit III will concentrate on revising
business laws, .specificallythe commercial code. Thesemeasures cal for elimnaunginconsistenciesand loopholesin existinglegal texts, defining the ll
status of various types of firms more clearly, and simplifying and extending
bankruptcy laws to public enterprises to facilitate the efxit of firms
Socialpolicies and the allaiationofpovey
&Lting In addition to economic and political measures, adjustment and
developmentin Burundi must also account forsocial dimensions of reform.
Among the more important are population pressures, rural poverty, inadequate health care, limited education, the role of women in the social and
economic fabric of the country, and the environmenL These issues not only
have short- to mediumerm implicationsfordevelopment (for example 4 per
capita income growth and food security), butalso long-term implications for
sustainabiity (as demonstrated by education),. as Burundi becomes increasingly active in a competitive intemational environmenL Burundi's social
indicators are about average for Sub-Saharan Africa (table 2.7)).
Reforms. Socal sector policieis under the adjustment program vere urmited, focusing primarly on alleviating poverty. The focus is crucial, becauise
. with a per capita income of only $220, Burundi remains one of the poorest
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countries in the world. In Burundi, poverty is essentially a rural problem given
that94 percent of the population lives in nonurban areas. Everyday hurdles
for the poorinclude distance from schools and healhli care centers, and lack
of potable water.
Structural adjustment creditL did not contain specific policy recornmendations with respect to the social sectors or poverty alleviation. Structural

adjustmLent credit II included the preparation of a social action plan and a
povrery alleviation progran. In collaboration withl UNICEF, the TNDP, and
theWorldBank, thegovernment targeted childnutrition, the role ofwomen
ini development, support for small productive projects, a food secury strat-i
egy, and a monitoring system for social indicators.
af

d

Imnpleent a6LAlthough structurl adjusunentcredit II measures did not
encompass specific actions to cope with the direct social costs of the adjustment program (particularly employment and income redistribution), they
were introduced at the same time as certain odtherreforms began. thus some
potentially negative effects were counteracted. For example, when taiiffi on
electricity, water, and transportation were adjusted 'social," or lowvcost, tariffwvereinstituted for the lowvestincome segments.The full benefits ofsiructuraladjustmentcreditII socialpolicieswere notrealizedbecause they could
not be put in place easily, and coordination among public agencies, donors,
and nongovernmental organizationswas inadequate in the face ofweakgovermmentleadership- In retrospect, the negative social inpactofthe program
an vrulnerable groups appears to have been fairly small in Burundi, in part
because social sector spending was protected, and in part because 90 percent of the population operates in the subsistence sector."
Unlike many countries, pursuing adjustnent, Burundi has maintained
priorities for health and education. Prior to the adjustment program in
1985, social sector expenditures 'were about 28 percent of total expendioes. The ratio increased to 33 percent, or 4.4 percent of GDP, in 1991.
Table 2.7 CComparative social indicators, most recent estimates
Indicator

ife expecancy inYears
Populatfon/physidan
Populton/nursing person
Dailycaloicsupply/capita
Accesstosafewaterb
.
Pimary school gross
enrolment raiio
a, Sanie region and income group.
b. As pementao r total population.

Source World Bank (I92-
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The acccss of low-incomc groups to health, education, and potable water
has improved: more than 60 percent or the poptilation now live within 5

kilometers ofa health facility, 70 percent are enrolled in primay education,
and 34 percent of die rural popuilation have access to drinking Water (tripling from 10 percent).
Despite significant proress in the qualityand coverage of public serices
during the l980s, poverty remains a critical probleti, particularly for the 94
percent of the population ihing in rural areas. While governimen t expen diLures on the social sectors are adequate, public expenditures must be reoriented toward basic services for die poor. Although muclh has improved. social serices are still plaguied by many probiems in management, quality,
urban bias, and insufficient resource allocation for the expansion of social:
infrast-ucture.
The third phase of the govertnment's program seeiks to improve essen-

tial services for the poor by effecting greater costrecovery firomuhigi-income
users and increasing participation of private and nongovernmental orgaizations. The governmentintends to reorient expenditures toward basic services that benefit the poorest segment. Cost recovery iln health and in tertiary education will finance improvements in quality. Private sector
involvement in social services will be encourage& Poverty will be attacked
through income-generating activities, and actions targeted at the most viulnerable groups and at specific issues, such as AIDs- The continued stress on
labor-intensive policies and deregulation of tle labor market also seeks to
promote the alleviation of povertyOutcomes of the adjustnent program
Perfonn'ance during the first two stages of Burundi's adjustment program
was mixed. While the. reason lies inpart with the overly optimistic goals established at the outset, negative intemal and exogenous factors also influenLed outcomes. Among these were the limited scope of some reforn measures, initial hesitanqr by the government in implementing refonn, the
delicate sociopolitical climate, a decline in the terms of trade, periods of
drought, and a minimal level of cooperation among donors at the outset.
Macroecononicindicators

Targets. Performance targets in the fiirst policy fiamework paper (198689) includedanaaveragegrowth rate of 4percent,anannualinflation rate of
less than 10 percent, a reduction in the external debt service ratio to .18.5
percentin 1989, andan increasein thelevel ofofrlical reserves to tree months
of imports.-The external currentaccount deficit (excluding grants) was tar-
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getcd a.t an average 6 percent of GDP, and the overall budget. deficit ratio
(on a commlitment basis and withou grantS) ws targeted tt an average o5.
percent for 1986-88. The second and third policy framtework papers took
into account th1le weaker oudlook foriworlcl coflfee prices, t liei m-arked increase
in debtservicC atnd aiicl dependency. and the expancling scopeortlhc reforms.
Tlie main obijectives were to accelerate annual-average GDP growth to about
4.5 percent for-193-91,
4percentil

recduce the inflation rate from 3 percent in 1988 to

1991. reduce the external debt srice

atio from 4

1987 to about 32 percent in 1991, build up net foreign

resevnes

percentim

to-fourmion dis

of imports starting in 1988. recdtuce the overall buLdget deficit to 5 percent-of
GDI' in 1991. and increase governiment revenuie and maintain the expansion of domestic a-edit in line

wuid balance of payment objectitves.

-Otcotms. On the whole, dte macroeconomic goals embbodied in the policy
franmework papers were citier

not achieved or proved difficult to sustain.

(Table 2.2 reveals the mixed results of tlle adjistment effort Table 2. Soffers
selected indicators of BurLnindi'sactual economic performance.) On average.
GDP growth under adjustment fell below tiat

oftlie early 190s-39

per-

Table 2LB Selected macroeconomic indicators, 1980-91
19809 5

Irdicator

1986

1987

1988

1989

1990

1991

Real groVth rare(percent)
.GDPatmarketprice

446

3.3

5.5

4.9

1.5

35

GDP/apita

1.5

5.8

-3.8

2.6

-5.0

-0.5

49
2.5

9.1
7.1
1.9

-13.1
7.6
8.1

6.8
-16.1
6.9

105
13.9
-1.1

-2-. -6.0
-7.9
-0.2
-15. 14 .7

15.9
20.6
5.5

14.6
24.7
16.7
2.7
86.1
-13.8
-12.6

21.7
49.7
11.6
1.1
88.4
-8.6
45.

49.0
61A4
22.7
6-9
71.0
-1739
-16.7

36.4
79.6
15.0
1.6
8L8
-14.5
-11.6

46.2 45.
69.0 77.0
16.8
17.7
3.3 -2.6
80.3. 72.3
-14.3 -20;8
-9.6 -13.0

322
63.9
16.2
-2.1
7953
-18.1

9.2
102.4

1.8
147.8

7.1
92.2

4.5
97.4

11.7
80.8

7.0
64.5

8.9
702

125.6

184[.8

102.9

133.3

105.2

73.9

84.8

127-3

116.4

99.8

87.9

89.1

774

77.8

Exports (9)
Coffeevolume
Imports gnfs)
Ratios (parent)
Debt servcetexports (gnfs)
DOD)AGDP.
InvesmneDPC
.
DomesticsavingsfGDP
Coffee/ecports
Curre taccountADP'
Overall deficit/GDP
Cornsumer price index
(3ufumburam percentage
change)
.
Terms of trade(1 980=100)
Urit export price of coffee
(ds/lb)
Real effectve exchange rate
(1980=100)
a. Exckidg grts.
Source Govemrnment of Burundi.
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cent compared with 4.G percent. Real per capilta growth registered an avezc
age ofl1.5 percen in tlie early l98Os but only 0.3 percent during the adjutstment petiod. Average growth in all threce sectors also declined from the first
paL of tlic decade to tihe next. (The pritilly sectCor even experienced negatiye growth in 1989, bitt this was largely attributable to the Cyclical nature of
agricultural production and inclement-weather, the repercussions of wlich
were felt tlhroutglout the econtomynv) While the overall structure of output
did not cltange, the modest shirts thata did occuir wvere in tlhe direction tlat
would-be expected under atn adjustinent prog.rim. The share of agriculture
in GDP (at factor cost) declined from an average of 60 percent in the
preadjuis'ment peri od to an average of 56 percent unrder adjus.tmnt. The
secondat sector's sliare increased from 14 percent to l 6percent for die same
period, and-the tertia sectorincreased from ?§ percent to 99 percent. Real
growth in all three sectorswas disappointing. dedining from die firstpart of
the decade to the next.
In die axtcerna ara,cuirrent account deficits were generally higlher than
those projected, as the average deficit-to-GDP ratio (excluding grants) rose.
from.13.8 percent in 1980-85 to 15.7 percentin 1986-91. Export merchandise volume grew by 4.4 percent, slightly less than the average of 6.7 percent
in 1980-85 The aierage ratio for die export of goods and nonfactor services
to GDP.during the preadjustment period was 9.8 percent After six years of
adjustment, die average increased only to 10.4 percent. The actual volume
of importsuwas loWer than target levelsin all years exceptl990 and 1991, and
avenge volume growthi fell to 2 percent in the latter part of tie decade.
The volume of coffee exports has followed an uneven pattern since the
beginning of the adjustment program. (The recent evolution of coffee expolts presented in table 29 documents a pattern that corresponds more to
agricultural cycles than to changes in external prices and adjustment measures.) Efforts to revitalize Burundi's export sectorhave unfortunately coin-'
cided with a significant drop in world coffee prices, and in 1992 they were at
their lowest level in a decade. At the domestic level. the incentives to coffee
produce s to increase production vere marginal given that dome.stic prices

for green coffee remained fixed at FBu 160/k1g from 1986 to 1988, increasing only slighdy to EBu 175/k-gin 1989.
Ina fullyliberalized coifeesector; a fall in world pricesiwould be expected
to signal an eXiL from the sector or increased production to compensate for
lost revenue or both. In practice, fixed producer prices and prohibited uprooting of plants have prevented coffee growrers from reacting to price signals. The series of successive devaluations instituted diring the adjustment
period also permitted the govemnment to refrain from reducing producer
prices in the ffce of collapsingworld plices. Devaluation allowed the government to mamtain tie nominal incomes of coffee planters at comparable
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Table 2.9 Export performance, 1980-91
Before adjustment
Irdicator

1980

Under adusurnent

198085
avg.

198691
cmg.

1981

1982

(983

1984

1985

1986

1987

1988

1989

1990

87.1
3.1
1.7
0,5
3,8
2.6
- 1,2
100.0

88.5
86.0
3.2
3.0
2,8
3.3
0.1
0.9
1.1 .2.8
3.3
2.6
0,9
1.5
100.0. 100.0

82.9
7.2
0.7
0.7
2.8
4.5
1.3
100.0

84.3
5,3
0.3
0,9
3.7
S.3
0.1
100.0

88.4
2.7
0.1
0.8
2.4
5.6
0,1
10.0.0

71.0
5.3
4.1
1.5
3.3
13.1
1.8
100.0

B2.8
4.5
0.6
1.7
2.4
5.8
2.1
100.0

80.3
6.0
0,2
34
4,0
4.5
1.6
100.0

72.3
79.3
11.5
9.7
0.2.
0.0
4.7
2.6
4.7
3.S
5.7
3,8
. 0.9
1.1
100.0 100.0

86.1
4,0
1.7
0.7
3.1
3,3
1.1
100.0

16.8
463
.-79.0
X345
-3.9
95.0
-60.0
13.0

17.6
32.3
.45.3
38.6
52.8
-6,6
167,0
18.7

7.6 -16.1
15.1
8.6
-36.7 2,187.9
13.6
-0.4
54.9
-4.3
129.7
61.5
8.8 .32.9
10.-7.4

13.9
-5.5
-84.1
17.6
248.6:
-i9.4
69.5
13.4

-7.9
-15.2
.70.5
29.0
31.3
-60.1
-44.0
- 8.4

-0.2
24.6
-33.3
2.7
.40.5
.25.8
-61.0
-5.8

7.1
3.0
21.8
5.0
-3.2 310.6
34,3
8.7
2.8
43.3.
35,3
22.9
26.1
-9.6
6.7
3.2

1991

19809t

avg

Percentage of total goods (fob)

CdFee
Tea
Cotton
Hides
Other primary
Manufactures
Re-exports
Total

87.7
2,3
1.7
0.9
4,1
1,7
1.6
100.0

Grwth ratese
Coffee
-31.7
Tea
:
-18.0
Cotton
-58,1
Hides
-50.1
Otherprimary
-37.3
Manufactures
42.1
Re-expors
0.0
Total
.
-31,7
a.Change Inthe volurne of exporls.
Source: Govemment of Burundi,
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46.3 .12.4
76.6
-2.8
6.0. 164.1
35,4 -21.6
26,5 -68.7
4.3 111,4
0.0 . 24.9
43.8
11,9

-18.5
-3.4
-6.8
238.0
47.4
-25.4
25.0
-15.2

.

20.6
32.7
-99.9
-10.4
-30.1
51.5
2.2
16.7

79.0
6.6
0.9
2.5
3.4
6.4
1.3
100.0

82.5
5.3
1.3
1.6
3.2
4.9
1.2
100.0
5.1
13.4
153.7
21.5
23.1
291
8.3
5.0
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production levels, sheltering them from the effects af low prices. Failure to
adjust domestic producer prices and to introduce quality incenives, combined with large aid-financed sector investments, contributed.to delayed
reform in tde coffee sector.
In terms offoreignfiancing, official dev&lopment assistance was an irmportant determinant of the country's external financal equilibrium. Net
official development assistance averaged $135 million annually in tde early
1980s, and increased to $192 million in 1986-91, wiith percapita equivalents
arnounting to $30 and.$37, respectively..The amount of fiancing for the
overall structuraladjustmentprogrmn (which includesWorld Bank, IMF and
related donor contributions). mirrors the increases observed in official development assistance. The share of the structural adjustment financing to
GDP ras 1.3 percent in 1986, andjumped to 3 percent in 1991 (with a high
point in. 1990 at 5 percent). The grant element throughout'. the program
increased relative to loans: in 1986 itwas only 7.3 percent, while in the 198691 period itLwas 24.4 percent
TotalforeignpubEcdebtsoared from 25 percent of GDP in the first half of
the 1980s to 74percentin the second half, and the debt service ratio for the
same period increased from 14 percent to 37 percent. This increase reflects
the increased levels of borroving and the nonconcessionalit of the loans
thatwere assumed. Both total debt stocks and debt service ratios have now
reached levels that, if allowed to rise, couldjeopardize the country's longterm adjustment efforts. Much to its credit, Burundi has maintained an excellent repayment record on its debt service, and has begun to address its
debt exposure by accepting external assistance in the form of either grants
or debt on a concessional basis. The donor community has also made initial
efforts to alleviate the debt burden by canceling some outstanding debt,
exemplified most recently by France and Belgium.
In the budgetary area, government revenue remained slightly below expectations, and expenditures generaRly rose above agreed-upon ceilings.Comparedwith the early 198Os, currentex-penditures increased by 2 percent
underadjustment, while capitalandnetlending.expenditures declined from
14.6 percent of GDP to 13.2 percent Nonetheless, the overall situaton has
sh ownverymodestimprovement The fiscal deficitas a ratio of GDP declined
from an average of 12.6 percent in 1980-85 to 113. percentin 1985-91. And
despite successive devaluations, the nonmonetary financing of the budget
deficit helped bring down inflation from 9.2 percent in 1980-85 to 6.8 percent in 198691.
While efforts to increase investmn2t bore minimal results, the observed
trends were encouraging. Fixed investment rose from an average of 15.6
percent of GDP in the first period to more than 17 percent in the next (the
share of private investment increased from 2 percent to almost 3 percent).
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The public to private investment, coefficient fell from 7.0 to 5.9. Thle sectoral
composition of public inveslinents Was essentially uinaffected by thc adjuisLiient progiratmt. Wllile 74percent of investinents went to econ olnic infrhastiructiure in LtIe 1983-88 periot, this percentage remained bIasically uncnliaged

at. 76 percent. in ilte 1989-90 pericid. Investment. in social infrastrtictilre
declined froni 17 percenLin tie first period to 11 percentin the%second;

ieL

only fiom 47
main cornponents, however-education and
to 49 percent, and firom 39 to 35 percent,. respectively. This relative inertiai in
.ealth-moved

the strictu ire otipublic investmnenLs reflecLts eii dependence on aidi financing, which shielded dhcii fr-omI price incentives, as wellas tLlhcir adninistra-

tivcly determined levels and the s1low pace at wVihichi thle goverinicnt.began
favoring social and economic infrastrnucture over productive sectors.
The share of consunptkmtz in CDP remained largely tih same, registering
abotO98 percentin both periods Attempts to increase domestic savingsweree

disappointing,. as the savings-to-CDP ratio droppedc from 2.7 to 1.7 percent.
Smniafla. There is no single explanation for Burindi's mediocre
macroeconomic performnance. Rather, several fiactors contribuited to these
outcomes. First, the miixed results reflect problemiis witl the policy frameWOrk}papers' projections. In fact, aWMorld Bank paper coveringpolicv framework papers for 21 different Sub-Saharan Afiican countries ack-nowledged
that "overall, the majority of projected valtes have turmed out to be ai1bitious in the sense that they diverge from actual val.ues by more than 10 percent" (Faruqee 1992), and the budget and cur-rent accounL deficit projections (as ratios to GDP) have deviated substantialy across countries. More
specifically, the study found that Burundi's policy framework papers we-re
aoverly optiniisdc"'for budget deficits and domestic savings as a percentage
of GDP and for tde growrth of exports orgoods and nonfiactor services. Tey
were deemed "optimiistic forinvestment-to-GDP ratios and real GDP growth.

In retrospect, it is clear that certain targets could have been met only in the
best of circumnstances.
Second. external and domesticvariables account fo-some of the resulus.
Deteriorating terms of trade, poorweather, and civil disturbance from years
of etlnic rivalry are partly to blame. Third, flaws in the design and delays in
the implementation of some adjustment measuress are also responsible. the
latter a function of the change in government in 1987 and die absence of
governmentinternalization.2QAnodlier important considet-ation is the mobi-

lization ofgenerous but untied financial assistance to the cotintyby the donor
communityr and the minimal initial coordination among the donor conimunity to reinforce adjustment reforms. Untied external investmnents that senre
national commercial interests may -have delayed restructuring and encouraged the status quo.
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Secioral ouicownsv
Pliudar sedrorandw dhre,rslrodirlrn.Because Buruncli has one of the lhiglhest

griiculti-re-to-GDP r-atios in the world (close to 60 percent of CDP at factor
cast prior to adjusnuent). restizic.tring its primaray sector was of paramount
importance. TlhroluglhotL the program, the share of agriculture declined
soi ewlchiat 1055 percent. hu die shlares of dte food and export crop sub.sectors
did not register any growthl (remaining at 77 and 9 percent respectively, in
tle preadjustn ent and posttdjusunentpeiiods). Food crops grew at an annal average of only 3.1 percent duting thc decade (just'keeping pace with
populiation growYtI); wlile cash crops grew by 16 percent. 'The markets for
food crops are poorly developecl. and die only incentive for increasing produiction is meeting population growth. Bananas, roots, and tubels account
for tie majoriy of food crop production,-wihile cercals.and beans contribute
ammuch smallershare of total ouLput. Overall, bananaand root crop production expanded under dle adjustmentprogram. Dezspite sitgnificantincreases
in rice output (box 2.6). cereal productton rose only slightly, reflecting the
stagnation of maize-and declining bean output after 1987.
Although there has been little evidence of a production shift from
nontradables to tradables, there has been a discernible movement toward
diversification within dle tradables sector. There are also some indications

Box 2.6 Li'beralization and supply response in the rice markets.
.
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Rice produection incrcased significandtl under the adjiistment program dtie 'to
government investrments in irnigated and rain-fed rice, the introduiction of highyieldingvarictics, a grouing urban demnand, and thelibcralization of rice nmariceting.
Large-scale rice growing was introduced in Burundi in the early 1970s.-At that
time, the countr consumed more rice than it produced and imported the difference. At present, howrever, roughly 30,000 tons of rice a year are produced, leaving a surplus in excess ordomestic consumnption. Yetgovcernmcnt investments in
the Itmbo plain, where most rice is grown, accountfor only part of the rice SIcceCSS
story. It was the steps taken in 1989 to libcelize paddy marketing that led to an.
increase in exports of hulled rice by pnvate companies. Until then, the parastatal
SRD-Tmbo had a monopoly for thc purchase and marlketing of rice.
In 1989 the company transferred its ricc-purchasing ftnctions tovillage associations, which have since frecly compe tcd w%ith each other.. Thevalue of exports rose
from FBu 53 million in 1988 to FBu 1829 million in 1989. Although there is'potential for exporting rice to neighboring Ruanda and 7aire, the complexityofdistnibution networks tends to preclude public involvement and leaves only private
companies to exploit such opportunities. Output projections for the areas now
under cultivation indicate the potential for rice exports to triple.
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thatproducershave become more interested in producing tobacco and food,
for which the relative price has increased over the past few years. lIowever,
few agricultural producers seeni to bave measurably clhanged die composition of their production. The explanation foI dtis: lies in somne of the main
causes of the genertal lack of a suipply response in Burundi: farmers are unfamiliarwith othiercrops, the goveiminentplaces pressure on dlemn to remain
in their subsectors, sufficient price signals are absent, and, in coffee, lairgscale, aid-financed development projects proniote production and export.
Administrative impedimentc and price rigidities aside, indications suggest that some level of export diversification did take place at the expense of
coffee (table 2.9). Calculations showfiat the proportion of coffeeJin total,
exports declined steadilybewveen 19719 and 1991 (froni 92 percent to 80
percent)., 1 This is an encouraging deelopment given. the preponderance
ofcoffee among Burundi's export crops and the fluctuations oftworld prices,
twvo factors that can have a significant impact on the financial health of
Burundi's.balance of payments and governmentbudget. Tea exports, which
rose in the 1980-85 period, have since stagnated, due to poorly managed tea
fictories, insufficientpro ducerincentives (which discourage producers from
harvesting), and inadequate fertilizersupply. Since 1986 the production of
cotton fiber has declined, attributable to noncompetitive producer prices.
(which have remained constantsince 1987), low and stagnating yields, and
irregular input supplies from the managing parstatal Cotton Mangement
Company. Hideslhave displayed the mostregularanduninterruptedincrease,
from less than 0.5 percent in 1981 to more than 4percent in 99O.22 Agin
on the positive side, several nontraditional exports have developed in the
pastfewyears, representinga.s-mallproportion oftotalagroin'dustrial exports
.(46 percent), butincreasing due to the government's more positive attitude
toward the private sector. Though nontraditional exports contribute only a
smaill share of total exports, their high average annual growth rate of 10.6
percent since 1985 underscores the dyniamism of the emerging private sec-.
tor and its ability to respond to incentives. The proportion of manufactures
increased under the adjustmen tprogram, a sector thatbegan exporting good,s
only relatively recently (figure 21).
The impact of exchange rate adjustments on the exteral trade sector
has generally been favorable. Overall,.exports grew and diversified in response
to devaluations. However, for traditional exports, which are subject to fixed
producerprices, the devaluations had limited impact. on production but did
increase the profitability of the subsectors as a-whole, especially for coffee
and tea. In contrast, since prices in tobacco are not controlled, these producers appear to have benefited the most. Among nontraditional exports,
primaryproducts appear to have grown significantlyin response to exchange
rate measures. (The main constraint on increasing nontraditional exports
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lihas been the unavailability of reliable, cheap, and frcquent flightsh to Europe,
and for horticultural products, it also has been poor project design.) Conversely, imports remained stagnant or declined. All categories of imports fell

(except for capital goods), which can be explained in part by the increased
competitiveness oflocal production relative to imports following tie devaluations and increased aid flows.
During the second phase of adjustment, the government was committed to becoming more ofa regulator and promoter than a producer and proces.sor for the majoriy of productive actiities..Commitrnent, however, did
not translate into action. The government's dominant position, exercisedthrough numerous public enterprises, restricted supply response in the ag-:
ricultural sector. Increased export earnings from successive devaluationswere absorbed almost-entirely by agroindustrial public enterprises. To date,
the-government remains the only real economic agent-for die principal
export and import-substitution crops. Coffee marketing and agricultural
inputs were not liberalized (although the rice sector was successfully-reforrried). Prior to April 1992, agricultural inputs had been subsidized, and
the price of traditional export crops administered (and, kept at low levels)- by the g. vernment This stance encouraged the inefficientuse ofinputs and
discouraged increased and better'quality output Other deterrents to tsupply response were capital constraints, inadequate accesss to land, the weakdomestic demand for food crops (a function of the scarity of urban centens and-a tradition of subsistence agriculture), poorsoil fertility due to erosion and overuse, and the reluctance offhrmers to increase their dependency
on a largely government-controlled market, given the country's political and
Figure 2.1 Burundi's coffee and merchandise
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social history. Nonetheless, new export diversification initiatives, sUch as
green beans, passion frttit, and flowers, have cmrcged.
IindustrialsecLrn. 13iruindi's induist.ial sector accounrs for about5 percent

of GDP (abouit tde same as in 1984 anmd about half thec share in most otLher
*low-inconie countries), comprises somiec 200 fliis enpgged in inanufacturing, and is dominated byppublic enterptises. The moden .sectoremploysabout
one percent of tie active population. Pr-oduction and cmployment in the
private manufactuiing sector arc domninated by tvo breweries. Foreign ownership h3a declined since dLie curly 1980s.2 Most of tdc Ianufctufing outputgoes to the loal nariket, and production is concentrated in ypical simple
import-substitution-activities. Tle importinten-sity=of tiesector is more than

one-third of gross outptL-Since the mid-1980s, industrial growth has been slow but positive. Real
output increased by about 4.6 percent annually between 3986 -and 1991.
(Manufacturingoutputfell by 5.8 percentin 1989 due toa dropin demanidattributable to the drought,wlhich. increas:- -food prices and reduced disposable income-and due toan increase in the transaction tax fom 12 to 15
percent.) Investments picked up in absolute terms during dle second halfof
the 1 9S0s. This growth reflected a stimulated private sector under the adjustmentmeasures: the share of tie private sector in industrial investments rose
from about 25 percentin 1978-82 to 85 percent in 1989.
*Both the overwvlhelming presence of the govermment as a producer and
the large share of aid-financed investnent (which was inevitably channeled
through the public sector) have been ithe primary detenninants of the industrial sector's slow take-off and relative inability to respond to market signals. The progress of the industrial sector under adjustment has also been
slow due to low domestic demand, difficulties in exporting, shortcomings in
transport infrastructure, poor access to long-term credit, the lack of initial
equity, and little industrial tradition.
In gener-al, the directon of the reforms was appropriate, but implemenation was deficient Industrial public en terprises have not yet been restructured. Export pronLotion measures were implemented late or partially or
On the w1hole, the industrial policy of the late 1980s failed to recogbciblo.

nize crucial intersectoral linlages. Still, refonn efforts did elicit a supply
response in the fonn ofinvestments ofatleast $10 million annually, and the
latest estimates suggest that investnents fur private industrial operations are
close to $25 million.
Informalsector. Burundi's urban informal sector is estimated to account
for about 5 percent of GDP, the same contribution as the fornil industrial
sector. The main activities are food production, tailoring, wood and metal
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working, construction, and repairs. I-Hal of til activities are concentrated in

die garmcntsubsector. l-airofrthe biisinessesare conducted in private hlomes,
and about. 20 percent r enit ecquipmiient. fromn oliher ent,repreneuis. Onl y 12
percent of die firnms have access to clectricity. Most informial workers alre
Burundi nationals (75 percent), while inuny of tic foreigners are Zairians
whlo emigrated in the 1960s. The level or edtuation is relatively low-twotlhirds did not finislh the tlhird gadce, ancd only 14 percent Irhve secondary
education. The avenwge mon tlilysalary is iihe cluivAlent of$17, whiclr is three
to four diies less than average compensation in the formnil sector. Concentated primarily in Bujumbura, the inform-al sector dotublec in
size betwveen 1986 and 1989, bused on nationalaccounts statistics.nThe sector's
growthdis due largely to the
dnorc
liberal economic environment under die
adjustmentprogrami, pa.rticularlyl rie gretter freedoii ofmiovementiwlicdhivas tightly controlled until late 19SS. Yet tlesecto'rremains relativelyunderdeveloped, constrained.by poor access to credit, by regulatory and legal is-.
sues,.and by local taxation. Despite recent growth, die sector remains relatively small-at about half the average size estimated for Sub-Saharan
Africa-attributable to minimal trading and industrial traditions.
Puzblic enteprises andfpiri-aesectordevelopment In general, outcomesc were
unsatisfactory. Public enterprise management remained inefficient, an em-.
ployment policy based on productivity criteria was still absent, and the pub
lic sector was not opened to private invtestors. In fact, the government continued to acquire shares in public enterprises and their numbers actually.
increased from 74 in 1936 to 86 in 1991, despite seven liquidations. A proposed study on the potential for privaization wVas not completed undilJuly1991. And itwas not until die same year tlat the governmentadoptedaglobal approach to public enterprises, dassif'ing them according.to whedter
they wrould be liquidated, plivatized. or rehabilitated. As of 1991 public enterprises still controlled directly orindirectly all of Burundi's cash crops and
60 percent of its formal manufacturing- The public sector's overall share in
the economy has remained essentially unchianged, a-veraging 27 percent in
.1983-85 and an estimated 28 percent in 1990. Furthermore, transfels and
subsidies (primarily to public enterpiises) increased from an avenge of 1.2
percent of GDP between 1983 and 1985 to an estimated 2A percent of GDP
in 1990, primarily in the form of capital subsidies provided by Burundi's
extemal donors.
Efforts to promote private sector developmenthave been disappointing,
particularly in terms of shifting productive actividies from die public to the
private sector, and promoting private sector growth. Legacy is one of the
important Factors in the slow transition. Years of isolation have limited the
exposure of private enterprises to international business practices. Past r ePublished by iRepository, 2021
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strictions on travel, limited participation in import-export trade, and tightly
circumscribed foreign rinancial transactionsall weak-ened outside '-xpeci'ence
and precluded contacts ror local private entreprenceluS. More recently. private entrepreneurs stiffer from poorinrorltation servicesand expensive telmanagement
communications, airfares, and freight fares. Furthermolr,
expertise is weak: most managers do not klnow their fir 's production costS,
nor the imnportance of using depreciation and replacement value, in cost
accounting (rather than nominal purchase values). Product quality is poor.
Policy barriers, regulato-y constraints, and low domestic demand have also
hampered die sector. And poor access to long-term credit and tde absence
of initial equity have hindered private investmentr But the foremost reason
has been the overwelming presence of thge overnmentand thealmost total
absence of any long-standing tradition-in trade, handicrafts, or industry.
As formeasures already taken private investmenthas notyetresponded
to them, probably because the msures, while necessary, were insuffcient
by themselves. Burundi's heavyjuridico-regulatory environment, the inadequacy ofthe banking sector and itS credit rationing policies, the crowding
out of the privatesectorbyypublic sector borrowing, the difficulty ofentering
those sectors monopolized by public enterprises, and the higlh cost of the
transactions taxand of laborall contributed to limiting private sector development. Inaaddition, little hasbeen.done to encourage directforeign investment, and the bias toward loan-inanced, capital-intensive investment has
persisted. Price-fixing agreements among banlks alio undernined sectoral
reforn Although real term depo.sitrates fluctuated annuallywith the inflation rate, theywere not adjusted systematically to remain positive. The COSL
of employment creation remained high, preventing a substantialincrease in
private sector employmenL This constraMintwas due essentially to red tape in
labor regulations and the comparatively high nonwage costs of labor. The
discretionarywayin which taxbreaksunder the investment codewere granted
encouraged uneven treatment of entrepreneurs and lowered predictability
and accountability, essential variables for private sector development
Despite the false starts, some progress hasbeen made Under the second
phase of adjustment, several nonviable public enterprises were liquidated,
program contracts for public companies scheduled for rehabilitation were
established, the recovery of-onlent funds to public enterprises and the collection of taxesand dividendswere improved;and two enterprises madestaff
cuts. The performance of the sugar complex (Moso.Sugar Company) improved significantdy, allowing it to assume part ofits debt service obligations,.
and private interests assumed the management of the company with an op.
don to purchase it later. The efficiency of the public transit company also
improved as fares were increased and cost-cutting measures introduced.The
structural adjustment efforthas clearly played an importantrole in establishPublished by iRepository, 2021
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ing an environmtient. that is conducive to private sector development espe-cialy for nontraditional prodtacLs not controlled bypublicenterprises. ThCSC
sectors have shown a strong s.upply response, and farnmers generally receive
a beuterrcturn to labor dtan for state-administered crops. Most recently, new
cp orLs have been developed by th cprivate sector in hides, decorative plants,
and fruits and vegetables.
Tihe business climatein Bunimdi hasimiproved markedlysince 1990. Most
of the cumbersome procedures of tie past have been either eliminated or
simplified. The system is considerablymore transparent, imp rving tde com-..
petitiveness ofpiiate firmns. The authorities are increasingly recogniz.ing tiat
private sectordevelopnientis in theinterestofthe econo:nyasawhole, since.
ptivate business could generate a significant share of tax revenue and em-ployvnenL For example, in the urban areas, a recent USAID-financed study
indicates liat, wlhile private firms accounted'for only 7.3 percent of nationalI
GDP. they contributed 58 percent of the national totalFvalue-added tax.-55
percent ofthe tourist tax, 40 percentofimport'duties, 24percent of corpo-S
rate income, and 9 percent of export taxes.
Private sector development has been disappointing, particularly in the
shift ofproductive activities from the public.to the private sectorand in overall private sector growth. Part of the reason is years of isolation, past restrictive policies, poor information serices, and high traisport costs. But the
foremost reason has been the ovenrhelming presence of the governmentin
tde productive sectors. In the public sector, progresswas disappointing in
terms of improving the efficiency of public enterprise management, developingan emplomnent policy based on productivity criteria, and opening the.
public sectorto prvate investors. In short, the private sectorwas constrained
from developing, and in the public sector the governmentwas reluctant to
encourage reform and reduce the number of public enterprises.
More rime will be required so that past efforts and new reforms can be
translated into concrete performance. Private sector developmentwill continue to depend on macroeconomic approaches that seek to remove policy
and regulatory impediments, to increase lknowY-how, and to develop a skilled
laborforce. In the shortterm, the focus shouldbe on improvingand expandingvocational training facilities and managementprogras. In the long tennr,
the objective should be to upgrade and expand primary and secondary education. Furdter political change may be necessary for long-term confidence
to be restored. Investors, both domestic and foreign, need the assurance of
long-term political and economic stability before, they risk their assets in
productive activities. All this takes time.
So cialsectors and income distributiomThe potentially adverse social effects
of adjustment programs can take the form ofa decline in real wages, poorer
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nutrition, reduced subsidies, higher interest and tax rates, and increased
unemnployment. Fortunately, die overall social impact or the adjustmiient
program seemis to have been fairly small in Burundi. In general, accescs to
health, education, and potable water registered improvenients under the
adjustment program, despite a rapid population growth rate.
.While GDP per capita improved only slightly during the adjustment
period, the real monetary income of rarmn households rose by almost ] pern
cenL In the modern sector, civil service pay rose by an average of 5 percent
*annually in tle late l9SOs.2'And tie income arthe export production sector
apparently rose faster than that of local trade. Following devaluations, exporters enjoyed a greater increase in income tlhan did producers ofiimport
substitutes and local market products.
In terms ofnutrition,j Burundi ispracticallyself-sufficientin food, which
accounts for less than 5 percent of imports. Per capita daily caloric intake,
while having declined slightly, averages around 2,200 and iS still above ie.
FAO minimum of21 00. However, the lipid intak-e is inadequate (44percent
of the FAO minimum), and regional disparities in caloric intake exist.
One area that appears to have placed a burden on economic groups is
taxes. The overall tax burden (as: measured by receipts over GDP) rose during the adjustment period-from about 14 percent in 1980-85 to about 17
percent in 1986-90. Caviezel and Fotga (1989) suggest that the tax burden
on fmuners rose from 34.1 to 39.5 percent Conversely, tde tax burden on
town dwellers eased, from 65.9 percent to 6035 percent In anotheraspect of
fiscal policy, capital expenditures in social sectors declined, but current expenditures increased. The reduction in social investment is due in part to
greater financial reTp onsibility at the local govermmen t level, and-by municipalities and communities.
In education, the share ofcurren t expenditures (primarily salaries) allocated to tis sector increased fromn 20.7 percent in 1980-85 to 26 percent in
1986-90. Expenditures on textbooks andsnrall equipmentwere defrayed by
extemal donations- Howeveri the share of educational costs borme by families is high relative to the rest of Afiica, anmounting to about 30 percent in
primayschool, 2 percentin secondary.and 13 percentin higher educatior..
While primary school enrollment has risen and benefited a greaternuinberof the poor (by splitting sessions and increasing class sizes), the potential exists
for negatively affecting the quality of education. Similarly, in the health sector, aconsiderable improvementin primaryhealth care infrastructurewasnot
accompanied by appropriate personnel assignments and recurrent cost allocations. In sum, public expenditures in the social sectors should be reoriented
toward further quality improvements in basic services that benefit the pnor.
The stabilization policy sloxwed the growth of emplovment in tldc public

and sen ipublic sector. Thus far,it appears
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aged to find newjobs, although the small size and growtl of the private sector continues to offer limited opportunities. It is assumed that poverty will
rise in agriculture wait will be the first to absorb the growing population.
Given the regulatory rigidities, incomplete iinplementation of reforms, and
unsteady economic growth, it seems that the current employment situation
is due more to lack of adjustment than to the process itsel.
The prudent monetary policy followed by the government during adjustmnent has kept prices reladtively low. nflationary pressures have been due
to fluctuations in food production. agricultural markleting problems, and
poorweather. And while some public tariffs were raised in 1989-90, die lowest-income groups were .spared the full impact by the imposition of special
low-cost tariffs.
Income distribution was -affected by devaluations of the FBu under the
adjustment program, both directly through wages and indirectly through
spinoffrom import substitution. A widespread perception now shared
among government officials in Bujumbura is thatwages and salaries in the
pnvate sector are substantially higher than those in the public sector given
the same level of qualification- This gap is believed to have widened as-pnxate secaorwages increased with inflation,wshile publicsector wages remained
frozen (aside from twvo isolatedc 10 percent raises in 1989 and 1992) The
relative vage differential is beginning to encourage the better elements of
the Civil service to seek-employment in the private sector, thereby laying the
foundation for the further disengagement ofthe state froin some economic
activities, and boosting the development of the private sector.
-The rise in the price of imported goods-due to devaluation-has affected personswYith fixed incomes, such as govemmentemployee.s and those
workingforminimumrivage-Yet, since fixed-income earnersarestill relatively
well off relative to the entire poipulation and make up avery small percentage of the total population, the devaluations have inffacthurthigher-income
groups more than they have lower-income groups. This dimension of the
adjustnent program has- tended to improve rural-to-tirban terms of trde,
since mostof the higher-incomegroup lives in Bujumbura. The devaluations
have also affected consumption patterns, shifting purchases toward locally
produced goods as opposed to imported items. The main beneficiaries of
such spending are domestic producers, primarily in the infornal sector.
In general, rural purchasing power has remained the. same except for
producers of coffee, tea, and-cotton, who have .suffered real declines in producerprices. The-monetary income ofrural hou.seholds has increased annu-allyy 0.9percentduring theadjustmentperiod, compared with 0.3 percent
in the preceding period. In the modern urban sector, the wages of civil servants increasedby 5 percentannually between 1986 and 1989. Yet consumer
prices in Bujumbura increased by 6.3 percent annually during the same
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period, eroding purchasing powYer by about 1.3 percent annually. Inflation
was lowerin rural areas, in whichi imnports representonlyabout 10 percent of
consumption and fewer exchanges are monetized, thus reducing the nominal income gap in favor of urban dwellers.
Fmal remarks
It is perhaps too early to judge the efforts of all who have contributed to
Burundi's incipient adjustment efforL Economic adjustment is a mediumto long-term undertaking, not one that can be measured fully in the short
term-according to targets and indicators. Measuring the success ofprogmms
poses challenges, particularly during the initial stages. Depending on the
methodologyuused for;determining outcomes, performance may appear sat-,
isfactory or le.sS so. What mayat first appear a failure may instead be only an
early prognosis as certain reforms simply require a longer sustained effort
than had been originally anticipated. An appreciation of the difficulties in
introducing strucuiral change is essential to determining the performance
ofan adjustnent program ,
The nascent stages of Burundi's adjustment effort are now over As the
country continues to taclde its pressing development challenges and engage
itself further in an increasingly competidve and intemational environment,
the need to continue its reform program remains more necessary than ever.
The effort will not be wvithout its difficulties; as demonstrated, adjustment
programs encompass a complex series ofinterdependentpolicy prescriptions
thatare oftensensitivein nature and thatcan be difficultto implement.Structural reform, as a means of contributing to effective economic change and
.sustainable grovth in developing countries, has proven to be a. long-term
undertaking. And though the experience has shown that the successful ap
plication of adjustmentefforts maynotyield immediate returns, the efforts
ensure a foundation for sustainable and equitable growth.
Notes
lIThe public entcrprise (PE) sectorgreatlyexpanded during 197881, appropriadng4O percent ofgross fixed capital formation (GFCF), 42 percent of outstanding
foreign debt, and 58 percent of debtsenice, but accounting for only 16 percent of the
formal sector labor force and almost 6 percentof GDP. The average forSub-Saharan
Africa is 20-25 percentofCFCF, 25-30 percentoftnodernmsector employment, and 15
percent ofGDP. By the mid-I S8Os, the government owned and operated 57 PE;, which
Lwere cngaged in a wide variety of commercial and social activities.2 Itwas apparently for the-sake ofpnudenceand with the objectiveofintroducing
the measurcsgradually tt the governmentdid notofficiallyinform the public ofany
newY measures.
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S. Under the leadership of President Buyoya, this trend has begun to be reversed.
Mostnotably, a referendum on a new pluralistic constitution was submitted to popular
vote in March 1992 and approved by a mnajorityof the voting population. National legislative and prcsidential elctions took place in the summer of 1993.
4. Contributors to Burundi's structural adjustment program have included Germany, France, USAID, the European Communityjapan, Switzerland, IDA, and Saudi
Arabia.
5. Gross foreign rescrves amoun ted to 2.3 months ofimports (goods and nonfactor
scrvices) in 1987 andjumped-to 5.2 montbsof imports in 1989. Due partly to excessive
foreign reserves, the World Bank proposed a smaller structural adjustment credit m
operation in the amount of S30 million. (Structural adjustmentcredit! , in conmbination with a special facility forAfrica of$16.2 million, amounted to $31.2 million;-structural adjustment credit lI was $90 million.)
6. Tenc problem of conditionality overload is not unique to Burundi. The average
number of World Bank conditions per sLructural adjusunentcreditincreased almost
threefold between 198042 and 1988-89.
7. Policy firamework papers drafted jointly by the government, the IMF, and thel
World Bank outine the expectedoutcomesof policy reforms andkey macroeconomic
targets. As of May 1991, 87 policy famework papers had been prepared for 29 coimtrieswith structural adjustmentfacility and cxtended structural adjustmnent facility programns. Burnmdi's participation in drafting policy framework papers was minimal until
the thirdpolicyframework paperin l989. Thefifth, andlast policy frameworkpaper
covers 1992 to 1995.
8. Later policy frAmework papers did not mention specific credit targets.
9. From 1976 to November 1983, the Bunindi francwas pegged to the TUS. dollar
at SI for FBu 90. This ratc was implidtly-devalued by 30 percent in November 1983
when Burundi adopted its peg to the SDR at a rate of FBu 122.7 per SDR
10. The weight of the U.S. dollar in the SDR is about42 percent.
11.According to the IM (Johnston and Williams.1991), gold exports are exempt
from the foreign exchange surrender requirement, and gold traders are permitted to
import and hold foreign currency. The foreign currencyis used by traders to purchase
gold locally, which is bought pnimarily in hard currency. The sellers of gold hold or
export thehard currency or convert itinto Burundi francs (or the currencics of neighboring coun tries) through the black market to purchase goods and services localy. In
some cases, gold is purchased with a transfcr of hard currency to the gold seller's bank
account held abroad.
12- Dcvaluations can also be used to moderate the gap between the official and
parallel exchange rates. One measure of the effectiveness of nominal devaluations is
the rcal effective exchangc rate, which takes into account relative price developmcnts.
It is through changes in the real exchange rate that nominal devaluations can improve
a countryis international competitiveness. However, if devaluations lead to cxcessivc
inflation, ticir cffectiveness is diminished.
13. The purpose of the open general license system is to liberalize exports and
imports more fully. Only a limited number of goods are restricted, primarily for securiry reasons. An open general license was introduced in May 1992.
14. Thc public sector is the. main beneficiary of foreign cxchange reccipts, while
private sector importers constitute the lion's share of the demand for forcign exchange-

15. The number of importers girew from 145 in 1985 to more than 400 in 1991.
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16. IFor a thoroughi discussion orl eimploymcent issues, see Poaitiquu de 1d'empli au
BunLfidi: bilnttetn p_Idtivff, I LO-PECTA, Addis Ababa, 1990.
17. The average Ior Sub-Sahatran Afrrica is 25-30 pe!rcent of gross fixed capital forination, 25-30 percent or mnodern sector emilployment-, and 15 percent of CDP.
18. IHigher social stattis was given to administrative and miliutry positions comn-

pared with those in tradte and industrial.activities.
19. The tei-ts of trade of agriculmtre improved slighdy in relation to the modern
sector, owing essentially to the fCall in real -incomes in the uirban (essentially public)
sector. The stabilization program was reflected in a slowdown of cmnploynent in the
pulblicsector, while absorption of laborby the nonagricultural (informal and formial)
sector-was verylow

dlie to rigidities that persisted in the economiiy (riegul1atiors).

20. Yet, even if the adjuLsutnent meamsures had becn inmplemllented fllly and the perfornance indicators had .howsn impre.ssivc iniprovenients, iLwo1ild be fallacious tosiggest that the reform measures by themselves were soicly responsible for successful
adjustMenL
21.A three-yearrunningaverage methodwas used tlcdosmooth overoddvalucs and
toyield a better estimate of the ocr-all trend. Calcutlaudons ba.sed on volune ieveal that
the coffee index fell noticeably relative to total merchan dise exports beginning in 1987,
the year when the world price of coffee began its downward spiral.
- 22. Hides have a small import component in their production and thu.s respond
well to devaluiations that do not affect their input prices.
23. This phenomenon is aLtributable to the "Burundization" cfforts of the past, to
foreigners selling their intcrests in nonviable activities (made temporarily profitable
by protection and tax exemptions) when investment code benefiLs run out, and to the
emergence of a small ntunber of newr Burundi entrepreneurs.
24. This increa.se was duc to a gneral salary increase of 10 percent at the end of
1989 and regular annual increments.
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Cote d'Ivoire:
fettered adjustment
Lionel Demery

Economic adjustment has not been easy for Cote dlvoire, and the record
shows that after ten years of "adjustment," little fundamental had changed
by the end of the 1980s. The limited adjustment that was achieved was at
considerable cost Negative real GDP growth characterized dte decade, and
poverty has risen steeply as a resul Both adverse trends can be attributed in
part to weaknesses in the adjustment effort. Despite its reliance on expenditure-reducing policies, the governmenthas failed to solve its fiscal problems.
And poliqc-induced distortions in trade and exchange rates have persistedFrom.these perspectives, the case illustrates some of the repercussions of not
-adjusting in any fundamental sense, and it offers insights into .what the.
counterfactual to structural adjustentrmight entail. Adjustment operations
-by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund have achieved some
measure of policy reform, but this can be characterized .as too little and too
late. The fundamental problemns remain unaddressedEarly attempts at adjustment were made during 1981-86, and. some
progresswas achieved, due in part to more favorable extemal circunmstances.
In the event, however, the adjustmentimpetus failed, and later efforts atadjustment during 1987-91 did notachieve the macroeconomic policy reforms
thatare needed. In short, we distinguish three periods in the adjustment experience of CGite d'Ivoire. The first, 1975-80, is the destabilizingperiod,when
macroeconomic imbalances grewr to crisis proportions. The second; 198186, can be .termed a period of partial adjustment The third, 1987-91, is a
period of inadequate or fettered adjustment.'
Three major constraints fettered the adjustment effort:
The severity and recurrence of economic shocks, as evidenced by the
continued decline in the terms of trade over the decade. The decline
is due in part to a concentration on coffee and cocoa in the country's
foreign exchange earning sector.
72
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The persistence of rigidities and distortions. incluiding thle pegging of
the CRA fhanc to the Fr enchi franc. thie movemnents of wlhich liave tindennined the coim try's competitiveness; nominal rigidity in doamestic
wages; domestic price iigidity, duiie to dlic oligopolistic structure orthle
countty's prodcuctimar lkets; and die pervasive influence of the state in
die domnestic economy.
Thie reluctance of the government, to take the need for acjustmiient

seriouslyeand to idenrify

.lfwith the adjustmentzprogras scupported

by the World Bank. Political coinmiunent to tie refonii process has

suffered from this lack of ownershIip. And thie goverm ent, has been
reluctant to revise its expectations sufficiently quickly in die face of
rapidly changing external circumst.ances.
Given the fettered natuire of adjustment in CGte d'Ivoire, whlat lessons
can be learned? The following lessons are highiligli ted in this cliapter

An appropriately detetrnined real exchange rate is critical for an adjusunent prograni. Failing to corect disequilibrium in die real exchange rate can undo theniajorpartof tlie adjustmenteffort. For C6te
d'Ivoire itis clear that the overv-aluation of tlie real exchange rate h-.s.
not only seriously fettered trade policy, but has also obliged the authorities to rely heavily on internal adjustmentL It is also difflcult to
achieve other objectives of adjustmentwivil such a serious underlying
relative price distortion: trade liberalization and export diversification
are difficultifnotimpossible to -achieve wlhen real exchange rates are
misaligned. Internal. adjustment could not correct the overvaluation
in the real. exchange rate for two.main reasons. First, domestic product and labor markets lackled sufficient flexibility for the adjustment
to occur. Internal adjustmnent requires diat market rigidities should
firzst be removed, and this was not achieved during die l9S0s. Second,
intemal adjustmentfailed ber' -ise wlorld inflation rateswere low, malting it difficult for the eal exciange rate to be corrected througl low
domestic inflaton..

A second lesson emerging from the lorian experience concerns the
phasing of policy reforns. First, intemal adjustment required that the
distortions and inflexibilities in the domestic economy be addressed
prior to (or at least concurrently with) the macroeconomic adjuistment In the case of C6te d'lvoire, these.measures were undertaken
after almost a decade of internal adjustment. Second, it is clear that
unless and until the real exchange rate issue is addressed, progress on
other policy reforms wrill be mixed. Third, the reforms of die banking system cannot be expected to be effective unless policies are.
implemented to correct fundamental macroeconomic imbalances, to
refonn the public enterprise system, and to restore private confi-
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dence, investment, anti growth. Without siucih relbnrnus, the fin;rnc:il
sctlor is liklely to contin ti It)le trotihledl by int'l
arrerds,
cl'lS,
and

Capital flighlL
Ccte d'lvoire's expereience eniphasizes tlhut. fiscal adjuistiment. is not
confined simiiy to recdlicing tie liscal defirit, iumpor:ani.;-lmotugii tdiat
is. The Ivorian awborities have gone shnie wuy toward redlicing dIle
priary(l dericit. bt.Liltvtv not .addresseld tde fitnchuiIient:tl isStletSo0UfiS.Cl1
restructuring. Given die significan;.incisc in the share ofwuges and
salaries in total govenmiient expenditures, dlie jeflecde delivev.iof
public senices-is likeev to have been adverselv affected.
* nothicr major lesson firom CO.e d'lvoire's experience conceins the

difficulnt in replicating in the real world the textbooklsymmetry oewnveen a nominal devaluationrand an export tax plus import subsidy.
nie twiff pluS subsidy policy failed to work in part because nf breakdown of thie textbook symnetr and in pau-t because of policy implemenution weaknesses.

A number of lessons: delive from the Ivorian det exCperience. The
1980s showled just hiow difFicuilt it can be for countriCs to extricate
themselves from the longer-teim effects of unsustainable investment
programs. Tb e debt overhang .that emerged from -a relatively short
period of Ivorian history (basically just five years of easy spending).
has dominated macroeconomic policy since 1980. But more fundamental lessons are to be derived from the debt experience. Given die
cC-%straints that it faced, the Ivorian governmr ent had little choice but
'jallow

arrears to accumul7ate. Whlile this is a short-terim solution of

a sort, it has deep-seated effects that extend -tlroughout die

. ---
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economy. The effects of public sector arrears on dte financial system
and their effects, on private investment activities are, die two main areas highliglhted in this chapter. Concerns also extend to the effects of
debt nonpaymnent on the underlying fabric of trade and exchange. If
economic agents consistently defult on payments, the basic func-doning of the economic system-i might be weakened in a more fundamental sense.
The social costs of nonadjustment, especially poverty, can be considerable. Given the inability of die Ivorian government. to adjust properly to die terms of trade shocks of the decade, tie effects on poverty
and other welfareindicators have been serioUs. In this sense dte Ivorian
case representssacounterfactual to tlie adjustmentccase.i Whereas many
cnricize adjust;ment on die grounds of itS social costs, tde altemative
represented bv C5te d'Ivoire's enxperience suggests a much niore dismal scenario for the poor.
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The settin1g for the adjustment experience

-Understanding tile citd,ilsticnt eforts*cfC6tc d'Ivoirc in the 1980s isilimpos-i ible wi 1liot I t an aiwtareness of t.Ie
ico mn try's inst-itti ional setting. n stitutional
chairacteristics hve been :ifl part, responsible Ihr miacroeconomic destabilization and haV
islyy consir-ained te al)iliLy of thc countryto under takC
- efrfctive a4justmen;.within iniatl social cost. To prepare thie readei- for what
--olloc, this sec diondescribes thic min econotiic instiltitions ofrCte d1voit e,
elmplsizingulic ways in.which they circumscribe policy choice. Four main
areas are rewed: the fisal system, ihe monetary setting, ide labor market
settng. and the produc: markeL
-ttng

an-.

.

Thefisral system-.
Fisad policy in Cote d'lvoire titsLbe understood in tie context of a ftirly
comiplex setofgovemnni tLfinancial anringemiients. Therfinancial operiations
of die goverinmlent are carried out by six principal agencies of the central
govenmmnt, several centrally operated. special-purpose funds, and 137 !o
cal authorities. The following main agencies are responsible for the finanMa- operations of the central government:
* The directiong6n&wa dii buzdgt is in charge of die budeL Within this
agency the dinectirzndes budgets et comptesis responsible primarily for the
current budget (revenue and expenditures other than debt service)
and for the component of the government investmentprogram that is
financed by earmarked tax revenue and domestic bon-owing. The direction.de- investusements /LWSs is responsible for the special governmentinvestmnent budget. The present aim ortle governmentis to unify
the budget process into a "budget. unique"within t-wo years.
* The autonomousauiortization fund comprises two departments, dealing ith. ptublic debt and banking.
o The agiculltur-al price stabilization fund vas sec up Zo stabilize producer
prices ofimporiantcxportcrops-cocoa, coffee. and cotton. Wlether
the agricultural price. stabilization fund generates revenue for the
government depends on tde relationship over the period benveen the
-(governmcnt-detennined) producer ptice and the world price for the
commodity. The fund generated large surpluses for the government
up to 1936. These revenues (which amounted to as much as 15 percent
- -of
GIOP in 1977) were eitler invested or transferred to oilier governmentdeparnnents. However, since 19S5 the operations of the agricultural price stabilization fund have involved significantly lower conributions to die exchequer. This fundamental c 1 ange in the flowof tunds
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between die govetnment and die agricultural economy is a key to
understanding macroeconomic destabilization during the decade. An
important characteristic of the agricultural stabilization fund is that its
activities were not part of dte routine budget process of government
* The pncc equalization fund for staple product ws established to stabilize the consuimer prices of imported rice and&sugar.
* The social security sector comprises tvo components: die National Social Security Fund and the Pension Fund for government employees.
In addition to these central fiancial agencies, die central government
includes several agencies dedicated to specific funds, including die Naliona
Sewerage Fund, the National Hydraulics Fund, tie Nadonal InvestmentFund,
the National Office for Vocatonal Training, the Oil Palm Fund, andvarious
petroleum funds. The allocation of revenues to these agencies is generally
inflexible, with systematic earnarking of tax revenues preventing cros--agency
tiansfers. The main source offinancal fle3xibility lay in the agricultural price
stabilization fund, which in the pastwas used to finance some major items of
government expenditure. However, this more flexible source offinancing is
also the mostvariable, the least transparent, and dhe most unplanned These
funds have been an unstable source of revenue. Their share in total government revenue ranged from 40.7 percent in 1977 and 28.8 percent in 1985
(due to high world prices) to lows of 4.7 percent in 1981 and 1.2 percent m
1987. In more recent times world prices have remained low, keeping the
contribution of the stabilization funds at modest levels.
Local govremment consists of 137 local authorities, which prepare their
own udgets. In addition to local revenue and earmarkled funds, these authoniies receive transfers from the central government Finally, there are as
many as 250 nonfinancial public enterpises in C6te d'lhoire, most of which
are not monitored closely by the central government.
The tax base of themcentral government (which uraditioally amounts to
about 20 percent of GDP) is mark-ed by a heavy reliance on indirect taxes,
with abouta third of revenue deriving from domestic indirect taxes, another
third from taxes on imports, and just less than 10 percent from taxes on
exporLS. The remaining 25 percent of tax revenue is derived from direct taxes
t

The monetary setting

C6te d'lvoire is a member of the West African Monetary Union, which was
establishedin 1962 .The monetaryaffairs of the WestAfrican MonearyUnion
are governed by die West Afirican Central Bank. The common currency. is
the CFA franc (francde la com7munautif?naaci2red'Afrique)3 which is pegged to
the French franc (FF). Its parity (CFAF 50 FF 1) hasnot changed for more
than fortyyears (since 1948). The free convertibility between the CFAF and.
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thC French franc at this Fixed parity is maintained through an operations
account (conqne d'op&aezions) of the West African Monetary Union with the
Frendc treasury, and an obligation by Pr-ance to support the West African
Monetry Union to maintain unlimited and full convcrtibility of the CFA franc
(see chapter 7 on Senegal for the;frmework for monetary policy).
Although the operations account pools individual countries' external
balances (or overdrafts) with the French treasury, the WestAfricai Central
Bank maintains separate accounts for each country and credits or charges
each country according to its contribution to the pooled accounts.5 The
guarantee of convertibility is subject.to several rules thiavpply to the West
-African Central Bank.and how it manages dIe operatons accounL Whenever the pooled external reserves of the West African Central Bank fall below 20 percent of its sight liabilities for three consecutive monthg the board
ofadministrators must meet in order to-take appropriate monetary action.
These decisions are reached through simple majority.
-Within the constraints of the fixed parity of the CFA franc, the West
African Central Bank decides on credit policy. The most inportainstru-0
ment operated by the central bank is an annual credit ceiling for each manber country. Until 1989, two discount rates were applied: the regular rate
(taux zd¶scompte nonizz) and a preferential rate (taux d'escompte preferentitO.
The latter applied to crop credit, housing loans, and loans to small and
medium-size enterprises. The margin between the two rates was usually 2.5
percentage points. In apackage of reforms implemented in October.1989,
the preferenial discountrate was abolished and interestrates are to be used
as a more fle
instrumentof policy.
Credit to a member govemment in any given year is limited by statute to
20 percent of the country's total annual tax receipts collected two years pre
viously. This limit on the amount ofborrowing by a government in any year.
is an imiportant feature of the fiscal-and monetary scene in C6te d'lvoire. It
seriously restricts the opportnmity for seignorage financing and has fivorable effects on the rte ofinflation. However, the governmenthas three other
major financing avenues. First, it can use the public enterprise sector, which
is not induded in the West African Central Bank restrictions (the cential
bank accounts treat public enterpnse finances as part of the private sector
category). By reducing its own direct financing to public enterprises and
forcing them. to borrowvwithin the banking system, the government can increase total public sector borrowing and circumvent the 20 percent limit
Second, the government can simply build up its arrears to. the private
sector. This source of finance can have serious effects on policy implemen-.
tation (as, for example, with. export subsidies) and on the-private sector in
generl.4 Third, the government (and public enterprises) can borrow externallywithoutviolating the guidelines of the WestAfrican Monetary Union.
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Tlhus, the leverage that tie West African Central Bank can exert on public
sector financing in C6te d'lvoire is greater when the government's aIccess
to borrowing is limited. This aspect explains why monetaly control slipped
somewhat duting -dle late 197Os when external financing 'sat available and
was restored in the 1980s when access to external finance was more diflicult
(Lane- 1989 provides mliore details on die effectiveness of monetary policy
in Cote d'Ivoire).
The labor market
The labor force inGOCte d'lvoire is predominantly rural. Wage labor, how is very uncommon in:rural areas. The C&te d'Ivoire LivingtStandards
Surveys, whiich cover-tie latter half of the 1980s, report that only about 5
percent of rural household income is derived from wage employment
(Demery 1993). The ruLal labor mark-et is generally unaffected directly by
-institutional and other rigidities..
The urban labornmarket, however, is influenced by three ypes ofdistordon. First, it-is subject to Iabor legislation, muci of which is inherited from
the country's colonial past. Minimmum wvage le-vels are specified for all categories ofwiork-ers in large andimedium-size firms. Legislation also requires that
emplovers provide fringe benefits and restricts their freedom to lay offwvorkers. Because minimum-wages arenotindex-linked, the governmenthas some
freedom to allow real values to fall. The urban real minimum wage fell
throughout much of the l9SOs (table 3.1).
The wvage system is also influenced by conventions collectives, which are
penodic negotiations among finns, unions, and the government to determine -wage scales by sk-ill and seniority. Average wages for unskilled workers
have risen above the minimum wage as workers gain senionry, as table 3-1
illustrates. This seniority effect makles the evidence on urban wxage trends
difficult to interpret Levy and Newman (1989) argue that the slightincrease
in real wages from 1980 to 1987, despite a sharp fhal in minimum wages (by
25 percent)! is to some extent a statistical illusion. Durinrg the recession a
large number offirns in CGte d'lvoire wvere liquidated. Those remainingin
business have been obliged to cut their wrk forces, which has generally affected the lower half of the pay scale. The effect of this recession-induced
increase in seniority has been to increase mean wages. despite the fall in real
minimum wages.
The implications of these trends for the adjustment programs are difficult to establish. If the growith in seniority is reflected in higher productivity
levels, then: thewage cost 'erunitofoutputmayhave fallen, thus-improving
the country's compeiiveness. But if limited or no productvity gains are to
eever,
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be obtained roiom the growdh in seniority, die wage costs per unit of output
may well have tisen. I t is also important to distinguish between ilie real can-

suption rwage and the real product wage. According to Bcrthlemny ad.
Bourguignon(forthcoming); `vhileuwage-earners experienced a drop in their

real purchasing power, the real productwage paid byemployers increasedsubstantially (emphasis added) If dWis is the case, real wage rigidity is likely to
have impaired the adjustment process.

Finally, the high public sector wages, which are more closely related to
French civil service wage levels than. to domestic conditions, influence wage
setting in Cote d'IvoirelExpatriateleviel salaries and wages are also common
~ ~ the
in ppriate sector, especially at the executive level. BerthAlemy and
Bourguignon (forticoming) conclude that "there is probablj considerable
room for reductions in w-ages and salaries throughout the moderm labor.
market that wxould makle es and salaries niore competitive." A similar.
condusion is dhiwn byan internalUWorldBank documen't of 1991: "Overall,
the evidence is clear that unit wages per unit of output as well as wages per
employee are comparatively high in Cote d'Lvoirel" Little is understood of
these wage interrelationships in Cbte d'Ivoire, and this is a subject in need
of further rcsearch.

Table 3.1 Selected data on real wages, 197045
f CFA fancs per month).
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The

vdudt tmiarket

Three characteristics of the pr-oduct market are central to understanding
the events of the 1980s. The first is the dominance of the agricultural sector, especially the importance of two key export crops-cocoa and coffeeand of forestry and timber products. The outpuL of this sector is predominantly for. export. Wilt a large numnber of planters in cocoa and coffee
production and of logging companies in the-forestry sector, tde product
mark-ets are potentially highly compe titive. However, given the government's
role -in marketing these products, ouitcomes have not always reflected this
competitiveness.

The second important characteristic of the productmarklet is the public
.sectordominance4 through two broad dannels: the influence of the.statemin
mark-eting and :the role of public enterprises. The government has historically maintained the right to conrol botl prices and margins at all sitages of
distribution. This control has been generally evaded in the industrial sector,
although it has been suggested that, since itacts as-a de facto barnier to entry,
it encourages an oligopolistic marketstructure. These controls over marketing and price detennination are more effectively applied in agriculture, especially exportagriculture. Although export crops are marketed by pnvate
companies, theiractivities are subject to close control by theAgriculture Price
Stabilization Fund. The companies are obliged to pay producers the price
determined by the Agriculture Price Stabilization Fund and, having upon
approval sold the produce in world markets, are also required to remit to the
Agriculture Price Stabilization Fund the difference between the exportpnce
and the producer price plus the exporters' margin. Because the activities of
the mark etng companies must be monitored carefully, those that trade in
cocoa and coffee must renew their permits annually.
The state exerts control over economic-activity in C6te d'lvoire pardy
through a netvorkl of public enterprises, which are either wholly or party
owned by the state. The rules governing these sectors vary according to the
degree ofstate ownership. During the 1970s the number ofpublic enterprises
grew rapidly, with the result that the statebecame involved directly in nearly
every area of economic activity. In 1977 there were 113 public enterprises
wholly or partly owned by the state, constuting one-third of the country's
total employment and contributing 27 percent of total value added.- The
activities of these enterprises covered a wide range of sectors, from basic
infrastructural- services, such as water and electricity sup§;,y, to majorindustrial undertakings, such as oil extraction and sugar processing. Compared
uith the private sector, the public entetprises have generally been inefficient
Although the government ow;nsabout 50 percent of the capital of the modem sector, the share ofvalueadded earned bypublic enterprises is onlyabout
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25percent (Berth&l1tnyand Bourguignon forthcoming). Frotn 1982 to 988
the govenmmen tinvested inouv than $500 million (net cumutlative invesunent)
in the sector, but the estimated returm on ti;is invesunent has been only 2*
percent annually. These enterprises ran surpluses duinng the 1970s and
deficits for mucl of tie 1980s. In April 1983 President Houplhou5t-Boigny
ack;nowledgedpublicly thatmisimanagementuas largelyresponsible forpuiblic
enterprfre lossess,*which amounted to about 1.2 percent of GDP that year
(Berthelemy and Bourguignon forthcoming).
The third key diaracteristic of the Ivoian product market is the highly
oligopolistic nature of the modern sector.- More tan half of the manufacturing industrial sectors are dominated by one or two firms, in the sense that
these firms produce more than 50 percent of the output of the industry
(Berthelemy and Bourguignon forthcoming). Given the influence of tie state
and the highly protected-nature of much of the manufacturing activity, the
sector is highly oligopolisuic. This structure leads to pice gidity,which
constrains the -extent to which internal adjustment can correct external
imbalances (given a. fixed nominal exchange rate). But it all clearly undermines competiton and allocative efficiency.
-Thenature and causes of macroeconomic destabilization
Given these institutional characteristcs ofthe Ivorian economy, whatwere
the main factors that led to macroeconomic destabilization and the need for
structural adjustmentAfalse dawn: ternms of tradeinstabllity
In many respects, the origins of macroeconomic instability in the 1980s can

be traced to the success of the previous decade. Cote d'lvoire had achieved
a GDP growth rate of 8 percent annually between 1965 and 1975 and was
considered a notable succesS story among African economies-as reflected
tin
he title ofavolume on the C6te d'Ivoire economyduring this period, The
Chalege of Succes (Den Tuinder 1978)..However, froin the mid-1970s onward, events, were to. tak-e a differen course. Ironically, it swas afavorable
external shock that interrupted the stable growth.
A boom in cocoa aand coffee prices in 1976 (generated by a frost-induced failure for the Brazilian coffee harvest) led to a dramatic increase in
the country's terms of trade-from 77.9 in 1975 to 100.5 in 1976 and 140.2
in 1977. The Agriculture Price Stabilization Fund kept producer prices
stable dunrng this period and thus accumulated large surpluses for governmentrevenue (amounting to 16 percent of GDP in 1977). The goverrinent
used these
to
on an ambitious investment program, wlhch
to embark
embarkd thsresources
reore
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was to have a significant adverse effect on macroeconomic balances in the
following decade. Yet given die -strong growth performance already
achieved, and tihe expectation that connueodit prices would enter an upward
secular trend, thc events in the mid-1970s were viewed as the dawn of selfsustained growth. AtltoLugh not quite matclhing the earlier period, GDP
grew by 6.5 percent annually between 1975 and 1979, with strong growth in
agriculture at 4.2 percent and industry at 13.4 percent (table 3.2 and table
33.1 in appendix 3B).
-.Buttdie price boomwas short-lived. Betveen 1977and 1980 exportprices
fell by 30 percent, and tie country's terms of rade declined [rrm a peak of
140.2 to only 98.1; Taking the. 1980s as a whole, the termsn of trade declined
by 38 percent This single shockE dominated all macroeconomic accoun fang
in CGte d'lvoire during the 1980s.
C6te d'Ivoire is particularly susceptible to terms of trade losses for wov
reasons.Thefirst isits heavydependence on two main export crops-cocoa
1

'Table 3.2 National accounts, constant 1987 prEices, 1975w-

Accvmnt

1975-

1980-

(985-

1990-

1975-

1980-.

1985-

79

84

89.

91

79

84

89

A. GDP

199091

(era2ge annud percentage change)

(bifions of CFA frncs)
2,545.6 2.917.9 3,088.4 2.931.9
.670.2
687.7
636.8
439.1

6.5
11.2

.0.6
-1.1

0.9
3.8

-2.2
-23.6

GDPatfactorcost
1,875.5 2,230.2 2.449.6 2,492.8
& GDP bysectorof origin: (es perearge of GlP faor cost)

6.1

1.1

1.1

-3.5

4.2.
13.4

1.5
2.3

0.1
-0.8

1.
-8.4

GDPatmarketprces
Net indirecttaxes

Agriculture
:
Industry
Mining and
quarryTing
Manufacunring ;

Services,etc
C(GDP by demand
* orrmpnents

Resource balance
importsofGNFS
- Exposof GNFS
Total expenditures
Total consumption,

etc.

.

-- 44.3
22.0

42.B
25.2

32.1
213

36h5
18.6

0.9

3.7

82

..

46.6

44.9

-

33.7

.

64.8

6.7-

6.&

1.8

7.4

11.9

5.1
30.3
353
94.9

16.1.
138.1
30.4
12.1
46.5
1.6
84.8 - 9.8

-97.6
-5.8
4.7
-7
-.

168.7
4.9
-02

28.2
-1.2
6.0
-4.5

-4.5

.. ..

32.0

12.

..

..

(as perentage of GDP at market prices)
-7.9:
37.4
29.5
107.9

-3.7
35.3
31.6
103.7

2.7

74.3

773

86.8

90.1

8.1

1.5

0.0

Generalgove nment

24.2

27.6

21.0

103

12.6

-2.5

0.4

-

Pr;, etc.
Gross dornestc investment
GDFI

75.8

72.4

79.0

89.7

6.8

4.0

03

8.6

25.7
97.0

22.7
96.2

13-2
93.0

9.9
99J7

16.4
19.0

-15.5
-14.7

2.0
;--3.2

-5.8
-4.2

PUblicsector .
Privatesector

44.1
55.9

45.9
.54.1

34.4
65.6

28.5
71.5

29.0
13.1

-16.6
-112

-3.5
1.4

-8.4
-2.3

3.0

3.8

7.0

0.3

166.6

6.9

-93.9

Changes in stocks
Not available..

Sboce.t World Bari data.
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znd coffee. This dependency increased rapidly over the past. twco (lecades.
Tlie secoa(I is that its exports constititle
tasignifican tshare of total world tirad
in these commodities. At thie end of the 1970s ivorian exports of cocoa amd
coffee represented 16 percentand 8 percent. ofotaul world trade byvolihne.
!Despite die faCiLthet flavorable cofree price shocklwas temporary (diue
to the Brrzilian fiost), tite govei-nient perceived the cocoa price increase as
pennanent. Tlic cocoa,price boom did indeed continuie slighitly longer than.
the coffee price boot, butt this does noL explain why tde governdentmade
such a-distinction bctween the cocoa and coffee price shocks. One possible
explanation for the prevailing optiinism was tie iCe tliat dlewoIrd economy
was-entenng a phase of increauses in counnodiy pces (an expectation that
was also fueled by the oil price hikes of 1973 and 1979).
The government's expectation that drices Would continue an upward
trend pronipted it to casti is expenditure plans (especially its investment.
plans) in this lightitis difficult to apprecate the g' onnds for thls optimismahamleyand Glianem (1991) could findno evidence ofany tend in die prices
of either cocoa or coffee over the period betieen 1970 and 1987. Nor could
they-detectany evidence of an upward trend based on historical data up to
1979 (wheTn these expectations were formed) Thie slump in cocoa-and coffee prices in the latterhalf of the 1980s does notappear to be out of line vith
historical fluctuations. Yet die government did not perc&4^ve the price movements in this wayv. 7The increase in prices in the mid-1980s served only to
encourage this misperception, and it appears that the government contiued to believe thatdiefafi prices ofthe.se commoditieswere highertan tho.se
*operating or than those thaLapplied before the 1970.s' price boom. The failure oftde goverment to adjusttits eexpectations to emergingeconomic reali-

tes led to the continuation of its expenditure plans and to an accumulation
of debt, which togetder precipitated ihe severe cnses of the 1930s.
Utnsstaintableitnvestment

The investment program underpinning many ofthe macareconomic imbalances of the early 1980s originated in a report of the ministry of planning
entitled C&te d'fvoire 2000. Although the planr was prepared in 1974. final

decis ons on many of its aspects were made at the beginning of 1977, wihen
the commodity price boom was underway. The Ced'Ivoire2000invesent
program was the government's attempt to reach a consensus about ihe
country's economic strategy for tlie future. Itiwas ambitious even by the fvorable standards of the time. The original public sector investment projection thatundergirdeddte plan amounted to CFAF I,350 billion in 1975 prices.
The World Bankl cnnsidered this level of investment unsustain:.Ae and stimated that an investment ofaboutCFAF 800 billionwas consistentwithavail-
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able resources. The final figiire adopted in the plan uws CFAF 1,020 billion,
lowter than. originilly planned biut noticeably higlher thian wlhat. the Bank
considered to be sustainalble. The plan amssuted a GDI' growth rate of 8.7
had been achieved in die recent past (8.3
percent, whichi exceeded what}
percenthbe veen 19665 and 1.973).
Table 3.3 compares planned and actaltlcvels o-investmentand finance
under GCed'Ivoimr 2000. The -tablehighlighs thle rollowing main weaknesses
in the implementation of the progrlaiml:
Tendency towaLzrd overspending,. The investment taigets were exceeded
indicating signi icant overspending-particularly in thie transport
trade,U
energy, and lousing sectors (butaLso in: eucation,
and tourism). Investment in mainufacturing was far below what s
planned (a target of CFAF 59.5 billion, compared with CFAF 16.1 actually invested'. . The overspendingws due to die absence of expenditure control in the public sector-primarily because many e-xpenditures (especilly by public enterpnises) are not subject to nolnal
budgetary approval and procedure. The discretionary uLse of tli e revenues generated by the Agriculture Price Stabilization Fund was another detenninant of fiscil undiscipline These difficulties in controlling public expenditures were to be a continuing problem in the
follo wing decade.
Table 3.3 Planned and actual investment expenditures and outcomes,

1976-80
Awzred

fared

ktern

(bilions of 1975 CFAF)
Total investment
Public
Privae
Publicfinancingofinvestment
External borrowing

1,670

1,591
:1.135

-826
-

Public
Prhaxe

-7

765
1,020
534

535
1,.433
555

327

438
I117

207

(percent)
Debt-sevice-to-export ratio, 1980
Annual grovw

GDP
Agriculture
.
Manufacturing
Manufacuring exports
Cash cropports
.
- Total exports
Building and publicworie
Services

.

25.0

8.7
6

7.7
4.7
I1.0
7.4
3.6
.2
11.1
8.3

14.1
15.9

.5.

- Source: Berh6l and Bourgignon (forthccTrigtj.
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- nderinvesiwentm
U
in inuda/wl. Muich of the public investmentuwas in ilic
nontiradables sector, and too little was directed tow1ard activities that:
wvoulid diversiry the tiradables sector. Exacerbating this allocation wats a
wveak privatesector response to C&le dI7vah 2000, wihich can lie auttrib
mtedLin part to the overv-aluution of the real exchange

ralte.

Expoi-t

performnance was signiricanldy below tmrgetn-particularly imannifiacturingecxporL.t w hich were projected to grnowat. 15.9 perCenLann naillylhut;

actuially grew at.only 7A percentL
L.

g gItation.

lags and-itnefidnt inivestments. Poorly -selccted proJects

:
yielded low incone streams. Tie major cauise wuas thie emphiasis on infrmstructure investment, especially in the nortihern Savannah region,
.-.
which had very longgestation lags. In some cases the gestation penods - -werclonger tian anticipated because implementation was incomplete
(for example, a bridge was constructed in the Savannai region, but
construction of is connecting roads was delayed). But the unproductive investmentwas also due simply to inefficiency. One example is the
SODESUCRE program, which absorbed 37 percent of the plan's allocation to agricultural investment, yet yielded little in return. Produc-:
tion Costs in SODESUCRE factories were high, and the incremental
capital-outputratio for the.se investmen LswVa1about5.8. In some cases,.
investmentprojectsl-ere selected-for their prestige value, such as the
construction of a-new capital city at Yamoussoukro. The emphasis on
infrastructure and the selection of l6w-yielding (espedally prestige)
projects yielded an incremental capital-output ratio of about 4.1 for
the investment program as a whole (Berthelemy and Bourguignon
forthcoming). The planned ratio was close to 3 (whichwas more in
keeping with recent expenence).
Decine itn savingigs

A major destabilizing event tonwrd the end of the 1970s was a dramatic fall
in national savings-from 25 percent of GDP in 1977 to only 10 percent in
1980-and 6.8 percentin 1981 (appendix table 3B.1). Both prvate andpublic
savings were significandy lower thai had been planned in Cdted'7voir 2000.
The fall in private savings was probably due to an increase in remittances by
foreign workiers. But Berthelemy and Bourguignon (forthcoming) suggest
also thacan increase in food prices (due to the shoch-induced boom) had an.
effect on aggregate savings, because most formal savings in Cte d'Ivoire are
made by food-deficit (urban) househoids. However, there are other explanations. During the destabilizingperiod the temporarily favorable commodity price.shock may have induced agents to increase comnsumpion, because,
although temporary, the shockwould raise pennanentincome levels (Bevan,
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Colliers and Gunning 1990). The terms oftrde decline, the recession, and
falling profits after the boomi, conibined with the emerging effect of debt
senice in the public sector, would then ex-plain mucli of the downturn in
national savings during the adjustment period.
:
This lowY level of savings, combined witlh th poor export perfonnance,
meant thata larger proportion of die investmentprogram had to be financed
through foreign borrowing, particularly by the public sector. While external
borrowing scheduled under the program amounted to CFAF 327 billion,
:public sector;external borrowing in fact amounted to CFtAF 438 billion [(an
overprojection of34 percent, see table 3.3). This accumulation of debtwas
to dominate macroeconomic polity for dte foreseeable future. The role played
-bythe expansion of private consumption in aggravating die external deficit
is discussed below.
An increaingdebt service burdent
The increased external borrowving and a general inrrease in world interest
rates caused a significant increase in debt service, creating a financial crisis
in 1980. Whereas C6red7voire2000projected a debt-service-to-exponrtio of
just 7.5 percent, the ratio wa actually significantly higher (table 3.4). The
debtservice ratio increasedfronmjustunder 7 percent of exports in 1975-77
toalmostl8 percentin 197840..Animportantshare of the debtwvas to commercial banks, which left the government vulnerable to the vicissitudes of
world interest rates.
Real exchange rate apprecation

Both the favorable exportprice shock and the increased foreign borrowing
to finance the investmentprogram could be expected to lead to an appreciation of the real effective exchange, rate, as explained in the "Dutch disease,
literature (Devarajan and de Melo 1987). The medhanism mvolved in such
modeLs usually entails a fixed nominal exchange rate and apprecation of
the real exchange rate due to an accelertion in domestic inflation relative
to wvorld inflation. For C8te d'Ivoire the movement of the real ex-change rate
is due to changes in both the nominal rate (from fluctuations in the value of
the French franc) and the relative inflation index.
In the destabilizing period (1975-80) the real effective exchange rate
appreciated. Since the nominal effective exchange rate was stable over the
penod (reflecting the stability of the French franc, to which the CFA firanc
was tied), the main reason for this apprecation in tie real rate was the
movementin the lvorian price level relative to inflation among its competitors (second column of table 3.5). The relative price index based on the
consumer price index rose from 103.7 in 1975. to 128.1 in 1980. Thus. an
Published by iRepository, 2021

https://ir.iba.edu.pk/faculty-research-books/13

ferid adjustment
Co^e d'7voire.J

87

acceleration in the rate of Ivorian inflationv
was the principal factor behind
this loss of international competitiveness during the latter half of tde 1970s.
And there can be little doubt that the acceleration in the inflation rate was
due to the commodity price boom and the concurrent investment boom.
The investment boom was partly financed through internal borrowving (the
* noney supply grew by 19 percent anually between 1975 and 1980), which
inevitably increased domestic infl;idon.5Lane (1989) suggest two broad rea-sons for the relative slackness of domestic monetary polcy in e late lg7os:
role
nhe of external finance, enabling the commercial banks to expand credit
financed by borrowing from parent banks, and shifts in the proporionsof
financial assets toward less liquid assets, which enabled commercial banks to
increase cteditwithout relying on centralbank financing.:
Market distortions
The overvaluation of the real exchange rate is one of several mark-et distortions duning the destabilizing period. Two broad sources ofmark-etinterven80on distorted price signals and resource allocation: a system of import tarTable 3.4 External debt, 1975-91
(15 milfions)
Typeofdebt

1975-77

1978-80

1981-43.

1984-86

1987-89

1990-91

Tot exernal debt
UseoflMFcredit
Short-termrdebt
Total long-tem debt

1,632.3
18.8
159.3
1,454.2

4,807.4
413
881.7
3,884.4

7,444.2
545.5'
1,052.5
5,846.2

9,646.0
653.6
725.3
8,267.1

14,410.7
494.1
2,011.1
11,905.5

18,4633
401.4
3,1982
14,863.6

1356.2
490.9
184.9
3.7

3,598.7
I,0713
4293

5,762.8
2,669.9
1,243.9
7.3

8,227.2
4,9893
2,186.7

10,306.1
7,264.1
2,813.5

7.5

4,803.9
1,4393
752.8
7.3

IBRD

92.7

236.4

5333

995.6

1,740.2

1,949.6

Bilateral

306.0

642.1

686.5

1,426.0

2,802.6

4,450.6

Private creditors
Bonds
ComrnmercialbanksOtherprWivt

865.3
.20.9
450.3
394.0

2,5273
17.5
1,3585
1,151.4

3,364.6
6.8
2,106.7
1,251.1

3,092.9
3.8
2,194.1
894.9

3,238.0
1.5
.-2606.6
629.9

3,042.0
0.0
.2,694.2
347.8

Private nonguarariteed;
loPnvternn
rt

98.0

285.7

1,042.3

2,504.3

3,6783

4,5575

38.8
23.8

533
20.2

27.4

Pubriclpubridy guaranteed

Tong-tern. debt
Official creditors
Multilateral

IDA

.

7.1

22.4

Debt service paymrents as percentage of exports

of goods and nonfactor services (cash basis)
Before rescheduing
6.7
17.7
Afterrescheduling ..
6.7
17.7
Sourc Wodd Bank and IMF data.
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ilfs and export taxes on intenational trade, w*hich created distortions wivihin
the tradables category of commodities, thereby increasing the domestic
prices of protected goods and penalizing otlhers, and die state's pervasive
role in marketing (especially agricultural) commodities, with a plethora or
state-run marketing boards and public enterprises engaged directly in economic activity.

At the beginning ofthe 1980s CMte d'Ivoire relied on tariffand nontariff
biwniers to provide protection to domestic producers. (Table 3.6 reports the
structure ofnominal and effective uriffs in C&te-d'Ivoire in 1971 and 1980.)
The average tairiff rate reported in the table (estimated at around 30 percent) is misleadingly high because of the numerous exemptions to the tariff
code: Berth lemyand Bcurguignon (forthcoming) repormthat less that half

of all imports were subject to the full im orttariff, generating an effective
average tariff rate of about 25 percent (28 percent for manufactured products)-a figure thatincludes the value added tax.
However, tariffs were not the main mechanism for protecting domestic
producers. Quantative restnctionIs were also applied, and they influenced
Table 3.5 Nominal and real effective exchan-

rtes,: 197S9 1
Resource

-

- .

-

Muticteral

-

AUdIaterd

Bilateral

Terms

RERr

baJonced

Year

NEER

CpREE(CP

1975

105.1

103.7

108.9

83.1

77.9

0.1

1976
1977
1978

101.1.
98.3
101.5

1042
119.3
1243

- 105.3
1173
126.1

86.6
104.6
113.1

100.5
140.2
126.4

5.5
6.3
-0.9

1979

108.4

126.5

137.1

116.5

1980 -108.
1981
196-1983

97.2
89.9
85.8

128.1
123.6
1213
113.5

1227
12;13
I IG.4
1..0

1984

95.2

104.6

1985

100.0

100.0

138.5
120.2
109.0
97.4
99.5.
-- 100.0

1986

- 120.5

iOS.0

126.6

1987
1988
.1989
1990
1991

139.1
141.9
146.4
1633
166.3

101.0
993
92.0
87.6
86.1

140.5
140.9
134.7
.143.0
143.2

.

-

.

cftr

.

(9 GOP)

e

12.7

-3.1

.

98.185.4
83.4
84.9

-6.1
-7.1
-2.9
-1.7

102.2

97.0

11.5

100.0-

100.0

13.2

110.4

101.8

110.7
112.5
107.8
108.3
111.4

83.8
76.4
65.4
61.2
62.6

-

7.5

4.4
18
3.0
4.4
4.8.

a. The mululateral nornal effectie exchange rate (NEER) is a trade-wehted Widec of the nominal exchange rates
oi Cbte civoire's main trading parters. The multilateral real effective exchange rate (REER) is the NEERadjusted

for price changes in the home country relaive to the trading partner. The home price index used inths adjustment
isthe consurner pnrce index (CPI), and the trading partner price index isthe wholesale price index (WPI). (See text
fordetaks.)

b. The home cmuntry CPI divided by the tade-weighted WPI of trading partners.
c.The bilateral real exchange rate index isthe CFtF/French franc rate rnultiplied by the relative @ls of Cate
d'lvoire and France.
d. Resource blance ismezred incurrent prices
Source: World Bank data.
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Table 3.6 Nominal and effective tariff structure, 1971 and 1980

Sector
Food canning
Cofee prooessing.
C:ocoaprocessing: Edible oilsand fats
Otherfood processing
gr.3767
Spinning, weaving,dyeing
Othertextileproducts
.
Leatherandshoeproducts
Wood processing I
:Wood processirg
OCemicalsPbstics
Rubber pocoucts -1.49
Cement, construction materials
Biasic emetils.
*Vehides
Simplemetal products
Machinery
.
Otherindustial products

Nomin taiff
protection corjident
1971
1980
1.3437
1.3167.
1.4375
1.3461
1.423
1,382
1.3029
1.25
1.2822
1.2933
1.49
1.2373
1.2i78
1.3263
1.224
1.2038
1.2351

1.3099
1.2767
-1.4909
.
1.4052 1.4932
J.4276
1.4158
.1.3031
1.2117
.
1.3046.
1.2322
193867
13867-

12097

.

1.1587:
1,2449
1.2615
.

Effective tariff
protection coeffcient
1971
t1980
2.518
17.924

.2.123
4.554

.01.8tg29
0.638- .B9
1.277,
2-26
1.597
2.649
1.687
t-307
1-.155
1.222
.1.232;
1.33
1.504
1.3B4
1.376
.29
- 1.223.
1.4B9
0.662
1.198
1.087
1.136
0.925
1.245
0.993
t.365

1.2303

1.242

K1236

1.309

0.782

1.339

.. Not avalabte..
Saw:e Eert3erny and Bourguignon (rorthcoenh).

-

the domesticpricemore dian did dte tiffstructure.AlisLof31 0foreign poducts (drawn up in 1975) either could not be imported atall or were-subject
toG iinport licensing. By 1982 the number of manufictured items on. the list
hadincreased to 426,!accounting for38 percentoftotal imporis (Berth6lemy
andBouruignon forthcoming). Inaddition,asystemofpriorauthorization
was-introducedin 1984,xequiring importers to obtainrauthorization from the
external trade department. All imports had to be clearedby the external trade
department, even those that could in principle be imported freely. In practice, the system ofpriorauthorization proved to be asenous impedimentto
trade-all categories (except those thatwere totally unrestricted) were pro-

gressively administered through licenses by the external trade dcptment.
Tariffs and import restrictions were not the only:distortionary -forces at
work- prior to structural adjuastment in CGte d'Ivoire. The combination of
tariffs, quantitative restrictions, real exchange rate overvaluation, and direct
pnce-setting policies seriously distorted the domestic price and. incentive
structure in product markets. Estimates of the effects of these four policyinduced distortions on
cultural incentives during the destabilizing period havebeen reportedbySchiff andVald6s (1992).;
Theirresultsshowthatthe prce distortionsin C6te d'Ivoirebetween1960
and
due
as
exchange rate
-ad198 1982 were
wer
d-u
as much
ch to the indirect effects of real ech'n'e'rate
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overvaluation as to theldirect effects of tarifls and quantitative restrictions
(table 3.7). Overall, agricultural producer.were taxed at the rate oFabout49
*0
percentlin
nominal terms, 23.3 percentarising from exchange rate distortions
and 25-.7percentfrom-direct trade and other tax and price-setting distortions.,
Yet tlhesc nominal protection rates differed significantly across agricultural
sectors. Importable commodities (particularly rice) received significantidirect
protection from external competition-approximately 26 percentfrom 1960
.-.to-1982 (which is higher than.the 14 percentaverage reported by Schiffand.
Vald6s for all 16 developing countries covered). Although producers of
importables (and&all other tradables). werepenalized by the overvalued exchange rate,- teir total protection rate was=positive (just under 3 percent).
Trade policy interventions taxed the exportables sector, however.Be--tween 1960 and 1982 th:ese, activities were taxed -directly. at a rate of 28.7
- percent (table 3.7), aniata total rate of52 percent (which captures the effects
of the exchange rate distortion). The tendency of tade policy to tax export-ablesand protect importables led to'senou-s distortions ofprices and resource
- allocation in C8te d'Ivoire. The distortionary effects of trade.policywere:even .
higher during the destabilizing period. For 1976-82 SchiffindValdes (1992)
reportaLpositive netprotection ofimpormables ofjustless than 7 percentand:
-highly negative protection for exportables of 78 percent. These figures confirm that tade policy seriously distorted resource allocation in CGte d'Ivoire
prior to the adjusunent and that trade reform was required to improve re-.source allocation and efficiency..
Adjustment policies during the 1980s
In dealing with the problems arising from these destabilizing events, the- government turned to both the IMF and the World Bank for assistance. An'.
Table 3.7 Direct incdrect, and total rates of nominal protection of
agriculture, 1960482
Ped6o'tezgoy

-

.

1960-2
Al agcultul products
Importables
-E4atles
.1960-72
All agricultura products,
Importables
Exportables
.1976-82
agrIcultural products
Importables
-41.4
Expo-t--les

Sma SdhiTiadl VaIdEs (1992)..
-.
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Diea protectnk

-2323

-25.7
26:2
-28J

-17.5

-322
273
-357

-34.5

-39.6
-43.5

.

Total prtection
49.0
2.9
-52.0
.
:

49.7
9.8

-53.2

.

-74.1
6.9
-78.0
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extended arrangement covering a three-year period was agreced on with the
IMF in Februar 1981, followed by five standbyarrangemenis during dic decade and another in 1991. In the ten-year period IMF support amounted to
* SDR 1 billion (table 3.8). The World Bank provided three structural adjust- - ment loansbetween 1981 and 986 (atotal of $650 million) and six sectoral
adjustment loans between 1989 and 1991 (a total of $780 million).
As each of these loans was provided, exteral circumstances clhanged.
Movements in the terms of tiade (particularly cocoa and coffee prices) and
-- in the value of the U.S. dollar had important repercussions for thefdesign of
-the
could not have been:
- - adjustment programs. In most cases, die changes
anticipated, so thatprogram designswere often foundwvanting. These changes
- inexternaL events are the basis fcr the to-part division of the:198s
Os-heperiod of partial -adjustrnent in 1981-86 and' the period of fettered&adj'ust-mentin 1987-9l.-In the firstperiod the real exchange rate depredatedand
- - the terms oftrade recovered somewhat (at least between 1984and 1986). In
:the second period thereal exchange rate appreciatedand the terms of wde
fell, thus fettering the adjustnent effort.
*

-SUMMay ofprogreSS duringthe decade

Fscal policywas generally contractionary throughout the decade, aside from
abrief respitein 1984-86, when revenuewas generated from improved com-.
modity pnces (table 3.9 and appendix table 3B.2). But internal adjustment
Table 3.8 World Bank and IMF support or structural adjustment
programs
Date

World Bank loons

19811983
1

Stuctural adjustment loan 1
Structural adjustnert loan 11

150
250

1986

Stn-Snral adjustment loan. Ill

250

1989
-1989
1990
1991

Agritural sector adjUstnent ban
EnerY sector adjustment loan
Water supply sectoradjusnent loan.
Financial sector adjustmenet loan

150.
100
80
200

1991

Competiveness adjustment ban

100°

1991

Human resources adjusbrent oan

150

WFsuppart

Feb. 1991
May 1984
June 1985
June 1986
Dec. 1987
Nov. 1989
Sept 1991
ource Grocaert (1993).
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Extended arangement (3 years)
Standbyarrangement(l year)
Standby arrangement(l years)
Standby arrangement (2 years).
Standby arrangement (16 rnaths)
Standbrarrangernent(17 months)
Standby arrangement (I year)

.

-

--

fSDRmiions

48450
82.75
66;20
100.00
94.00
[75.80
82.75
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in C6te d'Lvoire generally me.anta dramatic cutback in investinentexpenditures in the first adjustmentperiod, followed by some cuts in currenl expenditures later. Although tax rates increased sonmeewhat, the increases were not
enouglh to compensate for the loss in revenue from thi stabilization funds.
Moreover, raising taxes during recessionary times is difficult, because of tlle

smaller 'a base. The govemiiient generally followed a contractionary monetary policy successfully, bringing growth of broad money under control.
However, with die persistence of die fiscal deficit and a growing stock of
domestic public sector arrears, the Ivoiian banking system faced senrous fi-

nancial and liquidity problems.
Given the continued decline in the price of the principal exports, the

government had only limited opportunity to raise producer pnces signirlicantly. Thus, it directed policy reform largely at increasing marketing efficiency, lowvering marketing costs, and providing incentives to maintain the
coffee orchard stock and quality. The main comistraint facing agricultural
pricing policywas the real exchange rateovervaluation, which effectivelyconstrained the real retums thatcan be offered to exportproducers. Trade policy
reform sought to mimic an exchange rate depreciation, but the policiesurere
not implemented effectvely, primarily because fiscal constraints prevented
the timely payment of export subsidies.
Progress wiith institutional reform, particularly export crop marleting
and the public enterprise sector, has been noticeably slow. For much of the
decade very little was achieved, although recentyears have seen evidence of
a momentum toward marketing liberalization and privatization. Since 199 1
there has been improved progress in these areas.
Partialadjustmen; 1981-86
Adjustment during this period was supported by the initial IMF extended
arangement, by two IMF standby arrangements, and by structural adjustTable 3.9 Trends in fiscal deficit, 1976-91
(percentge of GDP)
Desdabdizngperod

Fettered aduwtent

19780

1981-83

198-6

1987-91

Total revenue

33.5

31.7

28.0

30.7

24.1

MTurevenue
Nontaxrevenue

20.8
12.7

20.5
11.1

21.4
6.6

193
11.4

19.9
4.2

Toal expendture .
Currentexpenditure
Capitalexpenditure

3439
16A
18.5

42.3
21.1
21.1

39.9
257
14a2

33.4
- 2635
6.8

37.3
33.9
3-5

0.1

-8.0

6.0

-3.6

-1.4

-10.6

-2.7

-13.2

Prinary deficit
OveraIlfiscalbalance
Saurce See appendix table 3B2
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-11.9
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imentloans 1and 11. Adjusmentpolicieswere partiallysuiccessrui, due in part.
to a depreciation of dhe Fr-encht franc (and thus die CFA freic) against thle
U.S. dollar and in part to de recovery oi commodity prices. 1-Toweer, both
tic structural adjusthnent loan documentation and the World Bankattdits of
the operations saw the structural adjustmnent process of C6tc d'Ivoire as a
medium-term task. Wlhile initial adjustment policies were foctused on short-.
tenn objectives, sucl- as fiscal and monetary restraint, more fundamental
weakenesscsin the Ivorian econoniywould be addressed only in die long term.
They include institutional weaknesses in government and' die public enterprise sector and distortions in trade and exchange rates.
- Con1raaionfactpoLcy.Thefinstprioityofadjustmientin Cte Wdlvoire
was to control and reduce the fiscal defciLC The overall deficit had risen to 12r

percent of GDP in 1980, averaging more than 10 percent of GDP from 19780
to 1980. Even the primary deficit was 9 percent of GDP in 1980. Policy response to the fiscal problem was twofold: a contractionry fiscal poliy and
more fundamental efforts to improve economic managemenL
- Given the low.levels ofwivorld cocoaandcoffee prices, therewas liitle room

for policy maneuver on the revenue side: at least between 1981 and 1983.
However, the taxation policy stance wvas contractionary-excisetaxes were
raised on petroleurn products, alcoholic beverages' and tobacco. These.
changes hadlitte effecton taxrevenue, which increasedfrom 20. percentof
GDP in 1970 tojust2l.4percentin 1981-3, slippingbackto 19.3 percent
in 1984-86. Fluctuations on the revenue side were due pnmarily to changes
in nontax revenue, especially revenue from cocoa and coffee. Revenue fell
markledly in 1981-83 but recoveredjust as dramatically during 1984-86.
The government did not attempt to revise the tax system in order to
broaden the tax base and reduce its dependeny on trade taxes. It was thus
obliged to focus on restricting expenditures, particularly investment expenditures, cuttng them from their peak-of 23 percent of GDP in 1978 to 13
percent in 1983 to less than 5 percent in 1986 (appendix table 3B.2)Z7 Current expenditures were not cut as drastically under the fiscal contraction,
hovering around 23 percent of GDP between 1979 and 1982, and 27 percent
of GDP in 1983-87.
This policy closed the primary defcit tojust 2.2 percent ofGDP in 1983,
and generatedasurplus between 1984 and 1986. However, the poor revenue
performance, combined rwith significant increases in interest rates and debt
service, leftan overall fiscal defict between 1981 and 1983; only in 1986 was
it reduced to manageable proportions (to just less than 3 percent of GDP),
when the increase in commodity prices raised government revenue.
In short, contractionary fiscal policy during the partial adju.stment period dosed the fiscal deficit, which had mushroomed during theAdestabiliz
ing period. The smaller deficit was due to more favorable revenue generaPublished by iRepository, 2021
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Lion in 1984-86, but also to dr-amatic cutbacks in investnent spending. ReVenue did not imnprove as a resulk or the widening or the taxbase, since revenie from standard taxes did not increase. The improvemiient ca.me primarily [roain n increase in revenuies from cocoaand coffee. On the expenditure

.side, government consumption was not reduced to any great extent, despite
efforts to curtail thc rapid growth in wages and salaries.
Investniv(nt planning procedures were also reformed in thle early 1980sX

One of the factors belhind the destabilizing events of the late 1970s was
the absence of control over investment decisions. To ensure proper control in tlhe- future, the government introduced the scdsJnt-dircteurin 1981a three-year macroeconomic firmework that determines the overall envelope for public invesulent, accouningfravailable financing amongother
things. The schhiaditcteuralso makes p'oposals for sectoral investment
allocations in the context of the FiLve-Year Plan lDetails ofinvestmentprojects
eto be implemented during the three-year period are set out in the LoiProgramme, wlhich covers the investment programs of both the centrl government and major public enterprises. In this way, the investment actiVities of public enterprises were broughutwithin the discipline of the-budgetary
process. The Direction et Controle des Grands Travaur remnforccd investment planning at the project level by monitoring all projects that cost more
than CFAF 700 million.
Monetary andfnnct-alpoicy. The first half of the l9SOs witessed a significant return to monetay discipline from theadverse monetary effects of
the fiscal expansion ofthe late 1970s. Under the extended fund facility-supported program, credit ceilings were set on net domestc assets of the bankmng system and on net claims on the public sector. These credit ceilings were
met, in par because the demand for pnvate sector credit was loxv-due to
an extremely tight creditpolicy followed by the central bank, which crowded
out the private sector at a time when the government increased its use of
credit from the banking .system (as opposed toextemal borrowing). But it.
was also due to low levels of demand for credit Borrowers were cautious
because theywere uncertain about the debtissue and its rescheduling, and
concerned about the drought and the general recession. With nonperforming assets increasing from 1 9 percent of total bank-credit in 1985 to 8
percent in 1986,' and with totl credit to the private sector growing only
marginally, the absolute amount of credit to productive activities fell during
the partial adjustment penod.
The policy of monetary restraint reduced the growth of money supply
dramaticallyin 1982-83, butmonetary expansion returned during 1984-85,
*with M2 growth averaging 16.6 percent annually. ThLs expansion was fueled
primarily by the balance of payments surplus during these years. But itiwas
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also duc to an increase in time deposits (partly a response to increavsed real
intereStrates), and to a decline in tic velocity ofcirculation fromii historically

highl levelsin 1981-84.Wihairetturn to an exetrnal deficitin 198G, monetary
expansion continuied to be constrained successfully..
In previousycars the WestAfrican Cential Bank relied primalily on crerlit
ceilings as the instrument ofrmoncLaty control, keeping interest rates low in

order to encoura.4ge prinate investmenLc Wtth tle retorms introduced in 1981,
the WestAfrican Central Bankadoptedamnore flexible interestrate policy in
order to control credit and to prevent capital outlows. The bIsic rediscount
rate was raised from 8 percent pnor to April 1980 to I10.5 percent between
April 1980 andApril 1982 and 12.5 percentp iortoApril 993 (andaclustd
back to 10.5 percent in April 1983). The increases pushed real interest rates
into douible digits between 19S2and 1985 (see aippendix table 3B.1). However, the two-rate svsten wuas continued-with a nornal rate (the nominal

discount rate) 2.5

percent higlher than the preferential rate (the

preferen-

tial discount rate). Monetary polcy relied less on quantitative credit constraints with the asociated sectorsecfic alloations, ad inceasingly on
indirectimethods ofcontrol.

At the beginning of the decade. the banking system in C&te- d'Ivoire
included 21 deposit money banks-l5 commercial banls and 6 .pecialized
credit institutions-setup primarily to finance specific sectors9 These institutions had serious.difficultesin competingwith the commercial banks, due
mainly to their relatively extensive portfolios ofbad debt, which resulted fromtheir commitment to lend to inefficient public enteiprises To avoid bankruptcy. the development banks relied primarily on arrears "financing," and
on high-interest overdraft facilities with the West African Centxal Bank.
T
policy. Major reformswas necessary to restoreinterntonal competidireness to the economy, and to lay the foundation for an expansion (and
diversification) of exports. An export subsidy scheme and a revision of the
customs tariffvere features of the adjistinentprogram. Dutieswrere reduced
on many products (wYhile those on intermediate goods were increased),and
*quantitatve restrictions wvere replaced with temporary surcharges to be re-.
duced gradually to zero over a five-year periocL The objective was to achieve
a 40.percent effective protection rate The exportsubsidyscheme called for
a subsidy on value added on exports to countries outside the West African
Economic Community. Ituwas applied first to 52 percent of industri value
added, andw-as extended gradually to all industry.Afurtherincentive to export
sas nmtroduced by acceletating reimbursement of the value added tax paid
on exports&Yetprogre&s to-ward implementing thispoliqnvas slow. Itwasnot
completed under the structural adjustment loan II operation, andwas effecdtrely postponed to later operations (structural adjusatmentloan Ill).
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Agriculturalpoli Treform. Tlh benefits of dte boom in vorld cocoa and
coffee prices during the destabilizing period were generally not passcd on to
tie farmer. Producer prices were not increased significantly during tie destabilizing period. Under structuiral adjustment loans I and II, several policy
reforms were introduced to raise agriculturalproduction incentives. First,
pnces for all major crops, induding cocoa and coffee, were increased substantially in an effort to raise export production.. Between 1981 and 1984,
producerprices ofnmajorexportcropswere raised by25 to 35 percent, bringing them closer to world prices.
-Second, the consumer price of rice was also raised, in effect raising the
producer pnces of foodcrops (such as yams, plantain, cassava, andmaize).
These prices were increased under favorable external circumstances. Both
the depredation oPthe CFAfranc against the U.S. dollar and the recoveryin
world commodity pnces between 1984 and 1986meant that theAgricuture
Price Stabilizadon-Fundwas able to maintain large surpluses while also rising producerprices. Producerpnces remained below world market prices,:
so that in effect producers continued to be taxed.
Third, a pruning premium was introduced to encourage the restoration
of the coffee orchardL Fourth, several agriculture-based public enterprises
were reformed, including SODESUCRE (sugar), extension services in the
Savannah, PALMINDUSTRIE (oilpalm, coconut, and copra),andForestArea
extension service.
*Thenew structure ofprice incentives in agriculture had a strong impact
on cocoaand cotton,wYhoseincreased productionwas due essentially to higher
producerprices and toa rebound i outputaftertwo.years of drought The

response for coffee was weaker, since price parity wiith cocoa had induced
farmers to plant more cocoa while neglecting coffeePublicenta7is reform. The sheer size and influence of the public enterpnses, theirgenerallylo0wlevels of efficiency, ad the macroeconomic implications of their inefficiency made itinevitable that public enterprise reform
wvould remain on the adjustment agenda for the entire decade. However, it
has proved to be a difficult undertaking. The most important measures
adopted under structural adjustment loans I and ILwere the establishment
of a systematic and comprehensive financial and economic monitoring systern (abtlau debo) in the Ministry of Finance, and a rehabilitation program
for several enterprises. Public expenditure policy was targeted at improving
the management of enterprises, raiher than changing their ownership. Some
public curerprises were merged with others, and some were liquidated. In
. general, the program lacked dearly defined policy objectives. Privatization
(or divestture) was not on the policy agenda in this period.
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FucSred adjustnntl, 1987-9)1

The measure of success duting the partial adjustmiient phase can be attributed to three*major factors: tdie implemnentation of structural adjustment
reforms, which began to improve economic management and rcstore production incentives; the depreciation oftlhe Fren ch franc, which caused a real
depreciation in the exchange rate, at least until 1983; and improved tenns of
trade. However, as the terms of trade took another shalp downward turn in
1987, crisis economic management returned, t-hus exposing die underlying
weaknesses of tie Ivorian economy, and calling for continued and intensi- fied policyreform. Throughout tie remainder of the 1980s, the tenus of tradelcontinued to decline. Adjustmentwas also fettered by another key external
shock-th;e appreciation ofthe realexchange rate,broughtaboutbya stronger French franc and by currency devaluations in several competitor countries, such as Nigeria and Ghana The combination of these eventsTforced
the govemment to rely on internaladjustment in whiich competitiveness was
to be restored by reducing domestic absorption.
During this peribd, adjustment was supported by a third structural adju.ntment loan, which sought to intensify the policy initiatives of earlier years.
But the govemment drew back from its commitment to adjustment, and
essentially abandoned the program in 1987. This stance led to an interrup-w
don in World Bank lending to Cote d'lvoire for a two-year period (198789). However, after an agreement wras reached with the IMF in 1989 for a
new standby arrangement, World Bank lending was resumed with the ap*proval of six sectoral adjustment operations, mobilizing a total of $780 million (see table 3.8). The medium-term fiamework that undergirded the last
three of these sectoral adjustmentloans acknowledged that the competitiveness problem had to be addressed before second tranche releases. The
sectoral adjustment loans should thus be viewed not so much as attempts to
replace macroeconomic policy reforms (aimed at competitiveness), but
rather as necessary complements to such refortms. Without the necessary
adjustment in the real exchange rate, sectoral adjustment loans cannot be
expected to restore sustainable growth.
Fiscalpolicy.The sharp decline in commodity prices in 1987 revealed the

fragility of the favorable fiscal policy outcomes during the partial adjustment
phase. Because producer prices remained unchanged as world prices fell,
the Agriculture Price Stabilization Fund's operating -surplusof 9 percent of
GDP in 1985 fell dramatically in 1987 tojust 0-3 percent. Given that expenditures had been trimmed to the bone earlier in the decade, fiscal policy
required an even more austere taxation stance. Tax-raising measures were
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taken in 1987 and 1988 (primarily on indirect taxation), butthelle outcomes
were disappointing, particularly for import taxes, whlich did not improve
revenue as expected.10 Th1ree factors explain the disappointing outcomes.
First4 reveniue was eliminated from thle agricujltural stabilization funds. Second, import.tax increases generated poor revenue outcomes, duie in part to
evasion. Third, the tax base conrLtracted, due*primarily.to tle recession. Rev6 billion in 1986 to CFAF; 143.4
enue from direct taxation fell r-om GFAF 61.5
billion in 1990, primarily because tax revenue declined.
With little room for maneuver on thie revenue and expendituire fronts,
the governmentraund itdifficultto reduce die fiscal deficit Havingimproved
during 1984-86, the primary dcit rose to 7.6percent ofrCDP in 1989 (am
pendix table 3B.2), while the overall deficitincrQesed to 17. percent of GDP
in the sanme year. Since then furtler expenditure cuts, notably on current ;
expenditures other than wages and salaries, havereduced tlie deficit somewhat. Wilthdiegovernment unable to close die fiscal deficit, and wih external financing opportunities limited, it has had littleialternative but to allow
arrears to accumulate even furtherduring the latterhalfofthe decade. Again,
the major limitation of fscal policy was its failure to restructure the tax ss-_
tem, and reduce the reliance on trade taxes. Given this constraint, the government did remark:ibiy well in containing the fiscal deficit
Monefatyandfinancdalpolicy.Monetrayandcredit contraction continued
during the second halfof the decade, wiith credit ceilings beingapplied successfully. Broad money growdi.-was negatve from 1987 to 1991 (an average
of-2.2 percent annually). Credit to the private sector was constrained, which
had serious effects on the economy. The financial problems of the government and the sharp detenroration in commodity prices forced the Agriculture Price Stabilization Fund to finance its operating losses by accumulating
arrears to exporters. This accumulation ofcrop creditcrowded outnoncrop
or ordinary credit, thus aggravating the recession.
Interest rate policy was also changed during this period. The regular
interest rate had been cut from a peak; of 12.5 percent in 1983 to just 8.5
percentin 1986. However, several upwvardadju-stmentswere then made, and
the rate increased to 10 percent in 1989. The premium on the preferential
interest rate was reduced in March 1989 and then abolished in October.
The banking system continued to have serious problems due to poorquality bank portfolios, and a serious liquidity shortage due to the credit
squeeze, payments arrears, and a low level of deposits.' 'The problems of the
former development banks were particularly acute- In 1987 measures were
taken to address them-to reform and restructure the BNDA (with foreign
assistance), and to liquidate BICT and BNEC. The BIDI and CCI wvere to be
merged. In 1989 the BIDI and CCI were also to be liquidated. But the pro-
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grain to restructure tilc BNDA was not efTectively implemented, and its future is in serious doubLt. The governmenL is currcntly arrAnging for- its liquidation, and is seeking to r eplace itwithl alternative arrangement for-providing rural credit.
-The government also soighlt to assist the conmiercial banks. In 1988
margins between deposit and lending rates were widened to ease pressures.
on banking profitability. Yet the problemsofrthese banks continued, and the
govemment is culTently engaged in a relhabilitation prograni. Similar diffi.culties, stemming oliLginally from the payments arrears problem, havc con[roanted the insurance sector. In respon.se, tlie government introduced measures to restrucuie tie sector, including new regulatory arrangements.
Trade pocY.. Trade policy refolm was a
jmajor unfinished task on the
agenda of structural adjustment loans I and II., Consequently, structural
adjustment loan III sought to maintain the impetus of this reform. The objective of tariff and export incentive system reform was twofold-to create a
framework of incentives in. which inefficient enterpnses were induced to
adjust in an environment favorable to exports, and to neutralize the depressing effect on the productive sectors of the difference betveen domestic and
international prices. The reform sought to provide a uniform,effective pro-]
tection rate of 40 percent across activities, induding a 20 percent subsidypayment for exports. In effect, the refonns were to mimic an exchange-ratedepredation. The new tariff code was revised. The export subsidy schemewas to be funded in the 1987 budget. AWorld Bank loan of$30 million was
made in fiscal ]986 to provide financing to help industry adjust to the new
incentive environment.
Most of the basic legislative changes necessary for implementing trade
reforms were enacted between 1985 and 1988. However, the negotiatons
between the World Bank and the governmentwere difficult, and the legislalion was much criticized by the national press and local industrialists. The
fiscal deteroioation experienced by the govermnent explains these difficulties in part The governmentincreased import duties by 30 percent in 1987,
raising the target level of effective protection to 52 percent. This increase
partly compensated for the continuing deterioration in the terms of trde:
and the declining U.S. dollar. Butincreasing pressure on the exchequer led
to reluctance to implementthe exportsubsidyscheme, due to bepaidatthe
rate of 20 percent ofvalue added byJune 1990. By that time, despite its intention of doing so, the government had notyet taken into account the 30 percentincrease in import duties in calculating the exportsubsidy. This created
a lack of symmetry between import taxation and the rate of export subsidy,
which operated to the disadvantage ofexports.tThe government did streamline the approval process, but government offcials and the industrial comr-
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muniy were not confidentdLat the exportsubsidywas Lo he continued.The
investment necessary t.o take advantage or export. opportlunities was tiJiiis
incomimnitted. Wet the cxpori. suibsidy schieme did increase thc profits of existing exporters, enabling tlhCI to rermain in business despite ihe overvalued
cxchange rate.
The removal of import zcont.rols was very painfuil foI Ivorian manufacturers, especially in the textile, footwear, clectronic equipment, appliances, and
vehicles inclustries. The press and sonie officials alleged that eliminating

:import controls mide it ea;sier to avoid customs inspection, or to engage in
underinvoicing on an extensive scale. Studies by Direction GEneralc des
Grands Travaux (DGGTx) estiniated tiat CrAF 30 billion in tax receipts (or
13 percent of total I987 tax receipts) inay lave been lost annually. Yet import tax collection figures and omissions recorded in the balance olpayinents
did not reveal evidence orfraud. Nevertlheless, in February 1988 the gover-

ment reapplied reference prices and quantitative restrictions to some 300
products,including textiles and footwear, in response to these fears of fraud.
Their reimposition was a setback to the program, but without a system
equipped tovalue imports effectively and realistically-the problem wilt remain.
The government did not. fully appreciate the-painful-impact of the import reforms on the industrial sector. The effects of the reform became even
more acute after 1986 as die CFA firanc appreciated against the U.S. dollar,
while other potentially competitive countries (Nigeria and Ghana) devalued
their currencies as part of their adjustment process. Removing quantitative
restrctions on imports at this time was particularly damaging to parts of the
industrial sector, and, in any event, proved to be politically unsustainable.
Agriculturalpolcy. The.weaklnesses of Ivorian agriculture again became

evident as the international prices of cocoa and coffee fell sharply in 1987.
Whereasvalue added in agriculture grew by3.8 percent-annually from 1965
* to 1980 (with the export crop sector growving by 6.5p ercentannuaIly), value
added declined by 1.5 percent annually from 1980 to 1987 (and the export
crop sector declined by 0.5 percent annually). Thus adjustment policy reorm in aculture did not restore agricultural growth, and firther reforms
were to be on the policy reform agenda for the remainder of the decade.
: The main policy issue facing the government was the continued weakness in world commodity prices, especially for cocoa and coffee. In an effort to reverse the decline in world cocoa prices, the authorties imple: men ted a policy in 1988 -whereby the cocoa crop was partially retained. This
policy disrupted the agricultural mark-eting cycle. Exporters were not reimbursed by the Agriculture Price Stabilization Fund, and were unable to obtain export pennits. Thus, they were unable to repay crop credit, which in
tum aggravated the liquidity problems of the banking system. But the reten-
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tion policy failed t.o inflience die world price, simjply lbecause thle markets.
anticipated that the Ivorian sitockswouild eventuially have to ma.ke theirway
into tle markeL The policy cost COtc d'lvoire sonic of'its market sharc,
notably t,o Ghana.
-Altlough Llie initial policy thrustwwas to raise the producerprices or cocoa and coffee under structural adjuistliient loan III,

thC

marlked decline in

world prices precluded implementing iJte policy. The reforns thus souglht
to alchieve ltro main objectives. Tlic first was to increa;se price incentives for
coffee production relative to cocoa. In determiningproduicerprices, tlh govermment lhad persisted in ignotring aworld price differential in ravol of corfee (amoun0ng to 25 percenton average benween 1987 and 1989). This was
corrected by the introduction or a coffee quality premium of GFA 33 par
kilognun. The second was to refonn marketingarrangements for both cropsrestructuning the Agriculture Price Stabilization Fund, whose charter was
-amendedin April 1991 .Its operationswere limited to cocoaand coffee, where
domestic marketing arrangements have been liberalized. The Agriculture
Price Stabilization Fund was also to cease undertaking direct exports on its
own accounL A new system of setting producer prices on the basis of the
averagerealized exportprices offorwardsaleswas-implementedcin late 1991..
The role of the Agriculture Price Stabilization Fundin quality control, whiclh
had been quite ineffective and did little to encourage firmers to produce
good-quality produce, was abolished. These reforms sought to reduce thle
costs (margins) of export crop marketing, and thus create the potential for
raising producer prices.
Export taxes on all export crops other than cocoa' coffee, and timber
products were eliminated. In addition, trade policy reforms (which were
initially framed under structural adjustment loan II and extended in structural adjustment loan III) were applied to the entire agricultural sector (except cocoa, cofFee, and cotton.). The-reforms extended the export subsidy
scheme, which sought to provide an effective protection rate of 20 percent
for such products. These reforms sought to encourage agricultural diversification, and the production ofhigh-value export crops, such as fruits, rubber,
and vegetables. However, the granting of export subsidies was patchy-the
policy was applied to some crops (notably palm oil, rubber, and coconut),.
but not to others (such as pineapples and bananas). Moreover, payments
were often delayed.
terprise efora Public enterprise reform changed gear in the
1987-91 period, with greater emphasis placed on divestiture, and not simply on restructuring. Between 1987 and 1989 almost 30 public enterprises
were privatized. Several divestiture techniques were ulsed, usually involving
direct negotiations with potential buyers. These privatizations were conPubtic
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ducted with little trnsparency, and little striategic stuldy.wws pursuelltcd plior.
to piivatliation. In short, ilte piivuatzaoions werc not parlicularly well mianaged. The new goveinment in 1990 adopted a inore strategic approach Lo
priviuization, siupported ly- ite International Development Association
(IDA). The g6vcreinent..has already privattizedl 4 enterpnises iindew tlhis iniliative, and is cuirrently bringing ;nohithr 20 eniterpilscs.l1o the illarket. 10
compleil.a . first plase or1privatLizat11.ion. (between 1991 and 1993). 4nothlcr
phase involving some SO enterprises isscilcduleLd fbiiplemencation in 1993. .
TIe privatization prognai has lcen subject to repeated cdelays in impilellnen-

aldon, and p-r-ogress to datce hllrieen patcchy*At. thie scsaeuile,policies 1r.ave
bveen falmed to strengthen the existing public enterprises by giving

them

greater finmancial and inaLngemiienc.autuonomy, and requiring greater accounip
ability froiii themn.-

Appendix 3A sumnmaiizes the main elements of tlCe structural adjustient

issues in COte d'Ivoirc and how they were addressed tnder the riefoml programs. Fiscal policy has been gencrally contractionaiy througlhouit die decade, apart fifoil a brief respite in 1 984-86, wvhien revenues were generated
fiom imrproved commodity prices. Apart from tlose years, internal-adjusLment in C6te d'Ivoire has meant a dramatic cutback in public investment
expenditures in the first instance, followed by cuts in curirent expenditures.
Altlough there was some increase in tax rates, this has been insufficient to

compensate for the Ioss in revenues from the stabilization funds.The authorities were general]y successful in following a contractionary monetary policy,
*withbroad money growtlh being brough-t under control. However, with tie
persistence of the fiscal deficit and a growing stock of doinestic public sector,
arrears, the Ivorian banking system has faced, and continues to face, serious
financial and liquidity problems. This has tended to crowd out credit to the
private sector.
Given tie continued decline in the price of the principal exports (cocoa
and coffee), there was only limited opportunity for tde goveimnent to raise
producer prices. Policy refonns have therefore been directed at increasing
marketing efficiency, lowering marketing costs, and providing incentives to

maintain the orchard stock and quality. Tne

main

constraint facing agricul-

tural pricing policy is the real exchange rte overvaluation, which effectively
constiained the realreturns that could be offered to exportproducers. Trade
policy reforms attempted to mimic an exchange rate depredation, but were
not effectively implemented, mainly because fiscal constraints prevented
timely payment ofexportsubsidies. Quantitative restrictionswere reapplied,
in part because of the weaknesses of the customs administration.

Published by iRepository, 2021

https://ir.iba.edu.pk/faculty-research-books/13

CS d47voirfetltred adjusctmail

103

Finally, progress with institutional relorms, particularly refoms of export crop marketing and the putblic enterprise sector, has been noticeably
slowr. For much of the decade very litte was aclhieved, though in 1990-91
there was sonic evidence or more rapid change, including moves toward
nmarketing liberalization and privatization.
Principal economic outcomes

:

The previous section set out the contenimnd limitations

Or

thea djustment

prog_rams of die l980s. Butwhat of the main economic outcomes?. Do thlese
confirm these wea knesses? In wvhat rollows, we divide the economic objec* tives of macroeconoimic policy reform into four main gioups: stabilization,
- resource allocation, ieconomic growth, and equity and povert reduction.
-

-Sabilization.

.

How successful were tlie adjustment programs at restoring macroeconomic
balance in the face of senrous destabilizing events of the decade? The main
macroeconomic aggregates are reviewed in turn.

Fiscalde&frt.The effects of the investment boom in the late 1970s can be
seen in an iocrease in capital e.penditures-from 14.8 percent of CDP in
1976 to 23.3 percent in 1978, and to 22.0 percent in 1979 (table 3.9 and
appendix table.3B.2). Consequendy, the fiscal deficitrose to 10.8 percent of
GDP in 1979, despite a relatively favorable, revenue position (total revenue
averaged 35 percent of GDP from 1977 to 1979) 2 Despite cutbacLks in investmentspendingto 13.1 percentofGDPin 1983 (from anannual'averaget
ofl8.6percentfrom 1978 to 1982), the primary fiscaldeficitpersisted (aver-aging just less than 5 percent of GDP in 1981-83). This was because lowerworld commodity prices led to a deterioration in revenue. More favorable
world prices and revenues in 1984-86, combined with further cuts in iinestment spending, enabled the government to achieve a primary surplus of 6percent of GDP and to close the overall fiscal deficit (to only 2.7 percent of
GDP) Yet the gaisint he terms oftradewere short-lived, and the downward
trend in revenue continued for the remainder of the decade, reaching its
lowest level in 1991-22.7 percent of GDP. Althougl the government-restrained die primary deficit to only 3.6 percent-of GDP between 1987 and.
1991, two fiscal problems remain-the persistence of an overall deficit (more
than 13 percent of GDP) and imbalances in the fiscal accolunts.
Despite severe cutbacks.in investment spending and an improvement
in the -primary deficit, a high overall fiscal deficit has persisted. The main
reason for the large deficit dunng the latter half of the decade was the strain
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that interest paynents on public debt placed on the governmental accounts..
-Debtincreased from negligible levels. in the early lOSOs to 12.3 percent of
GDP by 1991, most of which wras extemal debt. The debt problem has not
yet been resolved. Insofar as the debt service problem has been addre.ssed
by accumiutilating arrears, interest payments and die friscal deficit are in erfcct self-financing..

The closure of tie primary deficit to an approxiiate balance in 191.
.souldnot be- interpreted as die solution of the fiscal deficit problem. The
process of restoring this inacro balance in twm created imbalances in the structure of die-fiscal accounts, whose effects are arguably as serious as a persisting deficit The contractionary fiscal policy in the latter half of the l 980s has
created two majorimbalances-between investment and recurrent expenditures, and betveen waes and salaries and otler recurrent expenditures.
During the fettered adjustiment period, investment expenditures comprised only 9.4 percent of total expenditures, compared with a 50 percent
share during the boom of1978-80. Future generations.ill. thus bearmuch
of the burden of the currentadjusnnent effort Restoring growthand "crowding in" private investment calls urgenily for major fiscal adjstment in CGte
d'Ivoire to restore investment expenditures by the goverrnment. But this is only one aspect of the fiscal problem.- The overall fiscal constrain't facing the government have seriously distorted the composition of,
govemment recurrent ex-penditures. The share of wages and salaries in
noninterest expenditures increasedI from 49 percent in-the destabilizing
period to S4percent in die partial adjustment period and remained at this
leve up to 1991 (appendix table 33.2). The ratio ofwivages to materials costs
rose fiom 1.8 to 2.9 during the same period. WNage and salary levels in the
govemment sector are significantly higher than those in oiher counitnes of
the region The avenge civil servicewage was 9 to 10 times GDP per capita,
calling for civil service reform anda reduction in the wage and salary component of public ex3pendituresInterest payments on foreign debt were suspended in May 1987, and
irregular payments to the official bilateral- creditors were resumed only wit
the rescheduling arrangement of that year. Thus, despite the adjustment
e3forts that have been made, fiscalproblemswere as evidentat the end of dhe
1980s as they were at the beginning, if not more so. Aside from the persistence of the debt problem, the adjustment in the primary deficit has led to
low levels of public investment and high relative levels of wage and salary
expenditures, making it more difficult for the government to pursue eqmntable growth in Cote d'lvoire.
Arrears. Given the monetary disipline imposed on the govermnent by
the WestAfrican Monetary Union, the optionis available to the government
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to finance its fiscal deficits are limited. External borrowing has been reduced
significantly, duie in part to dte debt overhang. Borrowring from nonbanking
domestic sources is linmited by the shallowness of the domestic financial sector. Thus. the one option left is to accumulate alTears.
External arrears have become a major problem. Whereas the stock of
total atrears to external creditors anmounted to only $36 million in 1986, iL
rose to S215 billion br 1991. These figures underscore th effects of the
:destabilization- on Cte d'lItvire'sinternational creditworthiness. But another
major problem from the persistent fiscal deficit and theabsence of a longterm solution to its- financiail clises has been the accumulation of eam.due
to domiestic creditors. By the end oF1S9. the central government had accu
mulated arrears'of CFAF 556 billion (more than S4 billion), or about-13%.percent of GDP. These arrears are due not only on repayments of interestand pnncipal on loans from the private banling system, butalso on bills from
-private sector suppliers and-contractors; Ruenda-Sabaterand Stone :(1992):S
give a graphic account- of the extent of defaulting ialmost all firms supply-.;
ing the government orreceiving reftmds or .subsidies fron the government
have been affected. The governent and its agencies have simplystopped
paying many of their bills. Even small and medium-scale enterprises are affected Domestic arrears therefore had penasive economic effects, damaging
m the financial sector and private investment, and thereby affecting over- all economic activity.
Tke exteral deficit The mvestment boom of the late 1 970s-widened the
ex-ternal current account deficit to 163 percent of GDP by 1991 (table 310
and appendix table 3BE). The deiit fell to a negligible level in19S4 86
(Just 1.6 percent of GDP) primarily because commodity pric=es recovered..
However, the continued deterioration in prices tiereafter, combined wfith:
the growing burden of interest payments on external debt, have led to the.
reemergence of significant external deficits on the currentaccountL Aswith
- the fiscal deficit, this macroeconomic imbalance canged litte throughout
the 1980s. At the end of the decade, the current account deficit was onlr
marginally lo-wer than it was at the beginning. The main difference in the
external accountis the increasing importance of interestpaymenrLs on external debt In 1991 interest payments accounted for more than 80 percent of
gross factorpayments, and gross factor payments rose fromJjustSl84million

i 1975-to $1,278 million in 1991 Thus, the currentaccount deficitin 1991
can be explained almost entirely by interest payments (with the deficit
amounting to $1,132 million) In contrast, the deficit thatwas recorded in1980 was almost three times the gross factor payments.
Given the negative effect of net factor mcome and net current transfers
on thecurrentaccount of the balance of payments (indluding interest pay
ply
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ments on external public debt), the resource balance must be sufficiently in
surplus to contain the currentaccountdeficiL Unlornately, no surpluswas
recorded for much of the decade.
Table 3.10, which reports growth rates of export and importvolunes
dunring the three periods, dearly shows the nature of constrained adjustmentL Formuch of the 1980s export growthwas sluggish, averaging only 3.9
percent annually in the partial adjustment period, and only 1.8 percent between 1982 and 1988. The recent improvement is encouraging, and is due
to asignificantincrease in the exportvolumes of cocoa (in 1989) -andcoffee (in 1990).YetinportvolLunes declined throughoutmuch ofthe decade
by 1 percentannualy betureen 1981 and 1986, butby 8 percentannually in
*1987-SB The destabilizing peinod showed a positive growt
f more than
13.9 percenLt.hese figures indicate thatexort grwth has been insuffident to achieve an external balance under the structural adjustment programs, and that, insofiaras some adjustment has been made in the external
- (resource) balance,ithasbeen0broughtab outbynimportcompression. Given

Table3.1G0 Elanceofpaymentstrends, 1975-91
(uSS mrons)
Deswriaring

peiod
t975_80

Item

ExpasoftNfS
2,668.1
Imports of GNFS
-2,773.4
Resource baance
-105.4
(as percentage of GOP).
0.3
Net aorincome
-3042
Netourrentlansers
-428.1
zCurfentaccount
Baiace before oficial grants
-837.6
(as pecntage of GDP)
A-10
Offcicdlca$algants
28.8
Balanceaferoffial ggrat.
-808.8
Long-tern capital inflows
617.4
dOteritems:
155.1
Chargesin netresenres
16.6

Femued

Pondadipstmt
If-83 . 1984-86

castMt
1987-9t

*Z719.6
,949.1
-229.6
-3.9
-51 11
-401.9

3.2712
2,478.6
792.6
10.7
.602.7
-332.5

3.4313
3,161.6
269.6
3.9
-1.019 2
-470.5

.1142.6
-14.9
23.9
-1.1 18.7
784.4
110.4
14.7

-142.6
-1.60
41.7
-100.9
247.1
-269.1
213.0

-1.220.1
-12.4
s8.4

-1.139.8
267.6
6025
-173

Memoranrum iteum Gowth rates

Destbifizing

P.niol

perid

cejuznent

197-O

1981-86

4.9

3.9

-0.2

-0.9

4.0

2.0

-1.4

Fettered adp*strent

1987-88

1989-90

ExpotS of goods and nonfactor
senizces

.

.12.1

Imiports of goods and nonfactor
. senrces
GDPgrowth

.

Sourrc World Bank data.
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the decline in real GDP in 1983-84 and in 1987-91 (see tabIe 3.2), it is clear
that expenditure reducionhas been more important to Ivorian adjustment
than has ex-penditure swziching.
The currentaccount deteriorated in the 1980s in part because the debt
service burden grew, thus placinggreater pressure on te resource balance
to showa surplus suffcient to contain th currentaccount deficit. What factors have determined the movements in the resource balance during the
period? To investigate the underlying real-economy sources of external adjustmentin Cote dIvoire, -wre decomposed the changes in the resource balance based on its underlying identities in he national mcome and product
accounts. 3 Itis possible to decompose changes in the resource balance into,
changes in total outputand changesin thevarious expenditurecomponents
(publicand private consumptionanid investment). Such calculations establish the extenttowhich theadjustinentin the exteralaccountswasbrought
about through changes in outputorexpendimre-andifthe latter, which of
the components of expenditure have borne the brunt of the adjustnenL
Table 5.11 reports the results of the decomposition'for Cte d'Ivoire. It
records how changes in the resource balance were related to GDP and aggregate expenditure changes. Three periods are distinguished based on
changes in the re.source balance over the periodck 4 The firstperiod;is 197780, when the resource balance deteriorated. and when the seeds of macroeconomic destabilization were sown. During this destabilizingrpenrod, the
currentacoountdefidtincreased toaboutl7percentofGDP, assodiatedwith
a deterioration in the resource balance. The second period is 1980-85, the
period of partal adjustment, during which both the current account and
the resource balance improved- The third is 1985-91, when the -external
imbalance continued-with an increase in the currentaccount defict to 12
percent of GDP and a decline in theresource balance. These trends in the'
extemal account are clear from the memorandum items of table 3,i1.
To what extent were these changes induced by changes in aggregate
supply or aggregate demand? The memorandum items address this quesiion. For the first period (1977-80), the increase in outputwas insufficient
to prevent a deteriorating external situation in the face of the massive increase in aggregate expenditures. This scenario is not surprising, given the.
investment-led boom of the late 1970ss, The growth in aggregate absorption
dominated through this period. During the partial adjustmentphase (198085), the improvementin the exteralbalanceswasassociatedwithan expan-

sion in aggregate supply, rather than an adjustment in absorption. Total
ependitures increased, but by significandy less than the growth in outpu;
reducingthe external defiCt Thus, insofarasanadjustmentttookplace during
this period, itwas through an expansion in supply rather than-a contraction
in demandL- Fmally, the deterioration in the external deficit in the second
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Table 3.1 1 Trade and resource balances and thelr related identities, 1915-9
7
(CFAF billions)
:Iteem

1975

1976

1977

1978

1979

1980

1981

1982

1983

1984

f9B5:

1986

1987

1988

1989

1990

1991

Trade
balance/
GDP(%)
Resource

10.8

.6

M3.5

-11.1

-l5.2

17.5

-16,9

-13.8

.14.1

-1,5

0,6

-3.9

-10.7

-12,6

-13.5

-13.2

.11.9

1.2
61.2
96.9 .16.3 -59.5 -134.6 .162,8 -72.2 -43.2 330.2 114.3 212,3 137.7 86.6 88,9 119.6 128.4
834.5 1,1141)0 1,539.2 1,782.8 1,94'1,9 2,2216 2,291.5 2,486,5 2,581.9 2,069.3 3,137.8 3,24+3 3,117.8 3,0672 2,947.5 2,705.4 2,690.0

balance
GDP
Public

consumption

111.8

180,3

209.7

290C4. 353.8 39539

Private
: consumption
Public

501.2

616.4

811.9

978.1

106,7 1,333,6 1,462.0 1,553.9 1,658.5 1,787.8

76.9

105.3

165.8

238.0

258.7

2;01.0

202.1

169.1

131,0

117,4

153,0

123.0

143.0

93.0

110.4

150.8

251.9

292.6 285.2

125.7

391,9

107.9 368.9. 182.3

310.1

2,12.7. 211.8

321,3

211.7

investment

Prvate

.

investment
Total
expenditures

398.0

162.7

183.0 476.1

501.3 635,7

Changein 1977 to 1980
CFAF (billiis)
PNtcenCs

Resource balance

.231,5

100.0

GOP

682.4

.-294,8

Total expenditures
Publicconsumption
Private consumption

913,9

394,8

Public investmcnt

Prvateinvestment

.

.

.

186,2

.80.4

521.7

.225,4
-15.2
-73.8

35.2

170,8

a,Cornporentsasapercentage 6(changes in thresorcebance,
Source: Wprli B.ank data.

Chang,uln 1980etoPret,-CA
1985

CFA (W14)

548.9
916.2
367.3.
87.1
449.4
-83.6
-85.6-

516.2 491.5 470.8

1,783 2,129.9 2,11420 1,880,6 2.007.7 1,829.0 1,809.2

833.3 1,052.8 1,112,3 1,799,1 2,0014 2,356.2 2,454.3 2,558.7 2,625.1 2,539.1 :,723,S 3,002.0 2,980.6

Memorandum items
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127.8 135r0 438.0

CFAF

.lim

.Ingon

I00.0
166.9

66.9::.
15.9

81.9

74.7

71.4

190.6 207.2

2,8586 2,55.8 2561.6
1985to 1991
(billions)
Percent,
-285.9

:447,8

I00Q0
156.6

-161.9
-12.2
26.2

56.6
4.3

-9,2

-15.2

-43.0

15.0

15.6

-13219

46.5
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half of the.decade appears to have been due to.a contraction im aggregate
output, rather than to changes in aggregate absorption. In fact, absorption
declined during the period, which, all else equal,; would have reduced the
external deficit However, theseabsorpdion cuts were simplyimsufficient to
counteract the output shortfalls that increasingly characterized the Ivorian
economy in the late 1980s.
To explore the role ofthe various expenditre componentsi movements
in the external babnces, table3.11 disaggregates the fourmain components
of absorption (private and public consumption and prv:ate and public investment). The surge in absorption during the destabilizingperiod (197780) wasrelatednotonly to publicinvestment, butalso toincreasesinprivate
and (to a lesser extent) public-consumption. In fact the peak in public investnentappearedearlier than the emerging external deficit-reaching 133.
percentofGDP in1978, when thecurrentacccun.t defict was 11.1 percent.
of GDP, Far below its peakl of 17.5 percent in 1980 (able 3.11)
e the
boom m.inpublic investment triggered the destabilzation, it was the related
boom in private and public consumption that really fueled domesticabsorptionandled to the deterioration inthe external balances Private investment
had no significant effect on the destabilization.
During the partil adjustment period, both consumption components
contiuued to rise, thereby exerting upward pressure on the external deficit.
However, GDP.growth in this period dominated these absorption- chages.i
(Note that both of the investment components of absorption declined between 1980 and 1985, reinforcing the beneficial effects on the external defiCi.) FiMally, the destabiliztion at the end of the decade saw cuts in public
consumption; and (especially) investment, as well as reductions in private
investment Howsever tiey were no sufficienttopreventa continuedincrease
in the external deficit, due to declining GDPM16
Monry supply o:dA and inflaio. Price inflation is one of the aregates
that has been stabilized umder the adjustment program, primarily because
monetary discipline-was restored during the decade (table 3 12). The ex* pansionary monetary polices of the destab:lizing period. (which witnessed
:a gro'wih in money supply of 19 percent annually) were -corrected during
bodt the partial and the fettered adjustment phases (with money supply
growth falling to 9 percent annually in 1981-86 and to -2 percent annually
in 1987-91).
This restoration of monetary disdpline is reflected in recorded rates of
priceinflation. Table 3.12 reports tvo measures ofdomesticpriceinflation. one based on the-consumerprice index,-and the otherbased on the implicit
GDP deflator. The two measures are quite different-the GDP deflator
records a significandy greater decline in inflation during the period (from
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Thi) percentin 1976-S to-2.8percentin 19S7-90).Aside from-the 198186 period, the GDP deflator indicates a lower rate of price increase than the
consumer price index-based inflation index. The consumer price index is
sensitie to the expenditure weights that are selected. Table 3.12 compares
consumerprice index-based rates ofinflation according to three alternative
setsofweights (European, African, and low-income patterns ofejxpenditures).
*TheAfrican weights generally yield higher inflation rates than the others,
and these are usually the basis for the official consumer pnce index. The
lowver inflation rate indicated by the GDP deflator is due to the weight given
in the deflator to export commodities, the prices ofwhich fell during the:
latter half of the decade. The consumer pice index does not reflect this.
Both indices show- that, compared with earlier in the decade, inflation has
been significantly reduced. Given the monetary discipline imposed by the
WestAfrican Monetary Union and the severity of the recession (due in part
to contractionary adjustment policies), this outcome is not surprising.
Rdativpnices anld resourceallocation

Besides being a measure of international competitiveness, the real effectdie exchange rate reflects a key relative price that directs resource allocation in the economy. The real appreciationms in the exchange rate during
the late 1970s and the late 19SOs would usually indicate resource allocations away from the tradables sector in general, toward nontradable activities. To whatextent do directindicators ofthe price oftradables relative to
the price ofnontradables confirm this change in the price structure of the
Ivorian economy, and how responsive have resource allocations been to
these changes?
Appendix table SRA3reports estimates of the relative price structure of
the Ivorian economy based on tie broad sectoral, implicit GDP deflators- It
is dear that the relative price signalindicated by the real exchange rate is not
Table 3.12 Measures of price inftion, 1976-90
tr4ladon rrmeure

Annual inflation rate. CPt (percet)

African weigts
European weigs
Low-income weights
GDP deflator(annual pertente change)
Consumnerpricefindexvholesale price index
GP Pdeflatorftvholesaie pric index
Moneysupplygrowth (1M2)
Not a4aibble

Source: World Bankand IMF das.
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1976-80

t.981-86

16.7
16.7

5.8
5.8

15.0
120.5
132.2
20.8

7.1
£11.3
104.9
9.0

1987-90

43
43
2.1
35
-2.8
95.0
76.1
-3.2
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reflected consistently in die GDP deflator sceies. Altiough the series indicates that the rclative price of services increased during the destabilizing
period (when dierealexchangerateapprecialted) anddeclinedin 1984 (when
the real rate depreciated), die story dhereafteris confused. In particular, the
prices of seriices fell noticeably after 1985, whereas tradable prices increased-this, during a period ofsignificantreal exchange rate appreciation.
Certainly, die table does not provide evidence of a significant movement in
the relative price series thata favored the services sector inl the latter half of
the 1980s. One factor that has prevented the relative price of services from
rnsing is tde severe recession, as evidenced by declining GDP and resource
underutilization. The tentative condusion to be drawn from dtese data is
that, while the reliance on internal adjustmenthas [idled to restore the international competitiveness of tradables in C6te- d'Ivoire, it has prevented perverse price signals that favor nontradables.' 7 To what extent does resource
allocation reflect the stable pricing of n'ontradables?

GDP growth rates by sector of onrgin (see table-3.3) are more consistent
with the real exchange rate signals, with the services sector growving rapidly
during periods of exchange rate appreciation (at 8.68 percent betWeen 1985
and 1991), and less,so when the real exchange ratewas depredating (at only
1.83 percent from 1980 to 1984). Similarly, the tradables sectors (agriculture and industry) have exhibited slow and even negative growth since 1985,
and grew faster during the period of real exchange rate depredation. Although these indicators are too aggregative to provide accurate measures
of the effects of movements in the exchange rate or resource allocation,
they are at least consistent with the real exchange rate movements identified in table 35.
Changes in tuade distanons

Towhatextenthave theadjusunentprograms removed the findamental trade
distortions of the Ivonan economy-exchange rate overvaluation, import
restrictions, and price controls? The adjustment effort failed to reverse ttie
real exchange rate appreciation that dominated the decade (especially its
second half). Butwhat of trade policy? How have the reforms changed this
source of incentive distortion?
With the increasing overvaluation of the real exchange rate, any significant reduction in the level of-protection granted through trade controls
would be unlikely, given the penalty of an overvalued real exchange rate on
export producers an d import-substituting producers alike. As already noted,
the major thrust of structural adjustmentloans II and HII was to increase protection to import-competing activities and allocate subsidies to exporters in
order to mimic a real exchange rate depredation. (The reason for the fiil-
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ure of this policy is reviewed in the next section.) Given that levels of protection must be maintined when the real exchange awte is overvalucd, bow
can trade poliLy reforns be assesed fromn tlhe standpoint of-structural adjustnent and its objectives? Reform could have reduced the distortionary
effects of trade policy in C8te d'Ivoire in two -ways, without obviating the
-;objective of proxying a devaluation. First, trade liberalization could be
achieved by substituting tariffis for quantitative import restrictions. Second,
the tariff structure could be designed to minimize die distortion of the incentive structure and resource allocation..
Both of these objectives were part of the adjustmient lending operations
of the World Bank. The first was an essential part-of the taLiff plus subsidy
scheme, since the replacement of quantitative restnrctions by-tariffis would
generate revenue to the exchequer to help finance export subsidies. The
second objective was. set during strucmural adjustment loans IL and Il,
-which sought to achieve a uniform effective protection rate of 40 percent
for all protected activities. 'Were these more limited:trade liberalization
measures achieved?
Quantitative restrictions were replaced by tariffs in 1985 as part of the
structural adjustment program, with surcharges to be applied temporarily
during the transition. But the continued appreciation of the CFA fianc,
devaluations in Nigeria and Ghana, the persistent decline in commodity
prices, and well-based rumors of fraud, smuggling, and underinvoicing led
to a progressive reversal of this policy after 1987. The World Bank reports
that about one-third of imports were still subject to quantitative restrctions
at the end of the decade. Consumer goods with massmarket potential (such
as texidles, dothing, shoes, refined oil, rubberproducts, processed food, and
electrical appliances) all continued to-be subject to licensing. Abouthalfof
food imports contnued to be subject to eitherpriorauthorization or licensing. In other words, the limited liberalization objective of replacing quanttative restrictions with triffs was not met
Achieving a uniform level of effective protection in order to minimize
the distortions of trade policy in resource allocation is not easy. These rates
can change as mput use responds to major changes in relative prices, thus
derailing the policy. These difficuLties, as events proved, also confounded

the policy in Cote d'Lvoire. Table 3.13 reports the structure of nominal -and
effective protection in Cote d'Ivoire in 1990, as reported by the World Banki
Trade policy involved a combination of tariffs and export.subsidies. The latter were not consistently paid to exporters, and so the protection they actually received wvas significantly less than the level to which they were notionally entitled. The first two columns of table 3.13 report nominal rates of'
protection foroutputs andinputs. These are combined to generate estimates
of effective rates, reported in the remaining columns. The. third and fourth
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columns reporLerrfective protection rates for actual exporLsubsidy pall ents

and for die rull (notional) paymenL These dat clearly slhow a wvider dispersion in protection afforded by trade policy at the end of tde decade, ranging
from -40 percent in agroindustry to more than 40 percent in plastics and
packlaging. A comparison or the third and fourth colunmns readily shows tiet
effect of tie export subsidy arrears problem.
The finatl column in talile 3.13 estimates tie rate of effective protection
when die real ex'clhange rate
is considered (estimated to be 33
8
percent in the computati
; reported). It suggests that, even had the c;.wervaluation

portsubsidy been paid in lull, itwould not have been:sufficient to conipensate for the exclange rate overvaluation. Despite some high rates oF effec-,
tive protection, most activities
remain taxed due to the trade policyriegime.
Insum, the limitedattempts.at trade liberaliationwtvere notimplemented.
effectively during tLhe partial and fettered adjustment periods. The role of
the real exchange rate appreciation in limiting the government's room for
maneuver is self-evidenL Yet even within this constraint, itappears thatlittle
or no progress has been made toward removing import restrictions or mak
ing trade policy more evenhanded. Trade policy seemed to be as much a
source of incentive distortion and resource misallocation at Ehe close of the
decade as itwas at the beginning.
Econonicgrowth
The growth record of Cote d'ivoire in the 1980s was dismal. Be"veen 1983
and 1991, real GDP growth averaged -0.4 percent annually, despite high
growth in 1985 and 1986,when commoditypriceswere favorable. Atthe same
time, population growdt increased steadily-from 3.4 percent annually in
the earlyl980s to 3.9 percentin 1991 and i992.Thenetresultofthese trends
has been a devastating decline in per capita income.
Table 3.13 Structure of nominal and effective protection, 1990
Nominal
protecticn
S-ctor

Outputs

rtples

* Textiles -9.1

0.1
10.4

Ptaskscscng
Total
Excludingcocoa

30.6
0.4
16

Wood

Sorce: World Bank data
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18.4

Agrcindustry
exdudingcocoa)

6.5

.

29.7.

15
21.8.

:-9.8
-16.9

13.7

41.5
-38.8
8.B

11.8
15.1
19.1

Net efective
pmrectionr
actual export

Efective
protection
Actudl export
Ful eaqort
subsid
es

3S

subskeF.

44.2

-1.6

-39.4
16
tQ0.6
41.5
-38.3
30.2

-54.8
-34.3
-22.2
-6.8

.

.

-54.1
-16.4
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capita incolmle lhad reached CFAF 33S,959 in 1980, it

fell to just CFAF 209,411 in 1991. LEven wvhen compared with tie prebooli
years, income is now lower (in 1975, perI capita GNP was almost ClIAF

300,000). In the 1980s per capiat GNP declined by 2.4 percentannually. The
situation is worse for private consumllption. In 1991 nican private consumpdon was significantly lower in real terms than it was througlhout die entire
period. While real GNP declined by 2.4 percent annually between 1980 and
1991, real private consunption declined by4.9 percentannually-conipared
with tde 4.0 percentgrowtl in realtconsumption toward the end of die 1970s.
These figures may overstate die decline inlreal incomes, if a significant
siiFtofresources into theinfornmal sectorhastaken plac. NTational accountS
data usuallyunderrccord infonnal sectoractivities, and growtl in such activtiesmay have increased the underrecording ofmneasured national outputand
consumption. However, data from the GCte d'Ivoire Living Standards Survey
(discussed in die next section) also suggesta decline in real expenditures of
a similar order in the national accounts (Grootaert 1993). These estimates,
based on household data, include both formal and informal sectoractivities.
Thus, the national accounts data give a reasonably accurate account of die
declinein income and consumption. atleastduring the latterhalfofthe 19SOs.

The inadequacy ofeconomic policy in C6te d'Ivoire can be viewed from two
standpoints. The first is the inability of the govenumientto achieve, the intermediate objectives of economic policy-macroeccunomic balance, resource
reallocation, improved competitiveness. niese are the nuts and bolts of economic policy. The second is die more fundarnental objectives of economic
policy-enhancing economic growth and development, improving the environment and quality oflife, and alleviating poverty and deprivation.This brief
review of the macroeconomic balances (as part of the nuts and bolts) during
the 1980s tells a dismal story. Table 3-14 summarizes most of die relevant
data on both the intermediate results and the more fundamental objectives.
At the end of the decade, with the excepton of monetary instruments and
the rate of inflation, the imbalances were as much in evidence as they were
at the beginning. The composition of the macroeconomic aggregates, and
the immediate causes of the imbalances, have cianged over the decade, but
the fact remains: the adjustment efforts of the 1980s failed to correct the
imbalances. There has been some success in reducing inflation and controlling the external defidt, attributable mainly to contactionarymacroeconomic
policies, which has led to import compression and a general decline in GDP,
especially since 1987. The adjustment has also penalized invesunent at the
expense of consumption expenditure. Private investnent fell from almost
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16 percenL or GDP during 1978-80 to only 7 percenL in 1987-91. Similar
orders of magnitude hiold for public invesiient. Savings performance lhas
been weak, and export performlance only nmarginally better. These indica

tors do not auger well for future growtih.
Thc figuiires speak for themselves: the economic shocks Lo which LliC
economy has bcen sutbjected, togethier witl tdie limited and fettere'd adjustment response, have riesujlted in the Ilost. devastating social cost-declining
standards of living and welfare. It h-as meant die abandonment of economic
growth as an erfective policy objective. I-low this has affectcd poverty, and
the equity objective, is die SulbjecL or the next-section.
Economic recession, fettered adjustment, and poverty
Given -the abandonment or econ'omic growth, Cote d'Ivoire represen Ls a
counterfactual case -sblowing how poverty might be affected when adjustment policy refomis are not applied effectively. The analysis that follows will
show that nonadjustmcnt has re Juced avere incomes, thereby increasing
poverty alarmingly.9 Tliis "growth" effect in reverse dominates any analysis
y-~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

s.

Table 3.14 Macroeconomic indicators of adjustment. 1975-91
(annual averges)

.Indicator
intermediate rsults
Real effective exchange rate
Qndex)
Relative inflation rate (index)
Money supply growth
(percent per year)
Real interest (discount) rate
(percent)
Fiscal deficilGCDP (percent)
Balance of payments
current account/GDP
Final esults
Real GDP growth
Privateinvestment/GDP
Domestic investmentAGDP
Domesticsavings/GDP
ExportsofGNFSJGDP
importsofGNFS/CDP
Real growth rate of exports
Real growth rate of imports

Destabilizing period
1975- 1
19
97580
80
. 77

Partial a4ustmen t
1981- 1984- 198186
83
86

104.8
993

128.8
115.4

116.8
107.4

110.4
1W.I

106.5
102.3

108.5
1063

124.8
95.5

34.2

3.7

18.9

6.0

11.9

9.0

-2.2.

3.3
-1.4

6.0
-10.6

4.6
-5.8

9.9
-11.9

10.0
-2.7

9.9
-7.3

9.5
-13.2

-6.8

-14.6

-14.9
-10.7
(percentqge)
.3 53 .1.6
15.8
14.6
14.1
28.6
26.5
23.2
25.3
26.8
19.3
35.1
37.7
36.0
38.4
37.4
39.9
6.9
-3A
0.15.9
11.1
-8.4

-1.6

-8.3

-12.4.

24
8.5
12.6
23.3
43.6
32.9
7.7
6.6

20
113
17.9
21.3
39.8
36.4
3.9
-0.9

-1.6
7.1
.5I
15.4
35.1
31.2
6.0
-4.5

.5.3
13.5.
24.3
28.2
40.4
36.4
-0.1
16.3

No=e: For definitions o vajiables, see appendiK table 3B. I
Source: World Bank and IMF data.
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of poverty in Cotc d'lvoirc duriing tihe 1980s. lnsofar as t.hlis analysis is confined to thc historical record, however, it does not separlat the eflects oflthe
shlock (primarily the terns orlftade decline) friom the fettered policy response
(expendituire-r-ediicingpolicies) .Thc darnalso suggestlthat groups hiatwoulld
normally benefit firom
nistrcticul adjustmnentr-notably expoIt. crop Canniers
in the African con text-have in Fact suffered disproportionate losses due to
the economic changes of thiC 1980s. Again, thec analysis offers insighis inLO,
scenarios that arc counterfracutls to the adjustnent case.
* Althoughl data on poverty in Mte d'Ivoire ar c noL available for tile en-'tire decade, the Cotc d'Ivoirc Living Standards Survey.docsprovide reason-

ably good ho"sehold data for 1985-88- Infornation firom a sample of l,600
households was collected each year on a range ofvarliables-income, expen-- -

ditures, labor force activity, education, lihaldt, and anthropometry.-These
data, extending over aifour-year period inwwhich significantmacroeconomici
changes occurred, offer arare opportunity to investigate the implications of
economic shocks, recession, and adjustment forincome distribuiion in general and poverty in particular. One problem withd the surlvey hias been the
change in sampling procedures and sampling frame in 1987. Deer and
Grootaert (1993) identif the nature of the sampling bias generated by these
changes, and reweighed the data as necessary. The following review of the
effects on poverty in C6te d'Ivoire relies heavily on an analysis of these dat
by Grootaert (1993).
Due to difficulties in nmeasuring income through die COte d'Ivoire Living Standards Surveys and similar household surveys,20 per capita expenditures are taklen as the indicator of welfare (and indeed are a proxy fior income trends). The changes in nominal and real expenditure per capita in
Cote d'Ivoireand each of five regions of the countryare suinmarizedin table
3.15. To compare expenditures across the region, an appropriate regional
price index based on Grootaert and Kanbur (1993) is used. The consumer
price index was used to adjust for price changes over rime. For the period
covered by the C6te d'lvoire Living Standards Surveys (1985-88), the average inflation rate was 5.3 percent according to the consumer price index.
Table 3.15 sholvs ovenrhelming evidence of a drarnatic fall in household
expenditures during the period covered (and especially in 1987-88). These
trends are fully consistent witi the national accounts data reviewed above.
From 1984 to 1986 GCoe d'Lvoire benefited from favorable external price
shocks, which, togedher with a concerted effort at changing relative prices,
improved dle macroeconomic balances and GDP growth. Yet thereafter the
terms of trade returned to a downward trend, and the government in eff-ect
abandoned its structural adjustment program. In the crisis management that
ensued, the government sought to reduce expenditures in an effort to control the macroeconomic imbalances, and GDP declined sharply up to 1991.
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Table 3.15 Nominal and real per capita expenditures, by region, 1985488

( CPA fran cs)

-

t 1ef5.

.

Real

Rea

.

.

~~~

~

~~1986 1987 -.
Noamina

1988.
Red
value

index

Region

Norinal

Yalue

index

Noninal

Rd
volue

Abidjanr
Otherdb'es
Rurna reas
East Foest
West Forest
Savannah
CotcJ'lvoire

376,108.
252,387

376,108
271,864

100.0
114.3

335,698
271,758.

312,859.
270,540

.83.2

99.5

410,220
246,469.

372,361
250,010

99.0
92.0

332,%8
190,190

288,708
.178,165

76,8
65.5.

143,104
187,120
115,910
213,634

164,472
239,134
152,573.
237,853

69.1
100.5
64.1
100.0

160,890Q
163,782
'132,968.
216,173

172,341
204,457.
154,676
223,905

104.8
85.5
10O.4
94.1

159,491
138,380
120,017
212,191

167,974
169,776
136,061
216,965

102.1
152,267
71.0
120,225
89.2
113,957
9;1.2- -178,051

152,501
143,947
120,684
173,072

.92.7
60.2
79.1
72.8

index

Nomind

Real
value

Red
index

Source: Grootaert (1993).
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It is hardly surprising, therefore, that povertyincreased tiroughout the period. The evidence is summarized in table 3.16, which reports three mueasures based on the class, of poverty index suggested by Foster, Greer, and
:Thsorbeck-e (1984).21
Betwveen 1985 and 1986, poverty fell-margnally in most areas but more
so in the East Forest Poverty among the poorest groups fell noticeably (as
d
that the combination of the favorreflected in tle P 2 indexes) , suggesting
able external shock; and the initial attempts to improve tradables pnces
raised income among. the poorest groups. But thereafter all indexes began
to nse steeply-especially betveen 1987= and 1988, when GDP began to decline. For tie country as aiwhole, the proportion of the population in pow
erty increased.fom 30 percent i 1985 to 46 percent in 1988. Poverty in.creased more in urban than in rural areas, so that the share of the poor in
urlan areas increased from 19 percent in 1985 to 25 percent in 1988. How- _
ever, poverty in rural areas (apart from the East Forest) was also on the
rise-especially in the West Fores where poverty increased from 18 percent
in 1985 to 55 percent in 1988.
To explore the relationship benveen these poverty trends and the adjustment programs of the 1980s, poverty indices can be decomposed in two
ays. FFirst the effect of changes in mean expenditures can be separated from.

theinfluence of expenditure diributionchanges. Second, thepovertyindex
is disaggregated by socioeconomic group in order to assess the differentialeffects of macroeconomic events on the groups in socety.Growth. and distibutionaleffects
The methodology of separatidng outthe.effects of changes in mean expendi-

-
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ttures (tie growth component) from changes in.the distrunon ofeendi
tire (the distribution component) issetoutin Ravallion d1992) andRavallion
andDatt (1993). Grootaert (1.993) appIies thismediodologyto C6te d'lvoire,
and his results are summarized in table 3-17.
For the country as a whole, the growth effect is overwhelming. In act,
the effect of changes in the distribution of expenditureswas negative betveen
1985and 1988, meaning thattie dstibuon of expendituresnarrowved over
theperiod. If mean eenditures had remained constant, povertywouldhave
fallen by 20 percent The negative influence of the distributional effect is
true for all regions except Savannah. For this region, both the growth and
the distributional effects increased poverty.-The lesson of table 3.17 is clean
the declines in GNP were themosttimportantdeterminants of povertyin Cte
d'Ivoire during thelatterhalfof the 1980s. Andifpovertyis to be reduced in
the-comingyears, growth-mustbe rekindled. Butt:able 3.17assesses only the
early phase of income decline in the country. Since GDP growth=was nega-
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Table 3.16 Poverty. Indexes by region, 1985468
1985
Po

Region

0.03
0,234
0,479
0.178
0.502
0.300

Abidjan
Other cities
EastForest
WestForest
Savannah
C6ted'lvoire

.

-'
,
P
004
0.0
0.037
0.075
0,069
0.155
0.013
0.036
0.088
0.183
0,045
0.098

- .Po

016
0,233
0.395
0,200
0,481
0.045

P4 Indexas

i986
PI

P'

005
0.062
0.115
0.013
0.058
0.032

0,012
0.024.
0.045.
0.013
0.058
0.032

P2,

P0

1988
r'

0.009
0,019
0.041
0.043
0,093
0,043

0.139
0.410
0.494
0.553
0.652
0.459

0.023
0.106
0,145
0.154
0,258
0.142

1987

Pi

IP

0,04 .19
0,053
0,224
0,435- 0.1.11
0,102
0.376
0.197,
0.578
0,101.
0,348

DecompostIon (percentageshate by region)
Reglon

1.6
1.8
2.3
17.6
16.3
16,8
35.3
36,8
37.1
EastForest
4.1
5,1
8.3
West Forest
41,4
39,9
35.6
Savannah
100.0
100,0
100.0
.
C6te d'lvoire
Note. rablt fi based on apoverty line Qf 128,600 CFAr annually.

Abidjan
Other cities

Source. Grootiert (I1993).
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P1

p
- P

-

-

11.0
17,1

8.4
17.4

31.8

33.7

9.2
30.9

7.1
33.3
100.0

100.0

pi

P0
.

7,8
17.3

3.9
14.6

34.5

29.3

5,5
34.9

100.0

H O.8
40.3

o
100.0

3,8
3.6
12.0 : 10.0
22.4
S.8'.
11.0 .
11.1
52.9
47.5

100.0
;

0,006
0.040
0.062
0.064
0.131
0.063

1988
p

187
9.

1986

1985

F,

100.0

5,2
19.3

2.8
16,1

25.5

24.1

18.6
31.4

16,8
40,2

100.0

100,0

1.5
13.7
.

23.3

15,6
45.9

100.0
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tiveup to 1991 (and since cocoa and coffee prices fell furtherin 1989), itislikely that poverty levels have increased even above the 1988 levels reporned
here. These data are a chilling reminder of what the outcomes might be for
the poorwhen govemments fi to adjust to changing external circumstances
in an orderly and planned manner.
Pioerty among lte isoaeconomic gros
ln disaggregating the P indexes, Grootaert (1993) distinguished eight socioeconoic groups C(table 31 8) . Poverty among all socioeconomic groups
increased toughotthepeodbuttheincreases-were fbrfrom evenAmongthe urban groups, it
ear that public sector employees bore the brunt of
the recession (and fiscal:contractin), with the incidence of poverty (P 0 )
increasingfromjust5percentin 1985 (represenuingjustlessthan2percent
of total povertyr) to 21 percent in 1988 (or 6 percent of total poverty). Why
poverty among this group should rise as much miusL>be investigated furtherThe government has been reluctant to reduce real wages and salares in the
civi service-so why the increase inpovertyamong Lthi group?Judgingfrom
the movementm ithe Pmeasure, this deteriorationinlivingstandardsseemse
to have applied paricularly among the lo er-paid public sector workers'
Lowver-paid public employees may have been treated less fvorably than better-paid civil servants, dtough this is conjecture at this ppinu
Table 317 Decomposition of 198588 changes in head-ount index (Pa)
by regon and socioeconomic group
Omi
C--egot

Rej'
Abid,an
Otercities
East Forest
WestForest
Savannah

catrowmi

---

duta
camponent

Total
Reidd

C.an-

D.105
' 0.174
0.015
0375
:0.150

''w
0.076
0.213
0.046
0.355
0.146.

-0.002
=0.111
-0.061
-0.005
-0.022

0.031
0.072
0.030
0.025
-0.018

ExportcropfarezsFoodcaopfarners

0213
0.162

0.059

Public secor enipoye
Private foffnal sector employees
Informal sector employees

0.208
0.102
0306
0.123
0.126
0.114
0.169

.- 0.090
-0.037
-.. 00!
-0.040
-0.042

-0.043
0.018
0.016

0.186
0.164
0.080
0280

-0.045

0.122

0200

-0.068
0.047
-0.06

0.078
0.0181
0.049

0.136
0342
0.158,

-Socioecnoernicgroup-

Selfnemployed

Inactive
Unenploed
C&edivoire
For detk of deccrspoison, see et.L
S-ur. Gr-owert (I 993)..
ltco
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Table 3.18 Poverty Indexes by socioeconomic group, 1983548
986
.1
.
~~~1
985
. -: ~~~~~
.
- .
Po

Group

PF

0.366
Export opfarmers
0.434
Foodcrop farmei
. 0.049
Public sector employces
Private formal sector employees 0.071
0.262
Informal sector employees
.SeIf.erploye:d
0,183
.
Inadve
0.041
Unemployed
0.300
C8ted'lvdre
M

0.094
0.144
0.007
0.014
0.075.
0,104
0,075
0,005
0.098

14,5
Export crop farmers
63.6
Foodcropfarrners
1.7
Publicsectoreemployees.
Private formal sector employees 2,4
1.5
Informal sectoremployees
12.8
Self-employed
3,3
Inactive
0.2
Unemployed
100.0
C6tedilvoire

I 1,5

.0.262

65,2
0.8
1.4
1.3
15.6
4.2
0.1
100.0

0.038 - 0.354
0,411
0,065
0,056
0.001
0.096
0.005
0,028 . 0.401
0.287
0.058
0.211
0.043
0,346
0,001
0.299
0.045
10.0
63.8
0.3
1.1
1.0
18.7
S5.1
0.0
100.0

Note: Table Isbased on apoverty rine d 128,600 CFF annually.
Source., Grootaert (1993).
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Po

P:

.

21.8
51.2
2,4
2,3
1.8
14.1
4.9
1.5
100,0

1P'

P2

Pe

1987
P,

,

P indexes
0.063 .
0.150
0.477
0.037
0.055
0.132
0.473
0.048
0,006 .
0,072 . 0,016
0,001
0.012 *0.004
0,061
0.001
0.040
0.090
0,364
0.028
.
0,077 .033
0
0,03
0.080
0.141
0.015 . 0.327
0.047.
0,049:t 0.009
0.312:
0.067
0,119
:0,043
0,101
0,349
0.032
0,082
Decomposition (percen esham.by grup)
25.9 . 28.0 - 27.9
21.6
22.2
46.4
47.2
48.8
56.4
54.9
A1.:.9
2.4
3.0
0.4
1,0.
0,8
1.,0
1.5
0.3
0.7
1.6
1,5
1.8
1.2
1.6
10.3
11.3
12.9
14
13.8.
11.1
. 3
5.6
3.4
4.0
0.1
0.3
0.6
2.7
1.8
I00.:,
0
Do.0
100,0. 100.0
Ito
0.099
0.121
0.006
0,009
0.097

Po.

.1988
P,

0.548
0.590
0.213
0,151
0,542
00462
0,319
0.383
0.459
17.7
52.4
6.2
3.0
1.6
14.8.

0.179
0,196

0.OSO
0.025
0.183
0.127
0.060
0.151
0.142
.

P

0,087
0.087
. 0.018
0.007
0.093
0.052
0.031
.0.076
0.063
20.6
56.9

18.7
56.2
4,8
1.6
1.7
13.2

2.5

2.8

0.9
100.0

1.1
100,0

3,8

1,0
2.0
12.2

2.4
*

1.3
100,0
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All other urban groups have also suffered- More than 54 percent of'
employees in informal sectors were in poverty in 1988. The self-employed
were-siinilarly affected. An interesting feature is tie change in povertynamong
the unemployed category. In 1985 only 4 percent of die unemployed were
below the poverty line. By 1988 the figure had risen to 38 percent This suggestS that unemployment changed from being a "search" phenomenon (in
which better-off work ers voluntarily spend periods of unemploym-ent search-ingfor higher-wagejobs) to beingamanifestation ofalabor undemrtilization

-and involuntary

unemploymenL It:appears thiatthe unemployed increas-

-ingly have no alteriative, reflected by die gr-owing incidence of poverty

among them-.
Among rural groups, exportcrop farmers appear to have haredrheworse
of the two main groups ~distinguished. In 1985,37 percent of export crop
farners were poor; by 1988, fis figure hasrisen to 55 percenL The increase
in poverty among food producers is notas great, and de share of this group
in total poverty fell from 64percentin 1985 to 52 percentin 198S. According
to Grootaert, a significant decline,in fann income was die main determinant
of the increase in poverty among export crop fiamers. The C6te- d'lvoire
Living Standards Surveys record a decline in fiLun income of more than 47
percentin theWe.stForestand.12percentin Sav,annah. The same period .saw
a decline in the quantities of cocoa and coffee sold, which explains why the
*mcome ofsuch groups fell so steeply in the fouryears covered by tie survey.
The area planted in coffee also declined sharply, although the area under
cocoa cultivation increased.
. These daa clearly reflect the failure of the adjustment efforts to depredate the real effective exichange rate and to improve the real income levels'
of exporters. Whereaspov1ertyleveLsheld steadybetwecn 1985 and 19S6 (due
to fivorable world mark-et conditions), the subsequent detu rioratton in the
circumstances of exporters is due direcdv to the failure of key elements of
macroeconomic adjustment. The evidence of the CGte d'Ivoire Living Stan-.
dards Surveys is that export crop acthities declined over the period, generating lower income, and creating greater poverty among export crop farmers. Yet, under a successful expenditure-.switching adjustment scenario this
is the very group that shiould gain from relative price movement& The f-act
that this group has become noticeablytworse off is a clear indication that the
adjustmentattemptsin mid-decade failedbecause, among otherreasons. they
did litde to change the underlying trend in relative pnce movements. It is
likely thatpovertyamong exportcrop farmers hasincreased even more since
.1988, given the continued decline in termis of trade, and the continued appreciation in-the real exchange rate.
Several conclusions cmanbe drawn> from thiTs briefreview ofpovern wuends
in C6te d'lvoire, FirSt, nonadjustmnent has seriously eroded the living stanPublished by iRepository, 2021
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dards of all groups in Ivorian society. Poverty hasbecorne more widespread
in die country, and all groups now contain a growing number of persons in
poverty. Second. the decline in GDP makes eradicating povery an irnpossible task, and dominated tlie poverty scenario duriing tde second halfofrhe
1980s.Third, while all groups have suffered, some ex;perienced greater deprivation-especiaily low-paid public sector worrkers in urban areas and export crop producers in rural areas. The dedining expenditures and incomc.
of the latter group conveeys a powverful message about the Failure of the adjustment efforts of die l9SOs and-its repercussions. j
Human capitaland

-soc

enditur-es

This evidence of serious social cost incurred in the 1985-88 period is based
on a particular measure of welfare-the total expenditures of holuseholds.
Do other indicators of welfare suggest deprivation- of the -same orderBasicneeds Table 3.19 summarizes the evidence reported by Grootaert
(1993) on five basic needs indicators: tree for educational outcomes (literacy and pnmary and secondary enrollment rates) and tw.o for health out-:
comes (die percentage of ill household members who consulted either a
doctor or a nurse, and dte percentage of household meiiibers reporting
prevtentive consultations, primarily prenatal care and vaccination). All measures are reported for die poorest groups (those whose annual per capita
expenditures are below CFAF 75.000 in 1985 prce), the moderately poor
(those whose annual per capita expenditures are between CFAF 75,000 and
128.600), and the nonpoor (thosewhose per capitexpendituresaregreater:
than CFAF 128,600).
The literacy rate his amomentum' ofits own (reflectingprevious educatdon history), and major dcanges in this indicator are not to be expected over
such a shorLperiod Although this is true for most groups and for the count:ryas a wlole, literacy among the poorest males fell quite dramatically and
consistently each year (fromjust less than 23 perceni in 1985 to less than 17
percent in 1988). This decline in literacy among tie poorestmales is likely
to be due to changesin the composition of the poorestggroup. The leastliterate have clearlv been most liklely to Fall into the poorest category during
the period covered (Grootaert 1993).
The primarv and secondary enrollnent rates are more sensitive indiatorrs of how recent economic changes affected educational outcomes. The
net primary enrollment rate (the number of primary-school-age children
enrolled in primary school as a percentage of all children of primary school
age) reflects the effects of both temporary and permanent withdrawals from
schooling. This rate was fairly constnt for Cote d'Ivoire as a whole durmg
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die period (around 54 percent, e-xcept ror 19877), and the same applies to
inost groups. Howee,enolent aogfmale.. in die poorest group. of
h1ous%eholds fell noticeably~.The net secondary enrollment (defined as die
number ofrchildren orsecondary scho'ol age currently enrolled in school as
Table 3.19 Social indicator., 1985-8B
(percentrarge

oup))

indicator

5985

1986

.1987

.1988

18.2
7A4
263
10.9
49.8
31.232.4

16.88.3
32.9
I7
4.
31.8
3139

3441
16-7
48.2
3637
78.0
63.9'
58S4

31.0
16.754.3
41.9.
74;.0
57-7
54~.0

Edujcation indircatoa
Very poor
.

Moderately poor
Nonpoor

.male

ANl
Net pr*mary enrdlnenrtrace
Verypoor

~~~male

2819.9
female 8.0
male
26.7
female
12.9.
45.1
female
.28.0
30.9

Nonpoor

~~~~~7.3
31.3
153
45.1
27.7
3139

31.7
:'22.4
51.1
41.0
663
5~.O
53.6

35.6
22.9
49.3
37.6
64.2
.57.5
54.I

9.7
5.3
20.o
female 9.8
rrale
36.83
female
18.8
22.9

3.0
2.
16.3

.fmae

Modemtely poo

**

female
male
female
male
femae

Ail

.

~

Net s,econdary enrdtfment rote

'Very poor
Moderately poor
Nonpoor
All

fmal
female
male

.

.

.

NoM
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eteb

fodernixt.

~~~5.
37.6
25.6
25.2

Health kidicata
Percentage of i. peopk who consukEed docctr*me
Verypr
me31.2
femnale
302
Moderately poor
male
36.9
female36.2.
Nonpor
male
48.6
fe!Male
50.8
Ail
*45.8
Percen cage ofpeopl W@ have preventive corzsdrazions
Veyoar
mae12.21.9
~~~~~~ ~ ~~~~female
15.6
Moderatelypoor
mal~-e
17.1
female
18.1
*Nonpoor
male
2335
female
25.8
All
2223
*

2.8
31.2
11$5
4A
36.8
22.9
22-3

30820.0
28.0
15$5
30037.432
~~30.6
34.0
47462

3.S
14.8
.
33.6
2.1.1
1Ml

19.1
16.2
.1
52.6

51.8

48.4

54.8

43.9

40.6

41l3

.

272
21.9
23.6
29.2
30.7
27.9

1939
26.1
29731.4
33.3
2939
.37.2
32.1.

40.0
47.3
35.9
26.0
32$8
32.8
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a percentage of the total number of secondary-school-age children) indicates greater welfare loss over tlc period. The rate fell for most groups, especdally for die poor. Secondary enrollment among the poorest ell to only
35 percent for male.s and 1.2 percent for femiales-a sad reflection of die
dirnciit situation thalt poor hIusel olds fAced during the 1980s. These indicators also suggest that the poorwill have few opportunities to escape poverty unless their humian capital is enlhanced flr beyond that suggested%by
tlese data.
The proportion of ill persons contacting either a doctoror a nurse for.
treatment has dedined marginally overthe period. However, tlis masks cri&
cal differences among the groups. Between 1985Land 1988 the. nonpoor
were more likely to consult a practitoner when ilt while-the poor:(and
especially the vcry poor) were dramatically less likely to: do so. Grootaert

(1993) reports that medical consultations wvere also increasingly less likely
in niral areas, suggesting that access-to health icilities has deterioratedn2
Howrever, the preventive heaIth care indicators suggest a different trendan increase in the percentage of persons (including the poor) who had
preventive health care over the period. Why dtese indicators contradict each
other is not clear. it may be that vaccination programs have been well targeted, and do not require dte medical infrastructure necessary to support
effective curative consultations.
These basic needs indicators do not showi universl deterioration, but
there are enough signs of increasing deprivation among Lthe poor to suggest
that fettered adjustment during the l9SOs has constrained progress in hu-.
man capital accumulation among the leastprivileged in Cote d'Ivoire. These
outcomes are due to an interplaybetween demand fctors at the household
level (household income and opportunity costs that govern the choices of
households about the education and health ofits members) and supply factors, primarily the availability of effective service delivery (education ad.
health). Declining income and higher opportunity costs are hliely to have
discouraged poor households from investing in education and health care
for their members-butwhat ofsupply factors?
Basic needs inputs. As suggested earlier, the external constraints on the
govemmentcreated a largelyijternal adjustxnentefforr, the outcome ofiwtrhich
was a reliance on expenditure reduction. To what extent did this
contractionary fiscal policy reduce expenditures in the social sectors, and
thereby reduce the effective delivery, of education andihealth services? As
shown in table 3.20, nominal'and real government expenditures on educatdon and health increased during the 1985-90 period. Moreover, these sectors have been absorbing a growing share of total government exp enditures
(23 percent for education and 4.3 percent for health in 1990). Table 3.20
alsoindicateshigherallocations to primaryeducationat the expenseof higher
Published by iRepository, 2021

https://ir.iba.edu.pk/faculty-research-books/13

126

ADUSiThIEWrIN AFlICA LESSONS FROMi C6uNmrCAESTuI--

levels, whidc is uLsuallya Ftvorable.indicatorfor the human capital prospects
ofthe poor. Tlus, tde data in die table are encouraging, and in no way explain the downturn in basic needs outcome indicators among. the poor.
These expenditure data do not nece.ssarily measure effecive service delivery, but may siinply reflect increases in wages and salary costs in these sectors. As reported earlier, the share of wvages and salaries in noninterest expenditures increased from 49 percentin 1975-S0 to 54percentin 1981-86
(and thereafter). In the education sector, the ratio of personnel to nonpersonnel expenditures increased from I in 1976.to 10.8 in 1988. Sathn
and Bernier (1993) report that salaries accounted for 78 percent of total expenditures in the education sector in 1990, and 95 percent at-de primaiy
level. This tendency forwages and salaries to-be miore important at die primary level may explain the growing allocation of expenditures to the prmary-sector. However, it does not imply more effective delivery of educationalservices atthis leveL Sahnand Bemier (1993) suggest.thathigh teacherTable 3.20 Government expenditures on health and education, 1985-90
CGtepry

1985

1986

1987

19B8

1989

19

Educadr'nexpmcure
(CFAF biiorons)
.
As percenage ofGOP
Asperceritageofcurrentexpenditures

177.0
5.6
20.6

200.6
6.2
22.7

211.0
6.8
227.

220.4
72
20.2

221.1
7.5
20.0

208.4
7.7
23.0

Mernorandum items
Real education expenditure
(CFAF binlions)
Real education expenditue
percapita(CFAF)

177.0

188.9

231.6

236.4

236.2

248.0

18,830

19,475

22.931

22514

21.868

22,140

Composition of educatrn expendtwre (npersnt)
Pnimary
Semornary
Tertiary
TechnicalAcationall

40.8
34.6
17.4
73

41.0
313
17.9
:9.7

40.8
313
17.6
104

41.9
31.4
173
9.4

4221
3039
17.4
9.5

46.0
28.8
13.7

Health ependiture
(CFAFbiflians)
AspercentageofGDP
As perenta of curnt expenditures

29.1
.0.9
3.4

31.5
1.0
3.6

33.7
1.1
.3.6

36.2
1.2
33

235
1.3
3.5

38.9
1.4
4.3

Mernorandurn iters
Real health expenditure
(CFAF billions)'
Ra health expenditure percapita
.(CFAF)

29.1

29.7

37.0

38.8

41.1

46.3

3,662
3,058
a.Defbted bysericescornpnentofGDPdd&tor(1985 = 100).

3,698

3,808

4.133

*u5e: GrootacrtQl993).
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salaries (higher than in certain European coinuries) were responsible for
the dominance ofwage costs in the education sector. teachers constitduteju.St
one-third of the public. sector work force, but GO percent of the public sectorwtage bill. Thus, these considerations are a cautionary reminder that the
expenditure daut can be miscleading. Although thc education sector absorhed an increasing share of the budget during the fettered adjustnient
period, it is unlikely to have led to more. effective service delivery if the increase in teacher salaries diverted funds from other key recurrent inpuLt
(such a .books and other materials) or from developmental expenditures
(expanding the school netWorkl)..
A similar cautionary note should be sounded in interpreting the health
expenditure data. Sahn and Bernier (1993) describe the health care system
ofCte dIvoire as biased stronglytoward curative rather than preventive care.
The.share of the health budget devoted to hospital-based care rose from 40
percent in 1980 to more than 56 percent in 1986. They estimate that 54
percent of total recurrent expenditures and 61 percent of developmental
expenditures were allocated to the tertiary level of the health sector in I 99 0.
As with the educaiion sector, Sahn and Bernier report a high share .ofsalary
and wage costs in total health expenditures. nie 13990 figure for personnel
costs in thebudget (77.4percentin 1990) is above theaverage for theirsampie
ofAfican countries (61.9 percent) andwas-asibsrtantialjump overthe shares
recorded earlier in the 1980s, which fluctuated around 70 perceLThey
report that non salary expenditures in the health sector fell fom CFAF 1,22
per capita in 1981 tojust CFAF 670 in 1990, with adverse repercussions for
material inputs and.supplies.
Thus, the record for neither education nor health is encouraging. The
*problemsfacing the Ivonrian govemment in its adjustment efforts-obliging
it to follow an e-xpenditure-reducing strategy despite persistenty high wage
levels-are likely to have had serious repercussions for the delivery of education and health services.-Although the shares of these sectors in total government spending-vere protected throughout the fettered adjustnentphase, it
merely reflects the labor-intensive nature of these activities. The euidence
suggests that service delivery has deteriorated.
Key policy issues

Having established the turn ofevents in the various episodes of adjustment
during the 1980s in C6te d'lvoire, and their consequences ive now makle an
*assessnentof the critical wealkesses. The kley question here is what room
for maneuver did the Ivorian government have in framing its adjustment
policies
in a way that differed from the historical record?
p
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In thisassessment of tle attecuupLn at maciroeconomiiic idjustnentin Cote
d'Ivoirc, dtree areas ofpolicy failure are identiried. The first concerms macroeconomiic mism-anagement in general, and specifically die governnients
faiilure to resolve fiscal problems. Tlhe second involves the severe.constraints
on exclhange rate management, whlich have led to an undue reliance on e>*penditure-reducing policies. The third examines the implications ofmnacroeconomic policy for pnvate investment in Cote d'lvoire, which declined
markledly during dte 1980s.
PubUc sectoreconomnic mismanaqgemyentt
. Our discussion of economic management during e I9BOs is divided into
two basic issues: the first concerns the commitment of the government to
the adjustmentprograms and the seriousness with which it has approached
these matters; the second focuses more narrowly on fiscal issues.
- Twe ommitmen to adjustnmu In much of this section, areas ofinadequate
policy action are identified. Explaining why the government failed to implement key reforms is certain to be extremely complex. Many of the answers,
however, are to be found in the political economy of Cote d'Ivoire. Given
the political expediencies and priorities ofthe governmentduring the 1980s,
its policy objectives were to stabilize- the public finances and economy if.
possiblewithoutmakingfundamental reforms thatwouldhave upset thestatus
quo and threatened powerfulvestedinterest. Because of these objectives, the
governmentwas operatingin quite a differentparadigm from thatwhich lies
behind adjustment.
To understand why this was the case, one needs to explore further the
complexities of C8t_C d'Ivoire's political economy. Van de Walle (1991) argues that there art particular features of the political economy which explain
in largemeasure the failure of the gc;emment to implement.keystructural
reforms. Tvo partcular features of countries in the C(Afranc zone mustbe
highlighted: their urban social base, and the patnmonial roots of the political system. Van de Walle describes the regimes as resting notwith the ballot
box butwith urban-based elites dosely tied to the state. The political system
is thus builton Zprebendali.sm," 2 4 and onsecuring'olticalcontrol overeconomicaffairs. Anyattempt to loosen the grip ofthe governmenton the functioning of the economy (in accordance with the free market paradign) is
thuslikely to beinconrsistentwith the underlying political economy, and thuLs
to be resisted. According to Van de Walle, this problem is clearly and acutely
illustrated in the financial sector, where the govenmuent had alongstanding
interest in controlling the allocation of credit (and thus rewarding itS sup-
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porters). The fact that these credits lhave been allocated to poorly peiforming public entierpises and projects explains in large measure the poor state
of the banking sector.
The k-eylinadequacy of adjustment policy in CMte d'lvoire has been dhe
insistence on internal adjustnent, with its seriously adverse consequences
for growvth and equity. The reasons for this insistence-emanate from this un-

derlying political stem. Van de Walle (1991)argues that "none of the 14
countries in the Zone have sought to leave the Zone....African leaders have
steadfasdy supported convertibility at die current parity." He -suggests avo
main reasons for this. First, there are specific advantages in an overvlued
real exchange rate to groups that-givesupport to te goveinment (notably
the urban elites, who benefit at the expense of rural-based farmers). "It is
symptomatic" he argues, "f politicallrealities in the Zone that governments -::
have preferred to lower producer pnces paid to farers ratler tian cut
salaries or lay off staff in the plethoric public bureaucracy." Second, mem-.
bership in the CFA firanc zone provides elites in the zone with some key political advantages. During times of recession, political control over die
economy becomes even more important mechanisms -that-enhance rentseeldng and patronage become critical to maintaining political support. For
these reasons, Van de Wale argues, disturbing the economic arrangements
of the zone wvould be politically risky. It LS for these deep-seated political and
economic reasons that the government has been slow in initiating fundamental change.
:Failure to resolse fPcaL problems A concrete manifestation of the
government's limited implementation ofimacroeconomic adjustmen twas its
failure to-deal sufficiently with its fiscal problems.-While the fiscal deficitis
the outcome ofthe complex interaction among economic, political, andsocial
factors, three elements are highlighted in what follows: the debt overhang,
:
wages and salaries, and government revenue
'The fiscal undiscipline in the latter half of the 1970s dominated subsequent eventts because expenditure levels during these boom years were financedprimarilythrough foreign borrowing. The macroeconomic accounts
have since been dominated by the servicingofthis debt. Whereas atthe end
of the 1970s interest payments on public debt amounted to only about 2
percent of GDP, they had risen to 12 percent by 1991 (which is about equalto the fiscal deficit in 1991). Uncorrected, the debt burden will pams to future generations. For the present, the fact that the government is simply not
servicing its debt but is financing-it by accumulating arrears means that a
large overall deficit is not cntical. However, arrears cannot continue to be
accumulated indefinitely, and there are sigir hat it is having fundamental
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r epercussions on the economy at. large, disrulpting di

financial sector and

discouraging investment.

-

Withl Ihindsigilht, tie miacrocconomilic prolems orifhe 1980s oiwould ave
been signilicantly less seriouS if the fiscal excesses-or ti1w 1970s liadl len
avoided. BeriJh 6leny and Bourgu ignon (fortlhconiing) suggest thaWL excessive
and inefficient spencling by thc governimient vas tlic main dtereininanrt or
thle miacroeconolmiiccrises thatdomninated tle 1O80s. -lowevet, they also show
tilat hadc private sector savings not llen so rapidly, lhe investient prograllm
could have been financed witlhouit hicavy external borrowing. In fact, ou:r
decomiposition analysis reveals that the expansion

in
privaie scctorconsu1nl'

tion- expnditlres was also responsible for the growingI
xternal current account deficit at the end of the l97Os. And the decline in savings is readily.
explained by the severity of the external shock and tle decline in profit in-'
come that ensued.
-Detservice is not the only item ingovernmentnexpenditures thatestands
outin the rL%mI accounts. Expendiwrcs on wages and salaries have also increased relative to other expenditure items, and in relation to GDP. In 1985,
when an overall fiscal deficit ofJust 1.5 percent of GDP w-as recorded, wages
and salaries amounted toju-st over 8 percent of GDP, or 25 percent of total
central government ex-penditure (appendix) table 3B.2). By 1991 expenditures on wages and salares increased to over 12 percent of GDP, and
amounted to 35 percent of total expenditures (or.52 percent of primary
expenditure and 60 percent of total public consumption spendiig). Public.
sector employment and earnings have thus been protected from the major
burden of adjustment.r'
While other-expenditures have been cutsomewhat, the main burden of.
adjustnent has fallen on public investment expenditures. These declined
from-'an average of18 percent of GDP in 1978-83 to only 3 percentin 198791. The simple factis that had public sector employees borne a burden of
adjusunent similar to that of the private sector (leaving public sector wages
and salaries constant as a percentage of GDP over 1985-91), public investment could have been raised to almost 7 percent of GDP (roughly what it
was in the middle of the decade). The Failure of te goverment to control
the wage and salary component of it expenditures is a tangible symptom of
the constraints it faced in undert-ak-ing macroeconomic adjustmen t.In 1990

thegovernmentwaas forced to withdraw announced salaryreductions becau.se
of massive public demonstations against the policy.
The third feature of the fiscal imbalances of the decade Ls the revenue
side of the accounts. Aside from.die boom years of 1984-86, government
revenue during the 1980s amounted to 25 percent of GDP, and somewhat
less in the later years. Although these outcomes are atisfactory for a devel-
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oping cointry, tliese were muilch lower figures ditan lhad been ;icliieved in(ler-boom conditions. Fuinds cleiived fi-om thJe Agriculture P'rice Stabilization Fund contributed handsomely to the exchequer in diJc latc 1970s .md
again in 1984-85, bitt, by their nature, sucli reventues couldl not he relied
upon as a basis for mediuln-termnifiscal planning. By 19.91 they contributed
only 4 percent toward central government revenue, lcaving-a significant
h^ole on the revenue side. Throutglioiit the lOS8s, tax reventuc rarely exceeded 20 percent of GDP. Given tile decline in tlie tax. base, the government was exposed to lie vici.s.situdes of export revenues and the world prices
or a handful of primary commodities. One of the conundrumns racing the
government is that any attenipt to raise tux rates may be counterproductive
if doing so acceletiates the infornalization of economic activity and a contraction in the tax base.
The real exdcacnge-ract
The macroeconomic events of the l9SOs in Cote d'Ivoire cannot be understood without reference to die major exchange rate appreciation that has
dominated the scene since 1985. The government has been unable to reverse this appreciation given the policy instruments at its disposal.
An exchange rate appreciation in itself does not prove that the real exclange rate is overvalued, since an appreciation may be 'aresultof an undervalued exchange rate in earlier years. Even if the real effective exchange

rate. has not appreciated since some base year when the rate was in equilibrium, this does not prove the absence of overvaluation, since the equilibrium
rate itselfmay well have changed during the period. In partcular, if the terms
of trade faced by the country deteriorates, the equilibrium real exchange

rate wili depreciate. The constancy in the real effective exchange rate would
imply growing overvaluation, since the equilibrium real effective: exchange
rate would have fallen over the period. In C6te d'Ivoire during the 1980s,
the degree of overvaluation would be an outcome oftthese twvoforces: first,

the increase in the actual real effective exchange rate, and second, the decline in the equilibrium real effective exchange rate brought about by the
decline in the terms of trade, and by reductions in capital inflows, which
occurred in the 1980s.26
The appreciation in the real effective exchange rate we have observed,
therefore, must be interpreted with caution. For example, -assume that Lhe
real effective exchr.nge rate for 19S5 represents the equilibrium real effec-

tive exchange rate (on the basis that the resource balance was in surplus, (13
percent of GDP), and the current account was marginally in surplus (0.6
percent of GDP). Since then, the real effective exchange rate has appreci
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ated by 43 percent (tlat is, up to l991- see table 3.5). This does not mean-,
however, that the Ivorian real effective exchange rae is overvalued by 43
percent, since this would be die case only if the equilibrium real effective
exchange rate had remained unchianged since l985. Yet tble 3. also shows
that the terms of tade declined by 37 percentwetween 1985 and 1991 ,which
means that the equilibrium real effective exchange rate is certain to have
fallen.Y This means that there is a greater degree of overvaluation than that
indicated by the real effective exchange rate time series.-This is one reason
some observers-such as Boughton (1991,1992) and Stolber andVagenas
(1992)-haveplaced the degree of overvaluationatmodestlevels.The former
suggestss that overvaluation is around 10 percent,while theilatter estimate an
overvnaluation of only 7 percent .(in 1990). These authors fil. to tak;e into
-accountmovementcin the equilibrium rate general,andpacularly those
originating from the terms oftrade decline. The esmate of a 43 percent
real exchange rate overvaluationin 1991 might therefore be considered-a
lower bound to the true degree of overvaluation.
Using a three-sectorSalter-Swan dependent-economymodel, Devarajran,
Lewis, and Robinson (1993) have developed a simple methodology for estimating the degree of overvaluation which takes into account the induced
change in the equilibrium real effectiveexchange rate broughtaboutby terms
of trade movements and changes -in long-run capital inflows! 8 Using this
methodology, Berth6lenmy and Bourguignon (forthcoming) have estimated
the extent of real exchange rate disequilibrium in Cte d'lvoire.IThey find
that the ansswer depends critically on the choice of year to.represent the equilibrium configuration. Tak-ing ite real exchange rate i 1978 as the equilibrium rate, they estimate that the Ivorian real exchange.rate in:1987 was overvalued byabout 50 percent. similar to the esitate of 46 percentin 1986 for.
C-ameroon reported by D evarajan, LewisL, and Robinson (1993). Berth&exy
and Bourguignon, however, question the choice of 1978 as an equilibrium.
year, gilven the fact that the terms of trade were then at their peak. Taking a.
longerview, and assummingthatthe real exchange rate in 1970 was in equilibrium, they estimate that the real exchange rate in 1987 was overvalued by
only 15 percent (having been increasingly undervalued during the 1970s).
This lower estimate of the real exchange rate ovenraluation assumes that the
nettransfer ofresources (on the capital account) in 1970 applies (in relative
terms) to 1987. Taking into account the debt overhangand the consequent
debtservice commitinents, the estimate of real exchange rate overvaluation
should be higher than this estimate (recall that the eqilibrium real effective exchange rate is also a function of capital floWs).
However, even if it could reasonably be assumed that net capital flows
can be. reestablished at their relative values of 1970 (ignonng the: debt ser-

,.
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vice accumulation since), the estimate of a 15 percent real exchange rate
overvaluation should still be regarded as an underestimate. TlhLs is because
the methodology u-sed is based on a full employment model (an extended
Salter-Swan model), andassunes in effectthat intemal balance is maintained
throughout. Our review-of the events of the 1980s, however,. suggests ihat
notlhing could be further from the case in CGte d t lvoire. The adjustment in:
the external accotnt of Cote d'lvoire that took place during the 1980shas
been a result of import compression, which in tum wwas brought about by a
significant reduction in GD P and investment. In effect, external balancehas
been brought about through internal imbalance. And such ad ustments are
excluded from the Devarajan, Lewis, and Robinson approach. The real exchange rate can be considered overvalued by 15 percent as estimated by
Berthelemy and Bourguignon only if lower outputand investmentlevels are
assumed to be a continuing feature af the Ivorian economy (as well as discounting the effects of increased debt service on capital flows, andas.suming
thatnetcapital inflovs are expectedto beatthe 1970 level in the-foreseeable
future). However, if the policy objective is to achieVe both an external and
an internal balance over the medium term,- estimates of the degree of
overvaluation of the real exchange rate must also reflect the need to raise
levels ofinvestment and GDP, which, other things being equal, will require
a depreciation in the real exchange rate. For these re2-acns the degree of
overvaluation is certain to be-significantly higher than tAhe 15 percent estimate reported by Berthelemy and Bourguignon.
With modestworldmflation, itwould takeaconsiderableperiod ofnegat*ve rates of domestic wage and price inflation to restore the real effective;
exchange rate to an equilibriumvalue. Overvaluations in excess of 40 percentsimnply cannotbeaddressed through intemal adjustments, especiallywi
domestic wage and price rigidities ofthe knd thathave persisted in the Ivorian
economy. Whereas there will'be continued debateabout the exact degree of
overvaluation of the Ivorian real exchange rate, the simple facts that the real
effective exchange rate has appreciated, dhaLthe terms ofuradehave.declined,
and that net capital inflows have declined all combine to reinforce the con-~
clusion that-at the end of the l98Os a serious compettiveness problem per-.:
sisted for Cote d'Ivoire.
A key issue, therefore, in our assessment of adjustment in C6te d'lvoire
is wvhy the, government was unable to correct ths serious macroeconomic
distortion. The firstand obvious reason is Cote d'lvoire's membership in the.
CFA franc zone, with the exchange discipline that this entails. The tying of
has made exchange rate policyinflexible,
the CFAfranc to the French fc
and macroeconomic policy a hostage to fortune. In particular, the nominalI
appreciation of the French franc during the latter half of the 1980s has had
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since milich of.die country's tradce
was- o
the
ttsidl
frianc zone. leading to a su-ong upwar-d movement in the
nomiinal elCctive x cl.Ingel
rate (thiswvas alSoi Oaresittor[deaIluations among
serious repercussions

for Cbre

d'lvoire.

05te cl'lvoire's competitors).
There can belittledebateoverthis explanation ofthenominalinlexibility
underpinning the Ivonian case, and the limits that apply to relying on solely
internal adjustments to restore the cquilibrium real effective exciange rate.
However, dur-ing thle period under review, an alternative policy to anominal
depreciaition was triedi a combination ofexport subsidies and inport tanrffs.
In a two-commodity world, it can readily be showUn tiat tdie combination of
an ex;port.subsidyandan importtariff (both ofwhich raise the domesticpnce
* of the traidable commodity) is an cxact equivalent of a nominal depreciation.Th6is tlicoiretical equi:valence wCas.dtc foundation for the policy strategy
in tieiniid-1980.s. In tie event, dic policydidnotsucceed-and wasabandoned.Given the central importance of die exschange rate issue for the macro* economics of Cbte d'Lvoire, understanding wVIhy thlepolicy Failed is critical.
In this assesssment of the tariff plus subsidy scheme, we identif$ two major
problemsxwith diestrategy first, dle technicalrssues thatsurround the policy,
and second,.the implementation problenms.
Tecdnicalissues. Our fir.st concem is to establishwhether this policy strategy doevs, in ftct, have a strong theoretical case. The problem with the international trde model that underpins it (the usual 2 x 2 x 2 case) is hardly
appropriate for a country like C8te d'Ivoire. First, the assump don ofjUst twO
sectors (exportables and importables) is nota meaningful assumption for
most developing countries. In a model with three sectors (exportables,
iniportables,and nontndables), De-arajan anddeiMelo (1987) assesswhether
such a policy would lead to a real exchange rate depreciation in every case.
Thev find that because of its eFect on the price of nontradables, the tariff
plus subsidy scheme is lik-ely to increase the fiscal deficit, and thereby lead to.
an appreciation in the real exchange rate. Second, the orthodox model ignores the incentives created in the tariffplus subsidyscheme forillegal
de
(incentives that do notaise in the case ofanominal devaluation). O'Connell
(1992) analyzes the implication%sof this critical difference between a devaluation and a triff plus subsidy policy. The latter requires the existence of an
administrative maclinery to value trade flows and to assess the subsidy sayable and the mriff chargeable. Such administrative costs are notincurred in
the case of a devaluationY2
The emergence of illegal trade is likely to undermine the policy objec-.
tives of the tariffplus, subsidy strategy directly. There are three mechanisms
through which the use of the tariff plus subsidy policy can backfire and fhil
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to achlieve the equivalent ofa devaluation. First, an increase in trade taxes is
likely to reduce real incomes by drawing real resources into illegal activities
(such as smuggling). O'Connell (1992) argues tlhat the tariff plus subsidy
polick can wend up appreciating die real exchane rate in tenus ofimportables
if die nontradables sector has a sufficiently low income elasticity of demand
or a relatively high cross elasticity of supply with respect to the [tariff plus.
subsidy] rate" Second, otler illegal activities (such as invicing fraud) will
increase export prices relative to import prices, and thus Lhe tariff plus subsidy policvywill not be uniform between the nto trdable commodities (as
the textbook.mightsuggest). In raising reladveexpoirables prices, the tariff
plus subsidy polic will create distortions in resource allocation thatwould
notarise fromnadevaluation.Added to thisaretheeffectsofexpectations. It
may be that economic agentswill perceive tariffs as pernmanent, but export
subsidies as temporary. This asymmetry in expectations:might undermine
any drive to encourage resource flows into e-xportables. Finally, illegal trade
will increase the tendency for the fis.6 deficit to increase. (since revenues
from trade taxes will be insufficient to meet the expenditure requiremenb
of trade subsidies) .This may add to die tendency for perverse movements in
the real effective exchange rate to emerge.
In. shord, the incentivees created for illegal trade can end up completely
undennining the objectives of the exercise-increasing resource misallocadons, increasing rent-eetking activittes, and putting pressure on' ihe fiscal
deficiL These theoretical cornsiderations are particularly relevant to the Cote
d'lvoire case. There is anecdotal evidence of widespread underinvoicing of
imports, and there havebeen serious problemsin ensunng promptpaymcnt
ofexportsubsidies (given the fiscal constraints facing the government) -The
problems of implementing the tariff plus subsidy policy, therefore, arise im
part from these conceptual and technical weaknesses of the policy. 0 In addition, there have been more practical difflicultieswith implementation, and
it is to these that we now turn.
Impleteentation issnes. The, implementation of the tariff plus subsidy
policy left much to loe desire& Its financing over time was left indetermi-'
nate which led to doubts in the private sector over its sustainability and
permanence. Ivorian government officials never believed that the export
subsidy would gain primary access to the budgetar resources (despite the
creation of a special fund in the treasury, which at one point contained
CFAF 16 billion). In theory, the additional revenue needed for export subsidy payments wvas to come from the application of import duties. However,
as we have already observed, there was sufficient avoidance of such' duties
for the scheme to imply a serious frscal coinuittment to it. At a time when
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the govemment was under pressure to reduce die fiscal deficit, such a policy
lacked credibility from the starL Payment of the export subsidy was patchy,
the distortions in incentives remained, and the system Cailed to have any
impact on investment.
Would a nominal devaluation lhae hldped? The evidence of the overvaluation of the real exchange rate suggests that had the government had
the option of adjusting te nominal exchange rate when the crisis first revealed itself in the early 1980s, the adjustment effort would have been more
successful. Laambert, Schneider, and. Suwa (1991) use an applied general
equilibrium model ofthe Ivorian economy to trace this counterfactual scenario-namely a sharp, once-for-all, nominal devaluation in 1981 They find
that the devaluation has favorable effects on the macroeconomiic balances,
-debtservice, and income distribution. First, the-devaluation is found to be
effecdve in dosing the external and fiscal deficits through the orthodox
chamnels f(icrea ses in exportvolumes, decreases in imports, increased govemnment revenues from the more buoyant economy); The lower fiscal deficit results in less borrowing and lower accumulation of debt (and debt service). Devaluation was also found to encourage increased private capital
inflows, which further reduced public sector external -borrowing. The debt
overhang is considerably reduced as a result of a devaluation, and a much
larger share of the debt is in the private sector. The simulated devaluation
also improved income distribution and reduced poverty. It raised the in-:
comes of snallholders and reduced unemployment.'Using a general equilibrium interpretation of the economic history of Cbte d'Ivoire, Lambert,.
i Schneider, and Suwa have amply demonstrated how exchange rate inflexibility has fettered the adjustment efforts of the 1980s.
The collapse ofprivate investment
* The thirdkeyissue emerging from Cote d'Ivoire's ex-perience ofadjustment
is the devastating decline in private investment-from almost 16 percent of
GDPin 1978-80 to only 7.1 percentin 1987-91 (see table 3.14). The reasons
for this disturbing outcome are complex, but the following factors are liklely
to have played important'roles:
The availiityof ct- Credit has been limited due to the influence of
fiscal deficits and the consequent debt overhang. In a survey of private
enterprises (reported in Ruenda-Sabater and Stone 1992), a lack of
- access to finance was the singlemostimportant obstacle to the growth
of the enterpnse. It seems that each of the mechanisms used by the
government to finance its deficits and to service its debt has crowded
out prnvate investment.
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Labor market efecsc The public sector has crowded out the private sector by bidding away the most educated members of the labor force.
Graduates are guaranteed civil service employment, at.highly favorable rates of remuneration (9 to 10 times GNP per capita). It is difficult for the private sector to compete with these salaries. At the
same time, however, higher public sector pay has a knock-on effect
for wages and salaries in the private sector, which makes it difficult:.
to maintain competitiveness and create productive investment opportunities. Employers in the private sector also face several labor marklet interventions.
inappropnatemcmeczomicpoatcieL in particular, the overvaluation of the:

real exchange irate has discouraged vpriate investors. Such overvaluation, combined with nrgidities in the labor market,reduces thes
returns to investmnentin tradables-activity.At the saie time, the relianceon expenditunre-reducing policies has signifin y reduced the siize of
the domestic market, eroding investment opportunmities in this area.
Publicsetorarear& Arrears have also undermined productive investment in the private sector. Fancing the public sector defict by ac- cumulating arrears has adversely affected the liquidity position of enterpnses, and seriously undermined the confidence of private
investors in the ftiure (Ruenda-Sabater and Stone 1992). The arrears
problem is compounded by other related anomalies. For example,
profit tax is imposed on firms on the basis of an entitlement to an
export subsidy, rather than the receipt of the.subsidy. Even if the subsidy is paid, it may create liquidity problems for firms. But if the sutbsidy is seriously delayed, or not paid at all, the government in effect
taxes firms for income they do not receive (Ruenda-Sabater and
Stone 1992).
Concluding observations
Cote d'lvoire hasbeen subjected to three groups of destabilizingshocks over
the period covered in this mtudyr first, unsustainable expenditure levels in
the late 1970s brought ab'Jut in part by the commodity price boom and access to low-cost extemal I inance; second, terms of trade and real exchange
rate shocks that occurred mainly during the second half of the 1980s; and
finally, a plethora ofpolicy-induced distortions and public sector influence,
affecting production, trade, and exchange rates. Our review suggests that
the policy responses to these destabilizing features of Ivorian-economic his
tory have been quite inadequate, relying almost entirely on an internal adjustment strategy that emphasized expenditure reduction, rather than fiindamene l structural adjustment.
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Had the only source of destabilization been the unsustainably high lerel
of public investmentduring tie late 1970s, the policy response that occurred
wvould have been appropriate, and might have been sufficient, to restore
balance,An indication ofthis is the measure ofsuccessachieved priorto 1987.
Thereafter, the deterioration in the barter tenns of trade and the appreciation in the real exchange rate have rendered thispolicyresponse inadequate.
Even without these further shocks in the latter half of the decade, however,
there are serious doubts that the.policy response tak-en would have been
sufficient to regain a steady-state path of sustainable growth. This is because
the domestic economy had become so distorted by trade and pnce interVentions and direct government involvement in productive acivnities that the:
reliance.on internal adjustment is likely to h-ave been critically flawed. An
internal, expendinure-reducingadjustmentstrategycan be trulyeffectiveeonly
if there is sufficient flexibility and responsiveness in the economic system.
For example, internal adjustment. can be effective only if there is sufficient
price and wage flexibility in the domestic economy. Therefore, at the very
least, the policy response to the initial destabilizing events required that the
rigidities and distortions in the domestic economy be corrected first- Otherwise the internal adjustment effort would be fettered by an insufficient response of the domestic economy.
The attempts to improve the functioning of the domestic economy -are
currently being addressed in earnest, but these improvements are certainly
too late to rescue the internal adjustment strategy. This is because other
events-the terms of trade shock and the appreciation in the real exchange
rate-call for a different adjustment approach, one inwhich an equilibrating movement in the real exchange rate is brought about within a reasonable time frame. So far, the Ivorian authorities have not been able to bring
about this change- The attempts in the mid-1980s to depreciate the real
exchange rate (through a combination of expenditure reduction, export
subsidies, and import tariffs) did not succeed.
Appendix 3A. Strucural adjustrnent policy reform:
design and implementation
Fiscalpoicyand economic mangenent
- nitialdistonrt.The fiscal deficit in 1980 was 12 percent of GDP, comparedwithasinall surplusin 1977, due toan expansion in investment spending financed through.foreign borrowing.
SAP refomn Attempts were made to reduce the fiscal deficit by:
* linking investment expendcimres,
* introdudng a three-year rolling investment plan (loi_program),
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* bringing stabilization fund surpluses under the budget,
- improving reporting and appraisal procedures.
Assessment. Tle oerall fiscal deficit.wasnot closed duringtihe decade. In.
1991 it was 13 percent of GDP. Despite cuts in public investment from 18
percent (1978-83) to 3 percent (1987-91), the increase in debtcservice and
wages and salaries (the latter from 20percentof total expenditure in 1980 to
35 percent in 1991) has aggravated the fiscal deficit problem. However, the
primay defict has been dosed.
MUoncitarypoli-y

I--titial distmion. As a member of the WAMU, FCte d'Ivoire's monetay
policy is governed by rules restricting seignorage.I Yet the government engagedi expansionary monetary policy in the early 1980s by utilizing public
enterprise hon-owingand byborrowing from abroad.Themoney spplygrew
by. 19 percent annually between 1975 and 1980.
SAPreforms Credit ceiling tightened under IMF guidance. WAMU rediscount rates released.
AssessmetiMonetay expansion was arrested during the decade. The
reduced availabRity of external b orrowving meant that the WAiMU rules tightened monetary discipline. Broad money growth fell to 10 percent'aunually
between 1985 and 1991 and to -1.4 percent between 1986 and 1991.
Tradepolicy

Initialdistotion Major distortion in incentives and resource allocation
caused by trde policy (tariffis and quantitative restrictions, and exchange
rate overa.luation) and direct price controls.
SAP efornms. Adjustment programs attempted to remove quantitative
restrictions with temporary import surcharges during transition and apply
tariffsi/export subsidies, yielding uniform effective protection rates of 40
percent In thisuway, trade policv involvedaliberalization componentand an
-attempt to mimic a depredation.

Assessmnent.Thisprogram succeeded onlyduringits earlyyears, especially
1985-87.Thereafterimplementationwasweak.Effectiveratesofprotection
were not unifori in any event, and quantitative restrictions were reimuposed
in 1987. System of incentives remains highly distorted.
Exchange ratepolicy
Initiafdist oion Nominal ex;change rates fixed to French franc; nominal
rates stable during earliest period due to French franc stability. -But real
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exchange rates appreciated due to domestic inflation,whichwws in turn due
to commodity windfall and investment boom.
SAP reforms. No change in nominal exchange rate policy: CFA franc parity with French franc was to remain at FF = CFAF 50. Real exchange rate
changes to be achieved througlh internal adjustment.
Assessment. Appreciation of French franc cauLsed mark-ed apprediation in
real exchange rate after. 1983; intemal policy (fiscal/monetary restraint)
unable to reverse appreciation. CFA franc was thius overvalued at the end of
the decade.

Publicentmtprise zefomIziiialdistiomn. During crisisperiod, public enterpriseswere well funded,
but were inefficient and notsubject to budget processes and accountabiliy.
Hence, they became a senious drain on exchequer finance.
SAP reformsj.Policy reform sought to bring public enterprise activities
under the discipline of the budget, introduce proper audits and accountability, and restructure inefficient enterprises. Under SAL IHI resource flowvs
-tothe publicsectorwere to be reduced by3O percent (in 1986) and annually
thereafter. Programs also sought to accelerate the privatiztion program,
especally after 1990.*Aissessmen Enterprise budgetsSwere generally incorporated into central
government accounting. Management audits were conducted as planned.
Management practices in several public enterprises improved, but they remain inefficient, and enterprses. continue to absorb public funds. As of
1991, those enterprise management problems continue to be addressed.
Four enterpnses privatized by 1991, and program to expand to 20 enterprises in 1991-93, and a further 30 enterprises in a second phase. In short,
the privatization program, though late on the scene, is.progressing satisfactorily. Existing enterprises continue to be a drain on the budget and to
need assistance.
Financialsector reforn
. nitialdistoffiont
Realinterestrates weregenerally-negativefrom 1975 to
1980. Credit market controlled by credit ceilings. M ultiple interest rates in
operation; a lower rate for crop credit Overexpansions in the private banking sector.
* . SAPreformns Most financial sector reformsL were introduced in late 1980s.
Interest rates were raised. Less reliance was to be placed on direct quantita-.
* tive credit controls, and more on indirect instruments; direct sector credit
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controls were to be abolislied; favorable-TEP raLes-were to be abolished; and
development banks were to be closely monitored, assisted and restuctured,
especially the BNDA. Insurance sector was also to be assisted.
Assessiznt. Real interest rates were positive tlhroughout adjustment period, TEP effectivelyabolished, and interestraie swructure simplified. Attempts
to reconcile BNDA iled, and the governmentis arranging liquidation; other
major commercial banLks continue to he troubled, and require continual
assistance; similarly, problems remain widt insurance sector.
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Appendix 3B,
Appendix table 3B. 1 Key macroeconomic Indicators, 1975-91
ln4icator

1975

1976

1977

1978

1979

1980

1981

A.CDP and sector gmwth'

1982 i 1983

19784

1985

1956

1987

1988

1989

1990 1I9

(annuol percentage change)

GDP at market
prces

10.2

5.8

-0.2

13.9

2.9

0.8

4.3

1.6

5.2

3.0

-1.2

-I.6

-1.0

-2.6

Agiculture

9,4

6r0

-4.4

9.5

0.4

12.9

2.1

1.4 -11.0

4.7 -23.0

4,13

I

0.1

7.4

2.3

0.!

Industry

14.5

15.5

10.0

19.1

8.0

8.8

10.0

5I.0

4.7 -18.3

8.7

14.1

-3.8

-4.5

-7.7

-9.2

Services

.18.9

-22.5 -25.6

54.3

8.9 -22.0

9.8

22.9

18.4

5.5

2.8

26.3

43.8

16.4

-7.0

18.5

-21.3

4.6

15,0

12.6

8,2

-1.2

-4t5

13.3
4.0

5.6
11.7

1.3
-7.9

16.3
5.7

4.1

23

-2,7

25.7 26,0

14.7

50.4

56.9

-1.2
3.1

-i.l

-1.8

12.0 -13.7

55.9

.0.7

9.0

-2.5

-24.8

-13.7

-8.0

-52,1

40.0

-3.3

-11.8

23.6

-38.4 -11.6

0.0

-0,4

0,8

-0,7

3,6

6.0

4,5

-8.1

-9.1

10.3

0.7

0.5

9.5

-4.1

6.9
1.4
-5,0 -11,0

10.3

-3.2

12.7
6,2

0,3
-8.0

0.4
0.0

-9,3

-9,3

66.4

76.1

82.8

88.9

94.2

98.2 100.0 106.6

(1985- 100)
114.8 112.5 96,6 91.0 87.6 85.6
Relative inflatiotn
(1985-100)
94.9 95.2 107.9 110.8 116.9 118.4
Real interest
(discount) rate
2.8
3.2
4.0
4.6
5.3
8.0
C. Terms of trade and exchange rate
Terms of trade

87,4

88.6

91.7

97.1 100.0

113.0 110.9

106.6

Gross domestic
investment
Gross dornestic

income
Total consumption
Exports(GNFS)
Irmports (GNFS)
B.Prices
Consumer pnce
index(1985= 100)

35.3

.39.5

5.0

-0.4 13.2
1.3
-2,4 31.5 -10,1

-4.4
-6.7
-1.7

-5,3
0.7
12.1

-7.5

-5.8

O0S

-2.5

0.0
0.0

122.5 120.6

0.0

-8.8
12.1

112.2

120.7

93.0

94.6

93.7

98.8 102.3 102.4

103.2 100.0 103.8

99.9

101.4

96.7

91.0 88.3

9.1

9.5

11.5

13.5

13.3

0.0

69.0 62.4

63.0

Relative prices

(1985-IOOy'
Real elf, exchange
rate (1985=- I0OO7
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77.9

1O00.

01.2

100.0 113.2 121.5 131,0 133.9

140.2 126.4 112.7

98.1

8.7

11.1

9.9

85.4

83.4

84.9

97.0 100,0 102.8

83.9

77.1

119,7 110.4

101,2

100,3 ,100,0 1191

125,4

126.2

10.3

10.5

120,4 125,8 126.3
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Nom, official

-.

Jt;

224,3 248.5
exchange rate
D.External accountsCurr. acct, balance
-6.0
-10.8
(cxc.off,grants)
36.7 41.7
ExportsofGNFS
36.6 36,2
lmports of GNFS
5.5
0.1
Resource balance
E. Public rinance
.. 32.6
Total expenditure
.. 28.9
Total revenue
Fiscal dcficit ()
-3.7
dc
surplus
F,Investmentand savings'
Gross domestic
22.4 23.0
investment
9.5
9.2
Public investmnent
12.7
12.8
Private investment
Gross domrcstic
22.6 28.5
saving
Gross national
14.5 18.9
saving

289.4 256.4 278.6
235.3 209.0 201.0 225.8 287.4 336.3 417,4 479.6 378.1 322.8 267.0 302.9
(percentage of GDP)
-3.5 -11.1 -15.2 -17,5
42.6 36.5 34.6 34.0
36.3 37.4 37,7 40.1
6.3 -0,9 -3.1 -6.1

-16.9
3512
42.3
7.1

40.1
27.8

38.9
27,5

-8,8 -10.8 .12.2

-i1.3

37.2
38.1
0,9

42.7
34.0

44,0
33.2

.

-1.5
13.8 -14.1
36.4 36.5 45.8
39.3 38.2: 34,3
II.5
-1.7
-2.9
GOP)
of
(percentage
40.3 40.6 35.5
27.0 29.6 31.9

0,6
45.8
32.6
13.2

-3,6
-13.3 -11.0
(percentageofGOP)

-3.9
39.3
31.8
7.5

-10.7 -12.6 .13S -13.2 -11.9
35.4 32.0 34.9 36.7 36.7
31.0 29.2 .31.8 32.2 31.9
.8
4.4
3.0
2.8
4.4

32.7 31.9
31.2 29,0

33.7
25.5

40.3
25.7

40.6
23.1

36.2
23.6

35.8
22.7

-1.5

-2.9

-8.2

-14.6

-17.6 -12.6

-13.1

29.8
13.3
16,3

28,0
13.3
13.8

28.2
9.0
17,1

25.9
8.8
15.5

23.2
6.8
14.9

20.6
6.3
11.

10.9
4.6
77

14.6
3.7
97

12,2
4.7
8.3

11.7
3.9
6.7

15.1

10.3
3.2
6.8

9.8
2.8
7.0

10.S

4.7
7.2

33.6 - 28.8

24.9

22.2

18.8

20.3

18.9

22.4

27,8

19.7

16.1

18.0

13.4

14.2

15.2

14.5 .10.0

6.8.

8.4

6,7

10.8

14.3

7.7

2.6

4.6

-1.6

-3.0

4.0

27.3
10.8
15.1

25.0

19,2

2.8
7.7

..Not available.
a.Constant 1987 prices.
wholesale price indix FWPi). The retative infation index is he horne courntly CPI
b. Relative price index isthe consurncr price index (CPI) divided by the tade-weighted foreignf(r infation based on CPI Cl 985- 100). The real effective exchange rate index isthe
adjusted
divided by the trade-weihted foreign CPI. The real interest rate isthe discount rate
wholesale prie idex. The norrinal effecive exchange rte isrrared as atrdenorrinal effective exchange rate mujltiplied by the ratio o CPI and divided by the weighted foreign
rneans an appreciation n the exchange rate.
REER
the
in
weighted average for C6te d'lvoire's 20 most important trading partners. An ircrease
francs.
CrA
current
on
c,External account GDP ratio isbased
Source: World Bank had IMF di,ta.

Published by iRepository, 2021

https://ir.iba.edu.pk/faculty-research-books/13

Appendix table 3B.2 Government flnancial data, 1976-91
(percentageofrGDP)
Category

A.Totalrevenue
Total tax revenue
Direct
Goods and
services
Intemational
trade
Imports
Exports
Nontax revenue
Price stab,

fund
Surplus I
Surplus 2
Other nontax
revenue .
Social security
Sc.iasbucuitys
Other .
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.

.

-

.

.

1976

1977 1978

28.9
21.3.
4.0

38.1
20,4
.4.4

4.3

4.4

5.1

12.9
8.0
4.9

11.6
7.6
4,0

7.6

17.7

1979

1980

1981

1982

1983

1984-

1985

1986

1987

1988

1989. 1990

34.0 33.2
20.5. 20.7
5.8 . 5.0

27.8
20.4
4.8

27.5
22.3
5.2

27.0
21.2
4,6

29.6
20.8
5.1

31.9
19.2
44.

31.2 29.0
18.4 .20.3
2.7
5.0

25,5
21.5
5.2

25.7
20.3

5.1

23,1
19.1
4.7

5.5

5.8

6.4

6.9

6,7

62

- 6.3

5.6

-6.6

6.5

6.5

7.5

6.0

9.6
7.1
2.6

10.2
6.6
3,6

9.8
7.3
2.4

10.7
8.2
2.6

9.7
7.5
2.2

8.9
'7.0
2,0

8.6
6.1
2.5

9.3
6.7
2.6

9.7
7.3
2.4.

8.7
7.0
1.8

7.9
7.2
0.7

6.6
6.3
0.3

8.6
8.3
0.3

13.5

12.5

7.4

5.2.

5.8

8.8

12.8.

12.8

8.6

9.8
7.2
2.5
4.0

5.4

3,9

4.2

3.3

4.8
0.0
0.0

15.5. 10.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0

8.1
0.0
0.0

3.9
0.0
0.0

1.3
0.0
0.0

2.7
0.0
0.0

3.9
0.0
0,0

8.9.
0.0
0.0

9.0
0.0
0.0

.4.5
0.3
4.2

0.3
0.3
0.0

0.8
0.8
0.0

0.7
0.7
0.0

0.8
0.8
0.0

1.0
1.0
0.0

2.8

2.1

4.4

3.9

3.1

4.9

3.8

3.8

4.1

3.7

4.5

3.3

3.4

2.3

0.0

.

1.0

1.3

1.1

1.3

1.4

2.7

2.8' 72.9

2.6

3.2

1.5
1.7

1.6

0.0

1,2
3.7i

1.1

0.0

1.8

0.9

3.4
,

0.
0.0

.

.3.6

0.0

1.4

1

1.3

0.0

2.2

2.7

1.8

.

.

1991

2.36 22.7
19.4 19.3
5.3. 4.8
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B, Total expendiures
Bl. Primal>'
expendiures
.
.
.Wages and
.salanes
Social accounts
Othercurrenrt
Pnce stab, fund
. .
deficit
Investment
B2, Interest due on
publicdebt
Domestic
.
External
C. Total expenditures
Current
Capial
.
D. Prmarydefickt(A-BI)
E.Overall financial balance
(A-B3
Note.: Ratios calculited in current pnces.

Sorce: IMF data.
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42.7

44.0. 40,1

38.9

40.3

40.6

35,5

32.7

31.9

33.7

40.3

40.6

36.2

35.8

40.7

41.3

36,8

34.0

32.9

31.8

25.6

23.3.

25.1

26.7.

31.8

30.7

25.7

23.5

7.3
0.0.
10,1

8.1
0.0
11,3

8.3
0.6
10.4

9.0
0,7
9.6

9.5
0.8
8.6

9.8
0.8
8.3

8.9
0.8
8.0

.8.3
0.9
7.0

8.3
0.8
11.3

10.9
0.8
9.2

11.6
1.0
11.2

12.0
1.3
8.8

12.6
1.4
7.7

12.4
1.3
6.9'

0.0
14.8

0.0
0.0
22.1. 23.3

0.0
22.0

-0.7
18.1

-0 2
14.9

.0.5
14.5

-0.4.
13.1

-0.1
8.0

-0.6
7.7

0.0

3.4
4.7

5.4
3.2

1.3

0.1

4.7

1.9
3.9

2.8

2.8

1.5
0.0
0,0
32.6
17.8
14,8.
-2.2

1.5
2.0
0.0
0.0
0,0
0.0
37.2 42.7
. 15.1
19.5
22,!. 23.3
2.4
.6.7

2.7
0.0
0.0
44.0
22.0
22.0
-8.2

3.2
0.0
0.0
40.1
22.0
18.1
-9.0

4.8
7.4
0.0
1.2
0.0
6.2
38.9 40.3
24.0 - 25.8
14.5
14,9
-6,5
-5.9

8.8
1.4
7.4
40.6
27.3
13.1
-2.2

9.9
1.7
8,2
35.5
27.5
8,0
6.3

9.4
1.3
32.7
25.0
7.7
7.9

6.8
0.3.
6.4
31.9
27.2
4.7
3.8

7.0
0.5
6.5
33.7
29.8
3.9
-1.2.

8.5
1.0
7.6
40.3
35.6

10.0
1.0
8.9
40.6
37.5
4.7
3.2
-6.1 .7.6

10,6
1.3
9.2
36.2
33.5
2.8
-2.1

12.3
1.1
1 12
35.8
33.0
2.8
-0.8

-11.0

-3.6

-1.5

-2.9

-8.2. -1.4.6

32.6
31.1
6.4
0.0
9.9

-3.7

37.2
.35.7

7.1
0.0
6,5

0,9

-8.8 -10.8 -12,2

-11.3

-13.3

.

8.1

-17.6 -12.6 -13.1
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Appendix table 3B.3 External trade balance of payments, 1975-91
(US$ miltion)-

Exports of goods and
nonfactor sermces
Merchandise((ob)
Nonfactorserces
ImportsofGNFS
Merchandise(df)
NonfactorserVces
Resourcebalance
(as a percentage of
GDP)
NJet fador income
Factorreceipts
Fadorpayments
Net current tnrnsfers
Curnnt account
Balance before official
.
grants
As apercentage of
GDC>P
i gants
Ofli6iaIcal
Balance after offidal
grants
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.

.
. 0

1980 .1981.

1982 1983

197?

1978

1979

1,970
1,735
235
1,802
1,161
641
168

2.737
2,412
325
2,420
1,597
823317

3,026
2,616
410
3,138
2,043
1,095
-112

3,233
2,723
$11
3,585
2,233
1,351
:-351

5,5
0.1
-141 -158
28
39
180 186
-184 .290

.6.3
-194
42
236
-345

-0,9

-3.1
-460
59
519
-576

-421

-280

-222

-879 -1,388 -1 836 -1,427 -1,016

-10.8
42

-6,0
31

-3.5
45

-11.1 -15.2 -17.5
10
5
40'

-379

-249

-177

-839 -1,383 -1,827 -1,411 -1,0i6 -929

197S 1976

Item

1,465
1,239
226i
1,561.
1,012
549
-96

.309
60
369
-458

3,577 2,869 2,798 2,491
3,013 2,435 2,347 2,066
564 434 451 425
4,135 3,284.2,945 2,678
2,614 2,068 1,790 .7,635
,1521 1,216 1,155 . 983
-558 -414 -147 -127
-6.1
-563
63
626
-716

1984 1985 I986 . 1987 1988 1989 1990

1991

3,659 3,485. 3,247 .3,286
3,187 2,950 2,691 2,808
471 535 556 . 479
2,952 -3,214. 3.110 3,076
1,640 1,863 1,769 1,720
1,312 .1,5I 1,341 1,356
;707 2 1 137 210.

3,640
3,120
520
3,365
1,702
1,663
275

3.498
3,011
487
3,043
1,671.
1,372
455

3.0

4.4

4.8

2,995
2,625
370
2,311
1,487
824
684

-2.9 - -1,7 11.5
-7.1
-518 -507 .509 -494
38
47
46 - 46
564 553 555 -531
*495 -391 -320 -291

3,160
2,761
399
.2,173
1,410
763
987
13.2

7,5.. 4.4

2.8

-666 -648 .- 881 -923 -986 -1,046 -1,260

la
44
35
72
78
40 :68
706 716 959 1,035 943 1,133 1,278
-279 -427: -50i -514 -470 -S40 -328

-101

42

-369-1,f11 -1,300-1,246-1,311 -1,132

-16.9 -13.8 -14.1 - 1.5
27 .28
15 :30

0.6
26

-3.9 -- 0.7 -12.6 -13.5- -13.2 -11.9
0
10791
61
143
71

-955

-73

68 -298 -968 -1,239 -1,l55 -1,204 -1,132
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Long-term capital
inflows
Direct investment
-

270
69

276
45

571
15

839
83

715 1,033
75
95

921
33

899
47

534
38

346
22

242
29

154
7i

345
88

297
52

201
41

228
48

13

308

270

725

833

706 1,120

810 1,504

506

942

728

459

691

584

622

898

3,303

-107
.16

-39 -169
3 -275

-77
165

-66
339

-182
682

78
113

Net long-ternm

borrowing
* Other long-ternm
inflows
.
Otheritems
Non-short-ternm
capital
Capital flows
Errors and
ornissions
Changes in net
reserves
Not available.

7
0.

-227
0

198
0

418
0

759
*0

212
0

6

-4

-48

-32

-79

-77

-99

20

72

6

*62

92

.30

-119

-434 -339 -462. -718 .
339 206 113 508 3,308.

405 -IB0 -367 289
0
0
0 -459

752 1,011 885 896 3,308
-646 -807 1.173 1,375

3
0

84

-55

13

112. 377

Iso

145

-35 -154 -119
-166

329

.

Source: World Bank data...
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II
0

-653 -10
.
-617 -536 -376
321 .251 -299 -283 - 225

...

:

2 1,175
26

-27

-28
.90.

-341
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Appendix table 3B.4 Implicit GDP deflators and relative price indexes, 1975-91
!(cm

1975

1976

1977

1978

1979

1980

1981

1982

1983

1987

1988

1989 1990

37.5

44,9

59.8

63.2

67.6

76.7

76.4

82.8

88.2 100.0. 104.2 104.2 101.8

102.2

99.7

37.8
34.7
49.5

45.7
37.9
54.9

62.4
54.2
63.8

66.1.
61.1
67.5

70.8
67.7
70.6

83.0
69.8
69.9

83.8
75,0
66.8

89.1
75.4
96.8

92.0 100.0. 104.4 109.7 102.6 104.2
82.6 100.0 96.6 104.5 114.6 114.0
98.9 100.0 118.2 116.9 109.6 110.3

37,1

44.8

54.7

71.4

71.7

25.5

61.2

75.0

89.5

100.0 102.0

52.4

57.0

68.4

74.3

79.1

77.7

73.6

111.7

114.5

100.0

36.3

49.3

70.9

69.8

73.5 105.8 104.0

97.6

95,9 100,0 103.4

1984

1985

1986

1991

GDP defators.
GDP at market
prices

94,2 95.4

GDP at factor

cost
Agrculture
Industry
Mining/
quarrying
Manufactuing

Scrvices
Price racos
Agriculture/
services

0,954 0.767 0.763 0.875 0.921

0.660 0.721

102.5 96.7 95.5
107,8 99.9 97.9
108.0 116.4 114.8

44.5

37.2

37.0

35.8 35,5

109.8

94.2

96.4

96.8

0.772. 0,862 1.000 0.934 0.952 1.217

1,183

.....-

86.9

87.5

1.114 .1.150 1.119

Industry/serices
Mining!servikes

1.361 1,113 0,900 0,967 0,960 0.661 0.642 0.991 1,032 1.000 1.143 1.065 1.164 1.144 1.116 1.340 1.312
1.022 0.908 0.772 1,023 0.976 0,222 0.58B 0.768 0.934 1.000 0.987 0.405 0,395 0,384 0.370 0,409

Manufacturing'
services

1,443

Agicuhture/
induistry

0.701 0.689 0,848 0,905 0.959 0.999 1.123 0.779 0,835 1.000 0.817 0.894 1.045 1,034 0,998 0.858 0.853

Not available.

Surce, World Bank data,
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1,157 0,964 1,064 1.075 0.735 0.708 1,144 1.194 1.000

.. ..

..

..

..

..

https://ir.iba.edu.pk/faculty-research-books/13

-Gted7wirc tfered adjwtmnt

149

Notes
l. Thc cutoff point for this study is 1991. Since then, sevcral important policies
have been implemented, and tlie govermmcnthas made major.strides in making needed
institutional changes.
2. Othermember-sof thc \VestAfrican Monetary Union are Benin, BurkinaFaso,*Mali,Niger, Senegal, and Togo.. Boughton (1991, 1992) provides further details on
the history and structure of the CPA zone and its monetary unions.
3. Understanding the relationship bctween thclVestAfrican Central Bank.and
the French trea.sury is complicated by a similararrangementwith the Banque des Etats
det rAfrique Ccntnile (Centrl-Afrian (cen tna Bank) . While theWestAf ricm Central
Bank has acquiredl a sizable overdraft on its operalions account, the Central-African
Central Bank has generally maintainedlarge surpluses. It has been .suggested that the
French treasu takes the overall balance of both unions into account in considering
the urgency of correcting an operations account imbalansc.4. Whhichofthe wo options ispreferred is amoot point financing throughsciigni-orageand theinflationary tax,orfinancing throughdomestic amrars.The formrtaxesholders of money balances, and the latter "taxes" owners ofenterprise capitaL5. Based on a multiariate analysis of the real exchangerate, Chamley<and Clhanern
(199 1) Conclude that both aggregate demand shocks and public expenditurc appeared
to be positively correlated with the real effective exchange ratc. However, they werc
not confident about the robustness of the latter relationship.
6. The results-they repor for CotecVlvoire were based on an unpublished study by
AchiAtsain and Allechi M'Bet (Centre for Erconomic and Social Research, UniversitE
Nationale de C5Cte d'Ivoirc, Abidjan).
7. Rccall that it was the unsustainably high level of investment expenditures thait
led to the destabilization and financal crisis in the first place.
8.This figure does notinclude "creditsatrisk,which are more difficult to definc,
butuwhich would increase this measure of bad debt significantly.
9. The big four commercial banks-Socite GEneralc de Banques en C6ted'lvoire
(SGBI), Banque Internationale pour le Commerce et lIndustrie de la Cbte d'ivoire
(BICICI), Societr Ivorienne de Banque (SIB),and Banque InternationalepourrAfrique
Occidentale/C6te d'Ivoire (BIAO/CI)-dominatc the Ivorian banking scene. Th
account for 80 percent of net domestic credit
- 10. Taxcs on petroleum and tobacco, cocoa and coffee exports, and nrce imports
were raised, and value added tax was extended to the distribution sector.
1l. PFyment arrears were citherdirecdy orindirectlydutopublicsector arrear-s
Producers not paid by the government (such as exporters. suffering from the Agriculture Price Stabilization Fund arrears) defaulted on their credit rep aynents.
12. No'te that during these cars the contribution of the price stabilization fimd to
governmentrevenueswasathistoricallyhigh levels. As a proportion ofGDP, these funds
amounted to 15.5 percent in 1977,which, when combined with other taxes on intcrna-

*

-

-
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tional trade, amounted to 27 perccnt of GDP.
13. In the analysis that follows, changes in the resource-balance are explained in

terms of their proximate determinants, as defined in the national accounts identities.
Because of the use of identities, caution should be applied in assuming causation.
14. Thesc periods diffcr slightly from our representation of the periods of crisiSt
partialadjustment,and fetteredadjustment,because the tradebalancebegan towidenafter 1985 (rather than aftcr 1986).
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15. Of course, the supplyresponse neednothav bcenduc toadjustmentpolicics,
but simply to the fortuitous improvement in commodity prices.
16. Private consumption continued to increase, thus fueling the extcrnal imbalance, but not significantly.
17. It should be emphasized that the relativ price mcasures used in the table are
crude, and may not accurately reflect the tradable/nontradable relativc price. For example, food production included under agriculture might be beucr considered
nontradable, aswould many manufacturing activities sheltcredhehirid importcontroLs.
1-8.These calculations are similar to (butnotidentical with) those reporte;d earlier from Schiff and Vald&s (1992).
I9.

This section draws heavilyon Crootaert (1993).

'

20. In general, household surveys underestimate incomes (and savings), especially
among higher-income groups.
21..The poverty index is defined as'

X
- ~~~

~~~~~rp

;t@
lyi:''g

'<

'--0

whereY is the expenditure of the ith individual (it= 1,_q), there being it in the
population and qin povert. Y.is thepovertyline. ot is a pmeter to be sclected by the
analyst22. For values of cc> 1, a higher weight is attached to the incomes of the poorest
groups.

23. It is quite likely that servicc use by households depends in part on the quality
of the service received-for example, the availability of medicine, If the service has
deteriorated, households may be less likely to uLse it. The same considerations appy to
education'

24. While patrimoniialism is defined as the obtaining of a government position
through a financial contribution, prebendalism is thc obtaoig of a sinecurc through
favor or patronage.
25. The evidence from the CMte d'Ivoire Living Standards Survey suggests that
poverty levels among public employees have risen steeply, suggesting that public cmployment cuts have been directed primarily aL the lower-paid.
26. Edwards. (1989) demonstrate- that the equilibrium real exchange ratc will
change as a result of changes in tarifs, government consumption expenditure, and
long-term capital transfers from the rest of the world. The net effect of these changes
on the equilibnum real exchang rate is certain to be complex, and to depend on
whether the changes are (and are perceived to be) perManentor transitory. Edwards
concludes that "generally speaking, it is not possible to know how the effect of import
tanrffs and terms of trade shocks on the equilibrium real exchange rate will be distributed through time?'
27. It is unlikely thatthe increase in import taffs over the period,which, all clse
equal, would appreciate the equilibrium real exchange rate, would have been suffdent to counteract the effects of the terms of trade decline.:
28. Theirmodel explains movemnencsin the equilibrium real exchangerate in terms
of these two factors alone, and ignores other fuindame:tals that determine the ra-e
tarit-i, exchange controls, and real government consumption. Changes in these are
likcely to alter the equilibrium real cxchange ratec. Similarly, tic method is static in
approach, and does not addrcss a number. of dynamic issues (such as the effects of
permanentversus temporary shocks). See Edwards (1989) and Williamson (1983)
Published by iRepository, 2021
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29. There are other considerations thaL serve to restrict this exact equivalence of
schliec to the textbook. The tariff pilis subsidy schemc docs not
affecL invisible trade, it does not change asset values or domestic interest rates, and it
*does affect fiscal deficits. In each of these respects, the policy differs from a nominal
. devaluation.
30. Conversely, some studies support the tariff plus subsidy approach, on the
grounds.that exporters are highly responsive to increased price incentives. Levy and
Newtmani (1991) estimated supply responscs in the Ivorian export sector and found
.that exports respond positively to increases in exportprices.and negativel to increases
in import prices.' Although the argue that tc.htariff pins .subsidy policy would go some
way tow-ard mimickinga nominal dev-aluation, they stop short ofsupporting the statm
egy as itwas applied in the Cote d'voire cisc-because they did not assess the budgetary iiplications of the policy, and becauise problems surrounded how the policywas
implemented.

a tariff plus subsidy
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Ghana: frontrunner in'adjustment
Chad Leechor

By c-stomary
Ghana'sadjustment
program has been a succes. -nsPolicy
~~..... criteria,
....it

*
*

reformn has been extensive, despite opposition -andinstitutional constraint&.
~~The benefits of adjustment have been large, V-isible,anduwidely shared. The
~~resul. are all the moermrale
given the chaotic initial condition and
the external shockLs sustained since reformr began. But, there -is room for.improvemen LToday, Ghanaians still beli'eve th-atdoing business entals major
political ris-ks-. Banlk-scannot mobilize adequate resources toma3k-e more cred.it
available. Governiment employment practices k-eep wavages arficially high
Supplyre-sponse has been limited and cnfined largely to trading and.ser-ices, which require relatively little time and commitmente
Before the 1983 reform, Ghanaas economy had virtually collapsed. Econom-ic infrastructure was no longedr in working condition. Basic institutions
hadceased tovfunction- Themincentive system was
wbadly
distorhted. Underth.
circum-stances, necessary measures involved not just policy change, but a
substantial amount ofphysical and institutional rehabilitation. But the crisis.
did offer one adantage-wit helped limit internal reslstance to reform. Interest groups had little justifictiion for maintaning the statms quo. Rent-seekners could no longer find rents. A broad consensus forchange prevailed.
But external condioons
Tere
lesspropitious- In 1983 Ghana suffered one
of the most devastating droughts in decades. Furthermore, almost million
Ghansaians who had been working in Nigeina were sent home This made thi e
ask of rebuilding a shattered economy even'more difficult. But more seIneous shocs wer yet to come- Starting inl1984 the orld priceuof cocoa began
asharp descent andderpres.ed Ghana's exportearnings-desite an increa_e
in its export volume- At the same time,. import plnces rose steadily after-a
brief respite from' the oil-market slump of 1985 and 1986F The cumulative
terms of trade losses after 1987 were -substantial-

.153
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.Ghana'sinitialrefonn efforts Focused on stabilizationandliberali7.ation.

Fiscal discipline 'was introducedand sustained for nearly a decade. The thrust
of fiscal policy uas to reverse the decline in revenue, a trend that had lasted
for more than a decade. Revenue collection rose dramatically betveen 1984
and 1987, and the resources enabled the government to pursue more expansionary policies writhout enlarging its fiscal deficit The improved fiscal balance, maintained until 1992, allowedagreater degree ofmonetary restraint.
A measure of stability was achieved. In the preceding decade, inflation
had averaged 66 percent annually, with wide fluctuations from year to year
Duringr adjustment, the rate of inflation was brought down to an average of
26 percent-which, despite improved fiscal and monetary control, showreda'
persistence of high inflation. The main reason wa.s- Ghana's small monetary
base (6 percent of GDP), wvhich made the price level sensitive to monetary
growth. The pnmay source of monetary expsion was an imbalance betweenlocal exp endituresand domesticsources of revenue. Prior to 1990 part
offoreign aid-was converted into financing for local expenses, contributing
to the expansion of reserves and a corresponding increase in the supply of
money. Yet the distortionary effects of inflation have been.mitigated by the
liberalization measures. Particularly important has been the market-based
exclhange rate system, which minimizes the possibility of exchange rate distortion- Extensive price control has been removed, allowing relative prices
to adjust under inflation. Interest rates hav e also been liberalized.
Major progress has also been made in the external sector. Massive
overvaluation of the local currency has been quiicldy and decisively correctedL Quantitative restrictions and foreign exchange control have been
phased OUL Moreover, trade taxes have been reduced progressively in an
effort -- rationalize the incentive system. Trade volume has expanded significantly. In addition, prudent management of external debtLhas lowered
tShe burdenl of debt services, while also building up foreign exchange reserves to an adequate leveL
Foreign aid has played a major role. From the outset, it allowed Ghana
to imnport the capital goods and supplies it needed for rehabilitation- Later
on, foreign aidsupplemented themeager export earnings to payforimports
and soften the impact of adverse shifts in the terms of trade But the size and
role offoreign aidhave often been misunderstood. Forinstance, theamount
has sometimes been considered excessive, aldtough atits peakl Ghana's net
foreign aid was le.ss than 5 percent of GDP, compared with an average of 8
percentthroughoutSub-SaharanAfrica. In-addition, thelosses due to Ghana's
declining terms of trade havebeen substantial; since 1990 they have-virtually
offset the net aid flow (figure 4.1).
Foreign aid has served largely to facilitate policy change. By strengthening the baxgaining position of those in aitor of reform, dte donor commu-
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nity represents an important constituency in dhe political process. In the
absence of foreign aid, tde adjustment program would have been far more
modest But the leverage of foreign aid is often exaggerated. Even when
reforn has been undertaken, donors are notwell equipped to ensure thatit
is implemented effectively. Furthernore, internal political forces are generally the deciding factor, although donors may occasionally influence the
outcome by throwing their weight on one side..
The adjustmentprogram has clearly changed the economy. Grow has
been restored- Since 1983 real income per capita has averaged 2 percenet
annually-in contrast to the l970swhen real income fell bya third. Evidence
suggests alMo that the benefits ofgrowth have been distributed broadly. Farmers andruralworkers have benefited from improved producer prices for cocoa
and the liberalization of trade for other cash craps.Real food prces-(for
cereals and roots) have fallen gradually-. Furthermore, government expenditures on social programs rose significantly during the adjustment period.
Social indicators show improvements across the board.
The extent and replicability ofGhana's experience have atuacted much
-iterestMany believe that Ghana's adjutstmentperformance has been enxceptional by regional standards. But its performance largely reflects the depth
of economic dedine.before refonn. Over a longer time horizon Ghana's
recordis not that distinctive. For example, betweenl 98 and 1990, real GDP
growmthin Ghanaaveraged 3 percentannually, behind nine otherSub-Saharan
African countries, including Boswvana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Congo, Mali,
and.Mauritius, and comparable to six others, including Malawi, Senegal,
Tanzania, and Zimbabwe.

Figure 4.1 Foreign aid and terms of trade deterioration, 1984-92
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The economy before adjustment

The images of Ghana in the early 1980s are hard to forget. As twYo observers
put it

The economy had been largely devastated. Signs of collapse were
everywh ere.... Roads acutely needed repair; much ofthe railways had
ceased to function and the ports were in only slightly better condinon. Powver supply and telephone connections had broken down.
Lack of imported spare parts had crippled much of the-transport
fleetand prevented repairs ofthe infrastructure (Chand and van ThL
198S, p.11).
The calamitywa.notan isolated eventin Ghana's history. Norwas it entirely
self-inflicted. The most severe drought in decades hit Ghana in 1983. Worldprices for cocoa had already started their seculardescent. In addition, more
than a million Ghanaians who had been working in Nigeria during the oil
boom were sent back-home.
ExogenousshocLks of this magnitude would have been difficult to absorb
m any event But the timing could not have bten worse. Ghana's economy
had already been weakened byyears of declining output, accelerating inflation, and dwsindling foreign exchange reserves. Even without the shocks,
Ghana would still have confronted a major crisis from decades of economic
mismanagement.
Cocoa as a mucrocosm
What happened in the cocoa industry epitomized events in the rest of the
economy. Ghana produced 560,000 ton-s of cocoain 1965, about 34 percent
of world output Production then fell precipitously to 400,000 tons-in 1975
and to 160,000 tonsin 1983 (figure 4.2).Ln the same penod, Cote d'I oire's
cocoa output rose significantly, its .sharein the world market rose from 13 tL
30 percent Pricingand marketingarrangements played a crucial role in this
reversal of fortune. While Ghanaian farmers received 15 percent to 40 percentofprevailingworld pces, Ivorians received atleast66 percent Furthermore, Ghana's Cocoa Board maintained a legal monopoly over the internal
trade and the export of cocoa. The Ivorian govemment relied on private
companies to trade and export cocoa.
Fiscatpolicy
Prior to adjustment, govermmentrevenue fell from about 20 percent of GDP
-in1970 to less than 5 percentim 1982. The decline occurred mainlyas a result
Published by iRepository, 2021
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of overtaxing cocoa fainners, which depressed produiction and encouraged
smllggling. In addition, the overalued cedi (,¢) lowered import taxes and
had an adverse effect on revenuc generally.
Government expenditures increased significantly from year to year,
laely independen t of the budget constrain L Forinstance, from l972 to 1982
nominal government outlays rose front ¢587 million to ¢1 1,374 million.
Current expenditures consistently exceeded die revenue tcolelcted. Capital.
expenditures and grants to public enterprises enlarged the deficits. Despite
tthe-shortfall in available resources, g;rants accotnted fora significant.share
of total expenditures, ranging from 15 percent to 25 percenL
- Govenmment deficits represented a significant share of the economy in
the 1970s. At the peak of the spending binge in 1976, the budget deficit
!amountedto 11.3 percent of GDP. For the decade, budgetLdeficits averaged
7 percent of GDP.
Moncary policy

:

Highly accommodating monetary policies wvere pursued during die period.
The monetary base, and tius moneysupply, grew pnmarily because the Ban k
of Ghana extended credit to the government to finance deficits (figure 4.3)
- In certain years-1979 and 1982, for instance-the primary source of monetarygrowthwas directmlending fom teBankofGhana to public enterprises.
Net foreign assets playeda minor role in monetary policy, whetheras a con- tractionary or expansionaryfactor In the late 1970s, large cocoa export earn-

Figure 4.2 Ghana's cocoa output and prices, 1975-90
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inflation-adjusted exchange rate.
Source: International Cocoa Organization; IMF. International financia Sta tstiks.
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ings helped covter.the rising import. l)ill stiliulated by governuient expenditures. In thec arly lO8Os, as dlie external balance deteriorated, imports ancl
foreign exchange *vere controlled extensively io slowr die clepletion of for-

eign exclhange reserves.
Between 1972 and 1982, the monetary base expanded by an average
annual rate of'40 percent. The stock ofcurrency and resermes thlus expanded
fi-om ¢352:

million to¢10,2I 1 million.TIeIlo Sofrmonetary contuol acceler-

ated inflation, wlicl reached ll6 percent by ]977. from single-digit levels a
few years earlier. Dtiring the same ten-year periocd, die consumIler-price in-

dex rose byan aver-age annual rate of 53 percent- despite the extensive price
and distributional controlsofgoods and services.Tlieprice level didnotrise
as uickdlyas the money supplyin tie late 197O.s, reflecting tle control niechanisntEventuallyaconvergence occurred,with some oversi ootingin the early
1980s as scarcities of goods became widespread.
Exchange mrte policy

The loss of fiscal an d monetary control wvould already have been costlyto the
economy. But the problem -wa then aggrvated by tde government as it attempted to suppress sonme or the symptoms, tlhereby preventing the necessary adjustments.
As inflation intensified in dte 1970s, Ghana failed to make exchange rate

adjustments. Devaluation was regarded as a political taboo-the Busa Administration had attempted itin 1971, butitled to urban rioL:and asuccessfulmilitary coup. The paralel-nark-et exchange rate began to diverge sharply
Figure 4.3 Sources of monetary growth, 1976-82
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Figure 4.4 Exchange rates- cedis per U.S. dollar, 1974-90
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Note. The real official exchange-rate isadjusted for the inflation differential
between Ghana and the United States.
Source: IMF,InternationalFinancialStatistkz World Bank staff calculatons.
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from the offiacal rate (figure 4.4.) In 1978 and 1979 the exchange rate was
finally devalued from IZ1.15 to 12.75 per U.S. dollar. But the adjustinent,
whlile substantial by historical standards, was too little and too late relative to
need. The concurrently high inflation quickly eroded die effect of the devaluation. The divergence between the black market and official rates continued to viden.
The parallel-market exclhange rate nay not be a good yardstick forjudging policies. The black mark-et could be subject to speculative manipulations and could carry excessive risk premiums. For this reason, an alternative comparator is provided-the official rate taken at the beginning of the period
(1974) and successively adjusted by the extent to which cedi inflation (the
change in the consumer pnce index) exceeded dollar inflatidn. This newmeasure yields the exchange rate that-wvould maintain the relative purchasing power of the two currencie-hence the inflation-adjusted exchange
rate. As shown in figure 4.4, the inflation-adjusted exchange rate tracks ihe
black market rate closely, although some risk premiums are reflected by the
latter.
If the inflation-adjusted exchange rate is used as a proxy for the appropnate exchange rate, then the deviation betwveen the official rate and the
inflation-adjusted exchange rate represents a measure of the exchange rate
distortion. The extent of this distortion is presented in figure 4.5. By 1982
the overvaluation exceeded 1,000 percent of the official exchange rate. At
that time, an ex-porterwould get 512.75 for a dollar surrendered to the Bank.
of Ghana, but more thlan 5Z60 in the black markeL

Published by iRepository, 2021

https://ir.iba.edu.pk/faculty-research-books/13
160

Anjus-rsNTr

IN

Anc: LESsoNS FRONt CuNmYCASE SrDws

Policy reform, 1983 througlh 1991
The environment in 1983 was chaotic. Opportunities For illegal profit-mal;king were abundant. Unrealistic controls and rcgtulations led to substantial
hardship. Salaries were so badly eroded that moslt employees liad difficulty
feeding their families. Conditions were so bad ihat many businesses could
not operate, and governnient officials and public enterprise- enployecs
stopped reporting to work'. Usingpublic office forpersonal benefitLws tempt*

ing and often necessary for survival. Corruption was r'anpant.

The decision to tuin the economy around was reached early in 1983,
largely from necessity. The measures; .subsequently adopted were known as
the economic recovery program: The approach emibodied in the economic
recovery program differed substiantally from the previling intellectual climate.iMore attention wasgiven to macroeconomic balance. Price-seitingand.
the administrative allocation ofresources yielded toarecognition of market
forces. The rationale for die policy reversal appeared to be the realization
that fighting corruption in the context of extreme scarcities and distortions
was essentially alostcauise.
Initial efforts under the economic recovery program focused on stabili. zation. In the context of deferred adjustments in a bacly distorted economy,
. stabilization was not a simple taskl. The magnitude ofnecessary pnce adjust*ments*a. colossal and could have created considerable dislocations in a
fragile economny. iA gradualisiic approach was deemed necessary. In the
: meantimel, economic production had-to resume. Rehabilitation ofinfrastruc-

Figure 4.5 Overvaluation of the cedi, 1974-90
Perce.tageof official exchange rate
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Source: IMF. InternationalFinancial Statistics; World Bank staff calculations.
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ture was urgenL Foreign exchange was required to ensure dle floW of essential imports. In addition, Llte government lad to [ace tle traditional stabilization tasLks of controliing inflation and moderating fluctuations in interest
and exchange rates.
Macroeconomic reform: design, and implementation:

Foreignexchiange regime
Among the most significantand successful measures in the fitstage (198387) 'was die exchange rate policy. Within tie firstyear ofthe economic recovin275 to (18.83 to
ery program, the official exchange rate wac devalued from
the: U.S. dollar. And that. was just the beginning. Overvaluation was still
massive. Several maxidevaluaions, as theywere known then, -followed, depredating the currency furthier to (190 per dollar-by September 1986. The
official rate was thus brought wVithin 25 percent of purchasing power parity (figuire 4.4.) Yetethe black market rate wvas still about twice the official rate.
In September 1986 a major step 'vas tak-en when a foreign retail auction
tvas introduced. Initially the auction covered mosttrade transactions, excluding a few major items such as petroleum, cocoa, and essential imports. The
-auction systemwas subsequently modified extensively-the coverage of transactionswas broadened, the introduction offoreign exchange bureauislegalized the remaining parllel marlket, and awholesale auction system replaced
the retail system. Throughout, the foreign exchange market fmnctioned
smoothly-as the exchange rate adjusted to changing mark-et conditions, and
the overvaluation ofthe cedi wasiirtuallyeliminated InApril.1 992 thewholeisale auctions were abolished, and the cenitral bank's management of tlie
exchange rate has since taken place directly in the interbank markets.

Fiscalpolicies
Adjustmentin the foreign exchange mark-etswas .supported by the economic
recovery program's fiscal discipline. The key element of fiscal policy was
resource mobilization. Revenue as a percentage ofGDP rose from less than
6percentin 1983 to 14percentin 1986. Moreover, the increase in revenue
did not come from the imposition of new or more onerous taes. Tax polIcies were gradually restructured, with an emphasis on broadening the tax
base and lowering rates. The top marginal tax rate on personal income, for
instance, was cut successively from 60 percentin 1985 to 30 percent in 1991;,
while the standard deductionuwas raised substantially in real terms. Tax compliance improved, while collection efforts were strengthened; Tax bureaus
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.wcrc rcorgtnized..tnd profecssionalsttffwcre cxtensively recrtuited. Tlhesh-.arp
* psurge of reventec made it.po.ssile bo0t1 to narr ow tie fiscal inibalance and
to
6 aise the ievel of expenditures (figuire 4.6).
Thiis, unlike adjusiment.elsewlhere,

Lle

first fouiryciars of refonr

in Glnna

s.w a continuous expansion in govemiiient spcnTding (tlhc size and compo.ition of public expendittres .since tle rceorm started is showstn in rigure.4.7).
Yet the increa;sed cxpendilures relnected ' recovery from a.sharp fall tlhathad
preceded the reform, rather.than a net addition of new prograums and seir
vices. Public sector pay. for inst-ance., wmas raised significantly in this period to
compensate for the large erosion up to that point. Starting in 1986, a pro-,
gramn of cdil service retrenclimentwas also implentiented. Expenditures on
social selrices and rehiabilitation of infrastructure rose s.ignificantly, rever.;iing the sharp decline before 1983.--

Mwotickuiy policy
Witlh improved fiscal discipline, nionetary policy became more manageable.
.As the economic recovery program was implemented, the monetary. base
began to stabilize, and die rate ofinflation fell significantly (figure 4.8) yet,
the initiaI success of the stabilization program complicated monetary managementin new ways. External financial suppOrt for Ghana rose dramatically.
-allow ing a replenishment of depleted foreign e.xchange reserves. Althougl
the build-up of reseres wtaS pardy apolicy choice, itwmas also nece.ssitated by
the government!s financingof local e-xpenses. In 198Sand 1989, forinstance,

Figure 4.6 Government revenue and expenditures in Ghana, 197S-90
Percentage of GDP
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a. Narrow defSnition, including expenditures financed by foreign aid.
Source: IMF. International Financial Statistia. various years; World Bank staff calrculations.
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domestic spending in excess of domestic revenue was financed by the conversion of foreign aid. Foreign assets held by die Bank of Ghana. became ai
important source of monetar growth, replacing the fiscal deficits of a few
years earlier. But since 1989, domestic credit policy has been u-sed aggressively to offsetthe growth offoreign assets (see figure 4.3). Initially the policy
generated a small fiscal surplus. This was used to repay the govemm ent's deb t
to the Bank ofGhana to dffsetmonetarygrowth. In subsequentyears, repay*mentswere increased, and domestic credit extended by the Bank of Ghana
was reduced. Inflation fell to single-digit levels by the end of 1991.Figure 4.7 Composition of government expenditures, 1984-91
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Sectoral reform: design and implementation
Labor 7narkets

Ghana's labor market is segutented, with an informal sector (rural and urban) and an organized modem sector. In the informal markets, wages are
determined by market forces. In the organized. modern sector, the governmentisthewage leader, accountingforaboutwsbo-thirds oftotal employment.
Since themid-1980s, the gavernment has attempted to restructure the
size of the publicsectorworkforce and its campensation. Some progress has
been made towrd retrenchment, buta severe shortage of data makes assessing the progress difficult Partial inforrnation pieced together suggests that
aboutS percentofd e-vork forcem:ayhavebeen redeployedsince 1987.(table
4.1).Accordingto thegovernments own account, furtherretrenchmnentcan
be made in both government services and public enterprises.
Despite pervasve overemployment, public sectorwvages have increased
substantially in real terms during adjustment Between 1983 and -1988,for
instance, average real
garnings in the public sector more than.tripled (table
4.2). Again much of the increase sought to compenrsate for the.substantial
inflationary erosion that had occurred prior to adjustment Between 1988
and 1992, the governmentattempted to link wage increases to a measure of
productivity. Average real earnings wvere held more or less constan4t while
salary differentials were permitted to widen across grade levels and occupational categories. In 1992, however, organized wage demand intensified in
Table 4.1 Number of public sector employees, 1987 and 1992
CGLup
Core vil seMces'
Educaion services
Subvented organiationse'

1987

1992

131,089
159,000

102,173
167,370

29,000
400,663
250,000
650,663

29,000
.368,117

69,574

.81,574

Security organizationse
Govemrnentservices
Net retrenchment, 1987to 1992
Pubtic enterprises'
Net retrerchment, 1987 to 1992
Total pubicseaor
Net retrnchrnent, 1987 to 1992

.

.

-

-(32.546)
.
.

.

227,000
(23.000)
595,117

(55,546)

-Not applisbEea Betbeen 1987 and 1972a few arganizations were added to the civil service, incuding the h hway authorty and
the audit service.
b. Sorne ermployeesofsubvented orgzations we transerred to the core cu servike bewen the two periodsc Indudes estimates of agencies not cvered inthe conrtoller and acwu,tnt generars payrol, sudc as the intemal
revenue servce and custorms servic
di ndudes the police, armed frces, and ci defense ornizations.
e. Data are derived forn partial ccierage of public enterprises.
Surce Gernment of Ghw,a State Enterprise Comrnirssion (1992); Cornranderand 'stab (1992).
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Table 4.2 Indexes of average real earnings and minimum wages, 1983-92
(1985= 100)
.

.Awage real earnin
Pfae
Pub-ic

Year

1983

54

43

48

l:

miniintumvge

67

77

56

100

100

100-

1987
1988
1989

122.
160
167

93
188

1990

164

.1991
1992

171

..

270

..

1984
1985

.

103

1986

120
91
-

-

.

.

..

-

84
- 79
83

117

Not avaibble.
. The 1992 indees are estinated on the basis of aveage ulasy increase of 80 percent granted to gvernnrient
emnployees.-3--;
S
SoucnWofld Banik;QnatafyOgstofStrnrcs(1991). -.-

the months before the elections. In October 1992, the govemment agreed.
to raise the average government service pay by about 80 percent Avernge
real wages in the public sector have exploded by 500 percent since adjustment, or 20 times the gain in per 'capita GDP:

Trade!reforn

-

The aim of reform has been to rationalize the incentive system and improve
the competitiveness of local producers. In the. initial stage, the extensive
quantitaive restrictions and domestic price controls were removed and the
foreign exchange regime was liberalized. Subsequently, price distortions
arising from tariffs and protective taxes were reduced, as shown in table 4.3Significant protection remained, however, in the form ofprotective features
- built into the sales tax and the excise tax; these were phased out by 1989.
The special imnport tax, which covers awide range of sensitive industries, has
gradually been reduced from about 40 percent to 10 percent across the board
in 1992.
Critics of trade reform have said that it has been too abrupt and too
damaging to local industries. Yet this criticism fails to recognize the limited
extent to which tariffs have been reducedunderapolicy thathas been phased
in over five to seven years. Considerable protection is still in place-averaging about 30 percentin nominal terms overworld prices afteraccounting for
tarifsanddasurcharge (specialimport tax).However, removal ofquantitative
restrictions did significantlychange the extentofprotectionafter the firstfew
years ofadjustment. Fortunately, the charnge was accompanied by a series of
massive devaluations, wvhich worked to the advantage of local producers.
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Along with tde liberalization of imports, efforts have been made to promote exports. The first ws to remove a variety of export duties. Export licensingwas then abolished in 1990, and exportprocedurcswYere made somewhat less cmnbersome. A few export incentives were aLso introduced,
including duty-free iimport of machincry and income tax rebates based on
export sales. Yet major export constraints remain-partdiclarly die nonfunctioning duty-drawback mechanism and the lackl of access tO exCport finance by private firms.- The extensive control of public enterprises over
markieting activities and logistical services further inhibits the countr+ys export potentiaL Regulations of foreign investment,-including restrictions on
private firnms'joint venture.s with foreign partners, impede GhanaTs finnding
a footlold in overseas markets.
Finiancal

sector

Major financial sector reform has been undertaken since 1988, focusing on
the banking system. Initial efforts were targeted at upgrading the financial
position of commercial banks, m-any of which carried large portfolios of
nonperformingassets of'public enterprises. The governmentissued long-tern
bonds in exchange for the nonperfomingassets which were then put up
forsale orliquidation. Thisrestructuring enabled the banks to meetinternational standards of capital adequacy- Institutional development efforLts and
prudential regulations have been upgradedi
Conunercial interest rates are no longer regulated. Sectond lending
requirementsno longerapply. In 1991 the govemmentannounced its intendtion to divestits ownership ofcommerct-d banks. Inaddition, the government
broadened its use of government securities as an instarument of indirect
monetary control In 1992 global andinstitution-spedficcreeditceilings were
abolishedinaswitch to full-fledged open-narketoperations. At the same tme,
a variety of'new finandcal instiutions started operating in Ghana, including
two private investment banks, twvo discount houses. and a leasing companyYet the financial system remains fragile Resource mobilization is limited, constraining the scope ofcommercial lending. in recent years, more of
Table 4.3 Import tariffs, 1983-90
(percent)

Categcry

1983

1984

ConceSSonaytriff

10-20

10-20

Basicrawmaterias
Otherrawrnaterias
CaPal goods
Consumergoods
LuxurYgoods

25
30
30
30
30

25
30
30
30
30

Source:GATT (t9 9).
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t987

r988

20-25 10-20

10-25

10-25

0

0

15
20
25
35
.30-

10
15
I5
20
25

10
15
15
20
25.

10
10
10
20
25

25
30
30
30
30

10
20
20
25
30

1989

t990
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tle bankes' a.ssets 3have been absorbed by governmnent secirities soldc for tle
purpose ormnopping ip exce.ss licliditly. Nonb)ankn in: e-tiedi.doicn is dominated by public enterprises, uric! as a result the volume ofcontractual savings
hLas been relativelv small and silown little expansion.
Agiculitre

Thc agricultural sCctor has miore thini a 40 percent share or GDI?. Sectoral

reform started relatively lute, toward the end of the 1980s. The extent of
reforn lhsi been linmited, except for exchange rate polices. Adjusunents of
the cedi undermacroeconomnic reform havte significaritlndincreased die pires.
ofavarietvr of traded commodities. including cocoa and horticultural products. Anid for cocoa, die rate of export tax has gradually been reduced. Cocoa producens have thus received a higher share of world prices. But world
cocoa prices fell substantially diring the adjustment period-by more than
50 percent .since l9S6. Tlus, real producer prices have fallen, as ha cocoa
production since 1989.
Agricultural reforn focused on gradually reducing the government's
miolvement in the sector. Government farm estates and fertilizer plants are
being divested. Sub.sidies for fertilizers and chemicals are being phased outExpoIt taxes and otler trade restrictions are being reduced. Yet agicultiral
growtl remains sluggish, at a pace well below -growth in the rest of the
economy. In part this stagnation reflects the declining trend in primary
prices worldw%ide:

Role of the publicsectdor
Refonn has made little progress in several imnportant areas, one of which is
the rebuiLding of government capaciy in policy analysis and implernentation.Thelimitedinstitutionalcapacityreflectsafailureofmanagement.which
tends to centralize decisionmaking and monopolize information. Capable
staff are not fully utilized and are thus undermotivated. Budgetary procedures are hampered by technical and political constraints, which prevrent the
flowf of autlorized allocations. The civil se.rice is unduly liarge, with miad-.
equate- supernisory and managerial oversight. Even after several rouncds of
retrenciments, Ghana's civil service remains one of the largest in Africa in
relation to die country's population (figure 4.9).

Public entarpiese-

-
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Ghana had, and still has, more than 300 public enterpnses, more than all
otherAfncan countries exceptTanzania. These enterprises have established
theirpresence in virtually every sector in the economy. Moreover, they have
considerable commercial advantages over private companies, including Ri
nancial assistance, the use of government-owned commercial assets, specal
tx treatments and, inmanyindustries, a quasi-monopolistic position. These
enterprises tlhus threaten and deter private investmenL Ghana's prnrate investmentis less than 8 percent of GDP, far below the level required for selfsustained growth, and less than half of average, private investment in lowincalme developing countries.
The government has been ambivalent about public enterprise reform.
In the fiist few years of adjustment, -the govermmen showved no intention
of changing its role in commercial activities. However, it did acknowledge
the excessive work force and the poor performance of public enterpnses:
across the board. Its initial strategywsas to upgrade the efficiency of the enterprises, rather than to allow competition from private companies. Litde
effortiwas made to instill the basic financial principle that the commnitments
of enterprises be metby thd enterprises themselves, not by the taxpayers or
by foreign aid.
As the losses ofpublic enterprises mountedand their burden on the budget increased toward the end ofthe 1980s, the government began to reconsider its position Efforts to streamline public enterprises were stepped up.
The sale and liquidation of minor enterprises wvere attempted (table 4.4.
Limitedpatcipation ofprivate companies becameapossibilityYetas oflate
Figure 4.9 Size of cvil service in five African countries
Civil service employees per 1,000 nationals
2520-

10105-

l

__:

Ghana"
1992

Gambia
1990

Guinea
1989

Burkina Faso
1990

Niger
199D

a.Includes the core civil
service. educational service, and subvrented organizations, but not parastatals.
Source. Governent of Ghana; Wodd Bankstaff estimates.
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1992, statenients oFintent. far outnumbi ered actual measlures. In Marchl 1992,
for instance, in a break- witlh longstanding tradition, the, government announcedl a plan to let prirvate companies trade in cocoawithin Ghana. Howfever, cocoa exporting was to r'emain the exclusive riglht of the state-owned
Cocoa Board. The Cocoa Board was also granted responsibility for licensing
pnivate companies. Real competition has notet tak-en place.
Economic outcomes

Ghana has come a long way since 1983. Major price contr'ol and policy distortions have been corrected. A reasonable fiscal balance has been achieved.
lts.external position has been strengthiened. In fact during the adjustment,
period Ghana has prospered, despite a massive decline in the international
prices of gold and cocoa. foreover, structural reform
riil
enable Ghanato
respond more buoy-antlv to the extemal and policv shock}s it will inevitably
experience.
Productivesectdrs
Since 1l9S4 Ghana hassignificantl upgraded its economic performance. Real
GDP growth has averaged 5 percent annually, with per capita real growth of
about 2 percent. In the same period, Sub-Saharan African countries have
shown a GDP grow-th of less than 3 percent annually, with little per capita
growti. At the global level, however, lows-income countries as a group hasVe
growmn at an annual rate of about 6 percent, exceeding the grow th rate in
Ghana and Africa as a whole.
Ghana's performance has been relatively steady over time. Aside from
1984, when agrowth spurt occurred after the major drought, and 1990, when
there
-wan
oil shock and global recession, Ghana's growth has been very
dose to 5 percentannually. Grow tatthe sectorallevelhas variedmorewidely
(figure 4.10). Services, -whichaccotmtformore than 40 percen t of GDP, have
showsn rapid and consistent growth. Agricultural growth has been sluggish
Table 4.4 Public enterprises and divestiture, 1987-91
Item

1987

*Estwnaeddnumberofpubkcfrms
Targeted for drvestment
Actuai divestment
-..

329

Cumulative divestrnent

Uquidated

Sold

329
.32

1989

1990

314
45

.266
-2
25
63
26

15

291
39
23

..

..

..

38

..

..

15

24
14

..

.

-

Notavailabie.

a. Indudes sales, tiquiatn and mranagerrentc,tqraes.
SOu=Ce Swe En erpnse Cornnission (I1992); World 3;rik data
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and uneven. Mantufacturing, with a share of less dtan 10 percenL of GDP,
r,,ew rapidly in the initial yeast. oradjustmiient. as the utilization of existing
capacity increased.. In more recentyearts however, mnanufacturing production has stagrnated, growing aL an average of only 2.8 percent annually betwveen 1988 and 1991. Mining, wYhicih attracts muchi intercst from foreigni
conmpanies, has shiowvn consistent and strong performnance.
By 1991 Gha1na's economywasabout40 percentlargerdilan itwasin 1984.
Much of the growvth (77 percent) came from the seivice sector, especially
trading. Industy contribtited about 18 percent to th6e g-rowh, including tde
mining subsector, which contributed 3.6 percent. Agriculture, dte largest
segment of the economy, made a relatively smalL contribution of 5 percent
This pattern of sectoral change is similar to that of many adv-anced,
postindustrial economies in which production is being shifted to lower-wage
countries. In Ghaia, however, this pattern suggests aneed to reexamine policy
and other structural constraints.
The patter of sectoral growth in Ghana is subsmntially different from
that of neighboring Nigeria In the case of Nigeria. postadjustienet (19S92) growti was derived equally from agriculture, services, and oil production. Industry made no major contribution during this period. Thie expansion ofagricultural production was particulariy dramatic; Afteralong period
ofstagnantand declining output before 1986, agriculture grew by an annual
rate of4.3 percent betwveen 1987 and 1992. Adjustmentof the exchange rate
and the abolition of agricultural marketing boards provided the major impetws [or the growth. In Ghana, where agricultural reform has been slower
and more modest, output growth has been about half that of Nigeria.
Figure 4.10 GDP growth by sector, 1984-91
Annual percentage change in va!ue added
14~~~~~~~industry-12-\

I10
8
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....

~~~~~~~Servces
*

fl*
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Agriculture

-2
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Source: Ghana Statistical SerMce.
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Supply nt$ponse in agnicu.lture
Since agriculture is the dominant sector, its sluggish performance has been
a drag on dte economiy. ItS disappointing performance raises several ques-tions. Is reform in the sectorlaggingbehiind reform ni tde restof theeconomy?.
Have prices become less distorted and risen toward world price levels? Whait
nonprice factors are still constraining the supply response? Does the sector
have adequate capacity to adjust to changing incentives?
Aside from tie exchange rateadjusiinentsand changes in cocoa pncing
polides, agnrcultural reform in Ghana started relatively late, about five years
behind the overall adjustnent program. Reforn has sought priniarily to
reduce the role of public enterprises in die productior. pricing, and distribution of agricultural inputs and outputs. As with public enterprise reform
in Ghanagenerally, progress has been .slow and limitedin scope. Divestiture
and liquidation of state-owYned fanns, processing planLs, and chemical companies have started. Marketing and distribution control is being liberalized,
although longstandingpractices and tdition.,tend to change gradually. The
infrastructure is being upgraded, but remains inadequate, particularly rural
feederroadsand critical links with external markers. Marketing facilitiesand
physical structures are underdeveloped and owned predominantly by the
public sector, which limits the scope for attracting private invesnen-t The
combination of marketing and infrastructure constraints is reflected in the
wide distribution margins observed for a variety of common items (table 4.5).
Available evidence on price incentives suggests that Ghanaian FAnners
respond promptly and significantly to price clhanges. For instance, the production of root crops and cereals is projected to rise by about 37 to 50 percent of a given increase in real producers' prices in the short run- Longerrun price elasticities ofsupply are considerably higher (table 4.6). Among
tree crops, the supply response to prices is also significantL Cocoa producton rebounded sharply due to the increase in producer prices between 19 64
and 1989 (see figure 4.2), and avastmajoriry of cocoa producers undertook
neuw plantings after the adjustmentwas initiated (Commander 1989).
Table 4.5 Ratio of retail to farmgate prices
Retait center

Cornmodity
YamsE

Source: Chanexirn.
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Accra
Accra

-

Maize
Tomatoes
Goats
Pa)m oil
Sheanut
Cocoa

.

Acca:
Ao:
AccraTakoradi
Takoradi

Producng center

RPtio

1-61

SaLaga
Nhoshanza
Akumadan

Bawku
Kade
WaGoasco

1.56
-

2.27
1.76
2.26
3.30
1.64
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The adjustmentperiod in Ghana also coincided with a long-term cyclical downturn in world commodity prices. Glhana's principal crop was pruticularly hard h-it; since 1984world prices for cocoaaveraged les:s than tlhreequarters of the prices in the preceding decade, and the slump deepened
toward tie end of the 1980s. Wlorld prices for other commodities also'showed
a cyclical decline-including gold, anotler inajor export Domestic commliodity. prices in Ghana, including rootS and cereals (the primary foodcrops),
reflected this global twend. With the exception of the drougltyear (1983),
real food prices have been falling since 1980.
An important element of Ghana's adjustment policies was to improve
producer prices for cocoa The goerniment gradually but consisten dy raised
the share of world prices received by cocoa farmers. Yet the effortwas constrained by the necessity ofnmaintaining the low of revenue, by high marketingcos.- (to the publicenterprise),and, mostseverely, by fallingworld prices.
Starting in 1988 and continuing into 1993, tde prices received by cocoa farmers began to fall again in real terms. Production also leveled off.
Thus, cyclical swings in global commodity prices have played an important role in depressing Ghanaian fann income and fanners' ability to adjust
ordivtersif,y their sources ofeamings. This constraintwas exacerbated bylimited progress towrard rehabilitating the infrastructure and liberalizing marketing arrangements.
Foreign aid
An important aspect of Ghana's adjustment exper .nce in the 1980s is ihe
role of external assistance. Donors have played a major role in both shaping
the adjustment program and financing the attendant costs. Soon after the
economic recovery program was initiated, foreign aid increased dramaticaily.
Netresources to Ghanaunderofficialforeign:aidrose fromabout$270 million
in 1984 to $385 million in 1986, and to $480 million in 1990.
Yet the size of this external assistance is not partcularly large compared
swith thatreceived by otherAfrican countries.As a share of GDP, the disburseTable 4.6 Regression estimates of agricultural supply response
(selecied agicultural output)
DeperndE vcriabfes

Constcnt

Cerels.

-0.48
-0-26)

Root crops

.0.53
-01I9)

Price
(tqggd one period)

Productionr
(lagged one period)

0.53
(0.32)
0.37
(0.21)

0.82
(038)
0.16
(036)

0.73
0.71

Note Figures inparentheses are estimated standard errors. Double-Lig equaions are used. Ten observations
( 1980-90) are used in each equation.
Source: World Bank saffestirrates.
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inent of offidal aussistance to Chana was ahoutl O percent in the late 1980s,
considerably lower than in Malawi (20 percent), Senegal (25 percent), and
Tanzania (nmore than 30 percent). On a per capita basis, tie same picture
emerges. Official assistance to Ghana was about $40 per person in 1989,
somewiat higher thaln in Tanzania ($37) and CGte d'lvoire ($34), but still
lower than in Zambia ($48),.Malaivi ($49), and Senegal. ($91).
As it turned out, foreign aid was much needed to offset Ghana's losses
due to its dleclining teris of trade. Falling prices. for gold and cocoa had
lowered Ghana!s-foreign exchange earnings significantly in relation to its
potential based on 1984-prces (see igure 4.1). Witlhout foreign aid, tiehe
adverse terms of trade shifts would have seriously threatened the progress of
the adjustment program. Nonetheless, the net incremental resources avail- able to Ghanawere much smaller than is generallybelieved.Thenetamount
became insignificant after 1988, and the net aid flow actally fell short of
terms of trade losses in 1992.
The more important contribution of foreign aid-may h-ave been toward
policymaingl As wVith other countries, Ghaana's decisionmaling process involves balancing the demands of various interest groups. Foreign aid has
expanded the scope of policy consideratons to constituencies tlatwere not
partof te.policymaking cirde or did not have adequate political power. For
-instance, correcting local currency overvaluadon had been consdered a
political taboo for several decades prior to adjustment Similarly, without.
foreign aid the groups favoring fiscal diL;ipline and more liberal economic
management might not have prevailed.
Yet the leverage of foreign aid is not as greait as is generally perceived.
The acceptance of aid-supported reform depends on how such reformn af
fects local political and social expectations. Decisionmalking is governed by
internal political considerations. Donors likely can make a difference only;
when the contest among interest groups is close Moreover, the success of
reform depends on the capacity of local implementation-as indicated by
the limited progress, toward restructuring the public sector's commercial
undertakings. Vested interests, particularly political appointees in charge of
vast public assets, still dominate decisionmaking, despite considerable support for reform from the donor community. Foreign aid has had little effect on addressing excessive public sector empltynent, the absence offinancial discipline among public enterprises, and the overextended scope of
government functions.
Is self-sustained economic growth possible?
Has Ghana reached a point where it can generate rapid growth without foreign aid? Its strong performance for a decade does not by itself confirm ihe
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possibility. Many counuies, including neiglhboring CGte d voire, miade similar.
sttides toward self-sutstained*growt1h, only to sutffer protracted declines afterward. Assessing the prospects ror Ghlanal r eqllires ex-amnining some of its fun-

damenta. features.
International experience shows that. rapidc and sustainable growth is,.
characteristics. First; a country's
commonly assoLiated with a few obsvle
savings and investment. rate slhould be high, normally higher than the aver
age for counties with a similar. incolmie level. Second, the country should
extensive linksw ith world markets to facilitate the low of capital and

*

cave

technology. Third, a cotintry needs a stable economic environienit, which:.I
limits the volatility of th-e exchlange and interest rates.;
Whlere does Ghana stand today in terms of these criteria?Wile much -progress has been made, there ismuch scope for improvement. i.. -

-

Savingvsanald int'vest:ent
*

Domestic saving in Ghana has risen in recent vears from -about5 percent of
GDP to-8 percent of GDP (figure 4.11) .The increase.has brought the savings
ate -up to the level of the 1960s, which is still very low by international stan-dards. For .Sub-Saharan Africa, the savings rate has gone down in the past
-twvo decades, but the cu1rentrate is about 13 percent In Asia, where rapid
growth has often been observed in many countries, the savings rate is about
28
-percent of GDP.
Despite low domnesticsaving, Ghana has in recentyears been able to draw on oreign aid and maintain an investment rate of about 16percent of GDP
Figure 4.11 Savings and investment, 1975-91
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(figure 4.11). Half of ihe investinent comes firom governmient capital expen-

ditures. The remiainder is a coinbination of investmenus by public enterpiises
: and private companies. Data on private sector investment are not readily
available, but it clearly is not more than 8 percent of GDP.
Ghana's gross domestic investment is comparable to the average for
Sub-Saharan Africa (15 percent of GDP). But it is still considerably lower
than in lotv-income counties as a group (29 percent) and lower than in
high-growth East-Asian countries in the lYGOs (22 percent). Furthennore,
since the government's share in investment is large,- the shortfall is due to*
- : * ~a lack of investment demand-in the private sector. This aspect of Ghana's
adjustmnent experience requires further attention. After a decade of gener-t ally faorable adjustment efforts, private sector investmient, normally: the.
driving force for vigorous growth, has not been particularly strong (World
i199 2).
Bank
Links inth external markets
Ghana has long held a distinctive position in world markets as a leading
exporter of quality cocoa and gold. Yet trade with the rest of the world is
comparatively small. Ghana's measure of openness-the sum of i mportsand exports as ashare of GDP-has recentlybeen abOUt 40 percent, a significantexpansion from avery depre.ssedlevel prior tote adjustmentprogram.
While the degree of openness varies substantially from one country to another, many coun tries of similar size and endowments, such as Cote d'lvoirel,
Malaysia, and Zimbabwe, show much greater integration with the world
economy. For instance, Malaysis trade volume exceeds -its GDPThe size of trade is determined largely by a country's ability to export
-and to attract foreign investment. Ghana's exports seem to have reached a
plateau in recent years at about 18 percent of GDP (figure 4t12). Further;more, the base of Ghana's exports is restricted to a, few traditional itemLs,
including cocoa, gold; and timber, which still account for about two-thirds
of total exports. Nontraditional exports have gro
but remain a .smal part
of total exports at less than 6 percent (figure 4.13). Imports have also shown
dramaticgrowth, reaching about25 percent ofGGDP in recentyears. Butafter
aid-f-unded imports are excluded, the sustainable volume of trade (both
imports and exports) is about 35 percent of GDP, considerably lower than
the level for high-growth countries.
Economic stabilty

-

Published by iRepository, 2021

*

The adjustmentprogram has made significantstrides, particularlyin the areas
of fiscal discpline and monetary res2aint. Yet inflation control has shown
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mixed results. The raite of inflation-as measured by the change in the consumer price index-was brought down to a single-digit level on afew occasions. However, it averaged 26 percent annually between 1984 and 1991,
compared with a rate of about 6 percent among its trading partners. Inflaton has been relatively high andvolatile during die adjustrnentperiod. This
volatility is reflected in the nominal exchange rates, doimestic interest rates,
and credit conditions in the economy.
The apparently paradoxical link between monetary restraint and high
inflation can be explained by the absence of financial depth. The broad
monetary aggregate (M2) in Ghana has been about 14 percent of GDP in
recent years, implying dtat Ghana's financial depth is one of the lowvest in
the world. (Only Argentina andi Uganda have less financial depth. than
-Ghana.)This low level is due prmarily to the unwillingness of the public to
hold deposits in domestic banks. Furthermore, die monetary base (or highpowered money) is correspondingly small, representing about6 percentof
CUP in 1990.
-Given the limited financial depth, eren monetayincreases thatare small
in relation to the economy can have a large impact on the price level. Consider for example, an expansion:in the monetary base of 1.5 percentofGDP
annually, a modest increase by intemational standards. In Ghana, however,
this-increase would translate into monetary expansion of about 25 percenL
Over ihe medium term, this increase in the monemty base and money supply would translate into annual inflation of about 25 percent, the level ob>
served during the adjustmentpenod.
Figure 4.12 Exports and imports, 1975-91.
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Privatesector development
To achieve rapid and self-sustained growth, Ghana must overcome several
major obstacles to private sector devTelopment and public sector refonn.

Buildingpzivate sector confiden t The lack of confidence in the business.
environmentamongprivate sectoractorshas been frequentlynoted.AmongGhanaian business people, the terms often used to describe. the business
environmentinclude "Mistrut,"haassment,-and"the absence of support.l
-More erudite obserers use sudc terms as Sanibivalent attitude or "issue of
governance.
The confidence isslueis inpartalegacyofpastpolicies. Serious economic
mismanagement prior to the adjustment program had led to chaos and real
hardship-both of which remain vivid in the collective memory. Even during the period of recovery 'the economic climate-was clouded -by ofEcial
actions thatposedserious threats to pnritebusinesses.Propertieswereseized
and people's lifetime savings were confiscated. Prosecutions, of individuals
were actively pursued under normal and parallel legal channels Business
opportunities were constrained by the presence of public enterprises with
powerffil poliical connections.
The adjustment program has nonetheless made considerable progre;s
-towardpragmatism. Despite a strong voice for maintaiming the status quo,
official control ofmany economic actvities has been withdrawn,Tprinmarilyin
an effort to curb brazen forms of corruption. But convincing signs of a new
Figure 4.13 Composition of merchandise exports, 1984-91
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approacli and a new partnerslhip witlh private businesses have not been forthcomIling fron die government. nie
divCestiture of government commerdal
undertakings has been slow and faltering..
Thze availabiliyof credit. The absence of confidence shows up in the banking system. Deposits at commercialbanks, have represented about 8percent
of GDP. in recent years, comparedwith an. avenage ofabout 16 percent for
Sub-Saharan Africa asa whole (figture 4.14) . Tle ilure to mobilize resources
is in turn restricting the availability of credit and raising the costs of funds,
wYith pervasive repercus,sions in the. economy. Ghanaian business people
;throughout the coun'try consider the difficultaccess to credit one of ie most
.senousproblems theyffice.'
Since the adjustment process began in 1983, the level of creditavailable
per unit of final output has declined. This decline is due in part to the direct-control of domestic credit tlat was in effect until 1992 (Since 1990'
greater reliance has -been placed on the control of the monetary base
through sales of government secunties and the use of government repayment to die banking system.) Furthermore, a large proportion of the credit
that is available goes to state-owvned enterprises. Credit toihe private sector
has been extremely scarce. Compared with more dynamic economie.s-Tailand-and Malaysia in the 1960s, for example-Ghanaian private businesses
have about one-tJ:rd or one-fourth as much credit to work with, (table 4 7).
The same situation applies tO nonbank financial instimttions. Out-side thle
banking system, insurance companies and penson funds are the principal
ng

.

.

.

Figure 4.14 Financial resource mobilization in selected countries
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Table 4.7 Banking system credit, Ghana, Malaysia, and Thailand, various
years
(pecertage of GDP)
Ghtaato
-

rear

Prv te

;.scor

-a-ta

State-

owened

enterpr6e

Turdl

Year

4.6
6.2

t.8
5.3

6.4
11.5

1964
1965

1986
7.3
-019?87.
:6.3
1988
5.5
1989
'.A
1990,
.3

t3
3.4
3.4.
3.1
29

11.6
9.7
89
7.5
7.2

1966
1967
1968
1969

1984
1985-

.

Store

.

.

PrHvote
sector

1970

13.2
12.7
13.2
14.3
16.4
15.8

ISA

ovned

enterprie

Total

Private
sector

0.0
0.0

13.2
12.7

0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0

13.2
'.3
16.4
15.8
I8.4

Th.adad
Stateowned
enrerpnas

Totel

13.4
4.2

0.0
0.0

13.2
14.2

14.2
15.5
i16.1
-17.0

0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0

18.1

0.0

1V.2
15.5
15.1t
17.0
18.1

Note.-Table ertudes cLorns on the central gavernmcfnL.
a. Irincuding Cocoa Board borrowing trough cocoa bilk.
Source: IMF, !ntrernaona? F,noncivlSrstrics. twious yer...

intermediaries, and the private sector plays a minimal role in running tlhe
instituionss and using tie finds.

Laberw nardeis.Wage ratesand the quality of labor represent a major part
of business decisions, particularly dr.ose of foreignT companies. WMage rates in
Ghlana remiiain competitive -by international sandards. But this wage advantage is offset by the relatively low level of education and skills ofthe average
workker. Furthermore. die poor quality orinfrastructure and suipportsemrices
in Ghana tends to erode its coinpetitive positionWMages are aLso affected by public sector employmientL More tlan hialf
of employees in tde modern sectoruwork. for the government and public enterprises. Government service alone employs about 360,000 persons, or
more than 2 percent of the Ghanaian population, makling it one of the-largest civil services in Africa. even after several rounds of reLrenclment (sce
figure 4.9). UWithin the public sector, compensation incudes salaries. severll
in-k}ind allowances. generouis end-of-service benefits. relatively secure tenure. and undemiandig workloads due an overstaffing. Thlese practices!

when adopted by the largest employer in die economiy tend to limit tde.
extent to which wages can adjutst to changing miark-et conditions. They also
prevent Ghanafromfully realixing is comparative advantage. foiloiiing thc
relatively liberal trade and exchange regiimes implemented during the ad-

justment period.
As of 1990 public enterprises employed more than 200,000 workers, or
about one-fifth of the total work- force in tde modern sector. By dle
government's o wLn account, tlere is considerable redundancy at all job leveLs across public enterprises. A recent review shows that four-4ifths of die
workers in some enterprises are unnecessary. Th numberof support staffis
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of'Lcn several times lhighier than in comparable companics in the private sectar. In arddition to staffing recidindancy. geniero
ous ;e;tve policies prev%ail.Junior cmployces r eceive tlirtytworking days ofleave annually. Higher-level staff
are entitledl to miiore.

The stifling or pubiic enterprises hias. important fiscal implications. A
drainatic example ;urose in 1992whicn the governientaagreed to payaccruecd
. end-of-scrice benefits, wlhichi had not been funded by tleC public nteirprises.
The amoUnt was -eStimated atfabout 4.5 percent of GDP, atltough tile ftll
size orfte workerus' claims is not knowtn. This added fisad pressure arose in
-diecontext of a sig,nificant macroeconoiic imbalance in 1992. Thc govCernnient planned to pay for die expenses over a penod of tihrec ycars.
Bitt the underlying financial discipline necessaty to prevent future fiscal
costs may not havle been achlieved. The averae pay for public enterprise
employees is estimated to be 15 percent higher than for private- companies
* ~ -(State Enterprise Commission 1992). Furtlhermnore, dle levels of pay and
employment do not depend on tie financial posidion of the enterprises involvedLTheyare determined in a collective bargainingprocessin which representatives of th-e aotrners' have much to gain in providing generous
settlements.
Cntt merdcalausets Publicsi.ectoroownership ofcommnercial properties is also
pervasivel Local. authorities and public enterprises control a substantial
amount of commercial land and structures. The full extent of such control
is difficult to document without a serious effort by the gove,nmentL Available data suggest that it is extensive. According to information provided by
127 relatively large public enterprises i-n 1989, the fix-ed assets they owned
andcontrolled representedabout94percentofGDP. (Estimates oftotl fixted
assets in the econornyare nota-ailable, but they might be.on the order of S
to 16 times GDP.) Another 200 public enterprises aLso own and control commercial assets.
The impactofgovernment ownerihip of land aid commercial structures
on pn%rate investmnent requires further research. What is clear. however, is
that the supply ofcommercial properties iS.substantially more restricted than.
it would be without such extensive government ownership. In addition, entrepreneurs operating on rented premises have little incentive to make ex;tensive investments to upgrade and develop the properties.
Addressing the presence of pulic entriss To private businesses and prospectve investors, the exLstence of some'300 public enterprises is not a matter of indifference. Public enterprises have considerable competitive advantages. They have access to government debt and equity -capital,with virtually
no demands placed on them with respect to the rate of return. They do not
.:payrent on government-owned commercial properties. Furthermore. they
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are not expected to pay mxes, benefiting eidter from statutioy exemptions
or lack ofenforcemcn (see the contiibiition ofpublic enterprises to government reveni:e in figuire 4.15).
To a private entrepreneur public enterprises are a significant tlreat. To
overcome some of thc disadvantages. many entrepreneurs understandably
try to evade taxes,asevident fromdte Ihiglhlypublicized caseso[prosecution.
Even if successful, the benefits of tax evasion offset only a small part of tle
disadvantages. Clearly, private entrepreneurs have to seek out ie activities
and niches-in wlhichl public enterprises have not already established a foothold. But their search may be in main, since justabout every business niche
is occupied. In tde presence ofsuch com petition, investmentis the preserve

ofr.hse with exceptional business acumen or those insensitive to risks. Ordinary law-abiding and risk-averse entrepreneurs probably would not invest
in this enmvronmentRestrictingmonopoly power-Many legal ban-iers h-ave been erected to restrict the entry oFprinvate companies. The most visible restriction applies to
cocoa trading. Until 1992 pnvate companies were notallowed to trade cocoa

in competition with the state-owned Cocoa Board. Sice 1992 private companies have been granted the right to buy and sell cocoa within Ghana-but
exporting is still the exclusive province of the Cocoa Board- Yet even this
opening in internal trding has been marred by the decision to rely on die.
Cocoa Board as the issuer of trading permitS.
In the eneliy field, a few state-owned entities monopolize producti- n,
pricing, and distribution-the Ghana National Petroleum Corporation, the
VoltaRiverAuthorities, and the Electricity Corporation ofGhanaNumerous

Figure 4.15 .rivate companies and public enterprises:
share in work force and contribution to govemment revenue, 1988
Contribution to
government revenue

Share in workforce

Public
enterprises
49%

Public

- . .
Private
companies

~~~~~~~enterprises
etris

.,

51 Y ..

;i

/

s

t''t

= /

w

l'='.).S-

'

~~~~~~~~~~~~~r-i-:-Puriate
-

,g-.r
;t

_7r*~~
.

*,.:

. l-,-

"

&tit> t

qtzt.!.

,>:
-.

,

,

SourceJ World Bank data: Gawmnment of Ghana.
Published by iRepository, 2021

; .

.

\>

' .-

Si-w:G

.i:companies
97%

https://ir.iba.edu.pk/faculty-research-books/13

182

Ap;tusntrwr

IAnica:
&tua.

La~&ors
FROM COUN-rRYGME SIvti
.
R._

restrictions apply inotler ineiisnies. Inthe insurance1)usincss, forinstancc,
policies coveringa putblic sector organizntion or its purchases can lbe written
only bV the
Lgovernmn ent-ownedl State Insurance Corporation. The restriction
allowns :1. Stare Insurance Corpo ation to capture about 80 percent. or ric
incll(stry's revenltlc.Ten otleirprivat comnpanies'pick upwhatis left. Similr, .
in tle pension hind t)usiness t mn.datory%
contribulltion ort)out 17 percent
of eaich company's wage bill goes to the govermuent-owned Social Security
and National Invesuientrrls,twlicli is tle onlypension fund in the countly.
Social programs and adjustment.

As in miost countries in die region, the- Ghanalan govemment supports an
extensive array of welfiare mieasures. Sonie programs arejustifiable-for exaiample, liealth and education programs caried outlby designated -'gencies
to serve the gener-al public. Butt others are less viable and dese.x:
policy sctrtiny-such, as maintaining

greater

the high re ofIpublic sector employ-

mentand tde variety ofsubsidies for goodsand services.Taken together, tde
conventLional and other wel f-e

measures represenL a significant share of
scale and character of welfare progais
hlate

public sector undertaking. The
majorimplications for the outcome ofadjustnent policies.

Theie isjustifiable concern aboutwhetheradjustinenL policies hurt dhe
poor disproportionately. Expenditure cutsare often necessary under adjustment, and the cuts often fall leavily on social progirams. For dle poor, who
*have no alternative access to basic services, reductions in social programs can
halvre serious consequences. Yet tliS concem presuppo.ses that social-services
are actually being deliyered effectively-and this is not alwvays true. Where
the delivery of essential senrices is ineffective or wasteful, expenditure cuts
would not necessarily impose an undue burden. Furthennore, adjustment
and the-attendantfiscal discipline donotnecessanlyinvolVe expenditure curs.
Ghlana's

adjiuStment experience showfs thatfiscal discipline can be consistent

widt considerable increases in expenditures. Conventional sodal programs
have actually expanded during the period ofadjusent
aniventionalsocialprogrars

From the outset of the economic recovery program, social expenditures
expanded in real terms and as a -shareof GDP. Prior to adjustment, there was
a decade-long decline in real social expenditures, which reached an unusu
ally low level in 1983 (figures 4.16 and 4.17). Social spending rose thereafter
and reached aplateau in the late l9SOs-ata level somewhatbelow the peak
reached in the mid-lI9 Os during tie cocoa boom. WNrhile the increase in social
xpenditures occurred acrosstheboard, health, whichhad been compre.ssed
severely, received the greatest share increase.
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Education. Along with increased expenditures on eduication, an extended program of educational reforn was pursued, and. expendiLures
witlhin the subsector were reallocated. The preuniversity education cycle was
shortened, and more a practical curriculutnm wavs introduced. Streamlined
training programs, higher salaries; and a reduction in nonteaching staff
improved the quality of teaching. A greater share of the education budget
went to basic education, althougl the shalre remained low by international
standards. The progrm helped increase enrollment at tle primary and secondary school levels; primary school enrollment rose by about 10 percent
between 1985 and 1989.
Figure 4.16 Social sector current expenditure, 1976-89
Percentage of GDP
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Figure 4.17 Social sector capital expenditure, 1976-89
Percentageof GDP
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Tle quality ofeducation remains a concern. Functional literty has
lbeen
m'llchIow'er than the rate of school attendance wotuld imply. The low level of
literacyreflects, in part, tC linguistic diversity in Ghana-and agenera shortage of appropriate reading materials.

Health. To reverse the decline in healtlh status of the population, the government embarked on a health reforni program to improve tie accessibility
and quality of healdt services. Major enipliasis was placed on rehabilitating
existing facilities, increasing utilization, and expandingpnriate sectorinvolvement in care delivery. Sigrificant progress was made, in increasing immunization coverage and, to a lesser extent, establishing essential drug policies.
For instance, 67 percentof children younger than one year were immunized
in 1989 compared-with only 13 pelrcenta few years earlier.
But maanagement and organizational problems continued to limit the
effectiveness of health services. Budgets Vere inadequately prepared and
poorly executed. Ongoingprograwmswere not monitored or evaluated effectiv.ely. The accessibilityand qualityofhealtlh services remained poorer in rural
than in urban areas. The .supply of drugs was inadequate and uneevenly distributed. Organizational and policy refonn-persisted, however.
Socal indicators sugestthatLpublic healthservices improved during the
adjustnentperiod. For example, the inantrmortality rate fell from more than
11 percent in 1980 to about 9 percentin 19S9. River blindnesswas virtually
eliminated. Moreover, the malnutrition rate among children was cut in half,
while life expectancy rose from about fifty-two years to fifty-five years.

Allviatingpoverty
In Ghana poverty is primarily a rural phenonienon. More than two-fifths of
-ruralinhabitants, or abouta third of the national poptulation, live below the.
-povertyline. In contrast, onlyabout4percentofurban (Accra) residentsare
poor. The poor derive most of their income from agriculture and nonFamnn
selfemployment. Formaljobs provide less than 4 percent of their income.
-Thispattem of income sources is dosely linked to tie low level of education
amongthepoor.About80 percentofthe pocrlive in hotusehold.swhose heads
do nothavea formal education. In contrast personswith atleastasecondary
level of education comprise less than 1 percent of the poor.
The adjustnentprograminGOhanahas hadapositiveimpacton the poor.
The major expansion in the provision ofsocial services, particularlyin health
-andeducation, has directly served the needs of the poor. Agricultural pric~ing policy and liberalIation, which have increased fann income generally,
have helped the poor in their largest source of income. Physical rehabilita-
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tion of infrastructure hlas revived trding and expanded the markets, improving conditions for the poor. Quality-or-life indicators, including child malnutrition, infant mortality, primary hiealth care, and access to water, liave all
improved since the adjustment progran started.
More directantipovertyprogramswere also attempted. For example,with
an outpouring of international support, the government in 1988 launched
the PAMSCGAD progra, a program of actions to mitigate the social costs of
ad ustments. It vas an ambitious and complex uridertainga
involving seven
sectoral ministries, thirteen public agencies, twenty-three distinct projects,
and numerous designated acivities.The intentwas to provide quick relief to
the poor throughout the country. Whilef some progress wsv- ma=de, the impact was less than anticipated. The difEculty in targ,eting assistance -to the
poor stems from two factors.- First, the poor are not concentrated in any
particulararea. Second, their consumption pattern doesnot differ distnctly
thepattern-for the nonpoor. Furthermore, most ofthe measures un'der the program:
of actions attempted to overcome some of the shortcomings of similar programs implemented elsewhere. For example, program,
* design called for avoiding simple transfers in favor of producing useful as
sets for local communities. In addition, the wages offered under the project
were kep t relatively low to avoid attracting the nonpoor. But these cort traints
generated new problems. Administrative procedures became cumbersome,
and the response rate from the poor-was lower than expected.
Nonetheless, the alleviation of poverty remains a key policy objective.
The govemmentis committed to providing a stable and progrowth environment. The expenditure pattern is gradually being shifted toward rural residents. The provision of conventional social services is being upgraded and is
a high piiority. Remedial actions to correct labor market rgidities, paricu
larly those associated with formalandpublic sector employment, vould provide further scope for alleviating-poverty.
v
-from

Jmplicit welf-ar

Ghana has a variety of public measures that provide special assistance to
selected groups ofpeople, induding subsidies for certin types of goods and
services (such as water, electricity, housing, and education). Assistance is also
extended through the employment practices o[governnient agencies and
public enterprises that seek to protect the'level of eamings and create employment, particularlyat the lower organizational levels.;These measuresare
*similarto welfare measures elsewhere, although eligibility is not based on
categorical criteria, such as old age, disability, or temporary unemployment.
Norare the measures targeted specifically at reducing poverty, since the vast
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majority of tile benceicialriCs ar-e not. poor relative to tl It EesI. old'Ile poplllaCssistance is dlirected at. groipsw il IIpolitical poweltion. On the whole, the
primlarily cmployecs in tle public sectol.
hseIF-emploved, wiho. aire predominantly in
,Jobsatnd py. Aside fiont iltc
avgricultilrc, govCrnlmentaIgcncics and pull)Iic enterprises employ al)IIo. ItWiCC
ias many people as the privAte sector (table 4.8). (Note tIli-t respondents to
the surveys cited in table 4.8 did not always distinguish ':le;u'ly letween gov-emnientservice and public enterprises. Thus, thec dat on total pullic sector
- employment are mnore reli-able than the data-for itxcomponents.)
The penchantforlhiiingnd the tolerance for redundancyarenot.uni pie
to eithielr tle Current adminisitrtion or to Ghaina The.sentiment is tinderstandable and widely sharedacross die region. Many officials believe that the
-goveirnment's budgetis so large that a few more workers here and there lhardly
matter. Furthermore, protection againstjob losses also extends beyond lie
public sector. Private comipanics are often-told not to lay,t offworkers.In a-few
major companies, redeployed staff have subsequently been relhired at the
behest of the government.
-

Budgeamy transfer CIo public enteaipses. Closely linked to maintaining employrment in the public sector is tie regular budgeuuy support provided by
the government to public enterprises. The transfers serve avxariety ofpurposes-financing new projects, coveting operational losses, paying for deFaulted loans and, more recently, paying for tie enterpis es' unfunded Ii- abilities. Some transfers are also made explicitly to help public enterprises'
einployees purchase homes and cars. In recentyears.,transfers have been in
the fonn of implict assistance thiough forgone taxes and incollected dividends and interec. LRecent estimates show thiat both directandd implicit transfers amounted to about 2 percent of GDP.
Such practices raise important policy questions. The most obvious ques*- tion is tieir implication for macroeconomic stability. Aserious conimitinent
to fiscal discipline would call for not only a sharp reduction in Lhe transfers,

Table 4.8 Distribution of employment
(percentoge

ofr rkforce)

.

Type ofemp ornent
Private companies.
Government
Public enterprises
Self-employed
Others

TotalO

984 .987-88
5.9
5.7
4.5
82.2

.

1.7

.

100.0

Source: 1984 Population Census; 19B7-88 Ghaa Living Standards Surveyr-World Bank (1989).
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but also l'for an ll.br ItiE ex(Id reasonalflefinancial ietiurns on t-ipIilige "inveStiiit'nlit" inadi in 1)1i)lic en!wflt!1priSvS. Moreov'er, conliniling sipl)p.l limr
p'tblie ennIerprises woiitd sveiii 14) be inconsisl eTn twilli p Iurl ling l llUJ( ir pro-:
grnnl oklivesimunt. .tn(l, Mi ll tho cuirrently low ILwel of private invesineni. in
1il cmtini.ry in tilit piefls:nc! olf til! ct)Illmlerciaul Vlvantages (*illd( lby t.hle
p .1)blic seCt r, vill merely t'ltrss l)rir'at
i
invesineni.ft i-rili .i-

cantfnis widi

of'inconle, I ousing s S+zn-i Icscgnen
t
populatstion,
particit:l(larly thiose in Urain ent er
li, governinent. uses a iwo-prong.
i
strat Mr
ilmeeting llhiising needs. One is 1 poprovide accoinniodalions to civil servants
at dLesignmaterl levels arEl posting assignwenis. Tlnt is, hiouising is a comnponent ,
in J--wsing As in mitost

orcivil service

pay.

a coxum

iclvel
b

In recen t yearis, iotiL1lgtge loans have been nid available

tlhrolugh the new punblic enterprise, -lame Finance Cotrporaion, primarily

to assist puiblic sector em?aployees. No relialdelinormion is cUrrently available
die etent
or financial terms.

nL scope
ofr

this form of assistance, wther

in pihysical

The government also provides loutising aWssistance through tw:vo imajor
piblic enterprises-dhe State Housing Corporation and the Temai Develop
ment Corpo-ation. Tle program develops and provides affornlable hlouising
to the ptIl)ic by ofkreing prices what do nnot include land value and that are
set belowv constrilction costs, andl by settfing rental costs belowr the cost of

imaintenance and

management.

To support the -State Housing Cotporation and Tenia Developmirent
Corpolation, the govemnient has transferred a vast amnouint of resouirces to
the corporations. The Temia Development Corporation controls 40,000 acresof piine coinmercial and residential properties in tthe primary port. city of
Tema. The State Housing Corporation owns abouit 4,800 rental Units and
more -than 8,000 acres of prime land, incliuding 3,300 acres in Accra and
Kumasi. The government also supports the cnrporations by subsidizing site

development and construction miaterials. In a Idition, debt to private creditors and contractors is hlige-an amouint thiat has notbeen fully serviced and
may eventually becomiie th-e liability of the g6vernment. Botl the Tenma Development Corporation and the State Housing Corporation are techinically
insolvent, With substantial negative net worth.
Other gvods and services. A signilicanLtamotnt of

transfers

occuirs in thie

form ofunmderpiiced goods and servicesnmhde available to the pulblic tlhroughi
arious government-owned enterprises. Constimer subsidies in thie folrn of
subsidized loans are particitlarly important for water, electricity, and tertiary
education. In addition, avariety ofproducergoods,;including chemicals and
fertilizers, remain available at below-miarket prices or on favorable credit
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ever the at:tidat selec:ltion criteria, slpencling agencies initist. elest ly pri-

oritize compoeling claillis, TIe lack of clear priorilies hindceis alhieve-

nint,of' woriIyitile goals an(l intensilies lthe presslt(!e 10 providle akn
even greater amouint of' assistance.
*A-rket trlity. 1mIlpti lit wel lir e letasr
i ares olten in troil ce distortions.
rul.tIe dlisi.ordons umly pertain t.o priecs, fa.ctor liiibiliry, urprivaw.c mnechanisms lfor achieving tihe sa,me ends.-In Ghana, perhllps the miost. ilnportant clistortion is: fouind in tie labor markets. Because the governm-ient. employs ablout one-hall' oftlhe labor in the modern secior and
-pays thieti more thn their prodcLivity Warrants wagL'& and labor
mobility are restricted. It costs private companies iore to set up business anci compete for labor. This distortion has an imiportaint beating
on die sluggish economic performance aind low private investment..
Final remarks

Cleaily, truist and confidence mustbe restored to enhance the private sector's
response. Buta r.acfftured relationshipcannotberebuiltovemight, or mended
quickly. Winning trutst involves doing tiings in a new way-establishing a
consistent, sustainable policy to build credibility.
The key ingredient for restoring confidence is a commnitment to ftair'play.
Atone level, fairplay calls For eliminating the commercial advantages granted
to public enterprises. Public enterpnses must stand on their own, without
tax prererences, die free use of govermuent properties, priority access to
credit, expenses thatare passed on to the taxpayers, and monopolistic power
created by legal barriers. At another level, fair play involves nondiscrimina-.
tory enforcement of the rule of law. Today, private businesses are still con
cerned about losing property and being subject to arbitirary tax audits.-Further breaches of confidence must clearly be avoided. In addition, proactive
measures involving constructive dialogue with tlhe private sector and the
restitution of previously nationalized assets (as in Uganda) would-accelerate
the healing process. A good beginning has been made in recent years with
the creation of the private sector advisory group-a new participant in and
contributor to national policy deliberations.
Rapid growth also requires that govermment services be delivered more
effectively. But improving services is an immense task. First, the scope and
functions of the governmentmust be reviewed. Since many of the functions
are primaily.welfare measures rather than essential services, there is room
-forcurtailment. Second, the currentwork force must be reduced significantly,
at least to bnrng it closer to the level of other African countries. These efforts
must-be supplemented with transitional assistance-though not at the level
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Kenya: patchy, intermittent
commitment
Guruvhri Swamy

Kenya started Lhe 1980s with many inore favorable economiic feaLtures than
other Sub-Saliaran cointiies. Tlhe structure and dynamnism of the economyin the late 1970s evolved ott oftlie favorable policy environment ofthe past.
But economic management deteriorated in the late 1970s, which resulted in
the intensirication or emergence of a number of major distortions. During
tde I98Os progress was measurable and significant in only a few areas, and
the economy's momentum of the first tvo decades of Independence slowed
considerably. As one commentatorwrites, "Fewvcountry lending experiences
have given the [World] Bank so much cause for frustration" (Mosley 1991).
That frustration stemmed from tlhree sources.
First, the stated policies-wvhich were broadly in line with the 'World
Bank's recommendations -were tnderminied by implementation that was
often lethargic and sometimes contrary to the stated policies. The fourth plan
document ( 979) enunciated a more open strategy for the industrial sector.
In 1982 the Kenya Government Commission on Government Expenditures
clearly indicated that greater discipline and efficiency were necessary, and
that the gross misuse of government resources should be curbed. The Sessional Paper of 1986 contained policy statements on refor-ming agicultural
iimarketing, reducing protection to industry, and controlling public Spending. But tdie firstadjustmentattempt (1980-84) was marked bya total lack of
compliance, partly because ofdesign and timing problems, but also because
the commitment to the stated policy changes was limited to a small coterie
of top civil servants Trade reforms were not carried out, and grain marketing was not liberalized. Even in the second period of adjustinent (1985-91),
when much more effort went into building a broader consensus, the pace
'was incremental, and the commitment of top officials waxed and waned.
Overall, despite a faeirly stable political climate) commitmenttwas patchy and
intermittent throughout.
193
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of' the three parastatals to lye retruictured, in chiding a write-ofT' of debl. to
r-eduice its clahns on the budget. Becatise this restructiring never happened,

the second.agricultillrl sector.adijstnient.loan (1090) sked for perforilance
contracets to raise tlhe National Cereals kind Prodiuce Board's eflicicncy. And

conditions continuted to lb imnposed forsittdies, plans, ind excihanges ol vieWs.
The second agricul tu ral sect.or adcjUistinent loan had ltie following second
tranche conditions: to finalize studies on increasing tlic effi-ciency of'private
*1'ertilizerimports and on iminimilzing the dlistortions f;romi aid-linanced Fertilizers, to complete a food secitrity plan (started under the first loan), and to
prepare a drouight contingency plan. Periiaps the Wor!d Bank bouglhL into
a [ar too gradual pace or reformll knowting that dtie government la,cked conviction and political will. The design and dimensions of refr ms in tlis area
were too limited to achieve significant restructuring of die sector, a;nd political interests sabotaged the program.
Anotler major flaw vas that tile second attempt at adjusttment was made

in the face ofgrowing financial undiscipline. IMF programs were not adhered
to, die fiscal balance deteriorated steadily, and inflation accelerated. Adjust-

ment was affected differently than in the earlier period when refonrs

Ibe

came hostage to a stringent stabilization pyogram. Fiscal tndiscipline in the
second half of the 180s made trade and financial sector reforn diffilcult in
a different way: rather than fiscal policy defending a certain exchange rate,
the exchange ratie was forced to continuously catch up witlh higher inflation.
Independent monetary policy and the move towvard indirect instruments of
monetary control wvere made far more problematic b ecause of tie large [1nancing requirements of the government. In retrospect, this experience
underscores dle difficLulties of implementing structural reforms in the context of either financial laxity or extreme stringency. A relatively stable environruent.seems essential.-Such an envimonment*vas iotpresent during niudi
-of the 1980s.
The lack ofsufficientataention to the control of financial balances threatened to undercuit the World BEank's lending progimn altogether. In the late
I 98U0s, some second-tranche releases of sector creditswere imade, even though
inedium-tenn macroeconoImlic stabilityw-as clearly in question. But tuhe World
Bank soon found itself in the position of being unable tojustify sucli releases.
At the consultative meeting of November 1991, donors also expressed concern with the lack of transparency and accountability in die use of public
funds. In September 1992, the World Bank decided to postpone disbursements oftlhe second tranches for ongoing operations because several sectorspecific conditions- had not been met and, ImlOst important, the macroeconomic program was comnpletely off track. In December 1992, iL canceled the
second tranche of tdie second agricultural sector operation because of thle
reimposition of grain movement controls.
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83 per thousand live births in 11)80 wvere Signilicant.ly Iiiore fhvorlablu dtan-

.le ave rage for Siub-Saharan Alfiica.
The structure of prodcltcion also clhanged significantly after Independence. T he government distributed a considerable amouint of'lilgh-potential and miediumli-polential lan d4ltai.liad lelonged to large. rariiiera-to smialler
farnmer and encouratged cullivation oftea, cofTee, and hybtid imiaize, and dahry
farning.' Thle sinallliolders'c share of cofree and tea production increased
from practically nothing in 1955 to 40 percentand 70 perceni respectively in
tie early 1980s. Between 1965 and 1979, die small-scale (annrl area under
improved varieties of inaize inereased about fortyfold. The impetus- for
sinallh olderactivities lieiped rural income grow by 5.2 percentannually fromn
1974 to 1982, much of it in nonrni activi.es. Growth of income was probablyjustas strong in the earlier years. Collier and Lal (1984) estimated that,
in the Central Province, rural income per adult: equivalent increased 3.8V
percent a year during 1963-74, and Crawford and Tlhorbecke (1978) estimated that the incidence ofpoverty was reduced from50 percent of tie smallholder population to 22 percent.
Although a dualistic faiming sector continued to exist (about 3,500 large
farms accounted for 39 percent of cultivable area in- 9n79)ras influential Africans bought ranches, large farms, and estates from departing Europeans, small farmerswere notneglected or taxed. Because the large-Narmerlobby
was influential, prnces paid for major export Crops, maize, and wheat were
nearworld prices and crop developmentsupportwas exten.sive. Smaller fairers benefited from both. Moreover, traditional export crops were not taxed
explictly, and a diversified tax structure supported a sustained high tax effort.' All in all, in this largest sector of the economy-which provides the livelihood of the niajority of Kenyans,-dIlere. had been remarkable transforrnation and growth, unlike in most countries in the region.
The economy was also beginning to see favorable demographic trends.
Buoyed by favorable income growth in rural areas and improved health conditions,.the rate of population growth initially increased from 3.0 percent
annually at Independence to 3.8 percent by the end of the 1970s, and the
fertility rate increased from 6.8 to 7.9. However, duting the 1980s, fertility
began to decline, falling to 7.7 by 1984 and 6.7 i / 1989. Because the govemment did not offer extensive family planning ser-vices until the mid-1980s,
the demographic transition is explained by other factors, such as the increase
in education of women, the rising private costs of education, the modemization of Kenyan society, and the economic growth of th-e 1960s and 1970s.
Of course, given thle dynamics of population growtlh, the full effects of a ferility decline will not be felt for many decades. The government- must in the
meantime address die pressures imposed by the growth of population on

Published by iRepository, 2021

https://ir.iba.edu.pk/faculty-research-books/13
-______

y

_

ipclhy,

t1

nndni orl

hnnU

199

ture and bloated pulblic Sector, dw1C Kenyan economy was nol uinlike mainyotdews in the region.
The overextension -of the p1b)li sector showed up in econonlic. inelflciency. 'Te governumni. had chiangced-in the early 1980s frouni being a net.
providaer of investinent, \inds to being arnet. Isei* uf'privite samings to finance
its investment, and consumption expendiitiues. Tlhc surplluis in tihe current.
budget dwindled to zero, a4nd thde economic classification of ilie budget
showed tha t a large share was taken up by wages an¶l. salarieswit.h little left
to FUnd nonwage operational and maintenance expendi.ures. At Ihc samne dinle,the inci'exiiental capital-output ratio (IGOR) increased dramatically
from S to'4in the early 1970s (O L 15 by the early 1980s, suggesting thaLt
expansion of tlhe public sector's role in the-economy, including the support
orfpoorlyjustuied projects by govermient financial institutions, had been

highly unproductive.
Several other macroeconomic indicators were also poor diroughout1the
1970s and into the 1980s. Kenya suffered severe external terns of trade

shocks-A decline or22 percent during 1972-75 (the first oil price shock),
an increase of 53 percent in-die next two years (a coffee boom), and-a drop

of 28 percent by 1980 (die end of the coffee boom and the second oil price
slhock). These shocks were compounded by poor macroeconomic management, breaking the tradition of fiscal responsibility and prudent monetary'
policy during the first'ten years after Independence. By 1979-80, dle public-expenditure-to-GDP ratio had increased from its 197S-74 level of 24 per-

cent to miore than 31 percent, fueled largely by increases in school-enrollment, defense expenditures, and investment in national entities, suclh as
Kenya Airways and Kenya Railways. The budget deficit increased-from 3
to 4 percent in the early 1970s to around 10 percent by 1981. Inflation,
which had avelaged 3 percent in the first ten years after Independence, accelerated to 13 percentin 1981 and 22 percent in 1982. Kenya had adjusted
its administered interest rate structure only marginally since 1973, and interest rates ranged from mildly to strongly negative. The current account
deficit as a percentage of GDP increased from about 4 percent in the'early*1970s to 14 percent in 1980. Altliough the deficits were offset largely by
long-ter-m concessional capital flows, borrowving on relatively hard commercial terms expanded sharply, increasing the debt service ratio from less than
4 percent in 1977 to 13.2 percent in 1980; Macroeconomic management was
quite aggressive in exchange rate depreciation. The Kenyan shilling was
linked to the dollar from 1971 to 1975 and to the special drawing right (IMF
basket of currencies) since then. With discrete periodic devaluations, the
real effective rate, as calculated by the IMF, depreciated nearly 30 percent
from 1972 to 1980.
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r-edixicing Iitie proteclion given to tlih in diustrial sector. Au ltoin ltIc licensing
was extinrded progressively lto differvnit IImporit schedletiCs, rin!i twtifhs wvre
lowered significantly. ihchse mneasures were stupporledi by it stlibstandahl rtral
extcha,lnge rule deprecitidn thatiore di an reflected -erris oflrade c:hanges,
and by lit! dlecontirol ol'prices con tIlost nonftindl ColulllditSie,s With tle introduclion of'foteign. exchange bearer cwrifficat.es in(J export re tenflion
schlemes in 1991-92, a legal parallel im irket lor foreign exchl;ingt was created-and Kenya. reached a stage where it coulld delicense import and ForLi progessive: import.1bberalizacign exchanmgreatransactions coipitey
tion and dlie soluttion ofCloreign exchange markets, premiiatinns in the parallel
tliarkets for foreig n exchlange- reached a11istorical low b)y lite 1991, ancd
depyosits abro-ad grew rapidly. Tbhese developments su,ggest that thle rents
generated earlier by tdie licensing system vere r e(luced substantially. (1lowever, the official excliange rate-was allowed to appreciate in 1992, and the
premiumii in die legal parallel mnark]ets-increased.) Several export development efforts began or intensified around 1988-an export compensation
schenie, a manufacttuing-in-bond isclhemie, and, mlost recently, ni import dxi ty
and value added tax exemption scheme. An expor-t processing zone is being
built near Nairobi. On die whole, it is too,early to assess the inipact of these
efforts. Buta O0percentanntual increase between 1985 and 1991 in the quanttlT index of manufactuir ed exports on the lheels ofa decade of stagnation.
can reasonably be attribuited to import liberalization measuires and:currencydepreciation that reduced the antiexport bias.
Even in industrial sector reform-in which the reduction of protection
was one successful component or the adjustment programn-diree large Iacunae remained. First, tariffs on imports of some competing gioods were still
quite higlh. Second, and more importantperhaps, import licensing, even when
automatic, created delays, uncertainty, and too mluch discretion. In partictlar, parastatals continuied to he unofficially protected by their monopoly
position, higher.tarifr, prohlibitions on competing imnports, and ad lhoc duty
exemptions on rawnmaterials. Even witlh these advantages, all. indicatois of
efficiency and growvLh show tlhat the parastatal sectorlagged wvell behind thle
rest of the economy. Third, fundamoental legal and regulatory constraints,
induding nebulois property rights and umclear procedtral recourse, affected
private entrepreneurs. Laws and regulations on com-petition were poorly
enfoirced, encouraging dte buildup of market powver.
In the agricultural sector, the commercial import of fertilizers wvas
delicensed, and fertilizer prices tlhroughout die distribution chain wvere decontrolled. But aid-financed fertilizers continued to be allocated in nontransparent wvays. Furthermore, the government disengaed fronm output
.
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Macroeconomilc reForm: policy nnd. implententation
'Ile Iw4 oil crises in the 1970s ld
it) a sharp rdeterlonilion in iwilns cof srad e,
Adfidilionully, in ilit! wake of llt! coffee l)c)oin
h
of' 1977-78, fiscal discipline

It>S.
o,f the!se sdevelopenints, Kbny was caracwrizcd by large
financiul udimiu.1l.nt vcs in t1ia evarly 1!980s. In 1981. tlhc excss
om'estIicIeiiftnld oVter doniesti prodcict wvas 1 1.4 per1tcenlt of GDI', tncl tdie current ac-d.
countd
(ficilt was 12,5 percent. o GGDP. The
t toal absutrpion uff'oreigns'av
ings (inclutding grants), ivhichl financed
40 percent or (tloxies.iec
*investunient,, wstas 13.3 percent olCCDP. li buidget deficit *as IO.ercen
0
t .'
- CIl aind inflation watsover 20 percent. The h.ighi ctrrentaccotint deficits orf
.thie late 1970s-.nd early 1980s were financed by a record level ofborwing
frain private Sources,which caused tlhe debtservice ratio to increase bymore
than 10 percentagepoints to over 25 percent dtring 1980-83. These finnanciii inbalances were a:nprecedenten and unsustainable.
The plieiod 1980-84 was clharacrerized by a steady reduction in excess
demand-L-he excess or domiiestic expenditures over incomiie fell fromn 11I
percent to less dian 2 percent. Thiis reduction was achieved mainly by redtucing tlhe bu(Iget delicit, antI by shalpiy reducing expenditures, incdudding public
invesnient (figure 5.1). Thereduction in-excess demand was supported by
decelerating mnonetary g-rowth, lising interest rates, and tightening import
controls. As a-restilt, fly 1984 real domestic demand was 5 percent less tihan
-itl.

A\s a\ la

.over

Figure 5.1 Kenya's fiscal and external accounts, 1981-91
Percentage of GDP
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dranatically. Thu inability to control expenditures was diue in parl, to lo1w
thc composition ofexpendiires was structured; bittalso in parltcL a general
lick of discipline in expenditure allocation and execution.
The struictiural copliopnent caused eilber downward inflexibilily in= cxpenditures oran upward pressure.
IDownwar Icin iexibility chalracterized, for
exanliple, die civil seivice wage bill, whlich accounted for 6 percent of GDlI
during tlhe 1DS0s, Upward pressure camie from. the growing demands of
teacher salnties and inwr-a pyinents, partiLularly on domestic debt of the
central government and die parastatals (table 5.1). These problems cannot
be resolved quiccli' or easily-but the government did not make even the
smallest dent in the 1980s, The escalating share of theese paents severely;
reduiced die share of thle nondefense, nonwage expenditures, and it:limited
tie allocations to the education and health sectors.
Fiscal policy was also thwarted by tlhe absence of clear expenditure pnotides and the political will to control expenditures. One result wts that
- expenditure ceilings seLby the treasury were repeatedly violated. Government functions also proliferated. Withi a sharp increase in thle number of
departments and divisions, coordination became unwieldy. Much of dlie
proliferation came after the district focus program- was adopted in 1983,
under which all central governinent functions were fully represented at the
district level.
The strtuctlural problems associated widt expenditure control in the government were pervasive. Yet the government focused only on budgetary
processes. In 1985 it launched the budget rationalization program to introTable 5.1 The composition of current expenditures, 1981, 1985, and
1990
(percentage ofGDP)
Ecrnami cdrssificatin

Wages and salanres
Teachers' salades
Total
Nonwage expenditures
Defense-related
Non-defense-related
Interest
Domestic
Foreign
Transfers to state enterprises

1981

1985

1990

6.0
28
8.B
8.5
2.8
5.7.
2.4
1.3
1.1
0.8B

6.1
3.2
9.3
6.7
2.1
4.6
4.1
2.6
1.6

6.0
3.9
9.9
6.3
2.6.
3.7
5.4
3.6
1.8

6.1
2.3

5.5
1.7

6.4
1.7

Other

Setoral disbuiAon (total expenditure)
Education
Health

Not availabL.
Source: IMF, Swtdsticcl Abstrncts and Ecrnrnic Surveys; World Bank staff estirnates.
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hiee

l)cPr planninlg

LxI-*nNH F'RtoM CUCNToRYCAm1 Spims.

uInit dliscip?lin li inlo

v5sor'cti progrwuiing r ndl tspen-

r .lancet lietieen fheluphenpial and crrent .spend-ing, f(InheciLeenI wage and n nwiitgge ispendling. I'le(! i)ulIgel. rlitionllii ion
i-l ;gnr landfin ricirsoiir:es on
progra1 alsl sOught. Io trget. scce ugnIge
a Sn tIale t nmnlmbe' of crciical "core" inveS ten ; plrjecl.
dittre, secking. greIt

itl
achieve; I8o11( :1pro:eSs in proce 11i
111
al hugel;irclhlar dtin
.Irews, i'r
1
1'
tleflorward
tllidget.pelioil rndI timret1iuests sultiuissions wtll in aadvance
*posesceiling;s on expendlitures, inc:lttcling wvages and SUlUi1C'S. Onez provlsitnn
of' these ci rcularus at.ltem11pts to m111pose planning nclmbuldgeliay disciplinestating fiat.l. "pvrojects andl pvrogram1s not. inulticled in diC first year of'l.die For-0
ward buIdgLett will noL be considered Ifmr incluision in the draft CesliHnilles for
-'hile 1)1 ctw

.itionulliz.ionprogram

s, l7orministries
exampi
1)egan
begen torwir
to issi
mXWllplC

the next fiscl year." Witl in tLhes piAramneters, lfl is ies prioritized t drsit missionsto the treasurty; In Ltum, lie treasuty began to mtionitor central gov-

eernient expenditures miiore effectively.
Yet Lltc budget rationalization program did not improve resource allfflocaltion. Between 1981 and 1986, non,Wage operations and maintenance expenditrues declined from 36 percent-to 26 percent of total recuirrent expendi*tures. After the tbIudget rationalization progrtamwias introdulced , dlle share of

these expendittures declined Fuirther to 22 percent. Lacking nonw-age Funds,
the ministries relied increasingly on the development budget-particula ly
its donor-financed component-to finance theirrecu entexpenditures. Tle
share of recurrenL expenditures going to civil selvice payments remnained
higlh, and that of interest paytients and teacher salaries in creased. It became
clear thatwithoutLmore fundamiental refonis, imiere procedural r-eforllm was.
ineff-ective.-Investinent targeted atcore projects to ensuire that theywere fully
funded also came up short. One of the problems, was determnin,ng what a
core project is, particularly given that much of the investment budget was
donor-financed. iiite-ten whel a core projectwas 'defined, allocations were
substantially less than agreed upon. 4
Fiscalpolicy: revenu.e generation,a-ld co imposition

As mentioned earlier, Kenya's revenue generation efforts compare favorably
wiithl those in lower, to middle-income countries. Is structure of taxes is more
mature than in most Sub-Saliaan countries-it is mlore diversified and does
not rely heavily on international and production taxes. The elasticity of revenues with respect to GDP has been estinmated at 0.8 to'l .1, whi.ch is relatively
good, altlough the goverunm-ent has often introduced discretionary meiasures
to maintain the hiiglh ratio of revenuie to GDP.
Rather than raise additional revenue r-elative to GDP, the tax reform
program sought primarily to simplify the tax structuire, lowver higl tax rates
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d.121. tnay etncouirage evasion and liscoiilrage invesiuneni:, strengthen tax dw.
ofner. chimrges, parltciihirly in heald.
thne of'
inlniatrntioan, a1nld increase :we
ethillcation'
and.
11 reduce I nthily hlighl ratels IhenedXql
EFforts to,s11viy1:1w} lax Struci..:r aid
on. thiniport tax slrtcture ,andi on coiiipiny taxadtion. Tliti governnientwas

successrul in reducing lboth :1w company incollie iax (f;'omii 52 pcrtcmnt inl:
1981) to 87,r) percent. in 1992) and thie average uinwcighlteI iipjortl ltaliff (as
partof'wlw rael.felibeheli?.adocnp Zroess; sacbdx5.). In 190 thJe wwvurnmlnt:.;
also introdnced a iunirorm, 18 percent valtic adtded lax on the outputs.and
inputis forsevercAl prodicLts. Tlh cover.agc wvas lbroadened to cover inore prod'
and seslacesawell. Also in 1o99(, the governmeiintsoght to Inprove tax
MtISc
collect ion bvy introdluicing tllhe tax modernization program, an =atempt. t.ostrengthen the analytical capacity and opedt ional efficiency of the utx deparntments antJ to compiiterize the tax systenmi.

Mcrneitay Policy and deficitfji'nauri-g
As is die case in mnany developing couintries, in Kenya tlie central bank has
limnited scope for designing and implenienting mionetary policies independent from dtie Treasury's financing needs. It is forced to accept suich financing requirements and then to discharge its remaining responsibilities
residually.
During tie stabilization period of 1981-84, the shiarp decline in deficit
financing requirements wvas reflected primarily in a decline in foreign borrowving; domestic financing changed only slighitly (table 5.2). The share of
the private sector in domestic credit fell sharply (front 67 percent to 61 percent); part of tie stabilization was thus made possible by crowvding out the
private sector. During the second half of the 1980s, whien Iarge budgetary
deficits reemerged, all fortns of' financing increased, and credit to theeconomy expanded at a muclh faster rate. Still, die share of the private sector
Table 5.2 Financing of budget deficits, 1981-91
(cho%n inrotb)
tern.

Budget defcit/GDP (excluding grants)
.

Finandng

GrantsDPI-0.1
Foreign borrowing/GDP
Domestic financingSDPInflation (change in rater
Growth of real domrestic credit (annual perrentage)
Change in share of private sector in total credit

1981-84

1984-91

-5.8

+4.5
:

-4.7
-1.0
-1 1.1

.

+1.7
+ 1,5

14

4.7
5.6

-6.3

-2.8

a. From December to December.

- Source: IMF, Satistscal Abstruts and Economik Sureys; World Bank staff estimates.
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continulecd to (leline, Ilnus, the increame in dloiuiastic: finbancing had predictaile
lac(:eIenhted Inniat ion and contlinule(I tighitaning of' access l.a
(:crlil. by h.11(
strEValconont.ic
tiwork (covetIng t.h1( pelio(l i 06588) siil)sltltnttlesilii, criwlingoulhl:tiIlct. MwItgu dnd(i Killick (I1990) estime.nd

that ian Incri-ase of'KSh I m illion in hnrnking sysliti crelilt to thle piliclkl ceCt(or resilted ina reductiion in (TC(lit to lth ptIvatio sUticWl ofKSi (EO Inlillon,
-- I4From 19086, mionetary policy relforiim sou1ghI1.to shillf.1'froni direct, instroments of'control (cre'dit ceilings on pilvate sectotr crrd1i.,1rx1 xed in teres ,nln.les
on goverfnilitinrt paper, and aiinilllsoiy SQc:nn.(iidy li(lity req Iremienits)
to more indJlrect instrnneints- (rlselrtei 1r11uibs, variable liquidity nliduw, and
liberahise(l, Imna rket)sitSed interest, ralI.tes). llelor11 was ailso Ca
uI ge ted ar,hinI Iprov-

ing thc central hyank's con trol over tle growing nrmber ol'near lnmk finmncil internmedial Oc
thatw ere aible o circtl vent res.triciion.r on intnrest. itte
and cr-edit. ceilings. In conjiunction, coocrdin'ation betwieen the treasuryand
the central hank was to be improved-both to implemllent, monotazy policy
and to stabilize external -shocks oree effectlively.
The successfiul refoinis wer e in interest racite liberalization, Frilol 1984,
maxiiniiuoi rates on commercial loans welc positive in real termns. Over the
yeats, the interestirate ceilings on cuminiercial loansimoved closerto tle near-

bank financial intermediaries' rates. In April 1990 the government went a
step furtelr, abolishing all cliarges and fees from tlle ceiling on coimmercial
hank loan rates; effective rates could thus ex-eed the ceiling significantly. In
July 1991 an auction market for government bills and bonds was established,
Other reform measures included the introduction ofcash reserve ratios
(6 percent since 1986), and the imposition of 20 percent and 24 percent
liquidity ratios on commercial banks and near-bank financial intermediaries
respectively, consisting of casli-deposits witlh the central bank and other
donmestic banks-and treasury bills; the latter must constitute at least 50
percent of liquidity requirements. The government also instituted a rediscotunt window that allowed treasuriy bills and otler government paper with
three montlhs or less to maturity to be discoun.ted. Tle cenral bankdiscount
rate was set at 1.5 to 2.5 points above the latest treasury bill r.ate.
It appears that progress in monetary policy reform was a mix of old and
new measures, but-direct controls on private credit, pressure on commercial
banks and near-bank financial intermediaries to hold treasury bills above the
liquidity requirement, and pressure on govenmment-owned funds (suclh as
pension and social security funds and insurance companies) to buy long-term
govermmentpaper remained the main instruments. The "arranged" placement of securities hindered the emergence of a true secondary market for
government paper. The only market was for bonds nearing maturity. (which
can be used as bank reserves) traded by a few large banks as part of their
money market activities. While this policy probably enabled the government
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wouil(l livo liein ntwess;ay

In a1Itruly open niu'irker, large fisca.l lrleCIt.i5i Conlir1libted lo an incrosce in tligtoveinmiientl's cldonestic Intvrest. illl(lfl,niw1hic li tli
asd sinw oif GI)1 1

(Idiing the

I 080Is (sue table 5[1).

Trade refonn
ImporJrt iiibTrtioZ(n?,
I mpot lilberalization lhas a (checkered hlistoy in Kenya, andl Aignifitint and

,uistained progress was nade only in the past. few yetrs. Ilmpori.. sibttls.itillson
belhind protective ulrriers and 'Kenyan i ,ati on" di rogh llsta! ill licipapldon:
were tlie main principles
indIlnusturlalizalon in Kenya 'Il lleginnings ol'
Indic1lu1
riai lrotIection (pariculadly lbrrinaniilla:tctUring) datlt. back cb) Lihe- IostWorld War 11 per iod, whien -lie goveinuient e ec
a s.ljic.Uire o1fpro tectlive
tariffs Iilor -lla(e to the particu lar transnaldonal it was hrying to titra. In
1903 Kenya becwine part of the cuistomis Union wilI Ugandatanrdranzania,

straining the perpetuation of thC syst,en of favors tliroujghi tariffis. Ralier,
selective import quotas replaced taliffs as the primiiary instruiment, of protecdion. The systemil continued even after the dissolution of the customs inion
in 1977. The fourth development plan (1979-84) isubsequiently recognized
LiaL the industrialization strategy woujld have to m11ove to a more ouwardoriented approachi. To that end iLcalled for removing quantitative relstrictions, reduicing tariffs and their dispersion, and establishing a flexibly managed exchange rate to support import liberalization and export promotion.
Between 1980 and 1984, the fourtlh plan strategy formed tlhe lbasis for
two trade reflorms-tie phased replacemenIol quantitative r estriclionswithequivalent tariffs, and the subsequent tariff rationalization to pro-:ide a moire
uniform and moderate structure of tariffprotection. Yet'after an initial round
of liberalization, tie gover-nment halted its reform progress and actually
regressed, reintroducing import controls for some items when tLhe balance
of payments deteriorated. Moreover, to the extent that quantitative r estrictions were removed, tariffs were raised on restricted items, some t.o over 100
percent.- In addition, during the extreme foreign exchange crisis of 198284, tariffis were increased by 10 percent across tie board,
This episode of import liberalization was not successful for several reasons.
First, the attempts at liberalization coincided witl a period of macroecon omic
crisis followed by rapid stabilization, and trade policy became hostage to the
needs of stabilization. The central bank was justifiably concerned that the
removal of quantitative restrictions would result in loss of control over the
balance of payments, given a low level of reserves. Second, there was no

movement on the real exchange rate: small nominal devaluations were overPublished by iRepository, 2021
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wilw!limle(I by high in0lation thiring [11is5periiol. An inflc)t'Is inithe flit 4'Iexjorti.

Comlpensntionf, designecl to cohlIpensate br lack
provemnn t)fl
u 1w rtXil
'exchange rt,e, (lic( notl, kinction very well. There wYas a paucity of' lada
.
hr
design of reforlms-the mostrecentesth iaties I'elfective protection %erel t7r
1968-and die progrwani was laIlfl(lied I)eClo) tlt! nl-cIsSiry 1ih iework was
completed. As a restlt:, tli imiJositlion of: high ftarifls on sonm goods and redtiction of tarills on o,thers wvere clone in adn ad hoc manner.
-Yet the government, did inake souie progress. [lie slare of illiports on-

der tle qutota-Free categoryincreased flunl 244percent.in 1980 to 48 percent
iin 1985; Tlhel-aven.Age t-ariff rate was' lowered by albot 8 percent. An1d a mlorle
transparent, less arbitrary systemiliiunport licensing waYs established, in wiViicll
itnport itCleS wVer e allocated to either art inrestricted liiMs (sChedleli! 1) ur a

restricted list (sclhedutle 11).:
In 1988 another attempt W-as made to liberalize inporuts. The refoiri
program soughit. first to reclassify imports into five categor-ies: sclhedutle I
(unrestricted licensing), II, and IIIA, 11113, and IIIC, wVith progressively
stricter licensing requirements. Over tle years, progress toward delicensing
imports was fairly dramlatic. Automatic or inrestricted licensing Ias extended to sclhedules 11, lIIA, and 111B.y 1991 quantitative restrictions alL
fectLd only 22 percent of all importable iteniis, compared witi 40 percent.
in 1987, and they affected only 5 percent of imports,compared with 12 per-:

Box 541 Progress in trade liberalization
During most of the post-Independence period, Kenya's tiade regime wvas oriented
toward import sutlstitution. Domrlestic industries were protected by tariffs and
import quotas, and several putblic sector enterprises enjoyed monopoly statuts in
commercial activities, including internationial trade. Not surprisingly, mnanufacturing exports declined significantly as a shale of total exports, even though ex-

ternal circuinstances were generally favorable to tlhse goods. Recent reforrms
have sought to encourage export developmeniet and itmprove the efficiency of
domestic production by exposing domestic produllcers to foreign competition.
Under the Indhustrial Sector Adtjusti-rienltProgran, and the Export Developnment
Program, protection has become miiore transparent; with tariffs replacinig quantitative restrictions. There has also been a lowering of tariff rates, a reduction in
tariff dispersion, and, consequently, a fall in protection. The table below shoIws
the decline in economywide average tariffs. The refornn-i.diced declines in average tariffs are greater when imports previously protected by. quotas are ex-

duded. Though maxiunm tariff rates have fallen substan tially, most of the reduction in the level of manufacturing protection has been accompiLshed through a

reduction in the production coverage of quantitative import, controLs. For instance,. the quantitative controls (scheduile IIGC) covered most. manufacturing
production in fiscal 1986. This coverage fell to 79 percent in 1988, 45 percent in
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cenl in 11)87. 'Ilse shares Rll tiit'lt'l' when several 1itei1 Wswere moved fromt
III . to 1111 in.)tlylP 1'1,-so Ilial. ile!only goods lelt in IlI
vere those itStrtitled. I(tOr litetlli olr pib)lic s-afety reasons. MNoreover, whlile (qLuantitative lest rictions .covered 110s1 of Ilies 111i111nif tli iring irOdictiol.
in 11185-81, Ihey
cOvrer) onl4, 28 pePerent in I990-UI . T'hulls, tlie relormi effort to remiove Iicensing controls wvas miire fitu-reaching than (lilting the earlier aftemipt al

liheralization (box 5.).

*

.

rfl atev
was
urelbm
was. also generally imprm'ssive: tile higlest tarif
Taiff
redulticed flroit 135 percent to 60cpercen-, thi e nhimbjer of ta;iff rt7aegories wVas
reducdcl [rout 25 to 12, mnd tauifrrates on noncoinpeling imports were low-cered. These measures were coutnterbalatnced sonmewhat by the increase in
soIme tauills-to ensure protection whlen atllomatic licensing was.introduced,
andtlwhen itetnswere miioved Frot- te most restlicted list to autoiatici licens-;
-ing. Overall, produiction-weighted tariffis fell fruii 62 percent in 1989-90 to
45.5 percent in 1991-92
T'he second ai.temllpt rltilmtport liberalization wtvas relatively successful for
several reasons. In the intervening three years bietween the two attempts, a
sector studybythe World Bank developed asolid inderstanding of dte strucuIre of industry
aincd its effective protection, and yielded a detailecd design of.
coiponents of reformn, based on discuissions widt an intenrinisterial coinmiittee. Considerable effort went into btuilding a more genuine.coninlitnient

1990, and 28 percent in-1919.The reduction ini protection was not tuniform

across the manulif:actulinig sector. inJune 1989 reduLctions occurred mainly in the.
paper anl ironi and steel subsectors, injune 1990 in food manufacturing, and in
June 1991 in textiles and automobiles. However, the numbers understate the actual change in nominal proLectioni relevant to dloniestic manufactturing. Tariffs
onl competitive imnports fell by nutclh m
nore than the average. This is evident froni
the larger reductions in production-weighted tariffs,.whiiAi fell from 61 .8 percent
in 1990 to SSJ.i percent in 1991 -andto 15.5 percent. in 1992.

Box table 5. I Economywide average tariffs, fiscal 1985-92
(percent)
Allschedules

Unweighted
Import-weighted

1988

1989

1990

/99 t

1992

40.0

39.6.

41.3

41.0

38.8

34.0

29.6

27.3

24.5

22.0

20.4

34.5
28.9

29.5
20.2

25.9
18.7

.

.

..

1990 schedules l, 11,IllA, and 1118
Unweighted

-

-

-

Import-weighted

-

-

-

-Not

.

apoicable..

Not avaiable.
Source: World Bank-JUNDP (I1993)..
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on. tht patrt o,r thte government. Trie reforinis were setiiencedl and iinpleinentedw ith carefuil coorhination wili exeliange rate ch anges. Latter, the lil-

er-alization process was coipleiinentecl by otlier initiatives in export promoeitive sti-ic htire resulting fri-pm pnice de control.
tion, uand b))y an improved inci
Btut tle. liberalization process -was not complete. Althiotgh tdie tatiff
rIates introiduced wilit aitomiatic licensing were generally less than the estinated equivalent ratlifs, they were on Ithe higher. endcl andi needed to be
lowerecl to reduce effective protection ftirther. Moreover, the imnport licensing systelim was not entirel)y dismantled and was subject:to considetable execuitive dciscretion. For example, even for items eligible for auromatic licens-ing, foreign exchange athoriiatinns were to be obtained, and foreign
exchange was released only. with a 1ag. From time to tinime, depending on
the level of reserves, these licenses and. auithotizations tookllonger to obtain or were .deniedY. A 1992 World Bank survey on the costs to finns of:
annual licensing requirements (equivalent to a 5 percent tax on turnover).
indicated that import licenses were the main determinant of licensing burden. Equally

vexing were the continued ad hoc imlpot- duty exemptions to:

nonexporters-encouraging favoritinsm and discriminatdon, and. diminish-

ing revenue.

Table 5.3 Key incentive indicators, 1982-92
(percent and indexes, 1982= t 00)

IndFcator

1982

t984

1986

1988

1990

1992

Extemrl sector
Effective exchange ratesa
Nominal
Real
Terrns of trade
.Average import trit

100.0
100.0
100.0

97.4
101i9
109.9

82.9

73.6.

69.3

87.1

72.5

61.8

55.1
- 603

103.4

8B.4

71 .0

0.0

41.0
0.0

38.8

41.3

38.8

24.3

27.3

22.0

I00.0
22.2

83.8
.853
9.0

83.9
87.5
5.6

89.0
88.3
12.3

77.8
15.8

27.3

-10.0
-7.7

2.7
5.3

5.6
8.4

-2.0
2:7

-2.1
3.0

-10.1
-6.6

(percert)

Unweighted

Import-weightedb
Domestfc economy

0.0

Real wagesc

Private sector
Publicsector
Inflation (annual percent)'
Real interest rates (annual
percent)
Deposits
-Loans

100.0

83.7

. Not available.

a. IMF index.
b. Weighted by 1989/80 irrport values: estimates are for fiscal years (e.g., 1987 refers to 1987/88).
c. Upper ends o average comrnercial bank three- to six-month deposits and unsecured loans and deposits.
d. Revised Nairobi consumer price index since 1987.
Source: IM, ,StaUsticCl Abstracts and Economic Surveys; World
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Figure 5.2 Parallel market dollar premium, 1987-93
Percentage above official rate
120-

9060.

30 -

0-

1987

:

..

1989

1991

1993

Datanot availableforApril 1991andJanuary1992.
Source: World Bank data.
Note.

Exchange rate mcznagrmnent.
The management of the exchange rate in Kenya in the second half of the
I9PCc-was effective. The Kenp-n shilling was.pegged to the special draw-ing
rights basket of Scurrencies, with weighLs reflecting Kenya's trading.pattem.
Since the outs-et of stabilization in the early 1980s, the government pursued
a flexible exchange rate policy (table 5.3). Although.the real exchange rate
remained relatively constant betwveen 1982 and 1985, it depredated by more
than 40 percent in dhesecondhalf of die 1980s (bymnore than the decline in
the. te-ns of trade), and the black market premium declined fror 110 percent in late 1987 to 17 percent in the tlird quarter of 1991 (Figure 5.2). In
OcLober 1991, taking a significant step towatrd creating a legal free market
for foreign exchange, the government issued foreign exchange bearer certificates. Under the system, anyone changing foreign currency not denrved
from exports was entitled to a certificate that could be exchanged for foreign exchange in the future at the ruling exchange rate. In addition, ifit had
been held for miore than three months, additional foreign exchange equivaient to the London interbank offer rate (LIBtOR) applied to the face value of
the certificate coLuld be bought. In August 1992 a 100 percent export retention scheme was introduced for exporters of nontraditional goods; in November 1992 this was expanded to cover exporters of traditional crops at a
rate of retention of 50 percent. The retained foreign exchange was freely
tradable but had to be used for 'approved transactions," which had to take
place witlhin the bannking system.
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The markets for foreign exchiange certificates and export-retention earnings were clearly an alternative to the official market, partictliarly for repatriation of dividends and other tansfers. But they have also created anotmalies. In 1992, for cxamriple, tde real official exchange rate was allowed to
appreciate, and botlh the alternative markets displayed premiumlls fronti 30 to'
50 percent, creating opportunities for speculation. More important, niany
importers were reluictant to buy foreign exchange in these markets because
they feared that those withiaccess to the official inarketwould underctut tlhetm
in price and because they lacked confidence that the central bank would be
able to redeem die foreign exchiage certificates.
Perhaps the most significant constrant on the expansion of fr ee foreig
exchange markets was the-persistence of import controls despite significant
trade liberalization. Even importers-who used their own foreign exchange
were required to obtain iniportlicenses-undera "green cliannel" that supposedlly was quicker than the nonnal chiannel-and a letter of release from
the Ministry of Commerce. This structure allowed for manipulation, uncertainty, and discretion.
Export promotian
During much of the 1980s, a. significant antiexport bias on nontraditional
goods prevailed, essentially for manufactures-the effective duty on imports
was significantly higher than the subsidy on nontraditional exports. The
exportcompensation scheme thathad been operational since l974waslargely
ineffective, marred by frequent changes and delays, and benefiting only a
fiew large exporterls-fr top exporters received the lion's share of[payments.
The flat 20 percent rebate overcompensated or undercompensated various
exporters, and because the rebate was made arbitrarily, it left outa large
number of potential exporters.
In 1988 the government introduced the manufacturing-under-bond
scheme, alloving customs authorities to waive import duties and taxes on
imported materials used as inptut for the production of export goods. Yet the
fact that this facility was available only to export specialty firms limited its
attractiveness,.as did its cumbersome procedures and high costs. In 1990 a
more general import duty/value added tax exemption scheme based on a
negative list was introduced, whereby eligibility Would be expanded and
exemptions wvoluld be based on specific export contracts or previous export
performance.
These specific tax exemption measures were complemented by regulatory reform to centLalize and consolidate several licensing procedures for
exports and general trade, and by simplified procedures for new investnents..
In 1990 construction of an export processing zone near Nairobi began. Its
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uisers will receive othier advazntages-an exemiption fromi incomne tax for ten
years, unrestricted fo~reign Ownership and emiploymient of foreigners, and
pomiplete control over ibreign exchiange earnings.
It is too early to assess dlie lImpaCt, Of these measures. A greater- numiber
of fihins began -to use thie manufacturing-under-bond scelieie, and dlie demiand for die tax exeniption schiemet increaused. The export processing zone
wvas not yet oper-ational, but three other privately owned export processing
zones emierged anld becamei operation-al.
Thee impoartlibera-lization measures ofrecentyea,rs reduced die antiexport
bias; also, thle mnore aggressive management of dtie exchtange rate probably
increased die -absoluteprofitability 6'f exports. These developmients-rather
dmian die more recently introduced'export p-romiotion measures-ar e lik-ely
to have been the prime determninants of die 10 percent growthi in the quanthin index of manuf-actured expor-ts between 1985 -and199O.6
Price decontrol and regulatory policy
Price, conitrols iin Kenya predate World War II. However, the first foninal legislation was dtie Price Control Ordinance of 1956-later renamned the Price'
Control Act ofl1972-w,.hich also served as the model for the current price~
contol
ramwor. Athogh he ange of price-controlled commoditdes was
revis%ed, its procedures and regulationswere incorpor-ated largely' T as is" ito
the Restrictive Tr-ade Practices, Monopolies, and Price Control Act of 1988.
This act-applied tobothiprivate and pubtic sector enterprises, but did not cover
infrastructure services, thieprices ofwvhich wer.econtrolled bythe relevantlin-e
ministries. Price controls oper-ated at both the production and the retail levels,
depending on.the commodity. Price controls on staple fopds were imnpose-d
to protectiower-income groups, -whilethe main reason for price controls on
manufactures was to protect against mo-nopolistic pricing practices.
Prices have 'been decontrolled extensively, especially since 1986. Between 1983 and 1991, the number of controlled products under the general
order fell from 56 to 6, and those under the specific order fell from 87 to
29. Price decontrol was a continuous process,. andt thie government nimbly
seized the r-ight mark-et and political oppor-tunitie's. Price decontrols were
geared primarily towtard manuffictur-ed goods, while controls on consumer
prices of staples continued to exist., except on such items as sugar and m-ilk.
However, cost-plus pricing (based on outdated dauta continued to guide
price setting for prices still controlled in the manufacturing sector, and there
was no provision for automatic -adjustmentfor inflation or for price changes
for intermediate inputs. Nor had a procedure been establishe-d for appeal...
Prices were set for each enterpiise, and delays in price changes increased
during the 1980Os.
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A legal anti regu la tory fraimework lJlat provities clarity, certainty, andc

predictability is necessary to give Itle private seCtnr enough c{onlitience to

enter econoilic activities.1n addition, laws miust e 1rained anti enfUorced so
-tat the transaction cost of arriVing ati. nd renegotiating various conti-itsls is

reasonablle. The miinority po-putlation of entirpreneulrs or Asian origin in
Kenyat shiouild petrceive tIhat tley ha,tve access to aU"ievecl playing fieldl." Welcotlie l)utflIlted eflorts have been made since 1986 to improve the legal anti
regttlatoiy seLting-establishing a one-stop ollice in tie Investmiient FramnL
Lion Center to simiptifi and hlasten approval of new investments, simplifying

tr-ading (including export) procedutres, and allocating- foreign exclhange for
repatriation. BUlt these xneasures-nodifi anions, reallym--have notaddressed
the fundanmental legal and regulatory constraints thati affect private: entrepreneuirs. For example, in approving the acquisition and suibdivision of urb-an land, local authorities often asked [or tde sturrender of the freehold titde
in exchange for 99-year leasehold titles. Moreover, thle minister of finance
couldarbitrarily approve takeovers, setprices, orderdivestittures, appointor
dismiss board members and trustees, and overtutn the decisions of regulatory bodies. Guidelines for determiining violations of labor and emlployment laws were also absent-and the arbitrariness of import duty exemptions has
already been discussed.
But the most critical constraTints on private sector competition and economic eflidency were the laws governing ently, exit, and operational flexibility. Although competition policy had been set in legislation,

the

existence

of market power, extensive vertical int gration, and a highly concentrated
wholesaling system suggests that enfoi A!nnent was weak. Important market
segments in the Kenyan economy were controlled by single monopolies,
generally parastatals, or byjusta few producers. Nearly 60 percent of sales in
tde economy wvere estimated to occur in oligopolistic markets; in manuftacturing, the share was about 40 to 50 percent. Moreover, most manufacurers
were prohibited from marketing directly to retailers or the public, thus protecting tdie marketing power of parastatals-and nowhere wvas this more
pervasive than in the agricultural sector. Exit laws were essentially "vindingup" policy-focusing on the disposition of assets without any provision for
interim legal protection to reorganize. In practice, adjudication took four to
ten years, placing entelprises in limbo as their operations caine to a standstill and their assets were tied up.
Finally, empirical work indicates that licensing requirements imposed
significant monetary and transaction costLs on firms (table 5.4). A survey of
enterprises showed that the cost of annual licenses-including direct license
fees, agent fees and bribes, and transaction costs for enterprise staff timewas very high both as an absolute amountand as aproportion of sales. Moreover, the relative cost of licenses varied inversely with the size of dle enter-
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.4 percent: ol'tlir turnover. Coiiipouincling thiese costs was the prolileration o lbusiness licenses req.uiredl by
local -authlorities.
plise, wvithi small (irnms paying as mucll as

Financial sector policy and reForm

The financial systein in Kenya in thie mid-1980s was fairly wvell developed,
compri.sing 24commiiiiercial banks, 54nea-lbank inan cIt intelrm ediaries, 207
hire-purchase companies, 32 societies, 53 insurance companies, andl mnorc
than 1,000 savings and cre-dit cooperative societies.-In-addition, there were
.10 developnient finance institutions, a large post oflice savings bank, and a
national social security fund. The fonnal financial system- had mobilized
-domestic financial resources effectively: M2/GDP wvas around 30 percentaboutdie saIne as in otiermediuii-growvt

developing

-countries-an increase

from 24 percent in 1968.
In the early 1 98Os concerms about a large foreign presence in the system
promlpted a relaxation in licensing requirements, and small, locally owned

banks, buildingsocieties, andnear-bank flnancial intennediar-ies proliferated.
Anomalies in the banking law also made it possible for coininercial ban;ks to
set up near-bank financial intennediaries, and tlhus circumvent restrictions
on banking activities and interest rate ceilings. Indeed, because near-bank
financial intermnediaries were not subject to statutory.reserve requirements
and we..re allowed to borrow and lend at higher rates, they attracted deposits
away from commercial banks. Many of these new institutionswere promoted
actively witlh ftunding deposits from the political and administrativie elite,
particularly those responsible for stateowned enterprises. In die absence of
Table 5.4 Annual license requirements and costs, 1992
Overal

/tern

Numbrx, regular
Number, specific
m
rnporrtexport)
Total
Full cost
(KShthousands)
Transaction cost.
(work hours)
Full cost/sales
(percent)
License markupa
- @zercent)

Srll firrns

Meiun-sLze firms

4.5

(13)

2,9 (0.6)

4.0

(0.5)

10.2
15.1

(3A4)
(2.4)

1.2 (3)
4.3 (1.2)

. 3.8

(.3)
(1.2)

124.3

(3.1)

161

223.0 (14.8)
5.2

(3.0)

66.0

(4.9)

8.0

Large frrms

9J (1.3)
38.9
49.0

(1.7)
(1.4)

(3.7)

95.0 (2.8)

.450.4 (1.6)

69.0 (1.7)

89.7 (1.7)

816.0 (2.8)

(1.7)

1.2 (2.6)

9.4 (2.3)
30.5

(2.1)

1.8
102.3

(5.1)

84.6 (2-1)

Note: The let entry in each cell is the mean value. The coelficient of vaabon is plovided in parentheses. Mean
values reported in the table are statistically signiksant at the .05 level unless oferwise noted.
a Defined asful cost/direct cost minus one.
Soirce: World Bank dab.

Published by iRepository, 2021

https://ir.iba.edu.pk/faculty-research-books/13

21S

ApIU

Nr IlN AFRIcA: I.IISONS FRO GouJN1tkYCE Smlinws

prudential regulalion and tvitli ponrly enforced reguilations on capital anld

reserves reqitrinielents, kThur commilercilt hlank; gtoulps tha.t owin ed promlinent.
near-bank financial intertxnedia,tries fiadled in 198(i. By 1)89,4 other coinillierci-.l banks and 24 near-bIank financial intermeidiaries Were in trouible, 7 of'
whichi appearcel to be insolvent. If liquidited, tiese 28 instititonswould have
losses ranging from an. estiirated $105 million to $178 million.
The credit miarket was iore segniented titan appeared, given tle niunhter and range of financial institutions?7 Foulr large comimercial banks operated as a "gentlemian's cluib," retaining strong ties to multinational and bltue
Clcip companies, and adlering toconsertative tending practices. The rest

were weaak; to sturive, they souight ouit new, risky business. Under significandly wveak prudential supervision, and since the near-bank financial inter
mnediaries were stubject to hligiler interest rate ceilings than vere commercial banks, the financial intenrediaries could undertake riskier ventures. Six
development finance i-nsti'tutions set utp by the govetmnuent in the 1960s -and
1970s directed credit to specific sectors for long-term investmnent They were
largely unprofitable and imsu'stainable, suffeting serious portfolio problems..
In the agricultural sector, influential lalge falnners preempted the resources
of the Agrictultulral Credit Corporation and rarely paid them back-in essence being subsidized heavily by the budget And credit to the private sector was limited by the government's preemption of credit for financing its
budget deficits and those of its parastataLs, such as the National Cereals and
Produce Board.
The govemment amended the bankling laws in 1989-narrowing the
regulatory gap between classes of instituitions, imposing more stringent licensing requirements on banks and near-bank Financia intetmediaries, increasing minimum capital requirements, establishing the DepositInsur-ance
Fund, setting guidelines for loan provisioning and minimum fmancial disclosure requirements, and increasing penalties forviolation. The government
sought to strengthen the central bank's technical and managerial capadty
to inspect, monitor, and supervise the financial system. And, in the firstpphase
of the reform initiative; nine small banks were restructutred.
The legislative reform measures lhad little impact. The technical capacity of the supervisory department of the central bank was improved, but
political forces continued to weaken its enforcemnit, even as the number of
banks and institutions in difficulty grewr. It was estimated that 1I banks and
20 near-bank financial intermediaries, accounting for about 25 to 50 percent of nonperforming loans and forabout:60 percent oftotal assets, were in
distress in 1992. The consolidation and restructuring of nine banks was delayed andundercutbypolitical factors to the exte,atthat the institutionswere
stripped of their assets. The consolidated bank itself became a troubled institution. In retrospect it appears that most depositors had already shifted
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their deposits to the stronger institutions, and tie large depositor-s-were paid
ofl in equiily or bonds. A large niiuiber of banks ancd ear-bank financial
inrermlnediaries continuied I opera.lle witlh ca pital -at-ios vell b)elow thle reluired
ninimuimiii, and requiitedI caslh and li(uid asset ratios 'vere widely ignored, with
supervisory penalties conspicuiouisly albsent.'
The effects of intercesL rate liber-alization in the banking sector on mow
etary policy halve already been discussed. In a broader sense, the refo-rm prograin did not reduce the rigidities in the allocation of credit; thlus, interest
rate liberalization lhad little effect on improving the efficiency of credit allow
cation, which would be die primary objective. As discussed earlier, there is
no clear evidence that interest rate liberalization generally increased eitlher
dle profitabilityor.the solvency of financialinstitutions.lIt probably did help improve the profitability of a few already solvent banks, but higher interest
rates did not support the profitability of thelarge number of distressed ccommercial banks and near-bank linancial intennediaties becauise their clients
were not servicing their debts anyway.
Agricultural marketing reformKenya was one of the few Afiican colonies in which Europeans became involved in land oNvnership, agricultural production, and exports. The pattern
of land ownership and produce marketing from colonial days continued in
some ways-forexample, dualistic land ownership and marketing structures.
Beaveen 1931 and 1959, about 3 million hect-ares of high-potential and
medium-potential land were set aside for exclusive occupation and cultivation by Europeans, and these farmers provided most of the country's exports
of food and beverage crops. Under pressure from white settler fanners, the
government established a system of marketing boards that paid at least the
export price-and often well above-for all crops. African farmers limited
to nonscheduled areas were not allowed to grow cash crops or keep grade
catle. The net effectwas a rigid, dualistic agricultural system of land ownership, production, and marketing.
Of course, some of the features of this system changed.. Before Independence the colonial govermnent began to encourage smallholder producdtion of cash crops, a process that the government hastened considerably
after Independence. The govemment bought, subdivided, and settled
smaller fanners on abouit half a million hectares in settlement schemes. Indeed, the distribution of land to and support for smaliholder fanrmers was
the basis for the excellent performance of Kenyan agriculture in the 1960s
and 1970s. Nevertheless, the strongly dualistic nature remained, with two
attendant features. First, in all but a few years, the prices paid to producers
of the major food and export crops were maintained in real terms and as
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close to import or export parity as appropriate (table 5.5). There was little
discrimiiination against aigriculttlre in this respeer, althiouglh tie protection
given to industr) and an ovenralued exchange rare in soniie years ineant that
thle termns of trade fo-r agrticultre wer less favorable tLian tliey wotild liae

been otlherwvise.
Second, the presence ol' thie grain marketing parasLatal-dhe National

Cereals and P'roduice Board-continued to be pervasive, despite tlhe-recoiniiiendations of at least seven commnissions since 1942 to reduice the role of
tle state in grain mar-keting. Interdistiictiimovemiientolf grain continued to
be controlled. Large mnaiZe fairimers benefited froml guaranteed hiighi prices,
wlhile many bureaicrs gained rents fromn issuing pen-nits for grain moveinienL Directstate participation in and restrictions on private sector market-

ing and production extended to other agricultural commodities as well. The
government directly marketed several import substitution crops2 monopolistically: wlheat, rice, cotton, sugar, and nmilk In all cases, restrictions or
outriglt bans were iniposed on private sector participation.
The sustained, relatively high producer prices for maize, together with
smaller increases in the price at which the National Cereals and Produce
Board could sell to millers and the high marketing costs of the parastatal,had predictable effects on the budget (table 5.6). Also worth noting is the
sevenfold increase in the deficit per ton ofinaie handled-explainedin-part
by the rapid expansion of cereals and board depots in the late 1970s and
early 1980s, and a threefold increase in staff betwveen 1980 and 1987. in
addition, by 1987 the National Cereals and Produce Board had accumulated
debt exceeding 5 percent of GDP, which was 'written bir or taken over and
paid off by the government in 1988-89.
As with output pricing, controlled input prices reflected import parity.
For example, the piicing formula for fertilizer added margins and a-ansport
costs to a reference price based on import prices, seed prices were based on
the costs of production, and the price ofagincultural chemicals was not-controlled. The licensing of fertilizer impportsivas tlemain problem-in the guise
ofadministering technical standards and coordination with donor-Financed
Table 5.5 Producer prices in Kenya, 1984-85 and 1991-92Product

1984-85

Maize
Percentage of import parity
Percentage of export parity
Coffee (percentage of export price)b
Tea (percentage of export price)b

73.2a
155.7
91.3
84.4

1991-92
69.9
-128.8
89.5
88.6

a Figure for 1983, since there were no exports in 1984=
b. These are average prices. Srnallholders obtained about 80 percent of the price obtained by estates because of
diflerences in qualty and, in the case of coffee growers, deductins b the cooperatives.
Surce: World Bank dat; author's estimates.
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Table 5.6 National Cereals and Produce Board operations, 1983-84 and
1991-92Item

-

Producer price of maize (KShAon)
Price to millers (KShAoni)Gross rnargin/producer pricc (percent)
National Cereals and Produce Board deficits (ICK rnltions)4
Defkidtcurrent government expenditures (percent)
Deficit perton handled (KSh pierton'

983-84

1991-92

144
208
53.5
12.8
I .3

300
359
19.7
70,9
2,3
74.3

1i1.4

a.Before finance charge.
b. Sales anid purchases.

izurcr Wodd Bank data; Egerton University (19921 author's estitnates,

imports, the govermnient restricted import licenses to a fatirly smnall nulmber
of importers. Tlhe result was tncerLainty over supplies and poor tiling. In
ad:dition, piice controls down to the retail level reduced supplies andlpenalized cereal-producing stialilholders, whio did nothave access to institutional
supplicrs stucii as the coffee cooperatives.
Ouitput marketing

The reform program- sought to disengage the government from marketing,
(and in some cases, processing). Unfortunatety, the process vas slow and
tangled; only dubious success was achieved, and thatwith minor crops. Milk
prices wvere decontrolled, and restrictions on private sector processing and
marketing remiloved. In 1987-88, tlhe govemment eliminated the coLton
marketing board's imonopoly on paper, arndi approved tde divestiture of its
gins and its restruicturing as a regulatory agency. No fuirther progress was
made. The governmentalso decided to divestits bacon factory and tde Kenya
meat comnission.AWhile staff were laid offinitally, the commission resumed
operations in 1989. In the sugar sector, no decisions were reached, pending
the completion of a subsectoral study.
The saga of attempts to refotm the marketing of maize, the most iTnportant foodcrop, could fill many pages. Grain market refomi had die stated
aim of hiaving all domestic trade managed by private merchants with deregulated prices. Variou"s studies indicated that the National Cereals and Produce
Board hald a role-one lim-ited to holding minimal amounts of strategic reserves forsm-hoothing sharp increases in consumerprices in pooriharvestyears.
In addition, die National Cereals and Produce Board wvould be a buyer of
last resort, maintaining floor prices for producers. The food seculity and
stabilization role thus-envisaged for the National Cereals and Produce Board
would be quite limited-if its monopoly on internal trade and on imports
and exports were removed, private trade would be able to assume most of
these functions.
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1 refhlru, 11|I! (Ifd
sign flaw wva.s he1(i irnonsistvency IwI weevl fixing till!i ptirclh5! lplicI.? closeIio
till? imlport. parily' p]ifce and r(dt iaing diii role of'11w Nulitim-ml Certals and

]Procice Board toi being a buyer of luslresort, A.prie! selt 1:1se to Importparity is likelyit)In
courlitge iii)st faiiirmers Io choose Ito sell to Ilie :ervals
lHflhrdl. IndleteId 1.1tparastitatl then l)boconIIes
Of (t'e filtreil
')
fisitSI choice, leading 1t Ilietaccimmidallon of' slocks ptillclased at. prices too
'JtlIplurLC!Ih

highi to make ex port.pIo'fit able, rii iS C.cttrreli repe atedly in -til!t 1980's. In
Ilie eaurly l80s, grain reseRves for Seenthl yeaLrs were 40 to,(1 p6rcent liigiel
ilia the, desi-red leVvel o'f'270;000 tons. Later in tim decade, When tdhe desIl
level was increased to 560,000( tons, ac.tal stocksere still, often (50 tof

- percent

Iiigl r,l evesn after signific:ant, e!xports. *1
rllnall pr'ogrlamll SorIght
tIo reduce ill! role oftlie cereals hoard,-; tle most potent instru.unenl. was Ille

recluction in tlhe puirclhase price, perlhaps closer to eixport. parily. AlthoughI
terins suIchi as "llexil)le pricing" and "imipr ovWed pricing ilietiodologry" werie
cited in policy docimients, purchase price reduction was-neveran explicitly
stated objective.
Instead, otleti solutions to) die p robtlemn were attenipted-the .quantiity
of maize allowed to be mlloved without permnit WaS raisecl from 2 bags to 44
bags, 70 percent of the boar-d's tiqing-centers vere closecd, and millers were
allowed to buy an increasing share of thieir requirements diirecdy from ad-trad
ers r-ather than fromii the National Cereals and P'roduice Board. Tlhe cereals
board was -also "restructured, bWhich.
incliided a delbt write-off in 1988..
Evaluating tie eftects of these efforts is problemiiatic, since defining and
*

measuring whiatl is actually happening in practice is difficult. Somle arelilmi-

naryevidence does seem to indicate that during 1988-41, whien nmovemnent
- controls were eased, private trade was able to equ'alize interrIegional price
disparities by raisingpricesin suipilis areasand reducing them in delicitareas.
The operating margins orprivate tradewere clearly lover than those of the
National Cereals and Produrce Board. AL the same time, the cereals board
puirciases were lower than in previous years, suggesting that its role in tile
mrarket declined. But the trend was quickly reversed when movemnent controls wvere reimposed in 1992 and tde procurernent p1nce was jacked Up tO
110 percent of imnportparity. .Aft the samiie time, by reopening bluying centers
and offering maize to miller s at a subsidized price, the government undercut its own decision to encouirage millers to buy directly from the market.
The impact on tie National Cereals and Produce Board's finances is also
unclear. Despite the debtmwite-offand closing of buyipg centers, the average
cost of a bag of maize handled by die cereals board remiained high. Stiff
reduction targets wvere notmet, and the cereals board was still unable to cover
its cost of operation, as indicated by growing deficits. In addition to a pro-
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niercially
ent.el prpises
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j11o;Cjrity
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lInkler. Eqifih) was held directIy in alotai 50 enlterpiises;

equllity,'in time' re8'st wS hseld throulghl go,vcrniiienr-oYnrCid cdevelopmient. finance.
instditticins. Tihe single largest econoliiic activictly ofprastacttlswas ma-n ul'ctum

ing; in 1990, 60 pei cent. of lli entetrprises were in manufcctitring and miining, 18 percent in distiribution,

port, eleciricil y, and oliwer sei

1 ptnIcent. in finance, and Ite rest in iranns
-es. Between 198(aitIn

1990, th. paras ratal

sector accounted for 11 percent of CDP.
Wlile CDI' grew ojerall l)y5 percent LtbeLvteen 1OSfiand 1990, value added
in the parastatal sector grrewv at only 0.5 percent annually-with negative
gtrowt1h in. die ma iPf:actiuring and nining sectors.;(Table 5.7 provides intlicators of tie econoilic andl financial perfinuance of the puiblic enterprise
sector anli iLs1eltionsluip bo Lthe rest of tie economiy.) Basedl on a sample of,
parasiatals andc private en terprises, it is estimiiated that total factor prodlictivi ty g-rowvtlh dming.Lhis period wa-s negative for the parastatal secror, coImipar-ed
with 5.4 pelrcenL for due private secol-; ihe growth of labor inpults was lhlalf
that of tlle private sect.or, wlhilc Ilte growth of capital inptuts was twice as hiighi,
indJicatting atn ineflicient. uise of resoui rces. Excii(ling the profits of the cen-

tral batnk, net inflowvs to the central governmient budget were ei.ther signilicandy negative (-0.9 to-l.1 percent of GDP) or near zero.
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Wlhilc econoniic inelliciency was the in osl. distujrling cliaradterisdic of'

tlhe parastatal sector, its eIT&ts on the budget anti external accouinis were
not negligitble. The sector accounted foi1r iione than a third of' thi
government's net lending and equity operations and contributed little rev
enie: in Tac L,unreinitLed taxes-tiiose colklected but not remitted-wer e esf
tiniated t.o have been 0.5 percenL of tax revenujes in 1991.Tlie sector ran a
ne trade deficit of' 28 percent. of tie total trade deficit. Wlile the sector did
notgreatly increase the external debtandi debtservice birden,Ajefflicienct
withi whicll thdese funds wer e uised is at issue. F urthetrmore, the governmenL
often assumned tie debt and deblst vsicing obligations of parastatals, wilichcl
ofoten hbrrowed externally without clearance [ruin de treasuly.
*PaiasttaaSlsdonot appear to be a burden on the banking system. But tlieir
demand on or lack ofcontribution to budgetary revenues indirectlyincreased
dlie governmnent's own budget deficits and its demands for credit. Too, close
ties seemed -to exist between parastatals and distressed banksdistressed
banks held an estimated 85 percent of all pariastatal deposits, due to a government directive that parastatals place their deposits there and with nearbank financial intertnediaries. Conversely, it also appeared that loans to
parastatals iwere a source of loss for tde distressed banks. Thus, altlhoughl the
aggregate figures did not exhiibit a dangerous interdependence, the link
between poorly performing parastatals and the subset of distressed banks was
in fact quite close.
Table 5.7 Performance indicators of the parastatal sector,
1986-91
Efficiency indicators

Value

Total value added (annual percent):

0.5
-0.1-1.7
0.6
2.1

Value added in manufacturihg (annual percent)
Change intotal factor produdivit (annual percent)
Growth rate of labor use/growth rate of labor in private sector (ratio)
Growth rate of capital inp rh
rate of captal in prite sector (rato)
Relotiunship to budget and exteral accounts
Net lending and equity to prastatals/overall net lending by government (percent)
Profits, interest and dividend payrnentsAax revenue (ratio)
Parastatal external debt/public and publidy guaranteed debt (1990; percent)
Parastatal extrnTl debt servicingfutal (1990; percent)
Net exports of parastatals/otal net exports (percent)
-

35.4.
3.7
17.0
25.5
-27.9

Relotionship to banking system and near-bank financial internmdiaries
Parastatal deposits/total commerrnial bank deposits (ratio)
Pamstatal deposits/total near-bank financial intermediaries deposrts (rato)

6.7
10.0

Parastatal credit/commerrial bank credit (ratio)

6.0

Parasatal credit/near-bank financial intermediaries credit (ratio)

1.3

Source. World Bank data.
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Finally, ihe parastatal sector.strcngdtened die monopolistic and oligo. polislic structure ofindustry. Monopolieswere usuallyparastatal finlnls granted
such power thlrougli legislation or administradve decree. They could exercise this power in sales or purchases, the latter-through marketing institutions and boards. Oligopolies snmetimes consisted of a combination of private and public finns. Parastatals were often protected by higher tariffs,
effective (althoough notofficiallygazetted) prohibitiononcompeting imports,
andad-hoc exemptions oniimportduties on capitaland intermediate goods'.
-Althlough several attempts were matnde to. restructure the public- enter-.
prise sector, progress has been made only recently. In late 1991. the govemment announced its intention to divest its interest in a preliminary list-of 207
enterprises, while retaining. owvnership of 33 strategic .enterprises. Of the.207, it selected only 10 for pnvatization by 1995. Five have actually been
privatized or brouglht-to the point of sale. Furthenuore, five majority-owned.
public enterprises, Whichl accounted for die bulk of government transfers,
were to be restructured, including raiwhvays, the port authority, the tea: development agency, posts and telegraphs, and, again, the National Cereals
and Produce Board. This was a modest beginning. And it is undear whedier
all of the 33 enterprises to be retained in the public sector have 'strategic"
importance. But the greatest source of skepticism is the inclusion of the National Cereals and Prodtuce Board in this list-it is targeted for yet another
round of 'restructuring."
Civil service refonn
In 1990 the mainstream avil service employed more than a quarter million
people-or about a quarter of urban wage employment. In the 1980s civil
service eirploymentgrowth slowed to an average of 4.8 percenta year after
a spurt of 10 percent a year during the 1970s. Several policy measures have
reflected the strong pressures to create jobs-guaranteed employment for
university graduates and the tripartite arrangements of 1964, 1970, and 197981, which called foi employment increases in the public sector by 15 percent, 10 percent, and 10 percent, respectively. Further, adhoc-absorption o(f
staff from the agencies of the East Africa Community and the census operations of 1979, and a-large number of "works paid" employees hired under
developmentprojects, have increased employment A- maybe expected, the
composition of the civil service is biased heavily toward low-skilled employees; only 11 percent are in the middle- or upper-management cadres..
It can be difficult sometimes to judge whether the expansion of public
employment is justified by the corresponding increase in the real value of
government services provided. However, if one takes GDP growth as a rough
indicator of -demand for government services and assumes no decline in
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average productiviryorcivil serants, tllen increaises in goverminent employinent far exceed the increase in demand; thle ratte of increase in governmnent
emllploymient wias tw%ice Uit of GDI'.
Thlis steady growth in civil service employment%was acconi panied hystagnnation or regression in the salaries and wages paid to civiVservants, During

diTe 1980s, in particulars average real wYages declined by over I15 percent,
comipared witi a 7.3 percent decline in die private sector.Thegoverm ent's
wage policies helcped hold die total civil service wage bill in check even wtile
employment expanded-and in ficl selrted as the (nioderate) wage leader
for the entire modern sector.H"owever, die slow growth in real vages was
distribuited uineVenly-lowyer wage grades received Ilarger percentaige increases. Together with a "gr-ade creep, thlis led to a co&mpression of salary
scales, reducing dhe a ttactiveness of governunenLjobs for professionals and
Lhe highly skilled, as reflected in hIigh vacancy rates at tlese leveLs.
In suitim, overstaffing wa not deealt with effectively. While die government occasionally declared hiring freezes and supposedly abandoned its
practice of giving jobs to all iniversity graduates and graduates of odier

training programs, tlese policies were not systematically implemented. In
any case, overstafing occurs preclominandy at the lowver grade levels, so thiat
reduction in size at this level is likely to be mnore important than restriction
of university graduates.
. Social sector policies
E-ducationl

Kenya's educ'.,tional system expanded rapidly- -in part in reaction to dtie
*iighliy restrictive and tuneqtal educational practices of thie colonial government -andin part to acconmnodate tde extraordinary growth in the schoolgoing population. And its basic indicators are somle of the best in Africa: a 99
percent prinmaly school enrollment rate, an enrollbuent rate of 48 percent
am)ong females, and an adult literacy rate of 60 percent for mnales and 40
percent for femnales. Public expenditures on education are also among tde
lhighest in Afica-at 6 percent of GDP. Sonie 57 percent of public recurrent
expendituires go to priniary edutcation; the spirit ofHaranbee, or "Let's pull
together," has brouglht parents into the funding fold-thiey bear 56 and 73
percent shares of the capital (and some recurring) costs of educafion at tdie
primary and secondary levels.
Despite the additional ftinds froni parental sources, public expenditures
on education grew ius a share of GDP (see table 5.1) and coiprised 40 percent of the buidget by fiscal 1991. Ptublic reculTent e-xpenditvures financed
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primarily teacher salaries-real salaries declined but the nmtnber of teaclhers grew at a faster rate titan enrollmnents, so that dhe average class size was

unusually small. At the same time, the dropo' it rate was very high: roughly
half ofall children who began primary eduication filed to complete iL Thus,
there is r6ozu for inprovemen L
Only 1.3 percent of the.eligible population was enrolled at the university
level. Yet this subsector took up 72 percent of capital expenditures and 18
percent of recurrent expenditures in die late 1980s (an increase froni 11.8
percent in 1985). Until recently 30 percent of university spending went for
studentboarding and otherallowances. Recent structural cianges diatnmade
admission easier, and tdie fact that cost-sharng is substantialy lower than in
basic education, contributed to avery high private demand. In the last five
years, the number of public universities increased from-one to six.
Kenya faces differentfinancng issues tian mostolter African countries,
where scantpublic spending on education must be increased. In particular,
Kenya must address the higlh and rising budget share of education and its
bi;ased distribution toward universities.Threebroadmeasuresareparamount:
limiting the growvth of teachers at tie primary level, lowering dropout and
repeat rates, and containing the puiblic resource demands oF the secondary
sectors, particularly of universities. The first measure entails three reforms:
increasing class size and teacher workloads, limiting the intake of teachers
colleges,.and halting the recruitment ofuntrained teachers. Allocating public resources more equitably would entail-introducing direct charges and recovering the full cost of food and boarding, and reforming the student loan
schemeat tde university level. Public universities should also be consolidated,
and new admissions restricted for a period of time.
In the year since the adjustment program was initiated, quantitative limits on the numnber. of teachers on the payroll and the number and mix of
ttainees accepted into training colleges were exceeded. At the university
level, admission targets were adhered to, direct charges were instituted
alongwith need-based grants, and some aspects of the student loan scheme
(stil available to all students) were restructured to reduc-e the amount of
personal allowances.

Health
As in education, health indicators improved dramatically after Independence-life expectancy increased from 42 to 58 years. the crude mortality
rate declined from 20 to 1I per thousand population, and infint mortality
dedined from more than 200 to 110 per thousand live births. The coverage
ofimmunization programs has also grown, and dropout rates have declined.
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AL he samiie dine, AIDS Ihs become at significant publicl heailth problemii. About
200,000 Kenyans are now estimated to be IllIV-positive, and abolLt 2,500 new
AJDS cases are diagnosed annually.
Historically, the bilk of tihe ministry of Ihealti budget was allocated to
secondary and tertiary hospital services, ieaving few funds for rural healtli
facilities. And although the allocated sliare of preventive services ancd ruunl
health services increased in the late 1980s by 7 and 11 percent-age points, it
remained low in relation to need. Furdiermore; actual expenditures for
preventive-and rural services fell shiort of allocations-by about 19 to 24
percent--wvile actual spending for ctrative services was well above 1.00 percentofallocations.The share of recurrent e;xpenditures devoted to nonwage
expenses such as medical supplies has also declined steadily, from about 28
percentin the lO70s to 20percentin the late 1980s. Onlylimiteduser charges
were in effect until 1989. Moreover, inadequate maintenance-a systemic
problem-affects rural health facilities in particular.Asurvey in 1981 showed
th-at less thanr half of Kenya's rural facilities had a;reliable water supply and
65 to 70 percent were unacceptably run down.
To meet the increase in demand in the face of tight resources, die government has sought to mobilize additional resources and to ensure that facilities are used more efficiently. In December 1989 the government introduced outpatient and inpatient user charges at all puLblic sector facilities
except dispensaries; injuly 1990 it introduced reforms to the national hospital insurance fund, a parastatal covering primarily wage earners and their
families. User chargers were accompanied by waivers based on ability to pay
and incentives to facilities thatallowed them to keeppart of the revenue they
generated. The refo rms to the inusurance ftnd made contributions proportional to income and increased the coverage.
After the imposition of user charges, attendance at facilities fell, butthey
soon returned to theirprevious levelswivth one importantexception-attendance increased at dispensanes and health centers, and declined at hospitals. This was a desirable outcome. Howxever, public concern about the continued inadequacy of facilities and the perception that the waiver system was
not functioning properly forced the government to reduce or suspend some
charges three months later. Thi$s withdrawal reduced cost-sharing revenues
byabout 50 percentand eliminated the incentve to seek care firstata lowerlevel facility. Then, in 1992 fees were reintroduced progressively from the
national hospital in Nairobi to district hospitals and health centers. And tie
waivers system was strengthened and expanded. The government also increased'its budgeted and actual recurrent spending by 30 percent between
fiscal 1989 and 1992, and the share of total health expenditures increased
from 7.6 percent to more than 8.5 percent
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The outcomes of structural adjustment
Impact orn inientirediatevadiablea
Much of the stabilization gain of tihe early 1980s was lost in the late 1980sthe budgetdeficitincrLealsed almost to the levelsof the crisisperiod, and high
inflation reemerged (table 5.8). While tlde gains in reduicing the external
-deficitwere not entirely reversed, the increased and high debt service ratios
indicate the precariousness of the external balance.
Progress was made in maintaining positive interest rates and-in real exchange rate depredation. With the removal ofprice controls, and the mnaintenance ofprodiicer incentivesin agriculture, the overallincentivet strtictlureI
was reasonably undistorted in the late 1980s.
Macroeconomnic and sectorat outcomtes
From 1980 to 1984 the economy experienced a low groWth rate due largely
to stabilization policies that cut expenditures sharply-resulting in a decline
in the excess of expenditures over income from II percent of GDP in 1980:
to 1 percent in 1984-85 (table 5.9). Moreover, the low efficiency of investment in the late 1970s led to a high incremental capital-output ratio and a
negative rate of productivity growtlh during the early 1980s.
After the slowdown in the first half of the 1980s, growth resumed and
investment reflected greater efficiency in the late 1980s. The increase in
efficiency can be attributed to a decline in the rate of (unproductive) investment between 1980 and 1984-much of it in the public sector, where the'Table 5.8 The effects on intermediate variables. 197C -91
-ntemiediatewzde
Intermediate anol(e

-Crisis

Change in fiscal deficit/GDP
(percentage points)

Inflation rate (change in rate)
Real aerage interest rate ([oans)
Real effective exchange rate
(percentage change)
Ocange in current account/GDP
(percentage points)
Debt senmce/exports average (percent)

A4stuent perbid
Phase I
.
Phise 11
(1981484)
(1985-91)

period
(197"-1)
5.7

-5.8

4.5

33
-2.1

-11.1
-0.3

4.7
4.6

-16.9

5.7

-42.3

9.9

-8.2
26.0 to 28.0

8.0

Itte A minus sign indicates adedine inderct or rate.
a. Decernberto Decernber.
b. 1984-90.
Sotr IMF, St tisticalAbstcts and Economic Surveys; Word Bank staff estimates.
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ratioof puiblic fixed investmient to GDP declined by 1.6 percent. The pi blic
sector maintained a lower rate of inviestient in the late 1980s.
Yet, despite tie clecline in the share of public investunent, ithe secLor's
claims on private sector savings grewf. By Lhe early 1980s, tie, central government had changed firrom a net saver in flie late 1970s to a consumnier ofpri,te
savings. By tie late 1980s and early 1990s, the position deterioatied steadily.
After a shap decline in and imnprudent use of foreign savings in die imlid1980s, extern'al resource use increased to 4.6 percent in the late 1980s. The
conclusion is that lhitle soime public sector adjusntient occurred, primarily

as a reduction in the rate of public investimient, it was inadequate in tenns of
placing demands on boti the private sector and foreign saving.
Table 5.9 Macroeconomic and sectoral outcomes, 1975-91
Adjustment period
Item
GDP growth (annua percent)
Gross investment/GDP
Incremental capital-output ratio (annual.averagesr
Total fadtor gru-th/producbvity (annual pererit)
Sec tral GDP g

Cis's pediod

Phase I

Phas 1

1975-0-

(1980-4)

(I985-91)
5.0

5.6
28.8'

2.1
23.8

..

10.8

..

-0.3

2.6
..

2.8
2.1.

7.6

3.7

3.5
5.0
53

4.1

5.1

-3.4

4.8

20.0
4.2
-3-.

th (0nnual percent)

Agricutuure
Industry
Manufacturing
Services

-..

External tmde
Export growth (annual percent)

0.5

Growth of volume of manufacturing exports
(annual percent)

-4.1

-8.7

10.5c

Nonoil irnports)GDP-

2i..5

18.0

Domestc exports/GDP
Manufacturing imports/domestic supply
Manufacturing exports/output
.

20.6
44.3Y^

16.6

19.1
13.4

26.8

22.6d

13.3

23.2a

21.6

I0.4'

8.8

12.6'

.12.8

Saings and imbcstmen t (percentage of GDP)
Fixed investment
Public
Private
FirJancing
Central governmentsavings.
Private sector savings
Foreign savings (rants and net borrowing)"

.

2.8a
18.2a
9.0

.

19.1
6.1

.

19.4
8.1
11.3

-1.1
20.2

-1.5
21.9

1.4

4.6

.. Not available.

a. 1977-79.
b.Average oi incremental capitakoutput ratios for 1980-84 and 1985-90.
c. 1985-90.
. 1972.
e. Shares based on 1979 data.
f. The data are averaged differently tD sharpen the changes; the first period refers to 1978-81, the second to
1982-86, and the Iastto 1987-91.
Source. IMF,Stroiscico Absracts and Eocnmmic Sunes; World Bank staff estimates.
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A grrowth in private sector saxings was directe(I into riTancing the goveminent delficit ratlher than private investments; indeec, the private investment elfortslowed. throughout the 1980s. This may be indicative of tdie stagnation lt be expected in thle early,years of adjustment. Yet it may -alsoreflect
a continted reluictance to invest in tlie ftce orregttlatoyancl otler nonprice
barriers and, imore recently, political uncertainties.
Adjustmnent focused heiavily on dte external sect-or. lImport liberalization
was substantial. The ratio of imports t.o GDP has increased since the miid1980s, butI not die share of imports in the domestic -stipplyofrianuracttires
(table 5.9). In fact, tlis share wssr.w lower in the lattLer pait of tie adjustnent
period thnn initially, stuggesting tiat manufactiring sector imports were not
libeeralizedl to the samie extent as other imports.For exports the picttue is less clear. The export-to-GDP rato continued
to decline, as did the ratio of manufactured exports to olutput-suggesting
that a significant increase in export orientationdid not occur. At best, exports grew at the same rate as ClDP in the second half of the 1980s. But this
overall result-is due partly to the still relatively large share of primary coinmodities in the export structure, for which growth was modest.The rate of
marnifactured ex-ports increased sharply, particuliarly in tie past few years,
suggesting that production may be shifting froni supply for mnainly dome.stic markets to exports of manufacturing. But the small share of manufactures in merchandise exports-about 20 percent-has little inmpact on the
export-GDP ratio.'0
In agricultture, the rate of output growth, while lower than in tie years
following Independence, is still quie repectable. The delicensing of pivate
imports of fertilizerand decontrol ofits price could be expected to have a direct effecton production, although the direction of the effectis theoretically
ambiguous: plice decontrol and dius higher prices might suppress demand,
wider availability may reduce prices and increase usage. So fma, neither has
occurred. Usage showed an increase until 1990, and a significant decline in
the next two years. Thie failure at rationalizing public expenditures (including a restrulcturing of the National Cereals and Produce Board) suggests that
piiority investments are underfunded, as are critical agricultural services.
Adjustmtent and aid
This discussion of the reform process brings us logically to another question
about Kenya: whether aid (including tlie World Bank's) has been so generous as to encourage tdie government to avoid substantial reform. Tlhis question is difficult to assess. At the aggregate level, thle net disbursement of official development assistance per capita to Kenya in 1990-at $41-ws less
than that for other 'favored" African countries, such as Tanzania (347.1),
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BItrtindli ($48.8), and Mlalawi ($.56.3). Yet it ias substitantially iiglier than net
disbursements to Glhana ($31.2), Africa's best perfornmer. Much thle same
pictutre emerges for net oflicial developtiment-assistance as a shiare ofGDP. At
-11.1 percent Kenya's share is higher than Gliana's (7 percent), but mitch
lower than tiat of otler countries (48 percent for Tanzania, and about 26
percent for Malawi and Burtndi). Withtouit making too mun-chi of these niuibers, one can probably say that whilie the resouirce use and policy refonn
behavior of Kenya maukes it less deserving of the aid itobtained tlian, say,
Ghana, Kenya does not exhibit the smite extent of aid dependency as othier
donor favoritesin tle region. At die same time, it doesappear that generous
:project: futnding by several donors has led to a. ptblic investment program
-that,wlhile decliningas share of GOP, is not well prioritized. Even mfore critical, the grrowing reliance on grants and coutnte part ftnds has also undouibt* edly contributed to higher consumption expenditures by the government,
particularly on the cvil senice.
A more specific question: Has the WN'orld Bank's policy-based lending to
Kenyain the l980s allowed itto underte adjustmentor to postpone it? Here,
too, the answer is inived. The inost'successful area of reform has been trade
liberalization (and exchange rate depreciation)-and to a.lesser extent e.xport development. The link betwveen trade refoin and the increased demand
*forforeign exchange tliatit generates (atagivPen exclhange rate) is quite direct,
and it would be right to conclude that the reforms would nothave occurred
had the World Bank not kept tip ste;dv lending. At die same time, it is arguable that the budget supportprovided by these funds helped postpone many
critical refornis-civil service reform, parastatal divestiture (including the National Cereals and Produce Board), and social sector reform.
Appendix 5A. Policy reform in Kenya: design and implementation
Fascalpolicy anzd mrtanagenerat

-

Initialdistortion.Intlheearly 1980s, financialiiuhalancesandinflationwere
high. The budget deficit ran at 9 percent of GDP, the current account balance at 12.5 percent of GDP, and gross investment at 30 percent of GDP
(financed half by foreign savings). There was a large expansion in public
investmnent in the 1970s.
Refornis. There wYas sharp deflation during 1980-84, through die reduction of the budget deficit (4 -percent), import compression, tight monetary
.policy, and a decline in public investment. The budget rationalization program wvas introduced in 1985 to increase operations and maintenance expenditures and prioritize investnent expenditures.
Assessment ofpgess
During 1985-91 the deflationary trend was reversed.
Financial imbalance increased to levels of the early 1980s. Budget rational-
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iZ'ation was tinsuiccessful; die proportion of fucnding for operations and miaintenance fell ifiro 36 percentin fiscal 1981 to 26 percentin fiscad 1986 and to
22 percent in fiscal 1991.
A'Ionteleury fr7iuy '-

-

.

- .'

'

',-

inlulitial distortion. In the ealrly 1980s, die banking system financed large

budget dleficits; there were direct controls on credit to the private sector and-'
negative. interest rates.
llintns. ;Growth in credit during the stabilization period, 1980-84, slowed.There were positive intereSt ratesl- but continued controls on credit to the
private

sector, wi1ose share declined by 6.3 percentage points. Thlere were

also attempts to shift to indirect instruments of monetary control starting in
1989-such as introdiucing an auction for government paper and activating
reserve and liquidity ratios.
Assessment of prgn-ress. There was a reversal of wends in monetary growth
in 1985-91, and.a continued decline in the share of private sector credit (by
2.8 percentage points). The shift to indirect instruments wvas not successfiul.
The au1ction nmarket was limited; direct credit controls and placement of
government securities continued to be the main instruments. Higher interest rates contribuitecd to an increase in domestic debt service payments as a
share of GCDP, from 1.3 percent in fiscal 1981 to 3.6 percent in fiscal f190.
Exchtange -rae ttnanagentent

initialdistortion.Tile Kenyan shillingwas tied to the U.S. dollarfrom 1971
t. i975. and to the SDR since 1986. Discrete devaluations depreciated the.
real exchange rate during the 1970s.
Reforis. There was active management of the exchange rate through
muchi of die 1980s. In 1992 tradable foreign exchange certificates and export retention sclemes wvere introduced.
Assessment ofprogress. In 1980-84 the real exchange rate appreciated, but
there was-real. depredation during 1985-91, compensating more than fully
for the terms of trade changes and domestic inflation. The black market
premium declined. A second legal free mark-et for foreign exchange started.
functioning. In 1992, however, dhe official rate appreciated, and the legal
parallel markets carried premiums of 30 to 50 percent.
Inmport liberatizaticnl

Initial distortion. Local goods were highly protected by quantitative restrictions, high tariffs, and bans. The breakup of the East African Community in 1977 intensified inward orientation.
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Reforms. During 1980-84a firstaLtenipt.was nade to remnove (intitative
*restrictionsandt reduice tariffs. A second attempt was made dcuring 1988-91.
Assessment offtrrruew. Thte first attemispt was unsuccessful, and imiiport libcralization hecmate hostage to stabilization needs. Tire second attenpt was
relatively successftll. ByyJuly 1991 the only itemns protected by quantitative
restrictions wvere for lealtlh or public safety; all odier itemis were licensed
"automatically." In practice, even for itenks eligible for aituonatic licensing,
pelIluits were (and still are) delayed and foreign exchange authorizations were
obtained. This also applied to imports finar;redwi th own funds. The average
impo)rt-wOeighted tariff was reduced from ?4 percent in 1984-85 to 20 percent inl 991-92. Tariffs on competing inports fell faster. The import-GDP
ratio increased slighltly.
Promotionl of nontraditionalexports
I-nitial distortion- There was an antiexport bias despite the export -compensatioin scheme, whidc functioned poorly.
Refantis. A manufacturing-under-bond scheme was introduced in 1988,
followed by an import duty/value added tax exeniption scheme in 1990.
Establishment of an export processing zone was expected to be completed
in 1993.
Assessment ofprogress. Manufacturing-under-bond and import duty/value
added tax schemes were popular, but it is too early to assess their impact
Manufactured export growth picked up (10 percent a year increase diring
1985-91), attributable mainly to import liberalization and exchange rate
depredation.
Liberalizatiorn of donesticprices and trade
initial distortion. Agricultural output and input pricing was nt
distortionaiy, but mnaize trade was controlled by parastatal and movement
controls. Retail priceswere controlledfor basic commodities. Manufactured
goods' prices wvere controlled, and parastatals controlled wholesale trade in
a number of goods.
Refannas Prices for most manufactured goods and many staple foods
were decontrolled; maize and wheat pnces were not decontrolled. There
was some relaxation of grain movement controls and-controls on direct sales
to inillers.
Assessment of progress. Relaxation of food marketing controls has not resulted in true liberralization-the parastatal remains die majoractor. Recently,
movement controls were reimposed. VWholesale trade in some manufactures
continued to be controlled by parastatals (for exaample, the Kenya National
Trading Corporation).
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aitiatictalsector
Initial distortio. Tihere were large num-bers of banks and near-bank inancial intermediaries, but concentration and segmentation were high, A
poor licensing and regulatoryfianuework led to financial distress. There was
an unheilthy cross-relationship with parastatals.
Reforms. The banking laws were amendedto ithprove licensingand regulations and Lo strengthen the -enttantl bank's technical and managerial capacity.Nine small institutions were-restructured.
Assessmlent ofprgess. The laws were poorly enforced, leading to a financial sector crisis in the early 1990s. Tie number of distressed institutions-.

increased; restiucauingwas unsuccessful. Excessive political interference and
links with parastatals continued.
Publicente!Prise refonn

Initial distortion. There was a large parastatal sector :(about 250 enterprises) accounting for 11 percent of GDP, overwhelmingly in manuacturing. Economic inefficiency, monopoly status, and budgetaly drains characterized the sector.
Reforms. In late 1991 the government announced its intention to divest
its equity in 207 enterprises. Ten were selected for privatizadon by 1995; five
were brought to the point of sale.*
Assessment of progrcess. A modest beginning.
Laborand wage policies
I-nitial distortion. Labor policies toward the private sector were flexible
and pragmatic despite extensive umionization and collective agreements.
The only significant restrictions were on pennanent retrenchment. Public
sector employment (25 percent of the urban labor force) grew by 10 percent a.year during the 1970s, rainly at the lower grades. Employment was
guaranteed to all university and training program graduates. Real wages fell
during the 1980s.
Reforms. None.
Assessment of progress. None.

Social sectorpolicies
Innitial distartion. There was high private arrs g-nvernment spending (6

percent of GDP) on education. By. the early 1980s, primarv school enrollment was universal, but public expenditures were biased toward secondary.
levels and teachers' salaries, with low internal efficiency. There were good
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health indicators-somec of th e best among low-income cotintries. Bitt ter.ary care anld lar-ge udman hsospilalstooka disproportionate share ofresotrcVs,

with poor cost. recovery,
.Refottrms. Rtefonls since 1991.49 attemlptedl to limllit thle growthci'o

lte teach-.

ing force, increase class size, and increase cost recovery a; the university level.
In 1989 graduated user charges were introduced for certain services and

alenities, facili ties were allowed to keep 75 percent ofcollections, and waivers were allowed for those unable to pay.
Assessmet

fn'Porass.Thegovernmentimaintained its.expenditures (as a,C

share of GDP) and lhas not discliminated-against the sector. But it has.not
been able to restrain g,rowtll of the teaching force. Cost recovery las

increased.

The progiramii of user fees was poorly implemented; some featuires have been
abandoned, othiers reintroduced. The impact is unclear,

Notes

1. The MillionAcreSettlementScherne inLroducedin 1961 and olier minorsettlement schemes settled over34,0 families on 430,000 hectares. The.Shirika program
startedin 1971 had.settled more than 100,000 hectaresby 1976.Altogether, aboutonethird of the large-scale mixed farm area was officially subdivided.
2. Coffee and tea farmers received about 90 percent of the world market prices
on average. However, small coffee farmers received lower prices essentially because
of deductions made by inefficient cooperatives. The price paid for maize was about
75 percent of the import parity price in the 1980s but well above the export parity
price. Here, too, late payments.by the cereal marketing board have caused delays in
some years.
3. Mosley. (1991) notes that "the Ministry of Finance, in 1982, was firtmly in the
hands of Harris Mule with backing from Ndegwa and Nyachea. It was ... these technocrats within the Kenyan government who saw in this period of ec6nomk crisis an opportune moment for pushing through a comprehensive reformn package."
4. For example, in the agricultural sector, where attempts at budget rationalization were most persistent initially, the Ministry of Agriculture exduded about 10 percent of its projects, which it judged as hainrg lower priority, while the Ministry of
Livestock Development discarded about 20 percent of its projects. A subset of 33 was
then defined as 'core projects" for priority full funding in 191-92. However, actual
allocationswere substantially lower-56 percent ofthe developme nthbudgetcompared.
with 69 percent. On recurrent expenditures, there was a decrease of6 petcent comparedwitha targeted increaseof4.4 percenL.hIronically, noncore projects fared bettcr.
5. Forexample, the average lag from license application to allocation fell from six
months in 1988 to about fourweeks in early 1991. Butsoon, the time taken lengthened
to more than ten weeks; importers reacted by submitting multiple applications, then
the government returned all applications for resubmission.
6. Among nontraditional exports, the rapid growth of horticultural exports preceded the import liberalization program begun in 1988. During 1981-89, the volume
oF horticultural exports grew more than sevenfold. As a private sector activity, this
subsectorwas able to prosper essentially because of J-mal regulation by the Horti-

Published by iRepository, 2021

https://ir.iba.edu.pk/faculty-research-books/13

(,nitt
j 1y
______________e:

fr,I .'rnlri.ntt

237

Lthalt 11L15 COtontraudl 011 prtoiocilultural Crops Developininr Authority, IL aUIshItalS
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Thlis suatistic Indicated Lhat the asrcngth of' coinpetllion in tbhe inlustiy wiwsasiiliir, to
ditat In a itrket chilunctelizcc.i by aiboult 5 equliily sIzedhbailko, rotiler thai tlicJ28 Lthla
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1Ie
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12 nionbuik finanil inhtituloats
anl a mniany as22It
e
DAnl axainintleon:of Lhanulal IlOS shows tiat after reainig a low of 190
(:selihlXY§1to all average, of' 20.3 .parc:eni. tin ringr 198.9SO, befrelc
cent in.I 085, I1increse
declining to 17.3 percent in 1991.
10.11. Is inore dillCiclt to eXpliald why e ratio oor naniractured exports 1.0olL114t
has flalen, diespite growth: ofacxports twice thatofout[piltt An examInaiuionl of anlnual
ratios shows that aftet failling to a low or r percent In: 1987, the ratLio increased to 7.5
percent int 1991.
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Nigeria: ownership abandoned
Rashid Faruqee

--

Nigeria took ioldl steps early on in a few key policy a-eis of its Strtictural

adjtustmiient programn-reftforming lii e exchange rate, liberalizing trade, and
abolislhing colnutodlity lboards. Aldhough devaluation wtas widely deemed a
sign of wveak-ness, thw initial refornms devalued the naiai by G6 percent. Import liberalization wiped out the biggest source of rents for the politically
powerfiul. And the abolition of commlnodity boards executed with one stroke
a crucial reforn that took manyadjusting countries severalyears . o carly ott.
Several factors made this impressive beginning possible. The military
governmilent coild initiaLe tle reformis wvithout worrying about liow they might

hurt some groups. The refonn tasks*were fonrulated by a generally comipetent teclnical groip after muLchi preparation. And tle political clhanges tlat
were announced as the economic clianges.were made garnered acceptance
of the refonr.
The initial acceptance ofNigeria's structutaul adjustment prograinshows
tlhatable leaderslip
iand public debate and discussion can overcome doijiestic opposition to reform. Even at the start, some compromises were needed
to put the program in place. After the initial announcement bang, affected
gIroups mounted opposition-forcing reversals of die petroleum price increase and concessions on the tariff schedule-and the government lostits
determination and ability to overcome political opposition and keep the
treformis on track.
Tlhis political context of refonn in.Nigeiia proved to be iore complex
than either the World Bank or the government expected. The complexities
arose froin twuo Iactors. First, soiie of the refornis reduiced the income and
rents of those 'wio twere expected to carry them out. Secornd, the political
leadership, including the military, lhad a short-run outlook that foreclosed
thinking about benefits in the medium and long run.
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Nigetria's adjuisunent.prog-ram), hiowvever incolipleLe, has produiced clear
positive resiults, allthlouSghl part of the outcomiie is also dlue to resource flows
and sonie debt relief. IThe decline in CDP growthI has been reversed: fi-oml
-2 percent annually duting 1980-86 to mor-e thana 5 percenL during 198691. The ratio ofinvestmient to GDP, although still lower than in 1981-83, has
improved sinc the Clrisis years. Nonoil exporLt grew in dte early years of tle
adjustment progratml. Agriculttural production responded inore than antufactuling. Buit the outcomes in othet areas are not as encouraging. Perlhaps
miost important of all, stabilization has proven too elusive in Nigeria. And
pursuing structural clanges on several fionts simnultaneouisly is all the milore
challenging when a vast cadre of civil servants is eitlhel- unable or unwvilling
to manage the implementation of the refonus.
Obtaining tlhe commitmenet to sustain reforms, rather thanjust launch
them aginst political opposition, is much more difficult. Nigeria regressed
in 1988 when mounting opposition to aLusteity measures gathered miomentnn and Unnerved the political leadership. Another serious attempt to put
the refonu program back on track in 1989 could notbe sustained because of
mountingpolitical pressure-and the new oil boom during the Gulfvwar. Part
of tie problem was that structural refomn-to ensure a more efficient, diversified economy -would take more time than originally anticipated. And the
supply response was slower than stipulated. The result: the government lost
its detennination and ability to overcome political opposition and kleep the
refornms onL tLack.
The economy before the structural adjustment program
Since Nigeria's independence in 1960, the economy has been transformed
from a subsistence agrarian society into a largely monetized economny-fueled particularly by tde discovery and exploration of oil fields in the early
1970s. The transformation consists of three periods: 1973-78,197943, -and
1984-86, coinciding with an oil boom under military rule, an oil boom under civilian rule, and thie Buhari regime (prior to Babanginda's takeover).
1973-78: an oil boom under mnititary rule
The oil boom in the early 1970s had a pervasive effect on the growth and
development of the economiy. Oil quickly became the dominant sector of
the economy, accounting formore than 90 percent of exports, and the main
source of revenue. Between 1972 and 1974, federal revenue from oil increased
fivefold, constituting 80 percent of total revenue. Oil revenue grew more
modestly during the remainder of the period (1975-78) when OPEC rules
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required Nigeria to cut oil production. Nigeria's new wealth radically affected
the scope and content ofinvesunent, producction, and consuimption patterns,
the govemment's approach to econoimiic management, and the policies-and
programs inipleiiiented. Federal expenditures increa-sed rapidly, douibling
between 1973 and 1974, and again between 1974 and 1975. Much of this
increase in government expenditures-went to investment. Measured at 1984
prices, tdie share ofinvestinent in GDP increased fromi less than 12 percent
in 1971 to more than 25 percentin 1977.
The.growth in oil revenue wvas ab.sorbed largely by public sector spending, particularly on the infiastructure. The increase in public expenditures
went largely to improving transportation and social seirices, in part to ame-

liorate tlie effects of die 1969 civil war. Transportation Facilities, especially
roads-and ports, were expanded significantly, as were educational opportunities (tde primaly school enrollment doubled from 35 percent in the early
1970s to 70: percent in the latter part of the Adecade). Yet many public
projects were undertaken without the requisite analysis of their long-term
financial viability and the efFicency with which such projects were imple-.
mented in the past.
The rapid growth of the public sector-and the construction boom that
accompanied the massive investment program-altered the prevailing pattern of relative prices and wages and changed the una :rlying structure of
the economy. High wage and price increases secured the resources needed
to accommodate the demand in nontraded goods, but they depressed the
nonoil traded goods sectors. An exchange rate policy that allowed tie naira
to appreciate with rising oil revet tASsin combinaton with rising domestic
costs meant a sharp deterioration in international competitiveness. The
negative impact of these policies on agriculture wsas particularly severe.
- Notwithstanding a rapid increase in public expenditures, the growth in
oil revenue was sufficient to maintain a federal budgetary surplus; yet in
1976, expenditures began to outpace revenue. State budgets also began to
show defi cits. And as expenditures of the federal government outpaced revenue, federal trnsfers to states declined from about 40 percent of federal
revenues in 1973 to about 20 percent in 1979. Moreover, in the nontraded
goods sector, wages were inflated to keep pace with the wages offered in the
construction and service sectors. Meanwhile, the value of the real exchange
rate increased by more than 100 percent from 1973 to 1978. As the naira
appreciated with the growth in oil revenue, exports were placed at a particular disadvantage.
The foreign exchange generated by oil revenue was used to increase.
the supply of tradables. Yet the demand for imports was greater than could
be supported solely by oil earnings, and Nigeria borrowed significantly durink rIais period to purcilase overseas goods (an average anniual external borrowing of about $570 million). Economic problems began to surface in
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1978, btit a second oil b)0oo11 in 1979 lent confidence that oil revenuie would
inThtct be a sotind hasis for planning and sustaining public sector consutipLion anil investment.

.1 979-83: ant oil boomfollTnied by a crisis utnder civilialnlsiIe
The second oil revenue boom coincided with civilian government tinder
President Seghari. Yet tde economliic problems thrathiad begin to surface in
1978 continied in other ways. In 1980-H1 die terns of trade, wlich liad
remained relatively constant throtigih 1979, doukled from tleir 1976 level
(figure 6.1). Andt record oil revenue prompted the government to increwse
ptblibc expenditures-Ieading eventually to -adefiLcit in 1980. Overall growth
in GDP was only 4.2 percent in 1980. Agricultural GDP grewv by 6.4 and industrial GDP by 7.3 percent, butpetroleum sector GDP dectined by 11.6 percent. Moreover, exports fell by 9.5 percent, while imports grewv by 27.2 percent. In 1981 oil prices fell precipitoutsly. Thuis, severe terms of trade vaiations
led to extraordinary fluctutations in real income. Whereas real income had
increased by 200 percent betwvreen 1972 and 1980, it had declined by almost
60 percent by 1983 from its 1980 peak-level. Because the oil booni could not
generate enoulgh revenue to keep pace with public expenditures and real
income declined, the government was forced to rum a budget deficit and
increase its borrowing. By 1983 the federal budget deficit amounited to 12
percent of GDP.
The government financed its external and fiscal imbalances by incurring debt, depleting intemational reserves, and going into arrears in external paymen ts. Yet the prevailing viewv of the Seghari governmentwas that the
Figure 6.1 Terms of trade shock, 1976-91
Terms of trade index (1987=100)
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Source: World Bank data.
Published by iRepository, 2021

980

1982

1984

1986

1988

1990

https://ir.iba.edu.pk/faculty-research-books/13

242

AnptlsrI'nLN

IN AMucA: ILFaNS FROMt COUwrwrCMSFIi &llDFwS

*
dOWnu.w
n WiLs t.eiiporarytn
amc, I.tinit maintaining a i igii level of inesllnentitwi II
ftreign borrowing w%sjustified. Unfortunately for Nigeria, real world interest rates tulrnedl positive whlen its temlrns o tradie starte(l to deteriorate. Becauise additional tlelj cotulcl be contracted only atuvariaibe interestr ates arid

at shorter mnaturities, credit condilions becanie lhrs her. In tlle early 1980s,
re-al interest rates reached 20 percent. Given thie poor rates of return on
invesinment in Nigeria (as proied by tlhe negative GDP growthi rate in that
period), Nigeria clearly undiert-ook excessive extemal borrowing.
Despite the precipitoris diop in oil reverues, the real exchange rate
continuted to appreciate.Ahihotigh thenairadepreciated by27 percentagainst
thie U.S. dollar between 1981 and 1983, the noninal effective appreciation
rate was 1 2 percent-increatsing die -appreciation rate to about 40 percentin
real terms. Because die distorted exchIrange rate prevented tie government
from allocating resouarces efficiently to purchase imports, it establisled sevelr iLeastires and stringent trade c-ontrols in the Economic Stabilization Act
of 1982. Amllong the measures wiere the rationing of foreign exchange, a
restriction on impolt licenses, an increase in duties, and tde initiation of an
iinp6rt deposit prograii. Public inv cthnen'twas also cut drastically, and gasoline prices and tuiffks w<ere increased
Despite die austere meatsures, the economny reachled a crisis in 1983-84
when oil prices declined precipitously by 45 percent from their 19801evel.
The GDP growtli rate in 1983 wvas -6.7 percent; nonoil sector growth fell to
-9.3 percent-and petroletun sector growth to-2.5 percent. External and fiscal imbalances emerged. The external current accoLnt deficit grew to 6
percent of GDP in 1983, and Nigeria's indebtedness impeded iLs access to
foreign capital. The budget-dericit-to-CDP ratio reachiedi13 percentin 1983.
By 1983 per capita private consumption in real terms was 20 percent below

its 1978-79 level. Betveen 1980 and 1984, urban income declined by 34
percent and rural income by 20 percent.
The reform measures weire ineffective for several reasons. The government continued to increase its public expenditures and did not attempt to
improve the country's balance ofpaymnents. Short-term trade arrears mounted
to the pointatwhi ch foreignbbanks held back on confirmaing letters ofcredit.
And given Nigeria's unwillingness to devalue its cu-rency, creditors refused
to roll over short-term debt, or to provide fresh capital. It was under these
circumstances that the military again seized control.
1984-86: the Buthari regime
The Buhari military government caine to power in Janualy 1984 and augmented the austere measures of 1982. It sought to control public expenditures bypimposing a wage freeze on public sector employees, enforcing die
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reduincdancy of'.a large number on civil sersants, and requiring tiser lees in the
eduscavaon
healnb seciTliese measures madea
and dentin Nigeria's bedge
deficit, which declined fIromil 13 percent of GD) in 1983 to about 3 percnt.
in 1984. Yet thie hliuari regime continuledl to Ftind ineflicientparastattls, wlhile
cuitting funds for maintaining infrastriicture an(l equipimient.
The decline in p:iblic expenditures ltacd its severest impact on tile conslruction and service sectors1 buit employtnenLand production also cleclined.
sharpl in miost other sectors othle'economly. Gapacity utili-antion dteclined
and plant closures Werle widespread as tde access of the import-dependent
industlial secLor to imitported inpums was slharply cu-rtailed. Inports declined
by 22.-'7 percent in 184; nnnoil exports cdeclinecl by 44.2 percent.
Accompanying tie declines in imporLs and exports wvs tsignificant rise
int domestic prices and an increase in inflation to 40 percent. Domestic savings and invesutlient also declined; investment fell to 12 percent of GDP,
down friom 24 percent in 1981.- Private investmnent suiffered a more drastic
decline, accounting for only 25 percent of total investmnent in: 1985,: conlpared wuith 50 percent in the 1970s. Exteinal debt service requirements on
private debt and rescheduiled arrears reached 34 percent of exports of
goods and.nonifactor services in 1985-tripling debt se rice requirements
from die 1982 level.
By 1985 the distortions in the economyywere pervasive and serious. The
exchange rate was. grossly overvalued, and despite tie oil revenue boom, the
budget deficit again rose to an axerage of 7 percenbt beteen 1980 and 1985.
Moreover, despite efforts to conirol the budget deficit, public sector funding again burgeoned, and tde numlber and size of public enterprises increased sharply. Samie of the reformus introduced by tde Buhlari regime did
not include fundamental structural changes tUat wvere necessary-particularly the devaluation of the naira, import liberalization, and key refonns
proposed by tlheWorld Bankand the IMF. More specifically, die government
chose not to piivatize public enterprises, as had been suggested by die World
Bank and the IMF, and rather than rationalize die import regine, it made
import controls more stringent. Significant differences thus enierged betWeen the Nigerian government and its creditors, especially die World Bank
and the IMF.
In August 1985 the Babangida government came to power and, spurred
by anotlher precipitous drop in oil prices, proclaimed a fifteen-month period of national economic emergencyas of October 1985. By 1986 the tenns
of trade lhad plummeted in the face of the decline in the real price of oil,
representing only 35 percent of their 1980 level. Furdilenuore, with outLproper
accommodation to multilateral lending institutions, tde prospects for further credit were bleak. These events set tie stage for tde structural adjustment program.
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Origin, design, and implementation
of the structural adjustment program
One of the measures initiated by tde Babangida government was a national
debate abouit wlethier Nigeria should imiplemennt the policy reform1is necessary to secure IMF support. The debate was ostensibly to build political legitimacybysliowing the willingness of the new governiienLto escliew the authlolitarian approach of the previous regime. It was coordinated by government
representatives, universities, die central bank, and tie

civil service.

Yet dte debate clearly indicated strong opposition to the policy reformis
required by die IMF. In particular, the business community was concerned
that trade libelralization would prevent it from cotmpetinh imports. Others were skeptical that the IMF funds would be used for tht. 'Intended purpose. And nationalistic forces opposed the imposition of reform measures
by an external entity-particularly devaluing tle naira.
The Babangida government accepted the outcome of the national debate by rejecting the IMF loan. Yet the government se-emed willing to coinpromise by expressing its intention to undertake astucLtural refonnuprocess.
In 1986 the Babangidagovernmmentsubinittedarefo-nn budget tlhatcontained
a package of export incentives incorporating trade liberalization, but without a change in the import licensing system. The petroleum subsidy was
reduced by80 percent, and a commnitmentwas made to piivatization. Moreover, the government had balanced the budget. Although an exchange rate,
adjustment.was mentioned, the naira was not devalued; rather, a levy was
imposed on imports.
Nigeria's creditors, and die World Bank and the IMF, did not accept the
package of reforms in the absence of devaluation measures. Thus, in August
1986 the government announced its structural adjustment program, whose
central feature w*as a two-tier system to devalue the naira. Consistentwith its
previous stance, the government did not accept an IMF loan. Meanwrhile,*
tie World B-ank and the London and Paris Clubs agreed to new loans and
the rescheduling of old debt.
Several factor-s propelled structural adjustment and devaluation. First,
Nigeria's plummeting oil revenue wasjeopardizing the country's economic
stability, and devaluationwould boost the government's naira revenue in the
short term. Second, given Nigeria's precarious relationship with its creditors,
debt rescliedulings would be acceptable to its creditors only umder conditions defined clearly in an adjustuent program. Third, Nigerian policymakers
were becoming increasingly aware that the state intervention approaci was
not an effective developmtent strategy. And fourtl, a core group of leadcrs
was persuaded thatanew developmentstrategy-one thatturnedawvay from
gaverntent-led growth-was now most desirable. Too, people accepted
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inuetini hiardship fraoin the austerity progranm in tde lhope tiaL broadly based
political refomns woutld create a mlore eqttiable distribution of growth benefiLs at tde end of thle interimi austerity-and, in so doing, preclude die corruiption that had narked earlier regrimies.:
Declaring its intention to make a transition to civilian rule, the Babangida
gove mmenthad to retain tlhe supportof tie militay, wliich would be afTected
adversely by both die transition to civilian rule and tdie devaluation of the
naira because it was a large net importer and had access to goods subsidized
by the government The Babangida government reportedly obtained the
militar's support by gnting it exceptions to alleviate some of the impacts
of tlie structural adjtsttnnentprogranm Moreo6ver, the Babangida government
had eliminated one-of the main points of concern-tie appearn'nce of outside intelference.
The structural adjus.tment program began inJuly 1986 and originallywas
to end injune 1988. Tlhe government, hoWever, reaffinned its comniitment
to continue to pursue the basic elements of the structural adjustment pro gramn until the program's objectives were fully attained.
Cedingownership.
The Babangida government shrewdly distinguished between borrowing from
the IMFand initiating an economic reform program. It tlus created general
support for a program that was nmade in Nigeria by Nigerians," a source of
national pride that die program was not dictated by outside agencies. The
overill design of the adjustment program was comprehensive, stressing the.
key reforms required to correct senous distortions -orproblems in the exchange rate, fiscal perfonnance and monetary policy, trde policies, price
regulation, and parastatal performanceAlthough imnplementation started well, it soon slackened, and even regressed. Political hactors, interacting with fluctuiating oil revenue, contributed to tis phenomenon. Fluctuations in the oil revenue (due to changes in
the oil prices) not only had a direct effect on economic outcomes, such as
growth, butalso had an indirecteffect througl influencing economic reform
policies. As noted earlier, when oil revenue booms took place before (tunder
both military and civilian rnles), the government ptursued expansionary policies; Similarly, after 1986 the fluctuating oil revenue had some effect on how
the reform program was pursued, The implementation record can be broken into four distinct plhases.
July 1986/a Decermber 1987. During the initial petiod, crucial reforns were
implemented fiirly effectively. In one stroke the naira wvas devalted, tie
importlicensingsystem was eliminated, and the commodity boards were abol-
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islbed. Several institutional and political Factors contributed to tllis initial
rel'foirmi miioniwltn tu: a highly centlralized instituitional set-iip and extensive
preparation, which penritted cooirtlination bya snmall, reClatively unilied and

technically.competent econoimiic Leaim; Llte absence of pliase-in periods, and
the governmiient's strong posture; and the public's acceptance or thie close.

link between economic and political refonuis.
-

Janlucn 1988

early /989. InIJanuary 1988 the program stalled, and in
Soiie aueas, stuchl as controls on the budget.deflcit and the growlth ofrioney
supply, it even regressed. Tlhis stall in ihiuplementation was duie to several
Factors: acceptance otfmoderate inflation Lo stimntilate growth, apprehension
over growving labor and stuident unrest, and rising food prices; Fiscal and miionetary discipline alsof ell apairi Among other things, the government proposedc
a $600 million reilationary fund, lowler (r-egulated) interest rates, and backing away from a proposed petroleum price increase.
Early 1989 to AMay 1 989. Beginning in early 1989, tIre Bretton Woods institutions pressured the government into returlning to tighter fiscal and
monetary policies in the 1989 budget. Yet by now, rent-seeking interest groups,
vho lost ott during tlie initial period of the structural adijstment program,
had resuirfaced and undelm-ined the refonii process. For exanple, the cloisure of several inefficient industries promp ted the Manufacturing Associadion of Nigeria to seek and obtain greater protection. The goverminent also
lost nmtuch ground on trade liberalization to large agricuiltur al interests by
increasing die nutmber of itenis under import bans. Too, the govemtient
fell prey to political pressulre to increase public spending, and resorted to
extrabudgetalyspending. And economic anddpolitical refonrusm ere no longer
inrittally supportive. In fact, in May 1989 Nigeria expelienced serious riots
apinst thle StrUctural adjuistment program.
Juntte

1989 to Iki/e end of 1992. ByJune 1989 the government was focusing

more on political reforms than on economic refobuis. Consequently, dlie
quality and consistency of econonmic policymiaking declined markedly. The

last phase of the implementation coincided With the oil boom front the Gulf
crisis of 1990-91. The government totally yielded to political pressures, and
despite repeated official pron ouncemnents that it would continue wi td reforlims,
it could rot sustain tle original objectives of the structural adjustment prograin and instead implemented ad hoc policies to meet short-tern expenditures. The most serious issues vere unrestrained puiblic spending and inresponsible fiscal behavior. For example, the recent incremental revenue from
higher oil prices vas spent on major investment projects or on political tramsition programs-all outside established budgetary procedures and often in
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the absence of transparency. Overall, since 1900 tile government hias fallen
even furtlher behind in imiplementing tie r elormi program set olit under the
strUctural adtjustmnent progriun.
Key elemetsi of
/the structural,adjustmien.t program oJf 986

BUtL what was the design of the struictiuraladjustmientprogramUi of 1986?The
centerpiece was a niarke i-based excliange rate and liberalitation of iraderemoving most iiport bans, developing a new tariff schedule, and imlplemenLing policies to increase export growth. The structural adjusetment program and the supporting World Bank loan helped finance the foreign
exchange gap dial had accumulated in 1986-87 from the decline in oil revenue. The World Bankl made a Trade Policy and Expor-t Developnment Loan
of $452 million, and die IMF approved a staindby arrangement of SDR 650
million, althlouglh the dr-awings were made under this facility. Also, additional
financdal assistance in the fonn of dept reschedulings and new nioney fiom.
the Paris and London Clutbs accompanied adoption of the structural adjust-r
ment program. Appendix 6A provides a Fonnal summnary of the main elements of the structutral adjustment program. Here they can be highlighted
as follows:

The adoption of tight fiscal and monetary policies to reduce inflationamy pressures and to rationalize puiblic expenditrues, including public
investment progr'amis.

* The dismantling of exchange controls and the adoption of a marketdetermined exchange rate policy.
* The liberalization of the tiade regime, the rationalization of customs
tariffs and excise duties, and the abolitinn of price controls.
* Financial sector reformns.
* The privatization and commercialization of public enterprises and lie
abolition of marketing boards.
Macroeconomic policy reform: design and implementation
Fiscalpolicy ancd mannagement

Fiscal tmanagement and pfnblic expenditure reforms. The government's fiscal
policy and public expenditure reforms were a critical element of die adjustment programn. The structural adjustuient program called for reducing die.
relative size of the public sector and reallocating public expenditures toward
infrastructure and human resources. Federal budget- deficits were to be
brought below 4 percent of CDP by 1988, focuising particularly on reducing
civil service wage employmentandlimiting transfers to parastatals. The struc-
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turIl adj stisl ent program sol ight to rationalize budlgetary processes, particti-

larly the systems for renewving b)tdgetl propo(sals aind mionitoring and accouinting of expenditutires. Econonmic appr.aisal was also to be used to dcletnine
public investment programs, and fuincding priotityiwent to projects with proven

financial viability and low comiipletion costs (discussed later).
SIPLEMENTATION. In 1986 tie government closed-its deficit, largely becauise
devaluation increased naima-denotninated oil revenuie. The inflow of hunds
fromI muLttilateral institutions a.d otlher creditors alleviated some of the pres-

sure on die budget, albeit temporarily. Yet recurrent expeniditures exceeded
budgeted expenditure,, and attempts to control expenditures were of little
consequence.
To addle-ss the impact of the struictural adjustment program on the
populace, the governmentintroduceda reflationarybuidget for 1988. Among
the new expenditures were transitsubsidies, meal subsidies, and training for
civil servants. Total spending increased lby more than 30 percenit, and thle
1988 bu-dget led to a deficit or 11.4 percent of GDP. Rapid inflation ensued,
forcing the cur-tailment of budgetary releases in mid-1988. Not only w4as tlhereflationary budget of 1988 dhe first miJ or policy backslide but it also undermined progress in otlier areas oF refonrm.
The 1989 budgetattempted to getback on course byimposingstrictlimnits on expenditutres. However, demonstrations and riots in opposition to the
structural adjustment programn promnpted the governmnent to make sonie
extrabudgetary concessions-raising the minimum wage, unfreezing wages
in the civil service, and removing die ban on civil service recruitment Despite these expenditures, the budget de rcit declined dramatically as the
currency depredated and tie governnientreceived a nairawiindfall. In 1990
fiscal discipline broke down once more as the government renewed
extrabudgetary spending. Moreover) established budgeta-y procedures were
bypassed, and the strategic planning processes that had, been established
under the structural adjustment program were largely ignored. Of major
concern was tie expenditure of oil revenie withiout any apparent budgetary
authorization. Fiscal indiscipline persisted into 1991.
ASSESSMENT. Ptublic expenditure mn:magement has been ineffective for several reasons. Spending decisions and the rationale for spending patterns have
lacked transparency, and the -govetnment yields too easily to pressure for
greater spending, even when it recognizes the undesirability of doing so. The
commitment to fiscal discipline and adherence-to rules and established procedures seem to be weak or irregular. The government also continues to
emphasize capital-intensive projects whose economic justification is highly
uncertain. But also crucial is that ithas not yet devised a strategy for making
an effective macroeconomic response to the major peaks and troughs in
government revenue from oil.
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Public investment prograt refonn. In mid-1985 the Projects Review GC0rmmittee of the government of Nigeria made candid recominmendations (in
the "Onosode Report") for undertaking sLtategic planning in die public
capital investment programii based on quantifiable economic criteria. The
report went on to suggest that existing projects be completed and that all
new investmen-ts cease, given' the absence of strong evidence of their technical and financial effectiveness. Thie structural adjustment program subsequenty incorporated requirements that proposed -public-ivestments be
documented properly to enable the government to determine their economic rate of return. As another measure, the adjustnent program introduced a three-year rolling plan for public investment for the period 1990-m
92, which seeks to make the scope and content ofUinvestment projects.
conform to efficiency considerations.
-The rollingplanrrequires thatprojects beapproved before any expenditures can be incurred. On paper tlhe pla prioritizes 'core' projects and identifies a set of "noncore".investment projects that should:notbe funded in the
absence of available resources.-n reality, the structural adjustment program
-still failed to rationalize the public investment program; costs and benefits
and altemative financing strategieswere not tested; foreign-financingsources
for projects did not seem to have the same opportunity costs as domestic
budgetary revenues; and the practice of ad hoc, off-budget provisioning for
major projects continued. A review of the current plan shows a senrous
anomaly between project costs and financing sources. The core investment
program includes at least a dozen import-intensive megaproijects that will.
require resources beyond the government's capacity. As detailed in box 6.1,
the govemment has continued to pay as it earns for large federal, ongoing
and planned projects and programs.
'
Tax reform. The structural adjustment program did not initially incorporate specific tax refonn measures, but rather stressed the need for institutional, administrative, and structuiral changes in the tax system to realize the
potential of Nigeria's nonoil revenue sources. In particular, it called for
addressing the present disposition of taxation between the federal and state.
governments, and the consequent fragmentation and inefficiency of tax
administration. The World Bank collaborated with the government to sttudy
the policy and administration of direct taxation and recommended simplifying and limiting the progressivity of the income tax rate, the structure of
allowances and exemptions, the corporate income tax rate, and the structure of the federal taxation revenue department.
The structural adjustment program reduced the corporate income tax
rate, improved tax collection procedures by introducing withholding taxes
on interest income, and rationalized dividend taxation. The federal inland
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reveni e depa.rtiiient ItLas ilso )een reorganize(l to eIipI asiZe l'Unctionpal p1anning antl toI iiprove comilpuiit!rized capacity, and a series ol'intenai.ional t.ax

treaties

have been signecd.

Assesasent qffiseai refonois. Over.all, the designof fiscal policy and managemient reforms was sounId; reformi objectives have often heen reflected in
government budgetary documients. Yet the gover nimient1has not consistently
- controlled buLdget deficits (table 6.1), Muclh of its lackluster performance
stems front the refl aionary budget ol 988, when tie government attempted
to appease opposition to tle structumil a.djustniient-porgiami bycoimpromising on exurabiudgetauy expenditures. Tlis lapse quickly undenined prog ess
Box 6.1 Irresponsible public investment
The following is a sunmmaty of observations drawn from the World Bank's public
expenditure management report on projects and programs in the fcderal
government investment portfolio.
Agncdtutre.The allocation in the 1992 budget forfertiaen, the largest item in the
capital allocation for the Ministiy of Agriculture, is N 0.6 billion, but die actual
total procurement costis estimated atN 3.4 billion, and extrabudgetary allocations
will be required. Of the eleven ongoing large-scale iiygaliontprojits,f[or which N
181 million has been allocated, only three, repre-senting N 63 million of the
allocation, are deemed viable. Public grain storagefacilities, a comiponent, of the
Federal Strategic Grain Reserve Program costing N 1.6 billion, are not fulfilling
the goal of stabilizing food prices anid enhancing the food secuirity of the poor.
Under capital supplenmentation N 150 million has been set aside for projecL
execution by a newlyestablished agency, the NationtalAgrdcz uralLanndDevelopment
Aulhority (NALDA), whose mandate is to address the chronic problems of
uinderutilized farm land and rutral labor and the high cost of land developmenL
This mandate duplicates the activities of other agencies.
Water supply. The NationaIWVa terRehabifldtiontFundPfjetis supported by a World
Bank loan in the amount of $240 million and requires an estimated N 5 million
peryearin counterpartfundcfrom the govemmentuntil 1996. Eachyear,however,
federal contributions have been inadequate-N 3 million in 1992 and N 4 million
in 191l-representingapossiblewidespread external financing problem. The River
Basin Development Authority's bowreholebpgrams are performing poorly..
G.il and gas ector.Te total investment planned for the l991-95 perinod would
require about $20 billion, with almost $13.5 billion to cover joint ventures.
Several large projects do not have specific allocations in the plan document, but
are funded from extrabudgetary sources. The Nigerian National'Petrolcum
Corporation's PipelinePhase11 project ($550 million) is uneconomic and slhould
be abandoned. . Rehabilitation of existing refineries, such as Warri, Port
Harcourt, and Kaduna, are high-priority but underfunded. The NNPC estimates
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in oilier UIrC15s. All(tiigll lIlt! gnvertillienl. 1IlIs il)ilImnivlil sevv)ll
t.nlially uastill relrnims in pJialilic OXkI)flhllt tlr gtuin.itirn (a sylls r l lultulIrnhlizedl oversigh hias hemn esiublished ainc! airolling pl;n in r c)hi ed in primn.
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omcomvs Spending
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continue
be fInuincr ,itisicle
Ilue
hidgiti'llproceiss, andI ImbliC en llr)'pristi
rc11C
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.

tlhe cost orf consuilting a newv exporl tfniunrl f1°i! thie scoIId Portl 1laHrcomrlt
relfnery at $340 imillion, which World Bank staff estititatecoIul(l br caiL. b)y twotlhirds. ConstruIction of this terminal would tino be wvell tiinedl :s ouitlpt- frtoti the
new Port flarcourt. refinery would tieed to be dliverted to thle domestic market
dtue to inefFicient operation of oilier refineties, Tue oversized $1.14 billion
project Petroac/lenden L Phavse!! is econiomnical only on ; smank-cost. basis. 'There is no
butdgetaty allocation for this project even thouigh expetndit.ures are being
incurred each yeari The dotubtfrul economlic viability of thc liqitid naurirnl gas
projec4 originally estimated to cost abouit $2.5 billion, is fast approaching $4
billion due to delays in signing agreeinents witlh purchasers. This projecL atso has
no capital allocation in the federal budlget.
Pnver.Installedl capacityis about 5,600 anegawatts; however, onily 2,700.inegawatts
are available. No new investmtent is required unLil at least 1995, yet the NigerianElectric Power Audiority is planning to construct'a new generating platn t in 1994,
a 300-inegawattgas turbine plantat Geregti at a cost oF 135 miillion. NEPA's currl- ent
investment

programn is abotiL $300 miiillion per year-too large given its financial

condition and the sector's iiwvesunent. requirements.
Steel The Ajaokuta steel plan thad already cost inore than $ 3 billion by the end
of 1990, and capital costs are expected to be four fuxes higher than those of new,
competitive plants.

Aluminum. Initial estimates placed the capital costs of the aluminuim snmelterproject at Wkot Abasi at $1.2 billion, making this project 60 percent more costly
than comparable projects elsewhere in the world. The governmtent had atlready
expended $450 million by early 199 1.
Abaja. The federal budgetallocation for the newctapital in 1991 wasN 345-.miillion
and in 1992 N 465 million-both unlikely reflectionsof actual expenditiures. The1
government has not assessed its plan to transfer to Abuja; nor has it ideTntified
-priority expenditures or completed ongoing projects before undertaking new
investmenet-s.
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anlltle, Ithc Nigerian Nationnal P'etrolelrmi1 CorIporation operates as a1
pViratSlatal
till side o) , federal lhi
(Igelt review pro:e(lures, anrI auccotntalbity is absent.
Large losses by pu.lrastalals. wvhiiici have liv(el Ieluctaicnt .to increase uiser fecs,
have contliiuuted to larger fiscal uleficits. Similarly, tlt! impact. ol' reforms on
jilblic investinent. programs Ihas been negligible, an(d retturns on plublic inVestilient have been poor. Mosda
large-scale CapitTPal prOjects.S !ave not. been costefTective, dtile to stch hlictors aLs inapplprinate technology (and often localLion), lcong delalys in completion, and overclharging by foreign suppliers or
conlractorsl Inellicienc) is o110steident in the Ajaoktita steel coltmplex-ib
-w-ill be"a net. loser-or
ofreign

exciihnge even -on a stink-cost basis. These two

f'atctor-thle allsennct ol'tccotint[albility atn(l poor lyinfonni- ied invest;ment-arc
crowding out investment, in thle private sector.

Th.e govermtient's effort Lo atclhieve fiscal stability by smootlhing Fiscal
spending .dtiring ti e peaks and troughs of oiltreventue and sterilizing money

supply increases rrom hiiglier oil revenues has been unsutccessful. Tightfiscal
*and monetary policies were pursuied. However, stabilization efforts were
impeded in 1990, when die government initially kept windfall oil revenues
in its stabilization accontm but later spent the naira counterpart funds. Inflation increased in tde first part of 1991 by more than 30 percent on an annual
basis. Tlitis, the governmenthas continuied the weak stabilization efforts made
by previouis administrations in the face of windfalls.
Another problem has been the inadequate capacity of the civil service to
impleniient fiscal policy reformis. Despite tie 1988 civil service refolrms to
iimprove accouintability and managerial efflciency, the civil service consists
of a large tier of lowver-level employees and a small layer of senior-level staff
overbuirdened by tie requirements of reforni. Moreover, salaries did not keep
pace with the fivefold increase in prices from 1982 to 1990.
Finally, tie excessive debt butrden haws aravated fiscal management. Nigeria must pay roiughly 5 percent of its GDP as debtservice-one ofthe highest shares among developing countries. Tlese debt service obligations exacerbate fiscal indiscipline and excessive spending. In fact,, the primary balance
Table 6.1 SelectAd macroeconomic indicators, 1980-91
1980-85

Indicator
Budget deficit as a share of
nominal '-DP (percent)
Real irterest rate
Index of real eflectiw
exchange rate'

(average)

198S

-7.0
-3.0

..

..

167.8

..

Not available..
a. 1980 = 100.

Source: World Bank data; IMF, International Fin anciaI Statisucs.
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1986

1987

1988

1989

1990

199!

-6.8. -8.3
10.7 -37.0

-7.6
-8.3

-4.6
-33.6

-2.8
1.9

-6.0
2.4

91.6

34.8

31.0

28.7

24.2

29.3
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frniti 198itL 119111 averagedI albmii 3 percent, against an overall balance or
percent. This debt. obligation, along with excetssive spending in some ar
cus, le(l to dleficit financing and necessitaited cuts in higlh-priority expendilures-such as the infirastru cti re andl sociall services.

-t

-Anlrtetrirypaoihy

0

Rhforim. Since Independlenet, Nigeria lhas gained ratli ersignificant fi-nanCial depth. ILS financial systetm hats I)ecote relatively inore developed than
those in most devpeloping countr-ies, consisting of iimor-e than 110 coimmiel;rcial and merchant banks, several financial ins'titiutons, more than 100 insurance companies, neatly 1,000 pension funds, 7 stock exchanges, and severalspecialized fmancial institutions. in response to an M2-to-GDP ratio thathad
increased frotmi 9 percent to 23 percent between 1960 and 1990, the structural adjulstment prograim includecl tiglht monetary policies to control wage
and price pressures from devaluation. One of the policies was to restrain
dcomestic credit wlhile also liberalizing interest rates. The structural adjustment program sought to develop more market-oriented financial systems to
suppoirt r-esouirce mobilization and allocative efficiency.
Imipi(eettaliont. Monetarypolicy under the structural adjustment program
has been uneven and generally ineffective. With the reflationary budget of
1988. the growth in money supply (39 percent) far exceeded die monetary
target. In 1989, in tdie face of unabated inflationary pressures, the central
bankag-ain implemented strict monetalypolicies.The Federal, state, andlocal
governments and tile parastatals were required to transfertheirdeposits from
thelibanking system to tlhe central bank, tlereby c-ausing a shn.ip drop in liquidity. M2 fell by 10 percent, and tie requiired transfer of de posit-shad the
desired impact.on liquidity and prices. Overall, however, tLis stop-and-go
monetary policy has been expansionary: from an average annual growth in
broad money of 11 percent between 1981 and 1986, the rate ofgrowth tripled
betwveen 1987 and 1991.
The unstable interest rates of the pt-e-adjustmentperiodhave continued
(table 6.1). In August 1987 lending and deposit interest rates were deregulated, generating a dramatic decline in real rates, since nominal rates barely
moved to compensate for inflation. Yet when tight monetary policy and a
marked slowvdown in inflation occurred in 1989, real deposit and lending
rates bcecame higher, creating political pressure to reinstitute controls for
tie advantage ofselected borrowers. InJanuary 1991 interestrateswere again,
regulated. Yet even when interest rates have been deregulated, the central
baTke has encouraged banks to offer lower than market-determined rates.
The expansion in money supply points to- the absence of sufficiently tight
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monetaty policy and lack oi-indir ect nionet.ay policy contr ols such as money
inarkets and variable reserve ratios. Only in hule 1989 did die central bank
start Lhe open-market tendeiing ol tr-easury bills wvhichi led to a more marketoriented interest rate. Even wvh en interest rates were deregulated, the cen-ual bank encouraged b.inks Lo offer lower than market-determined r-Ates.This tinkering with the x: iarket linlited the impact of interest rate policy, as
has tle government's unwillingness to allow interest rates on its debt to be
subject to mnarket forces;
The structural adjutstment programalso exercised monetar poIiy by
imnposing credit ceilings on individuala banks. Moreover, sectorpecific credit
targetswere reduced to two sectors: agriculture and imanufacturing. Agricul.ture was to account for 10 percent orlnercliant bank loans and 15 percent of
commercial bank loans. Meanwhile, the manufacturing sector was allocated
40 percent ofmerchantbank loans and 35 percent ofcominercial bank loans.
At least 15 percent of bank loans were set aside for small-scale enterprises
wholly owned by Nigenans.
Assessnien. iThe structural adjustment program included appropriate
monetary policies, yet their inmplementation has been poor. The post-1986
period has seen wide fluctuations in the supply of money, leading overall to
an unprecedented ex:kpan.sion. Monetary policywas abandonedfirstin 198788, when the money supply increased by an average of 28 percent. Then,
despite monetary controls that led to a slowdown of 10 pei cent in money
supply growth in 1989, bro-ad money increased by 40 percent ill 1990. At
this time the controls were abandoned-and the gap between the official
and the parallel exchange rates wvidened. The monetary expansion has been
due to the government's inability to sustain tie sterilization of foreign exchange inflows while implementing its stabilization program. Too, the
government's interest rate policy has been varied. Real interest rates have
fluctuated since early on, du-e alternately to political pressures to regulate
the rates and to monetary necessities to liberalize them. InJanuary 1992 ditegovernment liberalized interest rates. The varied interest rate policy illustrates how dhe government has deviated from the structural adjustment path
under political pressure. The government has also pursued various but inconsistent credit ceiling policies.
Exchange rate mtanagenient
Refotns. The focal point of the structural adjustmnent program was a market-deterinined foreign exchange rate. Prior to the structural adjustment
progiram the demand for foreign exclhange far exceeded the available supply, and the quantity of foreign exchange was subject to arbitrary rationing.
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The structural adjustment program establislhed a floating exchange atde
mechanismn tied to market-deternined forces. The system was introduced in
plhases, and consisted ortwo tiers. Tie first tier was an officially adm-ninistered
rate, which applied to all public seivice transactions. Thie second-tier rate,
applied to all othler market transactirms, was determiined by auction-the
second-tier foreign exchange market-under the aegis of the cent-al bank
and funded by oil revenue. The reform souglht to curtail demnand for imports,
encourage capital inflows and nonoil exports) and eliminate the distortions,
imposed by the import licensing system-but above all to provide a realistic
exchange rate for the domestic currency.
Mipkteentatian. When it wa implemented in September 1986, the second-tier exchange rate system led to a 66 percent devaluation. In October
die auction method was changed, and the amount of foreign currency avail
able was increased. The naira appreciated by 45 percent. Tie exchange rate
then remained stable for several montls.
In July 1987 tie mnarket-determined (second-tier) exchange rate w%as
unified with the official first-tier rate, and tle second-tier foreign exchange
market was replaced with the foreign exclhange market; nonetheless, tWo
separate exchange rates existed. Every two weeks, the central bank determined an auction rate for banks, the government, official foreign exchange
dealers, and some importers. All other purchasers obtained foreign exchange at an interbank rate determined by mrartket forces. In die latter half
of 1987 the gap betwveen the auction rate and the parallel market rate widened, reaching more than 50 percent by early 1988. Despite the growving
gap between the official auction rate, which was an attempt to suppress depredatLion, and the interbank market rate, Which responded freely to market signals, both rates depreciated. The primary determinants were the
rapid expansion of the money supply and the fiscal imnpact of the
reflationary budget of 1988. Yet by early 1988, tghter fiscal and nmonetary
policies helped reverse the trend.
Then in 1989 the government replaced the. auction with the interbank
foreign exchange market, allowing the central bank to deteirmine the exchange rate on a daily b-asis. In the first quarter of 1991 both the auction and
the interbank rates depreciated quite sharply, and the gap between the two
widened considerably. The immediate catuse was the lhiglher public spending,which came as a resultof pressures arisingfrom a min-i oil boom in 1990-X
91 that permitted a large increase in money supply. Thie central bank's role
in the bidding process led Lo a brief appreciation in the nominal rate between late 1991 and early 1992, and die gap between tie official rate (N 9.8
per U.S. dollar) and tde parallel market rate (N 18.5 per U.S. dollar) widened. In March 1992 the central bank finally realized its goal-a uniform
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exchange rate system. Unilicattion ieduiced lie politically unpopular inter-.
vention in foreign exclhange sales by the central bank.
Assessienit. Exclhange rate refobrm lhas been one of the mosL imiportant
achievements of Nigeria's programil. What lhas been most remarkable is the
sustained devaluation of the riaira's external valtte between 1985 and 1992
(table 6.1). Fom l988 to 1992, tle quarterlyaverage ofthe naira exchange
rate per U.S. dollar depreciated by 27 percent, 58 percent, 61 percent, 67
percent, and 83 percent over the 1987 base period. Why is the depreciation
so rapid, and to what extent lhas a realistic exchange rate been attained? The
answer to the first question lies in the unmet demand for foreign exchange.
The demand-supply gap expanded rapidly, fromii a mere $360 millioniin the
first ten montlhs of the second-tiier foreign exchange market to $15 billion in
1989 and $17.5 billion -in 1990. Mluch of this demand has been specuilation,
genelrated by dte monetary expansion and tde controlled interest rate poli-

cies. The dramatic decline in tde exchange rate almost Tlaide it competiti:ve,

butintermittent efforts to regulate tlie exclhange rate have caused it to deviate significantly at times from an equilibriumii rate as reflected in tde observed

divergence between the official and the parallel mark-et rates.
The crudal determinantofthiscnmtinuous decline is the monetaypolicy.
Contrary to structural adjustment program goals on paper, an expansionary
money supply continued-banks failed to comply with credit limits, tie
govemment engaged in deficit financing, and furthier, it imposed a cap on
interestrates, wthich encouraged the private sector to bid forforeign exchange
with loan money. Overall,.the exchange rate reform, although significant if
comparedwitli initialconditions, wvas underriinedbyalack of consistency in
implementation and by contradictory in oveinent (or development) in other
polides, such as increasing the fiscal deficit and putting a cap on interest rates.
Liberalizationof intentationaltrade
trade policy
consisted of quantitative import controls imposed by comprehensive licensing systems, and prohibitions. In an effort to create a business eniironment
Import reform. Prior to the structural adjustment progrna,

conducive to the efficientproductionand distribution of goods, the structural
adjustment program liberalized trade. Several public sector trade corpora-

tions wvere abolished. As the second-tier foreign exchange market wvas introduced, importp rohibitions vere eased (t le number of affected commodities
was reduced from 74 to 16), and thie import licensing system and the 30
percent import surcharge, introduced in January 1986, were abolished.
Customs and excise tariffs were restructured so that the average unweighted
nominal rate of protection fell from more than 33 percent to about 23 per-
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cent. Ofrcourse, producerswere concernediliat the new tariff stiuctiire would
offer themn less protection.
The 1988 government butdget introduiced a nev twaiff stiructure that
provided a 28 percent average tariff level. While this level was higher than
the level under Ltle inteinm tariirsciedule, it wias still lower than tde 33 percent level prior to the strucUtiural adjustment programn. Yet the structural
adjustnent programi did specify import duty rates for a seven-year period
(1988-95), allowing producers and consumers to rely more confldently on
a sustined tariff strtctture. And although. the average tariff rate slhould increase marginally throughout the seven-year period, the overall tawifflschedule exhibits less dispersion than die interim tariff, because- it reduces
mintersectorl differences in tariffleels. Still, the stcture of protection for
trucks, metal and metal products, buses and-automotive spare parLs, cotton,
textiles and yarn, and packaging materials has been fraught with anomalies.
import iniptementation. The new tariff structure is operational, but the
evasion of dutiiesis fairlywid espread. Byunifyingcu-stoms duties forproducer
inputs for all regions, the structural adjustment prograw has dominated the
general concessionary duty rates for imports of certain inputs for selected
categories of producers. Similarly, favorable dut exemptions for parastatals
and the governmenthavebeen cuttailed. The new tariffregime hasimproved.
collection procedures for imports, thuis generating greater revenue.
The structural adjustnentprograrn has also introducedan implicitlanding charge into import duties, similar to die excise duty on comparuble locally produced goods. Although the landing, charge seeks to ensure that
revenue taxation on consumption is protection-neutral, the charge is not
always consistent with the excise duty and is not applied explicidtly. Since
import bans were curtailed in 1986, only minor dianges have been made. In
1989 several itemswere exempted from the prohibitions, including dgarettes
andjewelry, while others were added. Import duties on comrnercial vehicles
were also reduced in 1989 and were subsequently eliminated altogether to
allow low-income groups access to transportation.
Export reform The structural adjustmentprogram's exportpolicyrefornns
sought to support growvth and diversification of exports, partictularly manufactured goods. To do so, it reformied the exchange rate system in an effort
to promote. exports, abolished mnost export bans, and introduced a duty

drawback scheme.
Export implementation.The structural adjuLstment program soughtprimiarily to increase nonoil exports. With the establishment of the second-tier
foreign exchange market, exporters were allowed to retain 100 percent of
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Ilheir export ertlnings.inf ite lonni ol dion'iciliary accouints. As nt!tfl earlier,

thle foreign !xchlange miariket replarcd litic sec-ondi-tier fboreign exchange
miarket, and in 9I92 the exchange rates were unified andc allowed t(o mo%ve
freely according to nmitrket conditions.Tim nuIImISSive dieVIwaliiIaon olt lit?nfltidL
increalsedl the reb,>tiv'e price oUiir-adlabxles, creakting strongpit.e incentives fur
exports. T11e government climinatedc n1osL export bans, abolished export

licensing, renoved export dlties, anc simpliFied e-xport lprocedtutr-es. Tlie six
Iddmn opalp)' powuer were fll)QhiSll ed.
agnlcultuhral coiuimoditiy loan-ls thatt Wiect'
traw
ck/su.spension sclheme was an il porIant element ofthe
The diiLty cld
governmlentl's export incentive plan. D)ult drawbhacks wvere grantled to severla
manuFacturing exporters buit verifying the imiipor-t and export transatclions
lhas mnade imnplementing the scheime uliffictult. The centralHbank operates a
refinancing and rediscoun-ting facility that provides finalncia;l assistance to
largely to
exporters. In 1988 it proivided banks wiLh miiore than N 500 million,
facilitate cocoa exports. Yet since 1988 prohlibitions on certain crops and their

have been reintrodtuced, either to avoid domestic shortages of
*
derivatives
these crops or to. process thelml for export.
Assesswent. Trade liberalization proceeded initially withl little opposition.
For examiple, the govelnnientwas. able to easily remove tie imp ort licensing
-system, because substantial abuses tnder the previous government had discredited the system. Simiiilarly, irregiiilarities widit previois mechanismiis for
allocating foreign exchange discredited that system.
Yet the tariffstructure was revised vhen some manufacturers expressed
concern about the effect of the new trade regime onI their import substitutLion enterprises. In the end, the govermment. sotight to give them greater
protection from imports and imposed bans on several items that had previously been imported. Thse consolidated import prohibition list covered about
30 percent of agricultural and 20 percent of industrial products in 1989,
targeting items produced domestically-including most food products, major
grains. processed wvood, textile Fabrics, and vegetable oil. In December 1989
meat, chiick-en, and fisLh were added to the list.
Overall, trade and tariff policy refonr has been inconsistent. Some refon-ns have stalled; others have even regressed. Import liberalization ancl thie
rationalization and hannonization of the tariffstructure have not been fully
realized. In particular, tariff rates have been modified frequently and have
often incorporated landing clharges, equivalent to excise duties on domnestic
products, thus compromising the transparency of tde system. Excise duties
and other impolrt surcharges are changed at die discretion of the cuistoms
officials who collect them, *vhichi, according to one estimate, increased thle
avenage nominal rate ofprotection from 23 percentat tde ouLsetof the sLructural adjustmnent program to 28 percent in 1988 and to 45 percent in 1991.
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Sectoral reform: design and implementation
Liberalization,of dormriesticPHrces, nn*etsly, and trade
Refonn. A key element of tle striuctui-al adjustment program is price 1
eralization. Prior to the stiuctuiiral ad justisment progran, price distortions in
agrIculttire were major detenuinanLs of the shatp decline in domestic and
traditonal export productiun.As a result, tle. six existing agrictirralcom-H

moditty boards were abolished in an efhrt to give private individuals, gr'ouIps,
comilpanies, andprocessors access to tlie interaI arnd external markers forall
agrricultural connodities. Also prior to the strictural adjustment program.
many manuifacturing comniodities were subject to price and distribution

controls tihat were applied and enforced

primarily at individulal factories,

enabling.tiaders to absorb rents arising from die differential between die
market ptice and the controlled price. In 1987 private enterprises were allowed to establish their own prices, tius taking these rents away firom traders.
Irnpknhentation.The abolition of commodity boards was a bold step. Yet
lthe government has maintained price controls on some goods produced by
parastatals-most notably fertilizer and domestic petroleum and gas products. Furthernore, informal control mechanisimns continue. In fact, the government has pressured some nianufacturers and associations to roll back
prices. The government lhas also continued to provide substantial subsidies
for fertilizer and petroleum products-and has in fact increased them.
In 1988-89 restrictions on foreign ownership were relaxed significantly,
and foreign investmentacti tyis now permitted automatically for investments
of more than N 20 million. The investment development coordination committee was established as a one-stop shop for foreign investment, facilitating
the repatriation of profits. However, restrictions on foreign participation in
selected sectors remain-garment manufacturing, radio and television set
assembly, commercial transportation, and retail trading. Yet. despite the
greater freedom for foreign investment, investment growth is impeded by
continued infrastrtictuial deficiencies, government policy reversals, and
uncertainty about the sustainability of adjustment under civilian rule at the
end of 1992.
Assessment Domestic agricultural trade and markets have been liberalized substantially, thlus markedly improving the incentive system for agriculture. Yet progress in lifting restrictions on and abolishing subsidies in other
markets remains far from satisfactory. For instance, die investment development coordination committee deals onlywith new enterprises, thus discriminating agairnst existing enterplises that may be in a better position to under-
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take new invesltilenl Moreover, foreign parlicipation in insuirance, mining,
bannking, anti pe)trolelum prospecting cannot l)e expanded above cturrenL
levels. And the continuied increased subsidies for fertilizer provide a lesson
*
about
hIow political forces and poAverfuil interest groups can block or thwart
refolrmls. For-examnle, in nortlhern Nigeria, which is the most proiminent
beneficiary of fertilizer subsidies, strong political forces have blocked any
attempt to cut or abolislh fertilizer subsidies.
*Financial sectrr.
.

Reforn. The strutctural adjustment progriun did noL initially address fi-

nancial sector refonrms. However, one of its goals was to establish a marketoniented financial system that woutld suipport the milobilization of financial

savings and encourlage tile more efficient allocation of financial resources.

The strutctural adjustmnent programt thus called forrefonning the old system
of fixed credit allocations, subsidized and regulated interest rates for priority sectors, and tenn finance provided by development finance institutions.
until 1988 did the govermment focus on the portfolio problems of the banking system, take measures to strengthen banking
supervision, and carry out several portfolio audits. A deposit insulance systeni waS then established in 1989, and in October 1990 new banking standards and tglitened mininium capital requirements were introduced. New
prudential reguYtions confonning to dle evolving international standards
became effective as of 1990.
Same of the most important banking system reforms vere undertaken
in l9l, including prudential regulations and accounting standards for banks.
The centril bankwas also made more independentof the ministry of finance,
and its supeirvisory capabilities were strengthened. Tile new prudential regulations should flacilitate monitoring the financial status ofbanks inore dosely
and weed out bad loans and financially ineffiLcient banks.
[rn*pteentalion.Not

Assessment. Because the refonns in die financial sector are relatively recent, itis difficult to assess their effectivenessand impacL Despite the reforms,
Nigeria's financial system clearly contintues to suffer seinous problems. Fiscal
policy is the root of the problems (constraining the positive effects of monetay policy), as is the government's inability to undertake stabilization measures to offset oil revenue shocks adequately. Equally problematic is die
continuous noncommercial interference in the banking system: government
agencies curTently control or have a majority ownershlip in about 80 percent
of commercial bank assets and 45 percent of merchant bank assets. Many
traditional foreign banks are ceasing operations in Nigeria, and new foreign
entrants into the market operate within a narrow niche. Only a few repuPublished by iRepository, 2021

https://ir.iba.edu.pk/faculty-research-books/13

ANigojeria

070l

-riwJthij
aimlrloi0eu

261

ale internmalional banks are reportedly ablee to provicte Iiiglhi-tality banking services in Nigeria, anti new banks are rtstried fron expatndihig their
malrket share.
*Public r:zteiii.s rejbrmn.
Desigi. rlhe stri ICt urtl acj;

Istuien progr i estal)lisiecld

toui -citeria in an

ellirt toin r itn-aliZe anti combnierci.alize publictenjetprises: (1) enterprises that
can be hilly operatinl on a commercial basis would be pri-at zed; (2) those
Ifirt can be partially privatized Avould no longer receive operating siibsidies;
(3) Llhose Lh at can be partiilly or ftully coniniercialized blit can continue to be
owned by the goveruflenti oould le -required to operate widiout government
stibventions;-and (4) al osetlhat cant)e fullypubl)lic en titesivouldcontinueto
receive public stipport, witlh tuser fees itnpleitiented as appropriate.
InilVevintlatiraM. After estensive preparaLtory work in 1988, the federal
govermuent of Nigeria issuied a decree mandating tle testing of 145 federal
parast;atals for hull or partial privatization and commercialization. Some I1
enteiprises were targeted for privatization by the end of 1991. ByMarch 1992,
68 parastatals were fully or partially privatized.
The iimode and scope of commercialization have varied widely. For ex*ample, although tde Nigerian National Petraoleutm Corporation was commercialized, it is still subject to government-set fuel prices, and its investmentdecisions are still dictated by noneconomiiic ciiteria; its weak operational

performance is manifest. Although the Nigerian Electric Power Autlority

has become a commercial enterprise, it still retains a monopoly on generation and distribution, and tariffs are set well below the supply cost. Moreover, metering and billing are inadequate, ivlihich redtuces revenuLe by 25 percent. And Nigeria Telecommunications Limited is still sLruggling thlrough
the commercialization process. Althouigh international tariffs have increased
and contracted items have been openedc up to international competition,
other measures mutst be implemnented to make the telecommunications sector fuilly commnercialized.
The impact of the structtural adjustmentprogimn on government financing of parastatals is difficult to ascertain precisely, because comprehensive
information on govermnent financial subsidies for public enterprises in the
social, agricultural, and infrastructure sectors is absent. A large portion of
government expenditures in these areas is at the state and local levels, where
expencliture data are limitedl.
Assessment.I Tie overall b)tdgetayiipact

of the public enterplise refonn

progr amto dat has been minimal. Government divestiture ofits equityunder
its privatization program has been negligible thus far, and it is still too early
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to assess ill efNiciency gins oI thie refl nuS alreadly impleimenteul. TIIe gov(!ernnlnie lihas selId)
iiSIs(I pWrf uliinnante contracts, whiiichi can be (o considerable value
I.t) (clrif$and Io achiieve tlie long-ieniii go-als orpulic nien-Ptpises,
that slay in tlhe piblic sectll.

L abo.r and rag-

.Ily

ibfarnrl. Witl I (fWexceptions, tE;C labor market in Nigetil operates witlluoIt setiOcis restricltions. ni e governunent interferes only bysetting miniimintiii

wages in nominal terins. Yel tmlie iiniimiuin valge has not been binding because iniiretk'lelcaring pri:cs have been higlher. H4ence, the stuictural ad-

jtustinent prograuan clicd not include .any explicit policy reformins on latbor andi
wages. Hlowever, other policie's have lhacd an effect on labor and wages.

Lo
to

hnItiljlementtationt. Tb e impletnwen tahion of odlier adjustmient policies seems
have had a f-av,orablle inipact on emiploymlient. Export prices rose relative
wages, raising the demancd for labor in tlhat sector. The labor mark-et re-

sponded with a decline in url-ban unemployment from 10 percent in die preadjustment periodl to 8 percent in March 1988. The decline reflected tde
growtlh of the informal sector ind amigr-ation orworkers to the rural agricultui-al areas-consistent writh emerging incentives and rural opporttnities.
Employmsent in the rural sector also improved slightly. Overall, unemiployiiientfell from 6 percent in 1986 to 4 percent in 1989, bitt statistical evidence
indicates that empiloynment grew by slightly more than 3 percent annually after
the inception, of the progr-am-a growth rate alhnost sufficient to absorb the
growing number of workers, in the labor Force.
Real wages in Nigeria have declined since the early l980s. By 1987 the
index of rural and urban wages was less than half ttle 1980 level. In 1988
federal civil service wages increased by 27 percent-after having been frozen since 1982. Tlhe increase wras qtuickly eroded by inflationary tendencies
in 1988 and into the early part oF 1989. Because private sector wages in ur-t
ban areas tusually follow public sector vages, 1llOSt urban private sectortvages
have stayed the satne in real terms duming tlhe adcjustmiient period. A 1990
World Bank report indicates that since the inception of the structulnd adjustment program, rural wages have increased, but most urban wages, particularly those in tie public sector, have remained stagnant or declined.

Social sector-Potic es
Reform. Between 1975 and 1986 tde health c-are sector expanded significantly. The number of doctors increased about fourfold, the number of
hospital beds douibled, and the number of nurses and midwives tripled. But
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in li ! ii(1-I9i180s health cure facilities began to deteriorate, an(I lealih tcare
lkmncllng was cttrtaile(l sever ely, duie to thle tecline in oil revenie. Morleovel,
a dec:line in available fbreign exchange shiarply cuirtailedl d!ruig imiiporLs. A
similar trend beset education ancd water supply, with new capitl.l spendling
coming no a halt The adjus-tmient policy was to increose the relalive share of'
ptillic expenditures on lnititii resotitces in relation to coiMimiercially orientted
activities. In thie later adjustilletnt periodl, the governutent sought to iini-.
ilize ilte negutive social consequences of thie acdjiustimient hy.providingmemployiernt programs in iltc publicsecLor, Iranspo-t siul)sidlies, and special alittese elThrts h ave been largely ad hioc and not
lowances f or civil ,servants Br,11
well designed:l
qJflnenlatill.AIs healthi care resoturces have declinedl, so too have Lhe
qtiality and-availability of services; in response; individuals and families have
bypassced :1r ptiblic healit by-tem. Likewise, the education system now faces
deteriorating facilities, a shortage of instrttctional materials, and high pupilteacher ratios.
State and local goverrments are responsilhle for providing primary and
secondary hiealth care. For state-level budg ets, the depreciation of the exchiange rate.meant that thiey received a highier stiare of naira earnings fromn
the federal govermnent, whose naira revenue rose after the new foreign
exchange regime w%-as introduced. A newv system f6r allocating oil revenue.
among the federal, state, and local governments has recently been implemen ted-a system diat will provide more resourees to Lhe states. The additional funds available to [tie states shouldl help them to restore some of the
social sector programs and services.
-.

Assessmetw The govemrnent wanted to protect the relative size of social
expenditures, particullarly in healtlh and education, although this was not
explicitly incltuded in the declared policy goals of the structural adjustmernt
prograam.The gover-nmentivas not quite successful. In 1988 the share-of totAl
public expenditures for eduication was only about one-half its shar-e in 1980
(IJNDP and Wlorld Bank, AfiicanDeveiofptient Indicators, 1992), and its share
during the striictural adjustment program is smaller than in the p-e-adjtistment crisis period. As a share of total federal expenditures, health care fares
somewvlatbetter-remaining at about 2 percent friom the mid-I 980s to 1990.
Furthermiore, tie adver-se effectortile fiscal indiscipline was compounded
by tde federal government's recent shift ofresponsibilities to lower levels of
government. In theory this move is desirable: govermment can respond more
effectively at the local level to the health and education needs of the people.
But responsibilities were decentralized with little prepar-atory time for the
local levels to assimilate and delegate their new responsibilities. With the
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With tdie recent change in oil-revenue shlaring that will provide mote funds

to state and local govermnent, social service entities shouild be -able to-discharge their responsibilities more efliciently.
Outcomes of the structural adjustment program
MacroeconotimicreforNigeria's adjustLnentprogram had a positive impact on aggregate outpuL By
1988 output rebounded froni its limited 2 percent growth in 1986 to growth
at almost 9 percent, spurred primarily by an increase in agricultural production. Between 1989 and 11991 overall GDP growth avenged 5.8 percernt annually, dotinated by the oil sector. Thlree key factors explain the robust
groh of GDP while the progress of reform has generally been unsatisFactory. First, oil production and expor-ts are not affected by public sector inefficiency and other policy distortions.. Second, the private sectoir, especially
the agncultural sector, has performed well, partly because some key reforms
have vastly improved the incentive structure and partly because some regulations have not been enforced and distortions have not materially affected
the private sector and agriculture. Third, capital has been used more efficiently and investmnent has increased somewhat
Outcomes according to otther macroeconomic indicators are not as
impressive and generally reflect inconsistent, stop-and-go progress in the
reform program. The fiscal and monetary.restraint envisaged by the structural adjustment program was pursued at the outset, creating low inflation
in 1986 (6 percent, due also to a good harvest and low food prices) and a
moderate 11 percent inflation in the following year. But the reflationary
budget of 1988 was the turning point, and iriflation soared. Although some
monetaxy contraction policies were pursued in 1989, their effect was slhortlived. Overall, the structural adjusttment program has not yet fully stabilized
the growth of money aggregates and prices.
Nigeria's exports are still dominated by oil, despite strong policies to
achieve broader growth and diversification. Between 1986 and 1988 oil export revenue remained steady. In 1989 oil export revenue increased, and a
further windfall occurred in 1990. Nonoil exports increased early on, but
fell back to 1985 levels and remained constant between 1989 and 1991. As a
result of demand management policies tightening imports and some recovery in oil exports, improvements in the balance of payments first appeared'
in 1989, and the current accountwas balanced for the first time since 1980.
In Ig90 the Gulf war led to higher oil prices, further improving the balance
of payments and creating the largest surplus in the current account. Yet the
surplus could not be sustained in 1991, because of a once again increased
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budget deficit and rapid growith of money supply, along wilh receding oil
prices after the Gulf war; die- overall balance of paymients deficit increased
fturfold fromii its 1990 level.
Nigetia borrowed heaVily during dlie oil booml, hut it also continuecd t1o
do so tliereafter, in order to compensate for declining oil revenue, Nigeria's
debt was mostly nonconcessional, wvitl expensive servicing costs in the I!acc
of rising interest rates. Nigeria's .large debt overlhang was a challenge to the
Structural adjustnent program. Consequently, debts were rescheduled and
some debtswere reduced: with tle linitedainountofnet borrowing, progress
has been made toward consolidating debt and resolving all service arrears.
Aggregate outp/tL Evidence suggests that thie structural adjustmnent prom-

gram had a significantly positive impact on aggregate output (table 6.2).
Because the structural adjustment program was implemented in the last
quarter of 1986, the observed growth in 1986 was limited-only about 2
percent of GDP in real terms. In 1987. a decline in crude oil output and
weather-induced declines in agticultutral production masked the positive
effects of the structural adjustment progran, and GDP remametd more or
less at the same level thatyean. In 1988 outputrebounded, and GDP grew by..
nearly 10 percent. This growth was led by the spurt in apgicultural production, which will be reviewed later. Higher producer prices prevailed for the
traditional export crops. The decline in nonoil, nonagricultural output of
15. percent from 1982 to 1986 was partially recouped duiing the 1g87-89
penod. Between 1989 and 1991, overall GDP growth averaged 5.8 percent
each year, dominated by the oil sector. The provisional estimate for GDP
growth I

1992 is 4.6 percenL

Table 6.2 Real growth of GDP, 1980-91
(parent)
YrQr
1980
1981
1982

Rate ofgrowth

.

1983

1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
989
990
1991
Average, 198085
Average, 1986-9 1
Source. World Bank data.

Published by iRepository, 2021

4.2
-10.7
-0.8
-6.7
-4.3
9.3
1.7
-0.2
9.8
6.7
5.6
5.1
-2.6
5.4

https://ir.iba.edu.pk/faculty-research-books/13

266

ApLJSI',rwtlwr: INARItwA: LIcsuNS rljttlh COUtrlgvti'C

SIUS

Th,e 5.5 percent grl ItIh in (W t'.ills inI o(Ilivstil I* iow thw econflIoly (mtZilldl
perorlolnce. TIrI'
attliin tllis r1t'e despite its tineven, lackluster reftrtl
explhnaotins stand! olit, lirsi, as notled arlier, tit! pire-diiuijsltent crisis lieI-intd coincided wvith a precipitolls d(ecline in oil revente, urnd1 grothmili diuring
Ithe d(idl tstlilent. period was litie largely to the recovery oi oil pirodclt-ion and
recven lti-as VIn
as It!l oh'll eiii Iiilirte o1 C,l)l' groawl 11 uheItr 19[.89. 01 nott!!elute
is that oil prodictnion and exports arve

annaged quite t'cibriently by dtie oil

enterprise; sinilari elliciencyin oil revenuv unmnageminent seenis to be ablsent.
l
prdgrlatll falltrtl,1
Second.l, although MjOr (:Cl0llponenlsof tI-lie reform
key reboruis (stch asthe exchange rate regime)- allotwed the plivIat e sector,
f h
i.oral oiu IDlto floulrishl. A review a'lzse
especiatlly suillholdlllTerX aIgritluie,lll
conles (presented later) suiggests thlat tlti refiwnlis hadlcd a strong positive inipactpIarticuilarly on agl-ricilltulr al

ot.itpiutglrowth, Wlich was

also helped

by thlie

good weather. Too, thlC privitte sector in Nigeria is robust ;anci, despite inefficiencies and distortions in the public sector, mianagedl. to grow ata reason-

able rate. Sone oftheadjustinent efornis lielped, as didl illlpC ;o-artns (tlhlough
partially enfiorced) and higih tarliTi. A sector-specific analysis of n-ational aC-

counts indicates thiait, between 1986 ancl 1991, value addedl in tih.agriculture, petroleumii, and service sectors grew annually by an average of 4.8, 3.6,

and 6.1 percent, respectively; these percentages contiast sIrplly wvith the*
percentages for the 1980-85 period (0.4, A.4,:and 0.8 percenht respectively).
Thus, each of tiese major sectors contribu ted to growth, and growth in LWo
of the sectors, aglicuilture and services, wvas led by thle private sector.
Third, investment trends help explain the robustness of GDP growth as
the reforms faltered. If investmnent growtvh is strong (particularly in the p4ivate sector, since public investmentremains inefFicient), GDP growtl can be
fairly highi. As analyzed later, total investnent recovered soinewhat diinng
thle structural adjustmient program, but the investrnent-to-GDP ratio still
remains low. Even a low investnient-to-GDP ratio can yield a good-rate of
growth if investment efficiency improves mIarkedly. Some evidence of thaL
improvem ent exists.
Inflation. Stabilization has not been fully achieved andIhas adversely -tffected inflattion. Despite a comparatdvely low inflation rate in 1986 and 1987
(due to good harvests), aVerage inflation between 19.86 and 1991 was 24
percent, compared witli an 18 percent rate between 1980 and 1985 (table
6.3). The fiscal and monetary restrain t envisaged by the structural adjustment
progamn was eitiher abandoned or notpursued vigorously fromn the outset.
Credit to diie federal governmentincreasedby 12 percernt in 1987. Although
net foreign assets fell by 39 percent, net credit to the private sector remained
relatively strong, all of wlhich increased the supply of money by 23 percent in
1987. While the inflation rate was mnoderate in 1987, the reflationary l)udget
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of 1988 le to somie of Ithe largest inflation rtles ever in Nigeria. Duiring 1988
plices started to respond to monetary developments withI a lag.. IPolicy slip-

pa,ges of 1988 and die subse(Inent increase in tle buidget deficit led to an
increase in monetary aggreates, and the inflation rate reached nearly 55

percent that year.
In 1989 the govermin enL souglitag.tin lo stabilize dhe economyand cuib
tdie lligh rate orinflation by introdiucing dr-astic monetary control-for example, increasing tlhe discouint rain to raise the liquidity ratio, aind trnsferring public-sector deposits. The effect of in unetaty contr-action was not felt
until 1990, when the inflation rate declined tojust over 7 percent. Howevter,
in 1990 -broad money expanded again by nearly 40 percent, mnost in tile lat-

ter half of that year. This Was due to an incre-ase in over all financial credit to
ent (ty about 15 percent) and an increase in borTowing by the.
private sector from the financial system (by abouit 20 percent). The inflation
the govermin

rate rose to 13 percent in 1991., and as noted earlier, the cuirrent account
deficit widened once again.
Overall, tie adjustment policies stabilized the growth of money aggregates and prices only duiing die initial year of the program. After the
reflationary budget of 1988, the inflation rAte increased sharply, and the
monetary squeeze and some fiscal austerity in 1989 hlad only a temporary
effect. That the structural adjiustinent programn hias not stabilized monetary
Table 6.3 Money suppi and the rate of inflation, 1980-91
(bElions ofnairas, except where othervise specified)
Total net
domestic
credit

Net domestic
aedit to
government

Net domestic
credit to private
sector and other

Money phls
quasi-money

8.8
15.0

1.8
5.8

7.0
9.2

14.4

10.0

1981

.15.2

20.8

1982

20.8

10.1

10.7

16.7

7.7

1983

26.8

15.2

19.0

23.2

1984

29.5

17.4

11.6
12. I

21.2

39.6

1985

30.8

17.7

13.1

23.2

5.5

1986
1987

34.5
41.9

17.9
19.8

16.6
22.1

23.6
28.9

5.7
11.4-

1988

52.7

25.3

27.4

38.4

54.5

1989

45.8

17.5

28.3

44.i

50.4

1990

52.8

19.0

33.9

62.1

7.4

1991.

73.8

31.2

42.6

82.7

13.0

growh rate,
1980-85(ercent)

58.0

164.0

31.0

27.0

18.0

Average annual
growth rate,
1986-91 @ercent)

36.0

29.0

.43.0

58.0

24.0

Year

1980

Inflation
(percent)

Average annual

Source: Central Bank of Nige-ria; IMF, Intemrniortal fincnciol Statisics.
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policies is pairlicriltaly inanifest. in thle rapidly depreciating exchiange rates
and die growing grap between tlie olficial and die pairallel exchange rates.

hI.vestwentI.

and savintig. Prior to the structur-al adjutstment program, tlhe

Nigerian economtiy did reasonably well duuring the oil looiis. When windfall
savings were relatively highi, invesunentexpanded signiricantly. Wlhen domestic savings fell short or investment, foreign savings complemented domestic
savings to finance investnient. In itselfthis practice would notlhave lheen bad
for tie country, butithe quiality of investment was poor, not only creating the
debt overhang, but also leading: to the poor growvth performance of die
economny. Aggregate investment increased dramatically in the 1970s, peaking around 1979. During 1980 and 1981 the investment share declined,
dtouigh it still remained high by historical standards. After 1983 the investment share fell drastically, while GDP growth went up steadily. In the 198285 crisis pertiod, GDP growth and investmnent moved in opposite directions,
which is a clear indication of the dismally poor quLality of the investment at
the titne of tde oil boom.'.
The structural adjustment program has clearly improved tie efficiency
of investtmient, as evidenced by the movement of investmentsharesand GDP
growth (figure 6.2 traces the investment shares ofGDP and GDP.growtlh rates).
While the investnent shares and GDP growth clearly moved in opposite dir.
rections before 1986, they have since moved more in parallel. If measured at
1984 prices, investment shares are still declining. However, since 1986 GDP
growth has been increasing, clearly slhowing the efficiency component of

Figure 6.2 Investment and GDP growth, 1976-91
Percent (GOP growth in 7987 prices)
30
_

_
/

I~~~~~~~~nves-unent/

~~~~~~~GDP (current)

20-

~~~~~~I
nvestment /

o

-.GDP (1984)
10-

GDP growth

-10
1976

1978

Source: World Bank data.
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Table 6.4 Investment as a share of GDP, 1973-90
(peicenz,)

Type ofinivestment

Private
Public
Total

1973-80

1981-B3

4.67

.
..

11.37

l8a5

16.03

1984-8b

1986-90

1.67
5.70
7.37

3,70
8,70
12.40.

Not available.
Source: World Bank data for 1973-80;.International Firance Corpotatiot dati ror 1981-90.

investinentafter 1986. Growth in GDP during the structural adjustment prograin can tlius be attributed in part to the increased efficiency of investment.
Slhares of investment have.risen sliglhtly from the crisis period (table 6.4),
but Nigeria hias not yet attained the rates it lhad experienced in the first hialf
of the 1970s.The trend is similar for domestic savings. The rate of savings rose IIIarkedly during the oil boom period, but plummeted between 1984 and 1986.
After the structural adjustment prograrm was implemented, the savings rate
remained depressed, and aswithinvestment, the savings rate will recoveronly
when growth in aggregate GDP can be sustained.
Export gvowVth A key objective of the structural adjustment program is to
create export growth and diversification. Despite strong export-supporting
policies, nonoil exports have not picked up, and Nigeria continues to rely
heavily on oil exports. Progress toward diversifying the productive base and
increasing recorded oil exports to $1 billion has not been realized. This
outcome exists despite the fact that exporters were able to reap the parallel
market premium at a time when the premium was high. One point is that
the unofficial production for export markets seems to be considerable. Although dependable estimates-are unavailable, one study estimates tiatNigerian textiles now supply as much as 30 percent of the needs of the low-income group in the West Africa subregion (Mosley 1992). The same study
also estimates thatabout one-halfofNigerian cloth consumptionin die early
1980s was coming from neighboring countries, particularly C6te d'Ivoire and
Cameroon. Although agricultur al exports grew rapidlv in the early years of
the structural adjustment program, they tapered off in later years, and overall growth was not as rapid as expected (table 6.5 summarizes exports and
balance of payments).
Balance of payments. The developments in the world oil market significantly affect Nigeria's balance of payments-particularly debt service and
capital inflows. In .1986 oil accounted for more than 90 percent of total exports, but the value of oil exports declined to $6.4 billion, only about 25
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percenL of thkeir M'altle in 11980. Thie overall balance of payllenLs dleficit in

1986 reacdied an all time hiighi of $8.5 billion. In 1987 oil prices and expotirs
increased, as dlicd nonoil export earnings. Inpot-s of goods and selvices also
declined considerably ater the 1986 devaluation, redlucing the overall dleltcit somewihat. With oil prices again weakening in 1988, earnings dropped mt
f1986 levels. Imports aigain cleclined in real termis cdurting 1987 (by 29 percerit), and dropped by an additional 4 percent. in 1988. Current account
deficits dluring these years were financed Llirotolui extermal reserves and in-

terest arrears.
Due Lo the continuous conipression ofiuports and somiie recovery in oil
exports, the balance of paymllents improved somelwiat in 1989, and the current accountmwas balanced for thle first time since 1980. The balance of payments again improved in 1990, because thie Gulf var led to hiigher oil prices.
Thnus, the ctitent account had a surplus of $2 billion, and the overall deficit
was reduced by nearly 70 percent in 1990. In 1991 a shalrp, nearly fourfold
-increase in the balance of pamnents deficit was again recorded, because
-expors fell on weaker oil prices and iwiuporti spending accelerated strongly.
Overall, the structural adjiutinent program has had only a sliglht imiipact

on the balance of payments. The record deficit of 1986 has been redtuced
but a substantial current account deficit continued until 1989, when the

cuttent account was balanced for the first time. Although the oil price has
been the prime detertninant of the balance of payments, stabilization policies did help in reducing the extermal imbalance. Devaluation compressed
import demand-wvhich has helped reduce the overall balance of paynienLs
Table 6.5 Exports and overall balance-or payments, 1980-91
(U5$ bilhlis)

Ctirrent
account
bdonce

Exports

Year
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
Ratio of 1985to 1980
Raftoof 1991 to 1986
Source: IMF staff estimates.
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PL-traleirn

Othaer

Total

25.0

1.0
0.6
0.3
0.4
0.3
0.4
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.4
0.4
0.4
0.4
1.0

26.0
17.8
12.2
10.4
11.9
12.6
6.8
7.5
7.0
9.8
13.9
12.1
0.5
1.8

17.2
.

11.9
10.0
11.6
12.2
6.4
7.0
6.4
9.4
13.5
11.7
0.5
1.8

.

4.5
-5.9
-6.7
-5.0
-1.0
-0.2
-4.4
.

-1.7
-2.6.
0.0
2.0
0.0
-0.0
0.0

Overall
bdonce
. 4.5
-6.2
-5.3
-5.B
-0.4
-0.1
-8.4
4.3
4.9
-1.5
-0,6
-2.3
.0.0
03

https://ir.iba.edu.pk/faculty-research-books/13
-N;gr,":vnun

4ifl>Z/Mmatlll
ons

27/

dlefitcit. 1Irogress lowardI diversii}in g exports atndl aichieving nctn)i(l export
growthl
as l)een slight. rie largest smrplus in 1lwc current account t:ame in
1990, will 1tle oil price hilke induicedl by tvae Giilfm-r. Bly 1I)1 die ilcurrent
ac:couint no longer contained a suirplus, .mc tlie overall (leficit increwsed.
fouilroldi frolml its 1990 level.
External dlebt. Duiring the oil bootil years in die early 1970s, Nigeria borrowed heavily from the international ca1pital uii.rket. Latert wlhen oil revenu.e
fell, iLCcontinuie(l to borrow in an effor t to comnpensate for the 1nss. Nigeria's
debltis primaiwrily nonconcessional, andc it ha-s been forced to inicet expensive
servicing costs in the face of rising interest rates-particula.irly dilfficultwlhn
thie country's oil revenuies were (leclining. Nigerhi's large debt overhlang
treated a difficult iniplei entittion environmient ror tiesstircttil adjistimet
program. Since 1.98 Nigeria has
LSpai artn average of5 percentofGDP in delbt:
serNice,C equitalent to 21 percent of export eatnings and 25 percenL of Fedeml expenditures.
Whatimpact has tlie structtulrl adjustmentprog-arn had on tle external
debtburcden? Somne relief has comue throughli debttresclhedtiling. Yet asshowfn
clearly in table 6.6, Nigeria's debt has growvn in the -adjustnentperiod.fion
tde reschedlutling of gtuaranteed and nonguaranteed trade a-rears, promissor-y notcs, the capitalization of interest on long-term debt, and adjustment
Valuation. Of die additional stock of outstanding debt, less than 5 percent
has come from-n net borrowing. Butdespite die overall debt burden, progress
Table 6.6 Evolution of debt outstanding, 1980-91
(US$ mitions).
Resclteduflng
Net

outstanding

0
0
0
1,920
345
1,416
4,277
5,247
1,624
1,146
-87
716

1,017
2,078
2,744
3.075
-788
1,747
6,017
9,308
594
1,937
1,592
666

4,284
6,362
9,106
12,181
11,393
13,139
19,156
28,464
29,058
30,994
32,586
33,253

5,510

3,6B I
12,923

9,873
20,114

5,060

16,605

29,986

borotring

1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991

1,122
2,256
2,917
1,723
-302
-1,075
94
991
357
871
-543
-91
6,641

-105
-178
-173
-569
-832
1,406
1,646
3,070
-1,387
-8
1
2,221
41
-451

1,679

8,321

1980-85
1986-91

Total

applicable.
Soturce: World Bank data.
-Not
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towr
izllonstilidlaling
c
dehiz, aknd ll.1 servzice} atrrears hIave bee!tn
tIhI-ro ighi rescitedifding, consolidation, andl somie redtidcions.

haes l)cen wladet
resolved}

Prat i clioto .snrrwsvr

-

gncu
ifurn In agric:ttltre, the structural adt!ilstl1ent- programl songt

largely to chiknge ilw incenlive anci price striiC
alltae 1.) eni aln ce agricuitural
pr odulctioin, Vaise rtrlal incomes, andt iliake tlie regionail imix of crop prodlIc-

Lion more efficient. As noted, the key measures vere. tLade libei-alization.,
exchange rate ref'ormiis, antd the abolition of dlie comtnodity boards. But special interest rates on riral loans-vere also remoived, and agricultural credit
was mlaldle miore wNtidelyavail,able. Altlhoiughi not consistentvith.dte structural

adjustment program's liberldization policies, selected imports were banned
to promiiote domestic production.
- -

The
strullctulral adIustIment programn has affected different products in

different ways. For instance, the production of twYo key foodcrops, cassava
and maize, increasedi rapidlyas produiction techinology becamite iucre sophisticated. Blit the adjistiment Policies set these technologies to uise, because
they fi-eed tup labor-in tie rural sector. In a recent report by the central bank,
an azgregate picture oFthie moivemientorfreal prices and growth is based on
two broad categories-export crops and foodcrops. The central bank data'
show that both food and export crop produirction has risen since 1986-the
averiage index of export crop pr-oduction bynearly45 percent, an.d oodrcrop
produIction by 60 percent (table 6.7). Yet, whereas die impact of the strtuc
Table 6.7 Agricultural prices and output, 1980-90
(1980= 100)
Export crops
Real prices
P,oduction

Year

Foodcrops
tiecl prices
Production

1980
1981
1982
1983

100
89
95
79

100
94
88
78

100
116
120
112

100
102
112
94

.1984
1985
Structurat adjustrnent pefiod

65
78

118
1iO

131
110..

125
137

102103

93
69
105

153
145
193

69
76

216
212

114.3
86.4

111.7
183.8

1986
1987
1988

1989
1990
Averages
1980-85
1986-90

99
241
185
147
125

.

Source: Centnal Bank of Nigenra.
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tu-al adjustmient programi on exptiicr l-Op pi-ic-es was significaintly positive,
the centr.al kink's lbodcrop puice index actually went down. But suichl
noinpirice falctoIs as tlit! z-lilbilit+*ofiittported teclinolngy, ilmproved infrastrctuire, and the weatlher maiy he more imnpolrtant cleterminants of thle dir:
ference. In 1987-88, the slhirts in (demnand ibr locally produced Food related
to llte structuratl adjustment program, as weltsiL. te effect of thle 1987-88drougllh, led to an increase in tood prices (table 6.8).

-

For cash crops, the marnket-leternnined exchange rate led to large dcniestic priceincreasesin 1987-88, often oFlOO to 200.percentahove tie 1986-

87 plices. The demiise of tlhe comnidio{hty boards allowed farmers to reap thle
benefits of the price incre-ases. By 1988 dotiiestic pnices for cocoa, palm oil,
*and cotLon were wvithin 10 percent of the bor-der price; berbre the structural

adjustment prognuii, they were muclh fulrther below. For cotton, die [Ian on

imporlted inptuts for die domlestic textile industuy was a boon to procduicdonl,
increwasing the acreage under cultivation by 50 percent in 1986-87. Table 6.9
illustrates tde significant increase in export value of cotton and rubber during 1981-90.
The structurt-al adjustmentprogramn thus removed several key strctutral

barriers to agnic ilttrlal production. As awhole, the sector has responded well
to tle new incentive structure effected by hie structural adjustmen t program.
Total agricultural otutput grew by more than 4 percent in the five-year postadjustm:ient periodO, compared wvith near stagnation in the.five-year period
before aujustrieuit. In export agriculttire in the pre-adjustment period, a

combinaton of depressed prices due to macroeconomic policies and a
Table 6.8 Real prices of major food commodities, 1980-90
(1980 100)
Year
1980
1981
1982
1983

1984
1985
Structural adjustrnent period
1986
1987
198
1989
1990
Averages
19B0-85
1986-90
Source: Central Bank of Nigeria.
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Maize

Yams

Rice

100
131
99
89
91
142

100
116
129
106
97
68

100
107
75
71
87
108

12B
41
82
79
55

75
39
72
67
59

108.7
77.0

102.7

.

62.4

.

Cassva

Mlillet

(gan)

Sorghum

100
128
134
145
100
68

100
107
135
131
204
131

lOG
100
III
91
122
96

99
87
102
102
95

53
65
I10
82
71

94
82
139
113
91

63
59
103
70
67

91.3
97.0

112.S
75.0

134.7
103.8

105.0
72.4

.

0
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mairketing systeni doiminated hy die pulIic sector vir-tuially climlinatted soi:le
crops Irom export (cotton, grouindni ts, and paltim oil) an(I drastically recdlIce(l
other crop exports (cocoa, ruibber, and palmIt kernel). In the post-adjustmeni
period, cotton and groundnut exports revived, aind iIport substitution in
suchi crops as paint oil incre-ased. Mor e ihiportant, domestic Food prodtiction inicreased betveen 1982-85 and 19486-90; the giain eqluivalent Lonnage
ofall domestic foods increased by more than 31 percent, yielding -an annual
growthi rate of nearly 5 percent.

On the downside for farnners, dite structura.l adjustment progiam has
increased the price of inputs. For fbodcrops, prices rose fr(r stiulchinptuts as
pesticides and lIerbiddes and in inor farmiingfilhplements.Yet their increased
costwas compensated for by the easing ofthe Ltabor constraint after die structural adjustment prog nm.In addition to the purchased inputs, the tree CrOpS
sector must also replace plants and mnachinery. Althotughl erttilizer is heavily
subsidized, the absence of-adequate supplieslwhe tdiey are required remnains
problematic. However, fat-n budget analyses of several crops (sorghtum,
cotton, millet/cowpea, andrmaize/sorglhum) indicate that net real retrins
to farmning, especdally net real returns to family labor, have increased at least
three to four times betveen 1983-85 and 1991.
industay. The industrial sector consists largely -of dlie core indulstrial
projects controlled by the public sector, and die manufacturing sector. The
federal government established the core industrial projects ptimiarily to provide basic inputs for downstream industries. Many of the core industrial
projects were the product of tde oil boom and all of theimi reflect the inadequacyof the public sector in-producingmarketable goods andservices. The
performance of core industrial projects was grossly inefficient before the

structural adjustment program and has remnained so.
The manuFacturing sector grew rapidly in tie 1970s: froi 4 percent of
GDP in 1973 to 13 percent in 1983. This growth. was ascribed to increases in
investment supported by oil revenue, rather tlan to productiv.ity gains.
Table 6.9 Value of selected cash crop exports, 1986-90
(US$

minltons)

Comrnodity

Cocoa
Cotton
Rubber
Palm kemels

1986

1987

1988

265.0
0.2
21.6
5.0

375.0
0.7
24.2
8.0

325.0
8.3
52.3
15.0

Notavailable.
a. Estimated.
Source: Central Bank of Nigeria; World Bank staff estimates.
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181.4'

88.5'
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However, expansion intoc the early 1980s was largely im!port-dlependent,
encouiraged bIy ta ri if-distorted incentives, Assemnbly-type ac tivities ltat relied

heavily on imports predominated in t1he manifiactuing sector and Contitbtitedl little to local valuie adided or enmploymient. Domestic va.lued added
amiounted to only 14 percent of

t[ie

value of gross ou1tput, and imiore thlan

two-thircs oftraw maW
tteriatl was iniportedl. The export onmantifactured goods
vas virtuially nonexistenL. As roreign exchange became scarce, capacity utilizadion declined.
The structural adjusninent program souiglht to correct the distorted in-

centive strUcture that erncouiraged excessive dependence on imporLs. The
short-ternn strategy of the government was to provide a sharp injection of
imports to enable produtiction to recover. The imedium-tenrm objective w:as to

develop local teclinoogy,ravw materials, and intemiediate inputs. The structural adjulst lnent program sought to provide the enabling conditions for
achieving these goals by creating a reaistic foreign exchange-rate, liberalizing trade to make necessary imnports more accessible, removing ex-factory
price controls, and creating an appropriate tariff structure.
lantufacuriingfroduction.Manufacturing outputincreasedby 5.1 and l2.9
percent in 1987 and 1988, compared with a decline in manufacturing output of 3.9 percentin 1986. The significarttgrowth is attributed to local sourcing of domestic inputis for nianuhcturers of food and beverages, soap and
detergents, tires and tubes, textiles, and clothing.
The results of a World Bank survey of selected manufacturing enterprises indicate the impact of the structural adjustment program on a sibgroup of firms. Based on a survey of 100 enterprises in the main industrial
areas of tde country, the performance of tie sector has improved-growing
at 5 and 8 percent in 1987 and 1988, respectively. The scarcity of foreign
exchange in die first six months of 1989 caused stagnation in die sector.
The improved foreign exchange position in the latter half of 1989 was offset by tiglht credit constraints.
Among the subsectors that benefited from the foreign exchange and
trade reforms were domestic-resource-based industries-including wood
products and furniture, textiles, rubber, minerals, and certain food produIcts (table 6.1 0). The textile subsector performed markedlywell-more than
doubling production between 1986 and 1989, on the heels of a decline of 40
percent beaveen 1981 and 1986 (table 6.11).
In contrast, the import-intensive and low dornesticvalue added subsectos
such as electronics andvehicle assembly did not perform wvell, largely because
their previouLs survival had depende-d on an overvalued exchange rate and
heavy protection from imports.
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Maufacluin-igcapdtty utilizatiom. The Worild Bank's surlvey results indi-

cate diat capacity tuilization increkased fronti 42 percent in 1986 to 50'percent in 1988, but declined diereai'ter. Data fr omn the Manulicturers' Association of'Nigeria indicate tlhat capacity utilization fell-to 31 percent in the
first haoll' '1989, recovered in the seconcd hal of thc year, and rose to 38,5
percent in 1990. I-ligh catpacity utilization is evident in stibsectors that -are
doimiestically resouirce intensive, wvihereas low capacity, utilization occut-ed
in import-intensive suibsectors (see. table 6.10). According to the World Bank
isurvey, the highlest capacity uitilization-friom 64 to 80 percent-was found
in textiles, rubber, and nonmetallic mnineral products. The capacity utilization of electronics and electrical enterprises was miiuclh lower-about 26
-percent., In velhicle assefll)bly plants,' capacity utilization reli to as low as 7
'percent. A direct relationship exists between capacity utilization and the uise
-of dom1estic inputs. Capacity utilization among fimns that responded to the
newv incentive structture by using domestic inputs tended to be higher.

Itnvestnt. The World Bank survey resulLs indicate thatmanufacturing
investment in thie post-adjuLstment period has been quite limited, although.respondent-s noted plans to miiake investments in die future. Hence, oultput
hasgrown because existing capacityliasgrrown, notbecause newvinvestnient
has started to grow. Yet it is incertain how much additional growth can be
obtained from existing investments that fall into disrepair as they lie idle.
Exparts. Exports of manufactured goods have not increased as would be
expected withl die simplification of export procedures and die devaluation
Table 6.1 0 Average capacity, utilization rates and local sourcing of
raw materials, 1986-88
(percent; aighted acerage)

Share ofrav

mnatenials from
Capacity utdiaitiorf
Subsector

1986

1987

1988

locl sources
1988

Food, beverages, and tobacco
Nonmetallic mineral products
Wood products and fumrire
Electrical and electronk-s
Domestic and industrial rubber
Paperproducts and printing
Leather products
-50.4
Textles
Basic chernicals and pharrmaceuticals
Engneering industries
Aggregate average (percent)

44.2
81.1
37.0
37.3
59.2
3.2

50.9
83.2
42.8
37.8
69.0
19.3
50.4
56.8
21.3
25.0
47.4

55.7
79.3
53.7
27.3
79.0
22.2
49.5
79.1
35.3
20.0
50.6

50.6
80.4
85.1
12.3
-34.4
26.0
79.8
42.6
4.2
22.2
43.7

47.9
15.5
30.0
42.5

Note: Weijhted by firm value of outp ut and subsedoral value-added weights.

Source. World Bank data.
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abandoned

Table 6.11 Manufacturing production, q uarterly average, 1974--9
(1972= loo)
4 Aetrge
Akeroge
Avewrg
hPeo

-

X

Sugar and confectIonenres
Sott drinks
Beer and stout
Cotton textiles
Synthetic fabrics
Footwear
Paints and allied products
Refined petroleum
Cement

Rdofing sheets

.

1984-86

98.8
729.0
445.7
211.5
1,204.5
106.8
349.4
31 1.3
182.2

40,1
755.5
508.7
86.0
548.8
41.9
186,81
270.5

180.9

-

Vehide assembly
Radio changers and telenision sets
Soaps and detergents
Total

1974-83

.

2,641.3
321.5
454.2
363.8

.

308.1
887.5
176.9
294.4
313.6

19Y87-89
43.8
1,047.3
492.4
143.5
4,359.3
23.1
162.3
341.2
328.2
.

189.2
281 .9
339,2
1963
484.7

Source: Central Bank of-Nigeria (1992).

of the naira. One of the reasons is that official statistics underestimate exports, particularly in the presence of unofficial trading with neighboring
countries, for example, for such consumer goods as textiles and soap;
Employment. Employment in the manufacturing sector dedined despite
increased output and lower wages because private firmss have streamlined
operations in order to control operating costs. The overall structure of employment has changed, with the greattst decline evident among expatriate
employees and unskilled workers..With the contraction in fonnal sector
employment, the informal sectorappeas to have grown. The limited evidence
available suggests that the number of skilled workers and professionals has
not declined, and may in fact have increased.
Imnpot bans on vannufacuring.Approximatelyone-thlird of industiialvalue
added remains protected by import bans. In some instances, smugglers circumvent the bans; in other cases, import bans on certain textiles impede
export production. For manufricturing the bans affect beverages, bakery
products, garments, and wood products.
Social sectar
Poverty is fairly widespread in Nigeria. Based on a 1985-86 household survey, the Nigeria Food and Nutrition Sector Report has estimated that about
18 percent of the population is food-insecure. Unfortunately, no reliable and
*comparabledata are available from other years (particularly recent years)
to show the trend in poverty in the post-adjustment years. Furtlhennore, the.
Published by iRepository, 2021
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ilmpact orausterity nieasures uliie to the decline in oil revenues can blur rhte
impact of auister ity measiire itnpose d by stn ic tural Id j0astinent. TI e weakening of oil niirkets reduced Nigeria's exporttreventie in- real termls, sim1111taneouisly redticing per capita incotne. In 1987 GNP per capita was estdinated
at $370, wilichi is muct lowIer than the $850 in 198283, du1e in part, to tile
overvaluation of tlie naira. Even wihen previous naira devaluations. are accounted for, Lhe consequent drop in per capita incomile is substantial and
reflecLs at growing hardship on a large section of the poptulation. Since 1987
GNP per capita lss increased, and if it cran be awssulled diaL tihe structural
adjustmientprogrAim dic not matetially change die incomiie distribution, tlhe
poor wouild not be worse off in 1991-92 in cornnpar ison witil 1986-87. IHloWever, they still could be wodrse off coipared witd the oil boom years of the
early 1980s. In die absence of relevantrountertictuals (tirt is, e'stimates orf
poverty in the absence of the structuln1 adjustiment program), tle worse-off
situation during the adjustnent years in comnpatison withl the oil boom years
could be inappropriately ascribed to tie structural adjustment program.
Since per capita income growth was positive during the adjustment years,
the relevant question is howv income distribution was affected by the structural adjustment program.
Among die directresults of thle structural adjustment program-and most
significant-was the distributional effect of the exclhange rate reform. The
transfer of monopoly rents from those who lhad privileged access to foreign
exchange before the structural adjtustment program was significant In the
agricultural sector, producers of cash crops gained during the initial period,
but foodcrop producers initially faced higlher input costs without higher
output prices. Food prices recovered only after 1988. The retail prices of all
foodcrops increased between 1986-87 and 1989-90, in part because unusually good harvests allowed food prices to hit record. low levels in 1986 and
1987. Higher.food'-prices in recentyears have imposed greater hardships on
some people. While food prices rose ata much faster rate than nonfood pnces
in 1988, the tvo rose at about die same rate in 1989 and 1990. Overall, the
real plice of food actually cleclined during die adjustment years (see table
6.7), and the net impact on the poor should be positive, although recent
increases may have caused some hardslip. The critical Factor is the real income of the poor-whetler it has remained the same or increased. The
position of the poor actually improved during the structutal adjustment
program. Since the production of food also increased (table 6.7), the net
position of food producers should be positive or neutiral
Urban dwellers were genemally hitharderby the austerity program, which
began before. the structural adjustment program, because of resource scarcity. Altdough, as noted earlier, the real incomes of some self-employed.urban groups (artisans and businessmen) improved somewhat, most urban
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wages declined or remalined stagnant since 1986. Tlhe real incomiies of civil
seivants appear to have declined by about one-1ralf lbetween 1984 and 1980.
On the other hand, rieal income in rural areas increased by about. 40 percent
between 1985 and l989 according to a rood securityand-nutrition report of
1990. Tlhus, one clear imnpact of tde structural adjtustment progranm is. the
clrange in the relative lncome position of ruiral and urban areas. During the
1970s-especially after the first oil boomn -urban incomic imnptroved, and tlhe
gap between urban and rural incomes widened. Dunrng the 1980s the urban
and rural income gap narrowed from about 58 percent in 1980-81 to about
8 percent in 1984-85. In 1985-86 tie gap was almost totally closed, and tle
X
gap reversed in favor of rural areas after 1986.
Although tde oil boom had a limited impacL on the lives and well-beingX
of most people in Nigeria, there is some indication that living conditions
improved, in some respects and for some people, during the oil boom years.
For example, the primary scchool enrollment-rate increased from 42 percent
in 1060 to 98 percent at its peak in 197-S0.
With the end of the oil boom and the beginning of-a'crisis between 1984
and 1986, some indicators of well-being slhowed a dedine, while a few remained constant or even improved slightly (table 6.12). For example, pzimary school enrollment rates fell to about 80 percent in 1985-86. Mter the
structural adjustnent program was initiated, some welfare indicators stagnated or declined somewhat. The adult literacy rate, primary school enrollment ratio, and secondary.school enrollment ratio show a continued downward trend since the crisis years. However, health and welfare indicators
continued to improve: life expectancy contin. es to rise, andinfantmort.ality
rates continue to decline.
The progress in welfare and health indicators seems to be consistentwith
other available data-on access to water andwith social expenditure data.Access
to safe water seems to have improved from 41 percent in 1986 to 46 percent
Table 6.12 Social indicators, selected years, 1978-90
Indicator
Life expectancy(ears)
Infant mortality (deaths
per 1,000 live births)
Aduh illiteracy (percent)
Prmary school
enrollment ratio
Secondary school
enrollment rato

1989

1990

1978-80 1984

1985

1986

1987

1988

47.3

49.3

49.7

50.1.

50.5

50.8

51.2

51.5

120.0
66.0'

110.4

108,5
57.0

106.7

104.9

102.8

..

..

..

..

100.6
49.0

98.5
49.3

98.0

81.0

82.0

..

68.0

72.0

70.0

15.7

,.

29.0

26.0
2.

.21.0

19.0

Not avaibble.
a. Refersto 1980 onlr.
Source World Bank World Tobles 199Z UNDP ard World Bank, Afican Dewlopment Indicators, 1992; World

Bank data; World Ban k,Social Indicwtrs of Development 1991-92.
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in 19}88. Sim;ilaily, Alt.lhlough Iotal rl>derabl expenclittues on healtih in I 990 were
*about 40 percent or their viltie in 1W81 lit,Ith care. expenditurcs show a
constant trend-renmining at. al)rout. 2 percent of total government spend-

ing in the midl-l UOs uintil now. The continued ellf'ct of fiscal austelity an(
thle clecline in oil revenue led to a decline in tlie absolute ani rielative size of'
sonicll soc;itl expenditures. In 1187-88 eduication receivel only one-half ol'
whatL it received in 1-980.
In concluision, Nigeria's ac4jiistLient experience d:1early cl(einionsti-ates die
beniefits and the cliallenges of'iniplementfing strLuctural adj ustinent. On ilhe
-acijustment program has tirade itpossibleuf'or.die
bieneclftside, [lie str'uctural
economy to reverse tde decline anti achiieve a reasonable 1rate of'growili. The
the lack of sustained progress on tle- refolnlus. A.
challenges are evident fromI
comprelhensive strlulctur-al rel'onrm program requires pursuing structural
changes on several fronts simultaneously. Some elemtients ofdie refonni program proceeded more cfl'ectively and tenaciously than others. Perhiaps miost
iinportant of all is tie attainment of stabilization-a goal thiati las proven
difficult in Nigeria. Attaining multiple targets siniultaneously is even tnore
challenging in a situationwhere dile core group of civil seivants is either unailble
or unwilling to effectively manage implementation of comiiplex reformls.
Nigeria's adjustment experience, however, proves that the results and iitn-

pact of die program woulC have been even more impressive, and would be
sustainable, if ihe progress of die refor-m were consistent and unifonn.
Appendix 6A. Initial distortions and policy progress
under the structural adjustment program (SAP)
Fiscalpolicy attd managetmett

Initial situation/disiurtlin.The fiscal deficit in 1980 was about 7 percent
During the oil boom, public investment growth reflected die basis for capital-intensive projects. Public enterptises, before the SAP, were vehicles to distribute oil riches and genetate business and emnploym-rent for selected groups.
SAP refrwm. SAP reformis aimed at reducing tie deficit to 4 percent by
1988 and improving budgetary planning and control through:
* A three-year rolling plan of public investment.
* Bringing tde state and local governments within the context of a macroeconomic framework.
Assesswent ofprogressin refmns Overall progress in-achieving fiscal policy
goals is poor. The fiscal reformi objective was essentially abandoned by the
1988 budget, and a number of tle reforms were only on paper and not sexiously pursued. The 1989 budget made anrother attempt to return to lighter

fiscal policies, but the attempt was not sustained.
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A'onctrtty Pothiy.
in flintituationIdi.siomunWithII ,I signniln ficldy developed financial systenm,
Niger-ia's financial depth as measuLmtt-d hy thLe relatiVe Size of M2 increased
ovt lie.Broatd
r
tinon cy co utirnted for 9 percent.of CI-I' in 19610, In itbby 1H0,--M2 increased to 23 percent .ol' GDP. Nigeria experienced timprecedlented
monetary expansion in 1986,

S- AP rfntr Tl e SAP ainued itt reversing th e expansionary bidget, reducting inflationary plressures, and eipihrasizing a Iimore Miarket-oriented. financial system. The SAP incluided tiglkt. imionetary policies.to cont'ain wavg,es itifprices in the Face of'dlealltiation.r

In 1989. ltie central bank ituplemlented

restrictive monetaiy policies.

- Assessmlent of rogress in refiniltX. ThIeX monetary

restraint ptursu ed since

1986 waus abandoned in 1987-88 when imoney supply increased by 28 percent per year. In 198 alittemlpts

lo

slow Imoney

stupply growthl resuilted in atn

11 percent decrease. BuiL this inonetary control was not sustainedi, and in
1990 broadi mone'y increased by 40 percent. Thte monetar-y expansion was
due to thie governmenfts railure to ensiure stustained sterilization of foreign
exchange inflows.

Exchitnige rate wnian.gement

initialsituationl/disladfian.By mnid-1986 the naira became highily overIvalued. The black ma-rket rate was N 3 to US$1, agrainst thle official rate oF N 1
to US$1.

SAP refo"ln.

EX-CllangC

I-Ate r-efoi-mi

wVs mi-iied ouit in phases: secoindary-

foreigrn exclhange inarket (12/85); unified foreign exchlange mlarket (7/87);
interbank foreign exchiange niar-ket (12/88); abolition of foreign exchange
auction (3/92).

Assessment of progressin

refamts. Overall

progress in foreign excliange re-

form was good, but lack of reforns in fiscal policies and monetary control
nullified the progress to-some extent. Excess liquidity,weakinipliementa tion
capacity, and interest group pressture were causes of the government's failure to stabilize the exchange rate and domestic inflation.
Liberalizatio'n of iniern.ational trade
Initial situatzion/distufion. Trade policy was characterized by excessive
import controls enforced throuigh licensing systems and prohibitions. The
exchange rate was overvalued, discouraging exports and keeping expnrt
prices low. Oil was the domiinant export commodity and major source of
export revenue.
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SlAp ;vfvnw. 'lithe SAP ainied at cIret!'ing ( b)tisiness envtironm ent condiocive I.o production aind distrilution of goods by introdticing a'second-tifer
Fforeign excliange mnarket., tIo easse import prounhiblions; re ducing imporL%
mnnler proliibition liroml 74 to 16;

eliminating

dIe 198(i imiipoIrt sui-chlarge of

30 percent; ind restructming cutnnis ;rnd excise taril's, Earlyin tlhe SA' dlie
devtalued naira gave strong price incentives fokr exporls. Tue government
introdiced ain exporti.incentive pltan .tait eliininatcdl bamns, abolished licens-

ing, removed drties, simplified ptocecbzrcs, and esiablisheda dlty drawback/
ssuspension selleljlje,
Assesysmeta qfpg1ress i-t refiontrs. Tthe new tranif structure is operative, but
* evasion ofl duties is perasive. Favorable duLty exemiptions accordect to die

-

govemmen t and concessionary rates of duty ror selected categores ofoprodcAltancling cliarge vas introduicedI into
Over-all,
relotri
in
trade
and tariff policy has not-progressed
ilmport dUties.
ers verc eitler ctrtailed or temilinalted.

consistently. Neve rthieless, withl Lte inttoduction of a system of protection
based on tarilWi and a m110re realistic exclhange rate, tie private sector has
-entered the trade tnarketand Jihere has l)een asubsequentincreazse in exports.
Libenrli2zeaion. )f 14rires anad domestic tradle

hulial situation/disk;t.iom. Price distortions in agriculture were major
contributing factors to tie decline in domestic export.production. The colilmodity boards continued to set domestic prices on goods, miaintaining a

monopoly on exports. As in inanufacuiring, many commodities were subject
*

to pn4ce and distribution controls.
: SAP reformn. Price liberalization led to the abolition of six commodity
boards in 1986, whicl opened markets to private individuals, groups, and coinpanics. In 1987 pice controlswere lifted and private ente-pmises could set their

own prices. In 1988-89 restrictions on foreign ownerlship were relaxed.
Assessmnent ofprogressin reforms. Price regulations persist on such items as
*

fertilizer, petroleum, and gas. Subsidies, ain area of little progress, still exist

and have even increased on fertilizer and petroleum products. The impact
of price liberalization has been mioderate. Progress has been made in liberalizing domestic tiade and markets and in improving incentives, but implementation remtains inconsistent. Restrictions on foreign participation were
relaxed in 1988-89, but remain in many sectors.
Fijiatncialsector reforMs5

initial situatian/distortion.The plior financial system had fixed credit allocations, and subsidized and regulated interest rates for priority sectors, as
well as term finance provided througlh finance insttutions.
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In 1988 Ihl! gwv(!rnitnent lfocstsed on *potfolio problems oif1

ilic lpan kingssystiem depo;sit. inst ranCe systel11 wasestal AishIZI In 1989. New
retltiireIlments were inlroduced in OctoIer
standlards -ind 11linimlnrttmc1 apiilJ
199.0. NeW pruldieniitia regilitiions anti accoitning slnidards o1r bank
Cain!e eil[eclive in I¶10. Tnihe central hank l)came nIIilOe independent.

lie-

,lss.eswsint If pw)gn7Jssin nfr7im. Rebornis are newY and Itfe eiffectiveness of
iui1plemiientai Ion cannot let. b)t'e easil) (Ittetiiuine(.T lTe conltdct of'fiscail po-licy
*has causede(i seriotIs.prOIlius in the financial syseuii. Oil sliucks are not iidequate ly offset by staIliZa,tio'n measilres. Government control and harriers
to qu1ality banking inhibit. new international entrantS.
0 f

i

- Public ent.erpriseW refor1s-

0

-

- -

;

,

-.--

ci ~ of

Vaadn
~~~~ .- of

4

-nitit4al situatioplldiystuion.Idtentiication of the levels of prieati,ation of
public enterprises asasorely needed at the outset of die SAP fonintilation.
The goverminent n ceded to di stinguisli between frill and partial privatization
and recor(I levels of sulbsidies for pitblic enteiptises.
SAP refotm. [lie federal go-vernment.issued a decree in 1988 to test 145
federal parastatals for privatization and commercialization. By end-] 991 (or
into 19)92), Il1 enterprises h1ad been targeted to be privatized. Efforts to
cotmiercialize piblic en terpiises an lopen competition by in creasing international tariff and otlier measuires are under way.
-Assessmnt of progressin rfrmus- The budgetary inipact of privatizing public enterprises is so far snall, and divestiture of government equity tiroughli
privatization negligible. Public enterprise refonn goals and clear institutional
responsibilities still needl to be dlefined.
Labor atd wage policy iefamis
1initialsituatianz/distarlian.Be fore the SAP, unemployment rose to 11 percent in urban areas. Export prices rose relative to wages and raised the demand for labor. Since 1982 federli civil seivice wages have been frozen. Prior
to the SAP, there were no serious restrictions or interferences in die labor
market except for setting minimum wvages.
SAP reforw. The SAP policies did not include refonns specifically geared
toward labor:mndwages. However, otherpolicies in the SAP indirectlyaffected
employment and wages.
Assessmnent ofprogressin reformis. The labor market responded to policies

and incentives, and urban unemployment declined to 8 percent (3/88) due
to inforrnal sector growvth and migration of workers to rural areas. By 1989
unemployment declined to 4 percent-9 percent in urban ar-eas and 3 percent in rural areas. By 1987 the rural and urban wage index was less than half
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the 1980 level. In 1988 civil service wvages increased 27 percent l)ut the increase wvas not sustained cLic to the 1988 inflationary budgets.

Social sec.torpolicies
Initial wituatiou/distriiott.Since the mid-l180s, cutbacks due to decreasing oil revenuies caused fiailities to deteriorate while demnand [or services in-

creasedbeDrugs could not be imported duLe to declines in foreign exchange.
Enrolltment dotublecd during this pre-SAP peried, straining resources.
* SAPirform. Under the SAP, the govremmentirtended to increase dile share
of ptblic expendittures For human resources. As the SAP progressed, thle
government took steps to mitigate ihe negrative effects of -adjustment.
Assessment of/progress itn refonrts. The government did not succeed in protecting public expenditures on social sectors during ihe early SAP. Eduication spending decreased from 21 percentin 1981 to l3percentinl988.The
govemment decentr alized responsibility to tlie local level too abiptly to have
a positive effect. The SAP is intended to improve tle state and local governments' ability to imanage dteir resources efficiently. The government's efforts
to alleviate the burden of tde SAP have been wvasteful.
Notes
1. Gross estimates of the incremental capitL-output ratio (ICOR) for the-different
penrods underscore this point. During 1982-85, the ICOR became negative, whereas
during early 1990, when investment shares were the lovest, the ICOR figures are the
most satisfactory-less than 2.
2. The data on agricultural production in. Nigeria from different sources vary a

great deal, and it is often extremely difficult to reconcile the difference. Here, we are
using the central bank's data, because itjust completed a major study that seems to
have constructed the production indices carefully. However, it should not be surprising if the central bank's production index varies somewhat from what is indicated by
such other sources as the Federal Office of Statistics.
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Senegal: stabilization, partial.
adjustment, and stagnation
Mustapha Rouws

The results of ihe adjuistmentprocess pursued in Senegal have been modest,
often falling wvell short of the targes in the goverment's nediun-tenn financial program and in die policy framework papers. To achieve international competitiveness in die face of nominal exchange rate inflexibility,
Senegal has attempted to correct both external and internal imbalances by
reducing domestic expenditures, adjusting internal prices and wages, and
adopting second-best trade policies. This deflationay -policy has led to severe fiscal compression and cuts in public spending on priority areas. Inadequate administrative capacity has severely limited the effectiveness of sec-ond-best trade policies, and no credible incomes policy has been pursued.

Consequently, the internal adjustment process has not produced the necessary depreciation in the real exchange rate; thus; the performance ofexports
has been disappointing, as has die ability of domestic industry to compete
against imports, and private investment has declined. Deflationary polici 2s
to maintain domestic inflation below international inflation are not likely to
achieve real depreciation over time. Thus, with. a two percentage point annual inflation differential between Senegal and its main trading partners, it
wvould take Senegal fiFteen yeals to reduce relative production costs by onethird lit real terms. Moreover, austerity programs cannot be-implemnented
steadily -forseveral years running. The best option available for Senegal is to
depredate tde exchange rate quickly and substantially.
The financial stabilization achieved so far by Senegal is fragile, and it is
doubtful whether it provided an adequate basis for longer-terin sustainable
growth. -It has led to a conflict betveen fiscal imperatives that have necessitated higher taxation and competitiveness imperatives tiat have necessitated
reducing the costs of production. It has also reduced public investment,
operationsandmaintenance expenditures, expenditures on human resource
development, the provision of adequate public services, and (relatedly) pni286
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vaLe investment-all cricial elements For longerter-m developimient. While
gains in incomne growtih and in thle social indicators associated with a Imlore
eilicientutilization of capital and a r eduction in spending are desir-able, these
are essentially slirttteiii benefits.
Lessons and recommendations
Putblicsector ananegenment
Puiblic sector management has improved, butt piublic resOulrces continue to
be misallocated. Wages and salaries continue to be disproportionate to expenditures on maintenance and operations, as wyell as invesunent, and unless the size of tihe civil ser-vice wage bill is rediuced drastically, bo1th the fiscal
position and tie productivity of the civil service will deteriorate rapidly. Notwithstanding the mismanagement of ciil service recruitment1 the voluntary
departures program had a good start and'should:be pursued. .Te cost of die
program shuuld be reduced and iLt financing should come from savings
generated by a reduiction in the nimber of civil seivants-and not, as at
present, solely from external sources.
While intersectoral allocations appear satisfactory, intrasectoral allocations remain a problem in agricultuire, education, and health. Expenditures
on irrigation were made at the expense of extension and research- services.
Those on higher education were made at tle expense of primary educaton,
and those on the curative health system were made at the expense of preventive health care. A beginning is being made with sectoral reforns for agriculture, forwhich a proposed reform program is under discussion-wi ti the World
Bank and major donors. The -adjustmentprocess has not yet dealt with the
social sectors comprehensively: a good start in reforming the social sectors
has been made in the lhealtlh sector with the First Humian Resources Development Project; butL little has been done in the education sector-a sector
that urgently needs restructuring. With the completion of tie public expenditure review study and the higher education sectoral study, a good analytical base now exists to enable the government to enmbark on restructuring the
education system. To achieve the social targets delineated in government
mediehm-term programs, resources sliould shift toward primary edtcation
and basic hetlth care. But given tlie scarcity of resources, alternative ways
must be found-to deliver key services.hi this respect, die private sector must
be allowed to plaay an increasingly important role.
More vigorous shrinking of the state enterprise sector is imperative. The
recent progress in privatizing public enterprises in Senegal can be attributed
to ashift toward pragmatism in government strategy. The strategygave equal
emphasis to divestiture and other forms of privatizadon, such as contracting
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m tand franhllising. It alsoglgw upriirity It)lJroflital)lc and viable en terprises;
over those wIhit were financiailly tinsotinmd. The recommiiendatiori is thllat this
strate6gy bepi Irstle(l igo-t ilsly, antddlitkeyenterprises, inc-ludcling thegrutn1dnlut oil processing coipany and the utility coimilpanies, he next in il1e pr-ivatizalion process.
The design of the i4isutinent prograill uiust account foir tie longer-lerini
objective ol'a leviating poverty amcniaddress the tempor-ary social costs of adjustmnent. In Senegal these olbjectives were purstied in an adJ hoc inianner

rather than as part of thl ovealil macrtoeconomic firaimiewor In otlher wocrds,
little effort has been imiadle to build antipoverty obj!ectives into tlle ex ante
(lesign ofLtheadjuistment programii-i-due largely to-ie absence of infolnilnation onAtle people expected to stiffer the most from tle refor-mis. With the
comipletion of household surveys tiliatwill provide better ata on various social
groups, particularly the poor, social aspects are expected to be integratedl

niore fully into the ovell fraework of adjistment.
Dependene onm ertenzal aid
Senegal's reliance on external budgetaryassistance has-increaisedsubstantially
over the years. This reliance, combined vith die lack of hard clonor conditionality, accounts for tie postponement ofdifficult econoniic and social changes
in Senegal, such as tie dowvnsi.ing of thecivil service, the adoption ofa more
liberal labor code, and the restructuring of the gdriticultural rice sector. External budgetary assistance is viewed by some Senegalese officials as an "entitlement" to be counted on foryears to come in dhe*samewayas tax revenues. The
lack of real sanctions by donors mlaywell have been a mlajor factor in Senegal's
slow progress in adjustnent. Fturther adjustment support for Senegal should
be selective and conditional on the implementation of upfi-ont key policy
measures-over time, external assistance should shift back to investment.
Tie enabling nevirrmtnenit
While macroeconomic stabilization and relative price reforms are necessary,
a healthy business environment is essential for a quick recovery of private
investmnent and growth. As defined in tie World Bank's third report on adjustient lending, the business environment encompasses the degree of certainty about government policies, the quality and sophistication of tie legal
and regulatory framework, the condition of the physical infrastructure, and
the effciency of labor and flnancial markets. Wlhile progress has been made
in all four areas, only-in the financial sector has it been satisfactory. With the
government's preoccupation with short-term financial crises, fiscal policies
became unpredictable, and, in some cases, policies were simply reversed. The
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mutual distirust between government oflicials and private btisinessmien rendered the design and implementation of r efonns diflicult. But the legal and
regulatory framenwork remiiains problematic: wilhile progress. has been mK-ade
in improving tile incentive, systenm (by revising the investment code and establislhing a one-stop investment windowv), reducing the cumbersome control system of th e ptiblic enterprise sector (shifting controls fronm a priori to
a posteriori), and reformiing die tax administration system, thejuldicial sys.-

tem is not working efliciently. The piysical infiastructure is detetiorating in
the absence of adeqluate resources for niainkenan ce and operating expenses.
The deficiencies of the labor-market and competitiveness policy a-re among
the highestpnrorities for refortm. Wher e Senegal has introduced legal dianges,
-the attitudes of civil servants and the labor unions toward die private sector
have remainedfhostile. The recommendation is that future adjustinent prograins focus more on the enabling environment.
Government committen.t

For any prograrn to be implemented successfully, it must be owvned by the
government and must be accompanied by consensus-building efforts among
the various interest groups. This cooperation has not always been the case
in Senegal, despite the good intentions of the government and donors, in-'.
. cluding the World Bank. The government's resolve to purstue the actions
called for by the structural adjustment program appears to have weakened,
particularly after the 1988 election, when the program becamne inicreasingly
biting. Although the commitment to adjustment appears to be strong at the
higlhest official level, in practice the authorities are increasingly reluctant to
oppose the interest groups that have had the most to lose from the reformns
These groups are primarily the labor unions, the civil service, and religious
leaders (marabouts).1
The adjustmentprocessand sequencing
Stabilization has been easier than structural adjustment in Senegal, and the
latter is far from being complete. Although the third report on adjustment
lending classifies Senegal as an intensive adjusting country-with four structural adjustment loans, two sector adjustment loans, and an IMF extended
structural adjustment Facility program-key structural areas remain to be
addressed, incluiding higher education, the labor market, the wage bill, and
the legal environment. In addition, the real exchange rate remains significantly overvalr.±d.
The packaging and sequencing of the reform measures are as critical as
the policy content of the adjustment program itself. The sequencing of the
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reformis haC.s been flr frodln ideal. In adlditio)n to dhe absence

ora real exchange

rate policy, the dlecision to liberalize external trade belfore establishing an
effective tax administration, eliminating labor rigidities, and reduicing the
cost of prodcuction reflects ain intisulicient, consideration of the sequence of'
reforms. Similarly, the deeision to proceeid witlh the civil scrvice departlue
program before establishing a data bnase on wages and civil servants and A
monitoling systenm also reflects a deficient sequence of reforms. Finally, the
privatization of public enterprises shotld have been initiated as soon as a
good regulatoiy and incentive fiamework was in place.
The move toward adjustment
Senegal is a small, ;semi-atid Salielian nation Withl a population of 7.6 mu1lion, predominantly rural. Its natural resource endowments are limited. The
mainstays of the traditional economy remain imiillet cultivation and nomnadic
cattle raising for domestic consumption, and groundnut cultivation for export. The modern sector includes fishtiig, phosphates, chemical industries,
and tourism and is concentrated in Dakar and on die coastal belt. At the
currentovervalued exchange rate, the 1991 percapita income of$720 places
Senegal almost at the bottoni of dte lower-middle-income economies.
At Independence in l960, Senegal inherited arelatively well-developed
physical and social infiastructure due to the prominent role Dakar played
as the capital of die large Frendi West-African colony. Senegal has enjoyed
a high profile in African affairs and until recently, has been the only*
Sahelian country with a lively democratic systemi, including a vocal press.
This system has helped Senegal mobilize substantial external resources over
the years. Yet Senegal alsc has a long tradition of "Afiican sodalism"n with
widespread government intervention in the economy, and regulatory conw
trols. Traditional values still play an important role in social, economic, and
political spheres.
Although Senegal inherited a sound physical and sodal infrastructure,
its need for structural economic changes also first became apparent in the
early years of Independence, when Senegal lost its large French West AMican marketand found itselfwitli oversized industries and an excess of highlly
paid civil servants. Macroeconomic imbalances appeared as early as 1966,
when groundnutexports suddenly losttheirguaranteed French market-and
had to compete in the world markets. The governmentwas slow to recognize
the need for structural changes. To make matters worse, the government responded to a short-lived commodity boom in the early years of the second
half of the 1970s by borrowing heavily from foreign commercial banks in the
expectation ofretuming to more favorable terms of trade. A1987 World Bank
economic report on Senegal observes that 'adjustment became unavoidable
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at dlie entd of tdie 1970s, wlhen a coinbinnition ofl pooi financial anti investmlLent policies, worsened ternis or tradle and sluccessive drouglhLs plulngedi an
lreacdy weakened economtiy into a sevcre crisis."
Thie crisis is evident troam general statistics between 1960 andl 1980.
Seniegal's economnic performance was dismnal even by Sii-Stalratrn African
standards. CUP grew on average by 2.1 percent annulally against a opu tla-.
tion g'rowth r ate of 2.B.percent. Senegal experienced die-lowest GDI growvthl
rate of any African state not affected by wVar or civiltstrife. Until 1966, ecconotnic managiuenitw,as rclatively sound, and tle economly grew at al Olt 3.5
percentanntially dutring 1960-66. BeLxteen 1967 eand 1974, wllen the world
oil price quadrupled, GDP grew by only 1.3 percent annuially, and grotunnut production fell by almost hlf. During this period, Senegal actively putsued a nationalization policy and an industrial imnport-substitution policy. Between 1978 and 1981 Senegal experienced two muajor droughts togetherwrith
a substantial fall in world groundnut prices and, correspondingly, a GDP
growthl rate of 0.8 percent a year. By the end of this period, all.key econoinic
indicators reflected seriouis financial and structLural iImbalances. The fiscal
dericit and the current account deficit reaclied 12.5 percent and 25.8 percentofGDP, respectively. Savingswere negative-tiatis, total consumption
exceeded GDIP. The inflation rate rose to 12 percent. The total stock of delbt
represented 67.4percentofGDP, and the scheduled debtservice represented
18.5 percent of total exports of goods and nonfactor services.
In the late- 1970s the government began to recognize the shortcomings
of its ambitious nationalization poli des and public sector developinentplans.
In December 1979 it announced its mredium-teini (1980-84) program for
economic and fUmancial adjustment. The program, designed in close collaboradion with dLie World Bank and the IMF, sought to stabilize the financia
situation, amise public savings, increase investment in the productive sectors,
liberalize trade, and reduce the state role in the economy. -Yet, because tde
government did not implement the agreed upon measures, the IMF slhifted
its tree-year extended fund facility arrangement to a simple one-year standby
after onlyayear, and then cancelled itin 1983. Similarly, afterapprovingits
first structural adjustment loan in 1980, tie World Bank cancelled its second
tranche in 1983.
Renewed efforts were launchted in 1984 with the same broad policy objectives in mind. The First meeting of a Consultative Group for Senegal was
organized by tde World Bank in December 1984, after wlhiclh Senegalipr
pared a mediumn-teinn adjustment program for 1985 to 1992, whiclh was endorsed by the donors. This meeting was followed by a second Consultative
Group meeting organized in 1987. Since 1980 tde goveemment's adjustment
effort has been supported by four World Bank structural adjustmient loans
(1980,1986,1987, and 1990) and two sectoradjustnentloans (for thelfinan-
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cial Sector in 1989, and.for. die trCAnsport sec(tor in 1991), .and bya series of

I lWar
F

i-rangements (extendledrinc6

I'ticiliLy in 1980, flollowed by five stand)ys,
a two-year stinichtal adjusimentI facilily, and ai ilirce-year exl endeil strictiural
adjiistnent fiacility). Along.wiftl Kcenyat ancd rtlIkcy, Sene gal was d e first
country to receive a,n adistuient crelit or loan frot tiheWorldl Bank. Five
policy rratnework papers were approvedl. by die! Worldl Bank and IMF I)oards
between 19863 and 1 99 1. Senegal has been a r!ecipient countly of thle Special
l)rogruin of Assistance since dit progaxili was; estalilislhecd in 1988.
adjiasunent-programl in Senegbal Ihas been supported generoutsly by
thie donor comlmutnity, citlher directly or as colinancier orfBank operations.
-Between 19}81 and. 199JE1-ad.justnent snipport accounted for nearly twvo-hiirds

rue

of the official development assistance dishursed Lo Senegal, and die total
assistance. to Senegal represented 4.3 percent of tlhe total amount received
by Sub-Saharan Afi ca. (Senegal's share in the region's population is 1.5
percent and in GNP 0.3 percent.) In 1991 net aid flow percapita to Senegal
amounted to $84, or 12 percent of GDP per capita..
Underlying macroeconomic and sectoral issues
Real exchange rate and competitivnwess
In the past two decades, Senegal has wvitnessed a swing in its terms of trade
-with no ovelall wrend,Ihighi inflationaly rates, and low productivity gains.
Between 1981 and 1186 domestic prices rose by 4.5 percent more than the
domestic piices of Senegal's trading partners; they have declined somewhlat
since then. These developmiients, together witlh die sharp real currtency de-.
predation of non-CFA neighboring countries and the depreciation of thLe
dollar since 1985, have-severely eroded Senegal's competitiveness and exacerbated trade imbalances.
The movement in the real effective exchiange rate (see the Cdote
d'Ivoire chapter for theoretical background), a conmnonly used measure of
competitiveness,2 shows diat, despite the growing competitiveness of other
developing countries (Sub-Saharan Afiica, Latin America, and heavily indebted middle-income countries), tde competitiveness of the CFA zone, including Senegal, was actually worsening, even in tie face of internal adjuistment progr-ams. The real effective exchange rate in Senegal depreciated in
foreign currency terms by 14 percent between 1980 and 1984, and then appreciated by 20 percenL betveen 1985 and 1991 (table 7-.1). Ttie appreciation of tde real effective exclhange r-ate during die second half of the 1980s
is due to the appreciation of the French franc vis-a-vis the U.S. dollar and
*dle naira. The real exchange rate vis4av-%is Ghana, Nigeria, and China,
against which Senegal's exports compete, has appreciated substantially, particularly since 1985.
Published by iRepository, 2021

https://ir.iba.edu.pk/faculty-research-books/13
-Snuyaln:

slabibzntion, mrtiatl ajuistrtists, and stagnuiion

293

Tlhe relationslip beltween iltc real exchange rate aIndt Ilte real tr1-ade balance is also shown in lahle 7.1;
lWhile ttie real efflective excIliange rate in
Senegal appreciated hy 20 .percent between 1985 and 1991, die t.r-ade hal-

anf 1-alhd improved 1)by 6 percentage points of'. GDP. A closcr examination
ol' lie disaggregated datla provides an explanation in line with rheory. Thle

improvement in Lite trade balance was due to a dr op in exports by nearly
5 percentage points of GDl} (in line with expectations) and a crop in ofiicial inports bly 11 percentage poiints of GDP. The latter was duce directly to
drastic cuts in public expencli ure programs-particularly investment-and
-

to low growth.
The stlrategy for indlustrial developmiient in Senegal had hiistcorically con-

centrated on imiiport substitution, writhi the exception of a rewv industries engaged in exports -of fish-,:
osphates, and groundnuts. This strategy had
reached its limits by ithe mliicd-I 980s, -and, due to an' underlying policy of hiigh
imiiportprotection, haddiscouiraged tle development ofexports-and encoiraged fi-audulent imports. Until the reforms of 1986, import protection was
effected with extensive nontariff resttictionsz (quantitative resttictions, monopolies, and prior import autholization) and h igh and uneven nominal
- tariffs. In 1986, to improve the competitiveness of die industrial sector, the
government implemented a comprehensive industrial reform programn that
sought to rationalize and1liberalize its trade policy (discussed in the section
on tie design and implementation of macroeconomic refotin).

Table 7.1 Real effective exchange rate, selected years, 1970-91
(I985= 10).
Year

1970
1975
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991

Peal effective
exchainge rate

93
122
-103
91
93
92.
90
100
126
134
121
114
122
120

Real exchange
rote (French franc)

78
97
92
88
93
93
92
100
109
105
98
93
94
94

Terris
of trade

103
l00

95
101
88
86
98
100
106
103
102
107
106
103

Current
lesource balance
(percentage ofGDP)

-4.6
-5.2
-14.5
-19.3
-12.3
-12.3
-9.5
-11.2
-5.4
-5.6
-5.0
-5.2
-4.7
-4.9

Not An increase inthe-index indicates appreciation, The index is calculated from official exchange rtes deflated by
. the wholesale prce indexes. The real effective exchange rate is calcuated using trade-weighted data for Senegal's
20 most important trading partners; the weights are those calculated by the IMF using the methodology described
in A Revised Weighting Scherne for Indicators of Effective Exchange Rates,' IMF WP/87/87, which prcvides for the
inclusion of countries that are compe6tiors in export markets but that do not trade directly with the country
concerned. .
estimates
Source: World Bink estmates
-
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Labor and wage policy

Before the labor and wage r eforms of 1986, thc moderm labor market liad
been regulated heavily by the govemment and suffered from a higlhly
adversarial system of industrial and labor relations.3 The governmenL regulated hiring and firing practices and wage rates througlh various labor lawsparticularly the labor code, the 1981 collective bargaining system, 4 and the

civil senrice statutes. Although the.se regulations sought to ensure the welfare of workers, they instead led to highler production costs, low productivity, and limited investment and job creation. In effect, the government's
income policy was contrary to-its internal adjustment strategy.:
As in otherAflican countries, modern sectorwages in Senegal are influenced largely by wages paid by the government, which in 1986 employed68,000 ofa total modem sector employment of 131,000 (Berg and associates
1990). Real civil service salaries and wages in the modem sector had declined
between 1980 and 1985-but were still relatively high in comparison widt
other countries. Yet, to compensate for the decline, the governmentprogressively increased salary and wage supplements and benefits, which by 1986
increased to 25 to 30 percent of the vage bi. 5 For the entire industrial sector, Svejnar and Terrell (19888) found that total factor productivity had declined annually by 5 to 7 percent in the 1980-85 period.
Because employers could not lay off workers without an elaborate and
time-consuming process of government-approval, they relied more heavily
on temporary rather than permanentwork-ers. But even temporary laborwas
problematc. Havingfoughtforthe country'sindependence, the laborunions
remained influential, although their position weakened after 1976, when
trade union plurali.sm was reintroduced (Kaandvan de Walle forthcoming).
The tripartite union-employer-govrernment system was one of deep mistrust,
especiallybentween the unions and employers. In the civil serivice the government policy of guaranteeingjob security and wage security had contributed
significandy to an oversized and le.ss productive civil service.
Thze banking sector

Senegal's banking sector crisis has been due to an array of factors. One of
the most critical has been the government's willingness in the past to guarantee the borrowing of uneconomic public enterprises. Of the CFAF 144
billion of bad debts held byfailing banks, more than 20 percent-were governinent-guaranteed loans. These loans allow the governmentto circumvent the
20 percent limit on iLs borrowing from the cenal bank. These were considered risk-free. Yetwhen the government failed to honor its guarantees, they
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had a destabilizing effect on bank balance slheets. The govenmnent's interference is also evidentin Lle national credit committees' discretionary power
to fix bank-by-bank credit ceilings-which, because weaker-banks receive
higher credit ceilings than stronger-ones, prolongs the life-oftsick banks at
the expense of those dhatuare financially sound. Also, the complexity of the
legal frmmework made it difficult for banks to collect bad debts.
The ineffectiveness ofbank creditmanagementlhas also perpetuated the
banking crisis. Crop marketing credits were particularly problematic. Crop
credits are short-term advances that finance the frill collection costof agricultural. products from producers through final sale.. Since reimbursement is.
generally expectedwithin the year, creditceilings have not been applied.But,
serviced onlysporadically, these nonreimbursed crop credits have tended to
accumulate, absorbing much of the annual increases in credit ceilings, and
crowding-out the producdve sector. ONCAD, Senegal's defunct groundnut
marketingand processingagency, isacase inpoint. Its dissolutionin 1982 left
the National-Development Bank holding nonreimbursed claims of CFAF 94
billion. The majorlocal bankswere obliged to assume shares ofthe outstanding balance. Thus, in 1982 ONCAD's refinancing became a source of balance
sheet problems for the banks and, of course, crowded out other borrowers.
Managerial and operational control haqs been ineffective due largely to
the division of responsibility between BCEAO (the regional cental bank
responsible for inspecion) and national authorities (responsible for overseeing the implementation ofcorrective measures). Some banks hadnotbeen
visited by -the BCEAO for several years. Even ivhen BCEAO recommended
sanctions, the government often did not comply. Thus, prudential regulation eroded. Problems began emerging when political pressure forced banks
to lend to failing public enterprises through government guarantees and

BCEAO rediscount facilities.
The disregard of rules applying to liquidity positions and the absence of

applied accounting standards have further eroded the control of banks.
BCEAO failed to enforce sanctions on banks. Consequently, these banks
continued to credit accrued but unpaid interest on nonperforming loans,
making the balance sheets of weakler banks look stronger than they actually
were. The problem banks also had preferential access to BCEAO rediscount-

ing, makling their balance sheets deteriorate even further. The BGEAO also
used a money marketmechanism whereby healthy banks-those wvith excess
liquid deposits-were constrained by restrictive credit ceilingsand forced to
lend their excess liquidity to sick banks. Thus, liquidity problems surfaced
only when the bankswere finally unable to.honor checks drawn upon them.
The distressed banks had to borrow from BCEAO. (Table 7.2 shows the breakdown of-ailing and healthy banks in Senegal as of September 30, 1988.)
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Public entuwprises
Nationalization and tde crealtion of new agencies had expanded the
governmlent's public enterprise sector in the 1970s. BuL several deficiencies-soft budget constraints, lax hiring policies, and the absence of perforniance incentives for managers-softened the sector, and reforms becamne
critically needed.
In 1986 the sector as awhole (including the banking sector) consisted of
85 enterprises-25 classified asnoncommercial oradministrative entities. The
sector accounted for 29.percen t of total investment in die economy, 17 percent ofrtotal employment.-and 7 percent of GDP. The netlosses of the sector
after taxes and.before subsidies represented-about 2 percent of GDP. and 9
percent of government revenue. The govemment's equity share in the sector was 72 percent The financal performance of the nonfinancial public
enterprises was poor, cailing for budgetary subsidies. In addition to these
budgetary transfers, the sector enjoyed other explicit transfers, such as loans
from the treasury and debt servicing, and implicit transfers, such as tax exemptions, loan guarantees, preferential interest rates, and distortions from
price controls. These enterprises accounted for the bulk of the credits to the
economy (95 percent of long-tern credits, 15 percent of medium-term, and
25 percent of short-term over the period 1985 to 1987). Many of these loans
were nonperforming, thus perpetuating the banking sector crisis.

Fiscapoiciyand management
As in most countries undergoing adjustment programs, Senegal attempted
to use its fiscalpolicyas aprinaryinstrumentforreducingaggregate demand
and correcingmajordisequilibriain the economy. Yet the fiscalpolicyframework in Senegal is affected by several conflicting Factors that both complicate the design of the reform program and render an assessment of its performance more difficult Some ofthese factors are specific to Senegal; others
are related to the rules that regulate fiscal and monetary policies within the
WestrAfican Monetary Union, of which Senegal is a member.
Table 7.2 Summar-y of the banking system's situation, 1988
(CFAF NiYlon)

item

Distressed bonks

Sound banks

323
.233

166
6

Capital and reserves

36

29

BCEAO refinancing

167

30

Loan portfdlo
Nonperforming loars

-Srce World Bank es5mate
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Because Senegal belongs to tde WestAfrican Monetary Union-which
among other tlings regulates dte inoney supply by adjusting credits-it has
relied on fiscal policy for its adjustment efforts. While the French trea:sury's
"opeiations accounts" gives West African Monetary Union counLries financing guarantees for liheir balance of payments sliortfalls, tie BCEAO has
adopted a safeguard feature to prevent monetary expansion-a stuLor act
wherebythe maximum level ofBCEAO advances to the govemmentmay not
exceed 20 percent of the previous year's ordinary budgetary receipts. While
this overdraft rule can be circumvented in some instances, the rule does
impose a limit on tde financing ofgovernment deficits from the central bank.
Thus,whvile Senegal's membership in the WestAfrican Monetary Union may
help limit the threat of inflation, the system is prone to liquidity rrises.
The structure of the public sector in Senegal further complicates how::
public finances are managed. In addition to the consolidated central government operations, the treasury maintains diverse special and correspondent accounts. UntilJuly 1991 these accounts were not integrated into the
budget and were not subjected to normal budgetary procedures. Thus, the
absence of effective control over these accounts could lead to large annual
variations in the treasury's liabilities for them. The, design and manwagement
of fiscal policy has also been made more complex by the dose association
between key fiscal measures and the industrial policy, particularly tariff reforms and production costs.
Some of this policy complication reflects the conflicting objectives of
donors, particularly between those focusing largely on stabilization policy,
w%hich sought to mobilize revenue at the expense ofpromoting growth, and
those emphasizing longer-term issues, such as reducing the cost-of key inputs and the corporate tax rate. Also, it can be argued that the large inflow
of offidal assistance from multilateral agencies and bilateral donors (pardcularlyFrance) made itpossible for Senegal to postpone "hard-budget" choices.
Major policy reforms, 1980 to 1991: design and implementation
Sumnma:y ofprogress
Overall, Senegal'sperformance in implementingits-adjustmentprogran has
been mixedL Figure 7.1 shows the major reforms that have been undertaken
and their status. Senegal has made strides in monetary and credit policy,
pricing and trade policy, and financial sector policy-indeed, Senegal was
one of the first CFA countries to undertake such far-reaching financal sector reform. But twfo caveats are in order here: the government recently reversed its important protection policy, and it has not aggressively recovered
bad debts from the banking sector, hesitating to pursue the large debtors;.
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Figure 7.1 Implementation status of major policy reforms in Senegal,
19810-91
*Policy implementation
Policy reversal
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Rationalize tax sytem
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The financial rerormn agendaisunfinislhed primarily in monctarypolicy,where
a market-based system of moneyand creditimanagenientimust be established.
Senegal's exclhange rate policy has been a major disappointment1 as hlas
its labor and wage policy. Bo th are critical to improving die country's competitiveness in the world market.. The real exchange rate has appreciated by
at least 20 percent in foreign currency terns during the partial adjustment
period. The labormiarketh.as been partuallyliberalized (hiiring practices have
been liberalized, and constraints on using tempor ary employmnent contracts
have been partially relaxed). A labor code has been drafted to eliminate the
rigidities in the labor market, but has not yet been enacted into law. And
given dle persistence of the rigidities in the labor marker, labor costs remain
a serious impediment to investment growth, and competitiveness.
On the fiscal-front, dliegovernment has implemented several reforns to
simplify the, tax structure (introducing a global personal income tax and
assessing a single tax on corporate income), modernize the tax administradion system, and mobilize resources by widening the scope of the value added
tax.The governmentalso introduced expenditure controlin investmnent Yet
it has tended to focus on die financial short term, relying on windfall revenue from the petroleum imports and introducing n-umerous ad hoc tax
measures, butignoring more structural issues. Revenue has been mobilized
and resources allocated at the expense of competitiveness and long-term
growth. In expenditures the government has reduced investment and allocations to. operations and maintenance, but protected: wages and salaries,
thusjeopardizing future growth and employment In sum, the required fundamental restructuring has not been achieved. FLive fiscal reforms are still
key: strengthening tax administration (particularly customs), reducing dependence on petroleuTn revenues, reducing the we bill, controlling transfers to public enterprises, and raising investnent and operaitions and maintenance spending.
Sectoral reform also met with mixed success. The agriculture reform
program has liberalized domestic trade, decontrolled the prices of most
commodities, and eliminated input subsidies-but rice import controls remain a major issue, and-producer prices for cash crops-groundnuts and
cotton-continue to have no direct relationship to world prices. The domestic market for most commodities has been liberalized as a necessary
condition but an insufficient remedy for turning agricultural production
around. Agricultural development continues to be constrained by overvaluation of the real exchange rate and unfavorable terms- of trade for
groundnut oil and cotton.
The industrial reform program-which was to have been a comprehensive and well-sequenced effort-has been implemented only partially. Domesticandintemational trade has been liberalized, and most domesutcpnrces
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hlave been decontrolled, but the government has recently begun to reverse
its trade policy-primarily for fiscal reasons, but also to protect industry and
to compensate for the appreciation of the real exchange rate. Crucial reforms-labor mark-et deregulation, astrongerlegal and administrative environment, lowver enengy plices, and export subsidy schemes-have been implemented late in the adjustment process, and again only partially. Among the
measures to improve the regulatory environment, he investment code has
been revised and investmnent procedures simplifled. The industrial program
has been reduced dtus far to a policy of price and trade liberalization.
Public enterprise reform has been slow and uneven. -Divestiture, which
is nearly complete in the financial sector, has been slow with nonrinancial
public enterpnses. The progress made in the divestiture program is very
recent-three-quarters of the.public enterprises divested;-translating into
about 80 percent of assets and government equity, have been privatized and
liquidated since 1989-and is due to the government's adoption. of a more
pragmatic strategy. The restructuring and rehabilitation of public enterprises
have also been limited and in most cases confined to the signing ofcontract
programs and "letters of mission" between the government and the concerned public enterprises. Contract programs have improved the transparency and accountability of the two contracting parties-not a small achievement-but have failed to achieve perfornance objectives largely because of
the government's unwillingness to meet its financial comunitments. The accumulation of financial arrears betwveen public enterprises and the government and among public enterprises has been a serious problem. The.prob
lem seems to be less acute now because concurrentpreventive measures have
been introduced.
In education and health only a limited number of reforms have been
implemented. The unfinished reform agenda calls for reducing the imbalances between primary education and higher education, and between basic health care and a curative health. care system. Reform programs for
higher education and health are currently under active consideration by the
governmenL

Aswith otherprograms in CFAadjustingcountries, the dignofSenegal's
adjustment program lacks an important policy instrument-the nominal
exchange rate. The absence of an exchange rate as one of the major adjustment tools has complicated the design of the program and makes its full
implementation difficult to guarantee. The deflationary policy that Senegal
adopted relied more on demandmanagement, and less on supplyincentives.
Yet, aside from the real exchange rate issue, program design has improved
steadily as Senegal has gained more adjustnent experience. The shift from
fundamental but complex macroeconomic reform to sector-specific adjustmentprograms is underway. Senegal chose to implementaseries ofselected
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well-focused programs to avoid overbjrdcening i;S adlministrauve capacity. It
pursuied tliis strategy by diiding tde wide-ranging requisite policy changes
into manageable packages, or sector adjustmllent loans-for exam-uple, in
bank;ing, human resources, and trnsport-thatwere supported by the World
Bank and key donors.
As discuissed in the introduction to this chapter, die sequencing of iec.

refornims has certain flaws. The reformn programn addressed the following
policies chronologically: a reduction in internal and external imibalances,
the liberalization of agricultural marketing and then trade, public sector
management efficiency (including public enterprises and the civil service),
-wage and labor market deregulation, population growth, banking sector
restructuring, and transport sector relhabilitation. The sequencing and coherence of these various components of the refonn 'program have been
monitored closely thlrougli the policy framnework paper process. And die
-evidence indicates tlat, because of diie overvalued excliange rate, severalmore
fundamental measures should have been pursued to provide astronger base
for suistainability. Particularly lacking has been progress on human resource
reform-most notably education.
Some additional words about "ownership." As mentioned in the introduction, the momentum of die government's comdtnment to the reform prograin seems to have foundered after die 1988 election, when political pressure weakened die technocrats' influence. Government commitment to die
reform program seems to depend on three key elements: the degree to
which there is consensus-building among the interest groups, die strengtli
of institutions in charge of formulating and coordinating the reform program, and the nature of the reforms themselves-die more politically and
socially difficult these are, the more reluctant government is to implement

them fully. Over time, policv measures tend to be discussed widely with concerned parties, and publicly debated. A case in point is the revision of the
labor code, which involved extensive discussion between the government,
the labor unions, and the employers unions, and, more recently, the discusssion of the higher education sector. Notwithstanding thb. effort, the involvement of the private sector in the design of the reform program has been far
from satisfactory.
Macroecononicpolicy and ?nagna

ent

Fiscalpolicyand managementrefornm Fiscal policy reform in Senegal cover.s

a broad range of objectives-all to improve government financing and revenue. Senegal began the l98Oswith an overall budget deficit of 12.5 percent.
of GDP, a primaxy deficit of about 10 percent of GDP, and total public expenditures of32 percent of GDP. The civil service wage bill, by far the largest
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expenditure item, accounted ror 40 percent of total expenditurc. The key

fiscal initiative was to increase reventue by enhancing the buoyancy ofdtie tax
s,ystem. In line wib the r ecoinimendations of an IMF riscal imiission to Senegal
in May 1985. the government's fiscal rcfonu programii sought to modernize
-he tax system, create .ainore effective and less
.distorted tax regimei and widen
thle tax base.
Thic governmient has aso

pursued a restricted expenditure policy. Al-

thougl it recognized the need for a two-pronged stategy-controlling the
uwage bill and limiting transfers to public enterprises policy ineasures wrere
mostly ad h oc, and it was not until 1990 that the govermment adopted a Coherent civil senice- program. Too, fiscall reform has failed to work toward
improving the financial performnance of public enterprises, tlus perpetuating their budgetary burden and inefiEciency. With a few e-xceptions (road
maintenance and the recruitment ofpimnary school teachers), nothing wAs
done secifically to protect key social sectors, reduce operations and maintenance, and build-a core public investment programi
Anotlher important initiative of the fiscal refonn program was improving the public investment program. In 1986 a three-year "rolling" public
investment program was adopted, and it has since been updated on an annual basis. The public in-vestmentprogram reform package sought to malke
investmentprojects consistentwith the macroeconomic framewvorkanld secoral priorities; improve project preparation and appraisal, provide systematic monitoring of dte physical and financial aspects ofprojects; incorporate
die investment budgetinto the government's overall budget; and strengthen
tde technical minisu-ies'. capacity to identifl5, prepare, and monitor their
respective projects.
The third kley initiative was improving the external debt management
system. A computerized debt management system -was established with International DevelopmentAssociation-financed technical assistance to provide data on ouLstanding debts, arrears, and scheduled debt service and to
icsue computerized pay-ment orde r.To improve the structure ofits external
debt, the government also sought to discontinue commercial borrowing,
curtail public guarantees to private borrowers, and stop the transfer of proceedzs from debtreliefnegotiated by the governmentto the final borrowers.
The progress of the fiscal reforimLs has varied across policy areas. As part
of its wide-ranging tax reforms, the government introduced a general tax
code in early 1987 to change specific duties to an ad valorem basis and expanded the value added tax to the trade and construction sectors. In 1991
the value added tax was generalized to services and the transport sector, and
thevalue added tax rates were revised to simplifyand reduce their structureTo reform foreign trade taxation, die governmentsimplified the taiffstructure and lifted quantitative restrictions. In September 1989 the government
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instituted awit.liaolding tax on proression.al atndpropertyincoml an.md a-globial tax on personal incomiie-replacing a variety of schedular taxes-and in
January 1990 iLplaced a single tax ol 35 percent. on corporate incomc. In
anothCr efo-rt to wiCden the twx batse, tlhC fiscal cadastre f1i- thc Dakar region
WaS comnpleted, allhouIglh Ifollow-ip mneasuires to institute the tax haVe been

delayed. Finally, efforts have continuecl to lie made to raise tax revenue froom
the infonial sector.
In curn.J'mction with modernizing IhC tax systei, the goverinmenthas also
soug,hlt to mobilize additional recvenue tlhroughl a numllber of measrLLles.s The

riinplementation of tic plethoora of newv measures was particu larly taxing on
tle limitedadministrtive capacity, and the govemrment tended to focuis more
on short-renn thlan on structural issues. Thc new measUres also creatcd additional distortions to an already elaborate tax system. The predominance of
short-texm revenue considerations over meaLsures to promote longer-telm
growth has prevented a meaningful reduction in enprgy costs and hampers
the sustainability of tde customs tariff harmonization and r eduction.
Measures to reduce the size of tde civil service and control tde wage bill.
slipped seriously-and thus the wage bill still represents the lion's share of
government revenues and reicurrent expenditures. ne. lack of progress toward controlling direct and indirect subsidies to public enterprises reflects
die complexity of this sector and the lack of govemment commitment to
politically sensitive policies to reduce the amount of tansfers from die budget to this sectorPublic investment program management has improved; in particular,
conflicts between capital investment and sector strategies have been eliminated. Projects.are aLso generally better prepared. Institutional capacitybuilding must continue to be strengthened, else progress thus far will be
threatened. To do so, technical ministries must identify and prepare

projects in their respective sectors. more effectively, and coordination betveen die public investment program and treasury staff must be enhanced
so tihat the budget dearly reflects tde recurrent costs and debt implications
of the public investnent program. Without this coordination, allocations for
operating and maintaining new projects will be insufficient, thus yielding
poor rates of returm.
Although the financial position of the government improved during
the 1980s, the impact of some reform measures has been reduced drasti-:
cally because of poor implementation. For insnce, proceeding wniithe
liberalization before effective tax administation was established and stabilization results were consolidated reflects inefficient sequencing- Also, e£
forts to combat underinvoicing through computerized customs declaration
have yielded few significarit results, gi-en the absence of concrete efforts to
enhance the functioning of the value assessment section, without which
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zndcrinvoircing goes mostly undetected. Deficient. revenue mobilizaIion and
odim r expendinItiarc items, amclet inining fiscal adcwvage biill contro l akec
julstmcn t. fulrthler,.
Aflnnteay 15/ftey refJnn. Within LIte institutional fraxnework described in

box 7.1, Senegal's monetary policy is threefold: inanaging oveiall demand
to correct external imnbalances; gaining a competitive advantage by keeping
tie leircl of inflation below thait of major tiading partners; and stjrengthening dieimanagement orliquiidity and supervision orban ks. Wliile the govermn
mentaddrlessed the firil two objectives primatrily ly puirsuingrestiictive credit

policies, it implenented a more coiprehensive set of measures in die banking sector, including die introdaiction ofmarket-deternmined interest rates.
In September 1989 Senegal and other members ofr the West African
Monetary Union adopted a comprehensive reform of inonetary. policy instruments that replaced the administrati've controls over mnoney and credit
with an indirect and market-oriented system of monetary instruments. In
partcular:

The preferential rediscount rate was abolislsed; the central bank's
refinancing -ate was set above the money mark-et rates-atlevels slighltly
higher than those for the Frenclh fianc-and banks were given more
flexibility in determining their rates on deposits and loans.
Box 7.1 Framework for monetary policy in West African Monetary
Union countries
Monetary policy in Senegal is influenced heavily by its membership in the West
African Monetary Union (WAMU),whose membership includes Benin, Burkina
Faso, C6te d'Ivoire, Mali, Niger, Senegal, and Togo. Established in 1962, WAMIU
was substantially reformed in 1973-75 and again in 1989. Five essential provisions
characterize the operation of the monetary union. First, the member cotntries
share the CFAranc, whose convex Ubiity into the French franc ztaffxed exchange
rate is supported by an overdraft facility through the operations accountwitl the
French treasury. In return for France's support, the member countries, through.
the BCEAO, agree to deposit the equivalent of at least 65 percent of their foreign
exchange hoWings in the operations accounL Second, a uniform interest rate
structure applies throughout the zone. Third, uniform ceilings on bank lending
margins are fixecd to the common interest rate structure. Fourth, comm'on limits
are set for government borrowing from the BCEAO, which, excel: t for temporary
overruns, could not exceed 20 percent of the previousyear's fiscal revenues. Fifth,
one zonewide interbank money market was established inJuly 1975 to help reycle -the excess liquidity of deposit-money banks within the union and to curb
capital outflow (deposit-money banks are not authorized to maintain deposits
abroad in excess of their working balances).
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* Conditions ror access to central bank refinancing were tighltened, and
crop credit will be rerinanced by die central bank only if it is witliin
gencral refinancing limits and under dte overall credit ceiling of LltC
commercial banlks.
Rigorous controls wierc placed on Miate guarannees for boorrowing by
public and private enterprises. Govenment-guaranteed nonperfomling loans will be imputed to the ovenull credit ceiling set for the
government.
* The system of sectoral credit allocation was eliminated, and prior authorization will be used onlyas a qualitative credit controlinstrument.
* The BCEAO's bankinspection and supervisioniwere slharplyireinforced
with the creation of tde unionwide bank supervision body (Comntnsison
-

bencarem).

In -a subsequent phase of reforms, reserve requirements may be introduced. During the transitonal period, monetary and credit policy will continue to be based primarily on interest rate policy and overall ctedit ceilings.
Monetary and creditpolicy refotmn has been implemented forcefully and
according to schedule-due largely to the heavy involvement of die BCEAO
and in recognition that confidence in the banking sector had to be reestablished afterailing ban ks-were liquidated. Witl minordifferences, mostof these
reforms applied to all members of the union, making their implementatdon

The main monetary and credit policy instruments used by the BCEAO are national and bank-to-bank credit targets; a ceiling on access to centrl bank financing to maintain aggregate demand at a level consistentwith balance of payments
and domestic growth objectives; a rediscount rate; the interbank money market;
and a liquiiiy ratio.
Given tic openness of the monetary union, the fixed exchange rame rcgime,
and the necessity ofmaintaining the debit balance of the operations account at an
acceptable level, the BCEAO .ets an overall.credit target consistent'tith the final
target for the individual country's level of net foreign assects. Using this overall'
national ceiling, the national credit committee efeachmember country establishes
objectives for money and credit-based on external reserves and in light of prospective trends in production and prices-and the proposed.ceiling for access by.
the government and the financial sector to central bank refinancing. This formulation comprisesa targetfornetcreditto the government, an indicative ceiling for
crop credit, and ceilings for ordinary credit for the rest of the economy.
Monetary policy is conducted by controlling credit. As. part of the refornmc initiated in 1989, the BCEAO is consideringintroducingnew monetary management
tools, such as reserve requirements.
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more universal. The rcforms have created a sounder environnment in wlhicI
the government, stens its in terference in credit.a-llocation. The goveniment
has beguin to riely less heavily on borrowing friom the banking sector, clue to
stricter contrIols on government 1orrowing thloughi statc-owned enterprises.
By adlliering to a restrictive monetary policy in the past. ew years, tlhc
BCEAO has helped improve Scncgal's extetnal accounts.' et this policy lhas
severely constrained domestic credit; to thc rest of the economy. From 1986
to 1991 credit to tlhe nongovernnent. sector increased ljy an average of only
0.7 percent alnnually (in l.Cnte
S ofi'ioney supply at tle beginning oftliC year);
in real terms, it declined substantially. The iiioney supply (M2) has followed
asimiilar trend;ialthoughlith decline hass been less severe. Given these trends,
the ratio of M2 to GDP-one meaesure of the degree of financial deepening-has fallen from 0.28 in 1984 to 0.23 in 1991 (table 7.3).
ln the context of the fixed exclhange tate, BCEAO policies seemed to be
appropriate for maintaining a sustainable external position, particularly
because thie fscal situation could not be controlled. It isquestionablewlbeth:1er
this policy can be maintained widtout adversely affecting economic growth.
The policies have successfully controlled the rate of domestic inflation, which
has stabilized at less than 3 percent in recent years. Better inflationary control has helped Senegal recover a certain degree of compettiveness.
One of the results of monetary and credit sector reform has been liberali7ation of tle in terest rate structure. By eliminating the preferential discount
rate-which formerly applied to agriculture, the export sector, small and
medium-size companies, and residential construction (for first-time buyers
or builders)-and by liberalizing margins and commissions, the government
has kept lending rates for prime borrowers at 16 to 18 percent, while maintaining tle official inflation rate at less than 3 percent Bank lending continues to reflect the preference for short-term trade-related activities at th-e expense of longer-tenn investment projects, thereby undermnining the growth
Table 7.3 Summary of monetary indicators, 1984-9 1
(mnnuca percentage change, except M2/GDP)
Year

1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
*I 990
1991

Credi to
govemment
5.5
7.5
1.6
-1.7
- 2.3
-7.2
-5.2
0.6

Credi to
economy'

MonM"
(A2)

Ratio of
A2 to GDP
0.28
0.26
0.26
0.24
0.23
0.25
0.22
0.23

2.0

5.2

8.1

8.6
1.3
3.5
9.6
1.3
8.6
-4.3

4.5
11.2
0.2
0.5
10.3
-4.8
5.8

13.4
12.5
6.1
7.3
0.1
7.0
2.5

a. Change inpercentage of the money supply at the begnning of the period.
Soure: SCEAO and IMF stafrestfinates.
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prospects of ilih ceonoamy. Betwveen 1985 and 1991), thi share of"loriorw-iml1
lendling increased fiom G0 to 67 percentorcfctinlalvo hank lending,while
loans to indtistrial projects lhve fitl'en fioni 22 percent to less tian 15 percent.

The contin

iicto l'aln one .aDy ufl
n(.1Cre(IiI.policy inSenegl ha.s been diesignd

.mn(I implemented in aIi rmt, t.imiely, an1r( consisLren i.manner. Thes-e ilne;si wa"
s
1lave lclAped. keep inflation lowy, curl'ta.il overall domest1ic demand, provide
dlie l)asis for a more robust- lanking st'
e o, ndo restirici. government, in ter

venwoion in credit. allocAlLion. Yet. tIlicy.have nol. crealed thle foundalinn foi*
sustainaable growvlh.TW-iM1e lirsy nefunrn. Thie oi)jective ofr ate rade. efo
progrtillm was to
harionize efflective protlection. Il.was-t lbe iimplemiented in two stages Ovaer
a- two-yea-rperiod (Uly 19186wtoji:ly'1988). Inditeirstsi.ag in 196G,teC go
ernment was 1.0 rreeze the numnberof product.s su.bject t.o quotas, eilminat
quantitative restrictions for a lis. of go cis not produced in Senega.l and ror
categories of goods of one subsector, redciuice import. dutlies for 15Dgoups of'
product.s (from 90 percent. to 65 percent), and strengthen thc export. suib
sidy and duity drawback scli Cnes, tliis ensuring equivalent incentives across
mnamnfacturing sectors. In tie second stage in 1987, die governimientwas to
eliminale most.quJantitative restlictions, as well as all referfence prices (vaima.>t
mnercuriates), except when undetinvoicing or dumping were common practices; narrow the triffirate band further; and strengthen the key induistrial
-exportinstitutions-thatis, restructiure the exportinsurance agencyand tihe
external trade agency. The main objeclive of these refomis was to redutce

excessive tariff protection and to consolidate die tariff structuirewitlin a limited band (consisting of four customs duty rates).
Contrary to the experience in non-CFA countiies, the r em oval of quantitative restlictions was not followed immediately by Iligh tariffs, becallse the
protection level in Senegal was already highi enough, and, given t-he peculiargeographiic location of lthe Gambia, any additional increase would merely
have intensified the degree of fraud. Yet, althiougdigle schiedule was largely
adhered to, it can still be argued that die sequencing and pace of triade refonu were less than optimal in Senegal. The implementation period (twentyfour months) was too shor-t to allow dhe manufactuiring firms to prepare
themselves for stiff external competilion. Moreover, the timing of the critical accompanying; measures was problematic. The induistrial policy refomll
called for reducing ilte cost of production in Senegal-liberalizing theLlabor mnarket, reducing energy costs, and improving the regulatory environment In retrospect, the labor inarket issue was not addre.sssed effectively, die
energ cost was only slightly reduced three years after irade was completely
liberalized, and the regulatory environmentwas only recently addressed in
a meaningful way.
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Trade measures for opening up the economy proceeded largely on schedule. Hlowever, in the absence of thle accompanying mcasurcs necessary to
reduce die costof[businessin Senegal, aswell as in dte face of significantreal.
exchange riate depreciation in competing countries (including die Gambia),

dte industrial sector netincreasing competition fromn imported goods. Ught
manufactures such as textiles, shoes, batteries, and matches, whose smuggling was somewvhat controlled Ltirouglh quantitative restrictions, became
totally exposed to competidon. Under die pressure emanating from these
industries, the governmentreintroduced several protection measures in mid1989, including tariff exemptions for imported inpuLs necessary for producing textiles, matches, and battenies.
X
The govermnentreversed its protection policy by raising customs tariffs,
partly to restore protection for subsectors tdreatened by external competition and partly to increase tax revenue. It should be recalled that die goverment experienced major revenue shortfalls in fiscal 1989, and not necessarilyb:cause trade was liberalized. Customs duties (droisde douane) were raised
fromn 10 percent to 15 percent irn 1989, and a levy of 3 percent vas imposed
on mostimports ayear later (timbredouanie) .Thus,
tie -aeragenominal duty
rate, which declined from 60 percent in 1985 to 35 percent in mid-1 988, was
raised to its current level of43 percent Moreover, to combatunderinvoicing,
the government introduced minimum customs tax assessments on a lage
number of imports and broadened the use of reference prices. Tlus, the
manipulation of tariff rates in order to mobilize revenue and protect industry, combined with the introduction ofminimum customs assessments, bancally reversed mostof the tariff reforms achieved between 1986 and 1988. In
fact,Senegal's protection system mayhave become more complicated by 1992
than it was during the prereform period.
Table 7.4 provides rough estimates of the effective rates of protection
from 1985 to 1991 and shows dearly the reversal in government trade policy.
Onaverage, the effective protection rates declined from 165 percentin 1985,
before the reforms, to 89 percent in mid-1988, when most quantitative restrctions were eliminated and nominal trffs were at their lowest levels. They
-increased to9B percentin 1990 after the series of changes discussed earlier.
Table 7.4 Indicators of import protection, 1985-91
Indicator

1985

?86

1987

1988

1989

1990

165.4

111.0

111.0

893

94.6

97.7

73.4
IB.1

80.0
23.0

83.4
25.6

74.3

91.1
25.2

104.1
28.6

1991

Average effective rate af protection

(percent)
Customs receipts (CFAF)
Effletive tuiff rates (percenty
Notava;ible.

a. DeCrned as cuoms receipts as a percentage of nports

Surce World Bank staff estinates.
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In additior to tiese higher proteclion riates, I-ecent. clhanges reintiroduiced
vide distortions in dlie incentive system among soeIC industial -subsectors.
Based on the samie table, evidence about die impact of tde trade rieforms on
customns receipts is not. concluJsive. Customs receipts increased by nearly 13
percent in nominal tenus betwveen 1985 and 1987, declined by that inuich in
1988, and then increased by 16 percent annually between 1989 and 1991.
nhc increase duriingLthe latter period seems t.o have resulted froimi the effort
to reduce tax exemptions rather than fromn tarilf increases.

Domsticti/drdliberalizationand itmplnemntatio. Like otherAflican counties,
Senegal intensified directgovemmentintervention in agriculture and manufacturing pricing and markets in die lYGOs and 1970s. During its first plLase,
the adjustment effort attempted to reverse this situation and had achieved
some success. In agriculture, pricing policy vas used as the primaryvehicle
for stimulating production and shifting income in favor of rural producers.
SUBSIDIES AND PRODUCER PRICES. By tde end of 1988 major subsidies in die
agricultural sectorwere reduced orphased out, produicerprices offoodcrops
were liberalized, producer prices of cash crops were red'uced slightly, and
input distribution marklers were liberalized. Fertili7er subsidies were eliminated for all commodities except cotton. Despite being adjusted from time
to time, producerprices forgroundnuts, cotton, and rice remained delinked
from the world market prices.9 A major study on agricultural prices 'and incentiveswas undertaken in 1988, buit its recommendations were neveriimplemented, particularly a proposal to adjust the-groundnut producer price to
the world mark-etprice. Nevertheless, budgetary constraints necessitated reducing. the groundnut producer price in 1988.
cONSUMER PRCEs. The pices foral! but 16 consumer goods had been decontrolled in 1987 and 1988, and the office in charge of price controls was
abolished in 1990. For manufactured goods; pnrces were decontrolled in
conjunction with the elimination of quantitative restictions on imports. In
addition, an effective price information system was set up for local cereals.
For rice, the government reduced the consumer price further than wvas desirable. The consumer items for which prices remained under control were
sugar, salt, tea, wheat, flour, pharmaceutical producrs, cement, electrcity,
petroleum products, water, tran.sportation, broken rice, tomatoes and tomato
concentrate, and cookingoil.Thegovernments rationale forcontrolling the
prices of these.items was that it was for social and strategic reasons.
In energy the government instituted a simpler and more transparent
pricing and taxation system for petroleum products in 1991. This system set
ex-refinery prices at import parity, plus a fixed handling fee paid to the local refinery company to account. for the relative inefficiencies under which
it was operating. Prices to distributors were derived from ex-refinery prices
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in whiclh import duties and taxes were added together. Consequently, for
the rirst tme since 1986, domestic prices were reduced inJuly 1991 by 5 to
25 percent, with die higler reductions applying to industrial petroleum inputs. The distribution of petroleumii products and their prices have not yet
been deregulated.
MARRE DEREGULATION. Most restrictions on the domestic marketing of cereals otler tlan rice have been removed, tius creatig a well-functioning
mark-et with many participants. The role of the rural development authorities (SRDRs) wsas significantly curtailed in recentyears, the public enterprise
for input supplies (SONAR) was liquidated, and import controls on fertilizers were phased out. The distribution and collection ofgroundnutseeds were
privatized, as was the pnrmary marketing of groundnuts&The monopoly of
thc ptiblic enterprise SERAS on skins and hides was abolished (and die enterpnse was later privatized).
Other reforms envisaged by the govemmentinduded limiting m-arket
intervention by the food security commission, separating tie rice operation
from the Caisse de priquationel de stabitisationdespfix (CPSP), and allowing
private importers to participate in rice importation and trade. Of these acdons, the only measure implemented eWectivelywas limiting intervention by
the food security commission. In the rice sector, the government felt compelled to manage the distorted domestic prices to justifd almost complete
control of the activity by the public sector. In the groundnutsector, domesticprimarymarketing cost.swere reduced and theprivate sector wasa;lloiwed
into marlketing in 1987. The sugar sector, consisting of a private company
(CSS), enjoys a production and imports monopoly under a long-term convention with the government, which runs to theyear2000.The rice subsector
has remained inefficientand has distorted the entire domestic cereals sector
in favor of rice, to the detnrment of locally produced maize, sorghum, and
millet, wrhose production costs are far less expensive. The government also
abandoned the principle of special agreements (conventions spiciales)
Laborandwagepolicy reform and implementetion. A major element ofadjustmentin Senegalwlas to improve the functioning of the labor market. Strong
labor marketrigidity, high wages, and low productivitywere impedimemts to
new investment and the creation of employment However, reform was limited to abolishing the labor office in 1987 and, consequently, liberaliing
hiring practices; also, constraints on using temporary employment contrcts
were relaxed parially. The maximum period for such contractswas extended
from six to twelve months. An attempt to revise critical provisions in the la-

bor code had failed, and the modified codeuwas notapproved by the National
Assembly due to deep-seated vested interests in the unions and the fear of
triggering social unrest on the eve of the 1988 general election.
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In 1989 the use of temporary labor was relaxed further. For all firms the
maximum period fortlhese contxactswasextended to fiveyears,and for firms
in the industrial free zone and those benefiting from dte investment code

die period w

unlimited. Both the general payroll tax (contributionforfaitaire)

of about 3 percent and the- income tax nonnally paid by employers were
eliminated in 1989 for new and expanding firms. A uripartite committee
composed of the government, employeris associations, and labor unions wvas
formed inJanuary 1990 to examine existing labor legislation and industrial
regulations Thus, based on an in-depth study of die labor market in Senegal
bv the Interational Labour Organisadion in 1990, the government decided
that the labor code should be revirsed completely, rather than a few articles
of the code modified. To maximize support for adopting a new labor code,
the government informed and educated the public and the unions about
the importance ofliberalizing the labormarket.The labor code has now been
revised and submitted to-the National Assembly for ratification. Among the
kley changes are that the differentindusry-specific wage scales have been made
independent of the minimumi wage, collective bargaining has been encouraged at the firn level, and firing practices have been liberalized.
In the public sector, the government also abolished automatic recruitment from tragiing schools, downsized the civil service through a voluntary
departure program, rationalized the wage benefits,.and froze the minimum
wage. WCith the exception of the latter, which also applies to the private sector, none ofthe othermeasureshasbeen implementedeffectively. Legallabor
market rigidities still exist in Senegal, although compliance wiih them is
becoming less effectivewith the expansion of ie infornal sector. In the civil
service, real average salaries declined by 30 percentfrom 1980 to 19S5, and
then increased by 24 percent from 1935 to 1990 (table 7.5). But itwas, the
more highly paid civil servants who saw. their real wages decline faster. The
salary differential in the civil service has narroured from 1:8 in 1980 to 1:6 in
1990. Wages in the infonnal sector are believed to be a third of prevailing
wages in the formal sector.
The partial approach to labor mark;et reforn has been ineffective. Yet
although the comprehensive and less confrontationalapproach recendyfollowed has not yet yielded results in the context of the internal adjustment
strategy pursued by Senegal, it has enhanced public awareness about and
government ownership of the reform program (box 7.2).
Sectoral and institutionalreform
Banking sector reformL Of all the reforms undertaklen by Senegal in the
1980s, banking sector reform-in which 7 of the country's 15 banks wrere
closed-must be considered the most successful reform. This achievement
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owed a great deal to the veractive
y
role of the 13CEAO, whose iews on bank
restructuring were very close to those of the foreign donors involved in tlhe
operation. Also, after some
i hesitation at the starut, tde governmnent showed
greatpolitica courage in closing several of the country's public banks, widh
the accompanying shot-termn negative impact on employment.The commonality of approaches and close coordination among donors played an impoxtantrolein the success of the reform. Itis important to note that Senegal wras
one of the first countries in the region to undertake such a significant reform of the financial sector.
In October 1987 the government consulted the LMF, the World Bank,
and bilateral donors (France and the United States) with a view toward restructuring the ailing banks. BCEAO svaw the extensive banking crisis in seweral member countries in late 1988 as an opportunity to restructure die
banking sector and to lay a foundation for developing modem, responsible
capital markets. Wrhile the restructuring or closing of the ailing bank;s was
the more spectacular aspect of the reform, more important changes tookplace in policy that affected the general operational components of banks.
The reform programi consisted of six measures:
* A drastic restructuring of distressed banks that with die injection of
additional capital would experience a positive net worth and meet
minimum capital adequacy requirements (BIAOS and USE).
Table 7.5 Indexes of civil servants' real wages and salaries, 198-91
(1 980z too)

Mininurm

wage

Year
I9SOL'

-

1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
.199D

-,

99
91
94
85
78
74
77
78
85
85

Gwilservcnts'saries

MAirinEn

Mcudmum

Averag'

too

.100

1t

94
8B
85
76
70
66
69
70
76
76

87

,

Oange I980 to I985

-21.7

-29.7

hange 1985to 1990

8.6

7.4

1991

94
81
74
66
59
55
SB
59
59
60

94
85
81
78
70
72
77

-413

-29.9

0.4

242

aI
86
88

.
.

Not available
Note: Defated by the consurner pr*e index for the average Senegalese bfmily.
a.The difference between the earnigs (represented by this column) and fates data (represented by the two
prerding coliTs) an be explained by prornotions and krige benefitss
b.Flcal 19B0-8I.
Surce: World Bankstaf estrnas
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* The closiure of distressed banks for which no substantial inrjection of
new capital -ws expected( (BNDS, SOFISEDIT, SONAGCA
SONAB.A\NrQUE. ASSURBi\NK- and BSK).
* Asharp reduiction in abusive practices.suich as forced crop credits mnd
grnveminent guarantees on palrstatal borrowing, and a reduction in
governmentownershipin financial institwdtions to lessdthan 25 percentL

Box 7.2 Government ownership: two different strategies for revising

the labor code
The manernin which the governmentatucmpted to revise thelaborcodeprovides
a useful lerson for the design of fututre reforms in Sencgal and elsewhere. In 1987
the approach adopted by the government consisted of directly tackling selected
ariicles in the labor code thatdealwith hiring and firing (Articles35 and 47) .ThCrC
was little,.if any;, diLsclssion with dte Social partners concerned (the employers
association and labor union.s) . No public discusscion of the merit of these refornms
took place. hie end result was that the revised codc w;as not adopted by the Nltional Assembly; it us seen as being imposed by the donors.
In 1990 the approach was to revise the code completely And the social partners
have been involved in all stagesr of the process: -analytical work, discussion, and
drafting- The initial preparatory wvork was;L facilitated by an ILO expert, ho bad
established good. rapport uith'the unions and the employcrs association. The
outcome of this effort was the fonnation of a tripartite committee-comprLsing

government, unions, and employers-to work with another international expert
to rcvisc the code. Ternms of reference for the consultant were cleared by all parties concerned, as wus the selection of the consultant Avery peinenced consultant was selected.who also happened to have easy accs to the head of CNTS (the
main labor union) and the president of Senegal. Parallel to this eFfort, ILO w%asalso commissioned to carry out an in-depth study on the wage-stting system in
Senegal The study servedasa.valuable input into theprocess ofrevising the code.
Whencn the reaised code was drafted, the government undertook a six-month
public campaign led by high government officiaLs to sensitize public opinion to

labor marketflexibility and liberalization. Thus, a first public debate was held in
Marcth 1991, a presentation of the issue at the National Assembly mwa made by the
Prime Minister in June, and an employment symposium and a workshop for the
labor inspectors wvere organized in July. The revised code wAS submitted to the
National Assembly in September 1991 'buthas not yet been approved.
Rcising the code was a lengthy and time-consuming procesvs, taking ab ouL two

years betwecn the establishment of the tripartite committee and the submission
of the raised codc to the National Assembly. Nevertheless, Senegal ha-s omr-ership of the new code, not thle World Bank or outside con.sultants. Thosewho will

benefit from and oversee the implementation of the code have been directly involved in the preparation and revision process.
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Slubstuntial refons in credit. policies and in bank lcgislition,supervision, and practices (bank-b)-bank credit ceilings. sectoral credit taIgeLs. prior-authori7ation mechanisms, a.nd interest Late policies)..

Recovery of bad de(t.
StUiCies
t*
ognrss-roots imututal credit scIc;iics.
-InJne1989, after Otw
yearS ofrattempting to ,sa-ve mnost ortdie developnment bankLs,' dte govern
mentadopted aI comprehensive straLegy t.o restruc-

ture tde banking system. The strategy called for mainraining only banks tdit,
after rcstructu ring. couild become proritable, solvent, and liqulid; privatiing
banls to reduce government interference in banknmanagement, and limiiting tde government's equity share in banks to a maxXimurm of 25 percent;
and developing aglobal financingplan whdose projected annual government
contibtutions wvouIld be conpatible withl tle government budget.

Whlen.shareholders agreed to rchabilitite the b-ank underthicircon trol,
the strategv called for re.storing the banks' financial situation through shareeholder equity or quasi-equity contributions to offret losses and r ecapitali;ung
the banks to a level compatible with sound banking standards In addition.
sftiffingwtas to be reduiced, expensive branch nenvorks pruned, ndnmanagerial changes introduced. hlen the financial requirements for rehabilitating
a bankwould be bevond die resources of its shareholders, as in governmentowned or -controlled banks, the balance sheet wnas to be split into a "sound
balance sheeC that represented l.heperfoiming loans and a "liquidaitngstructure" that represented nonperformingassets. This procedure applies to five
government-controlled b'xnks.
The reforimswere de- t,ned to curb the abuse of crop credits and government guarantees on parastatal borrowving that in the past hadjeopardized
bank profits. They were also to pro%ide a mark-et-oriented determination of
interest rates (patterned after Paris rates) and to widen banking marginsall of which to improve the profitability of banks. In 19S9 the West Afiican
Monetary Union Council of Ministers decided that measures should be introduced to make the bank-by-bank credit ceiling allocations mare flex.ible.
The system of credit objectives targeted to sectors designatedas "priority" was
eliminated. The prior authorization mechanism required for loans of more
than CFAF 70 million was raised to CFAF 300 million. The CGuncil of Ministers agreed that the BCEAO would chann el all rediscounting needs through
the money market. wvhich itwo'uld continue to intermediate at the administratively determined rate; and meet the demand for borrowing in excess of
money market deposits through a last-resort facility of the central bank.
Therewere twvo barnksassociated with private Senegaleseinvestorswhose
foreign majority shareholders wanted to stayin business during the restructuring period: BIAOS (05 percent owvned by the French BIAO Group) and
MASSRAF (partly ownedbySaudiArabian interests) . The government closed
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four of thle live development banks and twYo commercial banks in which it
Ihad majority ownerslhip. In addition, it sought to prevent the recutirence of
past-practices, by directly and indirectlyreducing its capital share in all banLs
(except CNCAS, wliere no suitable buyer can be found) to a maximum of 25
percent, whiclh is less than required to be a b locking minority. In short, with
minor exceptions, the bank restructuring process was completed more or
less on schedule.
BCEAO has been responsible for making changes in the banking legislation and supervision. Ithas succe.sfullyimplemented the proposed reforms.
To reform bank supeivision procedures, it formed a WestAfrican Monetay
Union zonewide control conmission on October 1,1990, with .supranational
authority; it then revised banlking laws and regulations to prevent, the recurrence of past excesses and bring them in line with practices in other countries: The BCEAO obtained support from France and the IMF to strengthen
its inspection department
In contrasttto the government'spromptand courageous decision to dose
several banks, efforts toward debt recovery have been weak-and erratic. As of
the end of 1989, government estimates indicate thatapproximately CFAF 32
billion (about $100 million) of the CFAF 144 billion (about$450 niillion) of
nonperforming credits of the banlks to be restructured could ultimately be
recovered in the period from 1990 to 1993. This amount would repay depositors whose assets were frozen when the banking sector"was restructured
and enable the government to service the debt it incurred to umdertake the
reform program. In this connection, the governmentestablished arecovery

agency staffed in part by personnel Iaid off by the restructured banks, and
charged with recovering the bad loans of the restructured banks by seing
debtors' assets, rescheduling loans, and pursuing other arrangements. To
recover the bad debt and to ensure progress, an independent auditor prepared a data bannk ofal delinquent debtors of the banks being restructured.
Progress on recoverv has been followed by a committee established by the
Ministry of Finance.
Implementing these measures has taken longer than necessary. The
government's hesitancy to pursue the large debtors, most of whom are plitically well connected, accounted for this lack of success. The implications
oftlhese developmentsaremoresignificant than is the forgone revenue from
debtrecov ery. The factthatlarge debtors continue to be perceived to be above
the law explains in part the reluctance of banks to commit important sumns
for long-term investment projecsThe total cost of banking system reform was estimated at CFAF 27 billion- Of this, about CFAF 198 billion has already been secured through the
consolidation of CFAF 146.5 billion from BCEAO on concessional terms, a
sectoradjustmentloan of OFAS31 -7billion (IDAplus cofinanciers),and the

Published by iRepository, 2021

https://ir.iba.edu.pk/faculty-research-books/13

316

ADJusPdENr tn Am:

FRONM COUTR CASE SmDIES
Ic OLEsNS

recovery of bad debts, estimated at CFAF 20 billion. The remaining CFAF 77
billion is expected to be covered from a further BCEAO consolidation and
the ongoing recovery of nonperforming loans.
reform. Although the Senegalese were late in formulatPublic ense
ing a dear public enterprise sector strategy, the sectoral reform program
has been comprehensive and based on detailed anaycal work. The World
Bank prepared two sectoral reports in 1981 and 1989 to assist the govemment in formulating an overall frameworkl for refonn. Several audit reports
and specfic policy studies were also carried-out"l Two specfic bank-technical assistance projects were approved in 1977 and 1983, targeted at institution buildingand information. management atboth the:enterprises and the
supervisory agencies.
Public enterprise reform in Senegal dates back to the late 1970s, but in
1986 itbecame part of the government's medium-term economicand financial rehabilitation program, supportedby three structural adjustmentloans,
a financal sector adjustnent loan, and a technical assistance projectL2 The
objectives of Senegalrs reform policy are no different than those pursued by
other countries-to restrictgovermnentinteiventionin enterprises thatcould
be managed niore effectively by the private sector, and to improve the
govemrment's ability to manage the public enterprises thatremain under its
control. Until 1985 government strategy had not been articulated. The first
structral adjustlt rn i. loan reaffirmed the end of the nationalizaton policy,
the strong ex ante supervision of public enterprises, and the establishment
of a system of contract plans, a new measure to help public enterprises develop a medium-tenn strategy and to clariy the relationship between the
governmentand individual enterprises.' 3 In 1985 govermentstrategycalled
for privatizing and liquidating selected public enterprises, Improving the
management and performance of those that remained in the public sector,
simplifying sectoral control procedures, and improving portfoio management inforlmation. In 1989 this strategy was refined and continued.
Since 1990 stmtegyhasshifted from attempts topprivatizenonperforming
public enterprises to efforts to startwith profitable enterprisesandstrengthen
the process ofprivatization-a policy that has made the process more transparent; The govermmenthas imposed greater financial discpline byhardening the budget constraints of commercally oriented public enterprises (reducing operatingsubsidies,setdingcross-debts, eliminatingimplicitsubsidies,
and eliminating overdra ftacilities). Public enterprises must restructure or
face liquidaton. Overdrafts were eliminated to close a loophole for public
enterprises that still enabled them to comply with the reduction in direct
subsidies. One important shortcoming of the design of the reform program
is the large number of small enterprises that were to be privatized (which
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distracted the government from Fiocusing on major enterprises) and tde large
number of contract plans thatwere to be signed in a relatively short period.
It can be argued that privatization could lrave been speeded up had tie regulatory and incentive framework been reforned to create a favorable environment for private sector investment.
On the institLutional and legal front, tde govemrnment's approach throughout most of the 1980s was focused too much on perfecting instruments of
control and strengthening oversightagencies. Recently, the government las
shifted iLsapproach. It created and laterstrengthened a focal parastaal agency
(DRSP), the only agency outside the Finance Ministry responsible for formulating, managing, and monitoiing the reform program for public enterprises. The agency is also responsible for supervising contract plan implementation,strengdliening the public enterprise unitin the treasurybygiving
itgreaterauthorityin financial decisionmakin curtaiing the roles of other
supervisory agencies to aposteriori compliance monitoring and improving
the composition of the board of directors.
Implementation hasbeenuneven-good to Fairon thelegal, institutional,
and rehabilitation fronts; fair to poor on the financilfront; and, until quite
recendy, poor on the privatization front. Public enterprise reform has been
plagued bysignificant delays-a clearindication of the complexityand insttutional nature of the issues and the govermnentes hesitancy to tackle tough
reforms, particularly those affectng the treasury and vested interests.
The government has changed the law on the organization and control
of the public enterprise sector, but it hasnotyet issued the decrees required
for its enforcement Agencies that implemented the program have been
streamlined and ratonalized. Twenty-Four (of 44 planned) contract plans
and 'letters of mission" have been signed by the government and selected
public enterprises. While contract plans have improved the trAnsparency
between and accountability of the two contraccting partiese-not a small
achievement-they have not been successful in enforcing compliance with
the financial obligations. As Nellis (1 989) notes, 'tariff regimes have been
-specified,investmentprogramsrstated, noncommercial operations costed out
and compensationarranged for, and operatingsubsidiesset-butin case after
case the govremment has proven unable or unwilling to honor the financial
commitments agreed upon; and the agreements have had to be repeatedly
and extensively revised, or fallen into abeyance." Only 10 ofa programmed
27 public enterprises have been restructured and rehabilitated.
On the financial front, the governmenthas implemented the reforms in
"letter but not spirit." Indeed, while the government reduced direct subsidies to public enterprinss, the enterpriseshave resorted to commerial bank
overdrafts and governmtntguaran tees for borrowing, thus preacpitating the
financial crisis of the bankling system and accunulating arream when the
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overdraft racilties have no longer been possible. Tb e setleinent of cross-debt
aears between the governmentand public enterprises has been canied outtwice, in 1986 and 1989, but the problem reappeared because preventive
measures wveie not implemented concurrently. The arrears at the end of 1939
were large, and dteiriimpacton theworkingcapitaland taxpaymentofpublic
enterpriseswas significant. Settling these arrears was complex, and the process cannot be repeated indefinitely-and unless preventive measures similarto thoseeadoptedin lg9l are in place, theproblemwillrecur. 4 Asagood
start, the govemment focused on die tlree utlity companies (water, electricity, and telephone), apparently with some encouraging success.
Table 7.6 and figure 7.2 show the performance of the divestiture program for both financial and nonfinancial public enterprises. Over the entire
reform period, the government has liquidated 21. public enterprises (most
of them virtually defunct) and totally or partially privatized 26 others (most
of wYhich were small and unimportant)-together representing 42 percent
-ofthe totad numberof public enterprises in the sector. In tenns ofassetsand
government equity, however, they represent only 19 percentand 11 percent
of the sector, respectively. The disproportionate percentages reflect the fact
that the three utility companies (electricity, wvater, and telephone) were not
Table 7.6 Divestiture progra,
*
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NTce Data rnay not add up due to rounding.
Source- World Bark data.

Published by iRepository, 2021

https://ir.iba.edu.pk/faculty-research-books/13

Senegal.: slfabiliziion, prttialaIju.smen,

X

dwagntiil

-u 319

Figure 7.2 Senegal public-enterprise divestiture program
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part of-the divestiture pongram. They alone account for 33 percent of the
sector'sasser-and 46percentofguveernmentequity. Abreakdovn oftlhe public
enterprise sector shows that the divestiture process is SO tO90 percent com-

plete in the financial subsector. but far from being complete in the
nonfinancial-36 percent in terms of numbers. 12 percent in assets, and 6
percent in government equity; In total, privatization has brought nearly CF[A
19 billion in cash to the treasury-70 percent from the sales of sharcs and 30
percent from dividends.
Progress in the divestiture program is very recentX Of the public enter.
pnses pnvatized and liquidated, representing 80 percent of the assets and
government equity, about 75 percentwere divested between 1939 and 1991.
Tlere are several reasons for this recent positive development the focus on
profitable companies, the budgetary financial squeeze on public enterprises,
and the improved tramsparency of tle pi-vauization process. Had the government not insisted on certain conditions (higher prices and no reduction in

personnel), and had the enabling environnment of the private sector (includinga secondary market).been in place, the privatization perfonuance wvould
have been much better.
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Social sec/n' trfoann and imtipIaniematifUh Ti(! primary objeclive of thic social
sector program in Senegal is -to increase per capita income and generate
employment, tlhereby improving l1i0 social conditions -nutrition, primary.
health care, and basic education-rind r ecduicing poverty. EffIors tO raise the
standard of living among die poor lhave been more active and direct since
*1987 in the context of World Bank-supported adjustment operations (including the frlist human resource sector adj ustinent loan, approvedi n 1991).

These operations provide mechanisms for crcating jobs to miiinimiiize dhe
adverse shori.-term impact of adjustuent and for securing adCqCuate pr'ovi-sions in die budget ror basic needs. To imlprove the standard or living futrther, Senegal has prepared but not yet implemented an action plan to conLrol the population growtlh rate.-

In 1987 the government created a national employment fund and establislhed an agency (DIRE) to ease the transition of
laid-off workers in the parapublic and industrial sectors and to stimulate
voluntary departures from the civil service. A recent World Bank evaluation
of thisprogram conc:aded thatthe cost-effectveness of the employmentfund
has been mixed. Only 1,500 jobs were created between 1988 and 1991 at a
cost of $11,000 each, which is relatively high given the magnitude of the
unemployment problem in Senegal.
Amajor componentof the IDA's Public Works and Emp1oymentProject
(AGETIP) has been to identidy rehabilitation and maintenance works in urban
areas to be undertaken by small contractors with labor-intensive methods.
'The project has created 2,000 person-years of temporary employment over
a tw o-year period. Apart from its success at easing the initial emnployment
costs of adjustment, the project has helped increase the long-term skills of
both small contractors and their temporary employees.
PUBLIC EXPENDITURE RES,RUTuJRINC. While the adjustment efforthassought
to improve the composition oftheinvestmentprogram since 1986, itlhas only
recently emphasized restructuring the govemment budget to ensure tlhat
resource allocations to primary health care and primary education are ad.
equate. The voluntary departure program has sought to preserve adequate
recruitment of primary school teachers and to protect allocations to social
sectors during budgetary cuts. The results of the recent public expenditure
review indicated that, while the health subsector benefited from the restructunng of expenditures toward primaryhealth care during the 19SOs, notmuch
restructuring took place in the education subsector.
In the healti subsector, real recurrent expenditures were the hardest
hit, dropping by 21 percent between the first and the second halves of the
1980s (table 7.7). The total amrountallocated to the health sector under the
recurrent budget has fallen considerably, from 0.9 percent of GDP in 1980
to 0.6 percent in 1988. The balance between salaries and wages and matenals and supplies continued to deteriorate, with the ratio rising from 2:1 in
JOB CREATION PROGRAMS.
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1982 to 3:1 in 1989. The public expenrlitllre review provides ample evi(lenec
that t.h adequacy and quality ofheulti delivery services in the public sect.o
has deteriorated significandty over tlhe ptst.decade. One positive d evelopm ent
in health expenditures has lcen tlhi incrcasc in tlhe Sl)ar of tot,al1 recilurrentl
48
1per8cent.n
an d invesltment expenditu res on plhBitlihl ealtlh car e, fi'
to, 62 percent. in 1989. Relatedly, the regional balance or per capi, iheallh
expenditures has, imlpr'ovcd.

In ecduication, recurrent, eXpenditures rtemainecd constant. in real termns
during the 1980s. However, highier edtication experienced an increasea:. hlle
expensc of primaryeducation, comilpounded by tue flct.thatrnonwage rec::,r

renL expenditujreswere squleezed hard, dropping t6juUstahloui 10 per cent. or
die wage cost. Thuts, the quality of education sservices deteriorated at, all lev.
els. Expenditures in tlhe sect-or were weighted excessively toward lhiger cdiil
cation during thie IaLLer part of tlhc 1980s. These figures do not. bully measulre
die flailure of education policy, because they msk lhigh wastage and Pailuire
rates, especiallyat th.e univerity level. Costs per studentsshowvast disparitics,
witli those at the university level 18 to 20 times the cost of elementary educadon. This compares unfavorably with countries witli bettcr education systems.
fnlsiuionaial¢nd legal reform and imtplemeaiion. Severl institutional and
legal refonns hiave been discussed, includingtdle revised labor code and
greaterpublicsectornmanagerial efliciency.Thissection discuisses thle refonms

Table 7.7 Allocation of resources to social sectors, 1980-90
(redtier, 1980 ItOO)
Allocation
Tolal recrrent expenditure
Educaton
Higher education
Wages
Health
Wages

Total investment
Education
Health
Share of wages in educaton recurrent

expenditure (percent)
Share of wages in health recurrent.
expenditure (percent)
Primary enrollment (thousands)
Secondary and tertiary enrollment
(thousands)
a.Annual average for 1983-85.
b.Annual average for 1989.
c Annual average for 1981-83.
d.Annual average for 19B 1.
Source: World Bank estimates.
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Amnwl average
1980-85
1986-90

Percentage change
Total
Annual

108.2
963
88.7'
96.4
90.7

98.5
96.5
95.5
102.1b
71.6

-9.0
0.2
7.7
5.9
-21.0

-1.9.
0.0
.1.5
1

90.1

77.3b

-14.2

-3.0

85.1'
85.1'
85.1 '

58.7
64.1
82.0

-31.0
-24.6
-3.6

-7.2
-5.5
-0.7

70.0d

74.0b

5.9

1.1

73.0"
662.0

8.6
30.1

1.7
5.7

176.0

43.1

7.4

61B.0d
509.0
123.0

.

-4.6
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lhat. have not heen covered CIsewh1ere-puIblic adiinisirntiuon
rind

die piti-

VaLe SCCtIo enabling environmnent.

Senegal inlhCeiteCi a lar public adminiSsttion fr om
the time wh1en Dakar wwn die ca.pital or rie Frenclh West African Colonies.
Tie higl coSt and tile increasingly poor-per-foni-inance oof thLe civil servi-ce ha,1ve
been a major chiallenge to Senegal since at lCeLaLs the inid-1970s.15 The govpeminent first addressed these issues in 1976, whien it. decided to reorganize
the central ministries (optraion,organigalnnwe)with aview toward downsizing
staff, reducing wage costs, and improving efficiency. Thic programi wais abandoned because- of resistance from some ministLies. Since 1982 the
government's adjustment programi has called for maintaining a ceiling on
the number or civil senrants, freezing salaries, and improving ciil servicc
management These measures have been supported by the World Bank's
second, third, and fourit structural adjustment loanS, and a technical assistance project, and by a'series of lMF arrangements.
The most far-reaching attempts to reform the civil se-rvice have been
undertaken since 1990. The goverinmentsought to restructure key imiinistries
CIVqL SERVICE REF;OMi.

Box 7.3 Civil service voluntary departure program: a policy failure
after a good start
The civil service reform program, introduced by the governmentinJanuary 1990,
consisted of three components (1) a major restructuring of the administration (a

reduction in the numberof minrLtries frum 23 to 15,followed by an organizational
audit; and the elimination of about2,850 positions-49 percentofwhich byjune
1990); (2) an early retirement,program thatcould affect about 1,450 staff age 48
years and over, and (3) a pfriatization program of selected government senrices
(induding the Road Maintenance Department of the Mlinistry of Infrastnucture
and the Maintenance Departimentof the Ministr ofWater Resources) ,which could
coverabout 1,300 staff. The education and health sectorswere cxcluded from the
reform program to avoid worsening the personnel shortage in these two sectors
Because the govemnient had ahlways opposed a unilateral firing of civil servants,
it decided to grant generous compensation packages (up to 48 months ofrsaary,
except for the two lowest grades, wuhich would receive 60 months of salary) to
entice the staff to leavethe administration .The program was externally financed
by France, the African Development Rank, and counterpart fundcs froni SAL IV
cdisbursements.The government's voluntary departure program, which started later hian originally expected, was well received by civil servants, and, as. a result, 4,140 staff applied to leave the service under this program byJune 1990 (box table 7.3). Of this
number, onlv 2,030 could leave by August 1990 because some ofthe financing for
the separation packages (provided by donors) was diverted to fill the unexpected
budgetary tinancing gap in 1989-90. Another round ofvoluntary departures of
1,715 staff occurred toward the end of the 1990-91 fiscal year. Thus, as of August:
1991 a totalof3,745 staff, representing about90 percentofboth the totalnumber
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(by reduicing stafl tirotugh a voluntary departure programn), insti lute ineasures
to control the wage bill, and improve personnel management. Tlhe development. management project sponsored several studies to frailiitate the design
and implemiientaition ofrefonn. 1-lad tlhey been implemented, diese m easures
would have reduceci tlhe nuiniber orcivil servanis by 7.2 percent byJ tin I 992,
and brought their ratio to the population frotm 9 per thlousand to 7.7-. r-tio
comparable to tihose orothlerAMlican countrieswidh better resoutce endow-

ments..Tlie nominal-wage billwould h1avte been reduced by 8.7 percentrfrom
CFAF 125 billion in fiscal 1988 to CFAF7115 billion in fiscal 1991 .Ncithlert:argct
was achieved, and the actual outcolm wasa move in Lhe opposite direction.
The success of civil service reform has been mixed. The administration
was restructuired in March 1990, reducing the number of ministlies from 23
to iS with die elimination ormnergingofsome departments. Key depriuunents,.
sudi as the taxand customiS depalrunen ,.were strengthened.Thevoluntary
departire program was introduiced successfully and led to die departure of
3,745 staff from die payroll. (box 7.3). Yet the gowernment wras unable to
control recruitmient or the wage bill. As ofJune 1992 the number of civil

of applicants and the original progrAn, had left the civil service, ata total cost of
CFAF 15.7 billion. The average cost per departee is calculated at about CFAF 4.2
million, representing nearly3.2yearnofsalaty, which isin linewith the programmed
cost. Most of these departures have come from the lowfer levls of the sernice,with
the nwo lowest levels (of five) representing abouit 46 percent of the total- This is
more than tuwice the share of these twro categories in the total nunber of civil servants (29 percent.) Early retirees have accounted for about43 percent ofthe total
number of departures.

Box table 7.3 Civil service voluutary departure program, 1991
Catery
Nature ofdeparture
Voluntrly departure
Early retirement
Priadzation

Total
Deperure by grcde
AQiighest)
B
C
D
-

E(tos)
Total

-

Application
(rnbe)

2.850
1,450

2.458
1,682

1,309
5.609

4.140

3,745

100.0

4.2

11.6

5.9

24.
18.0
35.8

4.1
3.1

10.0
100.0

2.2
4.2

-

2.155
1.590
-

-

492

-

1.088

-

744
1,417

434
925
674
1,339

-

399
4,140

373
3,745

-Notapplicaible.
Soure Government of Seneat Wodld Bank stafesiamtet:
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Actal (as ofOctober 199 1).
Number af Shae oftotal Aveage ccst
departures
(percent)
(CFAF millons)

SAL IVprogreim
(number)

57.5
42.5

4.8
3.3

-

5.9
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sernice personnel stood at about 64,000, or 4 percent higher than pro
grammed. and the wage bill for the rear realched CFAF 130 billion, or 13
percent highler iltan projected. In addition, the amount of "rappel" in arrears continued to increase, contrary to dte spirit or[de aIcdjtstment program.
Th e manageminent informnation s)ystem, providing data on staff and payroll,
tias not yet l)een installed.
Progr-am implementation was not without problems. Rather than carrying out a well-designed organizational audit for which resources were made
available by die donors, as originallv planned, the govemment resorted to
ad hoc procedures. It paral-zed tie admini.stration forsome tie. No .serious follow-tip took place on what beanie of tle staffwho left the adminictration. The most serious setback of the voluntary departure program was the.
inability of the government to control recruitment After the First roumd of
departures injune 1990, tde government recruited as manyas had left This
is a-clear indication of the lack of coordination among ministries and the
laclk of a reliable management infonmation .sstem, two key elements of the
civil service reform program and the development management project.
Having adequate institutional capacity to implement the reformis is cruciaI
to the success of the program.
RECuL-ToRYE%nVIRoNMENTr. The regulatory environment hasimproved somewhat under the adjustnent program. but more must be done. The fundamental issue is attitude-civil sevants, mistrustr the private sector. Administrative regulations are cumbersome and lack efficiency. The main
achievements in Senegalwere with theincentivesystenm The investment code
was revised tnice, most recentdy in 1987, -wit a view toward eliminating the
bias againstlabor-intensive mivestment, introducing automaticiy in benefits,
eliminating the special regime, and streamlining the administrative proceduresfor investment approval with the creation ofa one-stop window (giidzd
unique). The formalitiesinmolvedin setting up an enterprise have been streamlined and simplified (mduding the commercial code) to allow for quicker
and more efficient evaluation of private sector investment applications. A
March 1991 law allows theautomaticapproval ofall such requests ifnotacted
upon within thirty days.
In 1980 a series ofe;xport promotion measures were adopted, consisting
of a duty drawback scheme and export subsidies, and both the export promotion agency (CICES) and the export insurance agency (ASACE) were
strengthened. Subsidies have been extended,and the rate hasincreased from
10 percentof exportvalue to25 percentofvalueaddedc Howrver,since 1990
budgetary difficulties have forced the goverrunent to stop honoringpayments
for export subsidies. In 1990 export promoton centered on resuscitating
activity in the industrial free zone. Firms in this zone are now allowfed to sell
up to 40 percent of their output on the domestic market. The govemment
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has also set up Tfiree points," granting all the taxv advantages of firms in the
zone to selected export-oriented enterprises'located outsi'de dte zone.
Special agreements between tie government and finns (conventions
sApilates) provided long-temi concessions to finrs as an incentive to invest in
large projects. These concessions, made essentially ad hoc, introduced distortions in the incentive system and led to substantial forgone revenue for
the government. In 1986 about 21 com'panies 15 in the industrial sector,
benefited fronispecific protection regimes. Between 1979 and 1986 agreements for the four most important firms cumulatively COSt the government
some CFAF 115 billion in forgone revenue. In l987 the government decided
to phase out these agreements by simpky letting them expire, and for three
majorcomnpanies (sugar, petroleum, and cement) specificactionswere tlaken
to reduce govemment con cessions Ofrthe 15 industrial finns covered by these,
agreements. agreements for 4 firms had expired by 1991, 5 more will expire
by 1995, and the remainderwill e-pire by theyear2000.
Outcomes of the adjustment program

Aifacrocontomic outcomnes
Eight keyvrariables indicate the macroeconomicimpactofadjtLstment: three
intermediate indicators (the ratio of the budget deficit to GDP, the ratio of
the currentaccount deficit to GDP, and the real effective exchange rate in
dex) and five outcome, o1- 'response,' indicators (economic growth rate,
invesunent-to-GDP ratio, savings-to-GDIP ratio, export growth, and the infladion rate). Figure 7.3 shows these indicators for the period 1980-91. Table
7.Spresents comparisons ofthese indicators for the crisis period (1979-81),
stabilization period (19S2-85), and p-arial adjustment period (1986-91).
Some observers, including the Operations Evaluation Departmentof the
World Bank, have citicized the govenmment'smnacroeconomicperformnance
targets as, too ambitious In response, the analysis here compares the policy
firamewfork-paper'sprojectionsofthe selected indicatorswvith actual outcomes
for the period l9S1991.6 While tiepolicy framework paperprojected steady
economic growth ofaround 4percentannually, actual rates have been within
an acceptable margin of error in four of six yean. The two years for which
actual growth rates diverged significantly from projections are 1989 and
1991-years when rainfall was poor. Projections of savings and investment
ratios to GDP havebeen optimistic,with actualvalueslowerby42percentand
12 percent on average, respectively. Inflation has been keptremarkably low,
within the projected target. because of the tght monetary and credit policy.
The fiscal-deiicit-to-GDP ratio fluctuated the mostuidely. While the policy
framework; paper projected an improved fiscal position of around one per-
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centage point of CDP
1annually, the acttual outcone displayed wide flictiations. Yet the overprojection dioes not reflect a deliberate optimisim in the

policy framework papers. buit rather the poor implemnentation of fiscal reform combined with external shocks (box .4). The currentaccotint deficit

has been less favorable than projected, due largely to poor export perforinance. Imports asasilare orGDIP have declined to a point considered harm-

Figure 73 Key macroeconomic indicators for Senegal, 1980-91
GDP and sector growth (percent)
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fil to longer-term growth.The actual exportgrow:th rate has been lowver than
projected by a large margin. In particular, traditional exports (groundnuts,
cotton, fish, and, to some extent, phosphate) have been projected at hiigher
rates than warranted by either world market prospects (for groundnuts) or
the countrys potential (for-fish). The poorexportperformance reflects the
substantial appre ciation in the real exchange rate. In sum, aside from achieving a low rate ofinflation, the adjustment program, as envisaged in five con-

secutive policyfframtework-papers, hasfallenshortofeven the modestprojec-.
rions, due in part to poor program design and implementation, in part to
external shocks, and in part to optimistic assumptions.:
Yet ovterall, Senegal drasticaly reduced its macroeconomic imbalances
during the 1980s, particularly since 1983, although other macroeconomic
indicators point to miixed success. The budget deficitwas reduced from 8.8
percent of GDP in 1983 to 4.3 percentin 1990 and was completely eliminated
in 1991. Ifinterestpaymentswvere excluded, the budgetposition would reg
ister greater improvement-from a defict of 5-6 percent of GDP to a surplus of 2.6 percent over the same period- The current account deficit (exTable 7.8 Macroeconomic indicators, 197-9 1
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Box 7.4 Senegal's fiscal performance: a stop-and-go approach
Sengal appears to have perforned well on tle fiscal front in 1984 (ayear during
which Senegal resumed the adjustment dialogue with the World Bank and the
1MP) and in 1988 (a year prior to the &oughr;). Indeed, the fiscal deficit (on a
commitmentbasis and ecduding externalgrants) had declined by more than three
percentage points of CDP, reaching 2.6 percent in 1988 (box table 7.4). This
adjustment,however,wasunsustainableandwasdonein awaycontra-y to improving Senegalts competitivcness andc to promoting long-term growth. The adjustmentwas madepossible largely by cutting expenditures (in paicular, investment
andoperations andmaintenanceexpenditures) andbyrelyingheavilyon revenue
windfalls, essenially from petroletum (to the tune oftwo percentage poinsofGDP,
startingin 1986) andrice importTherevenuewindfallsfrom petrolcum reflected
the government's policy of maintaining the domestic prices of petroleum productswhenworldpricesdeclinedsharply. Currntly,domestic pricesare two tothirce
timesworldprices.The heavy dependence on petroleum revenue has twoserious
implications: it increases the cost ofproduction, and it mikes the revenue strucare subject to the volatility of world petoleum prices
While the substantial revenue w
alls werc used 'wisdy" to reduce the budget deficit (contrary to the mid-1970s, when revenue windfalls from groundnuts
were used to increase expenditures and borrow against future improvements in
the terms of trade), they were not accompanied by an improved. fiscal revenue
position, despite seveal discretionary measures introduced under the adjustment
program. The share of tax revenue in GDP dropped from 18.1 percent in 1984 to
14.3 percent in 1988, due primarily to an internal adjusunentstrategy, stagnation
in the cconomy, and poor tax administration performance, particularly in the
customs department.
Thesubstantial reducton in the fiscal deficit over this period is somewhataoerstate& Indeed, the official statistics should be adjusted to reflect the huge nonperforming loans of the banking system, since the government is ultimately responsibleforhonoring thcm-Atthe endof 1988, nonperformingloansaccounted
fbraboutone-thirdof the nctdomestic assetsof thebankingsystem. Some CFAF
253 billion, equivalent to 16 percent of GDP and 93 percent of government revenue in 1988, were needed to restructure the banking system.
The financal position of the government deteriorated seriously in 1989. The
budget defict as a share of GDP widened to 41 percent in 1989 and 4.3 percent
in 1990. While drought and border disturbances in 1989 and civil service reorganization in March 1990 played a part in this deterioration, the real problem was
one ofstrucurual rigidities and laxity in expenditure controls. There was Utile, if
any, control of the treasury special accoun ts the budgetary transfers and subsidies
to the parastatals contnued to be relativelyhigh; and, although the wage bill registered a decline in real terzns, it remained the major expenditure item.
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Economic stagnation due to the intemal adjustment strategy, as well as poor
tax administrtion and collection, continued to be part of the Fiscal problem.
Tax revenue remained almost constant in nominal terms despite efforts to reverse the dow-nward trend of its share in CDP through several discretionary tax
measures.
There were three main reasons for this poor performance. First, the tax base
continued to erode as the reintroduction of high ariff and the complexity of
admintrative regulations contributed significantly to theshrinking of the formal
sector. Second, underinvoicing and smugglig continued to be a major Cause of
revenue loss. And third, the tax basewasweakened by the numerous exemptions
that, despite effiorts to reduce them as partof the reform program, continued to
exist. Nearly a third of total imports were exempt from the palment of customs
duties in 1990. Duties thus forgone represented 80 percent of customs revenue
and a third of total tax revenue.
The fiscal situation improved significantly in fiscal 1991, with the fiscal stance
turning positive (0.2percentof GDP) forthefirsttine. Howvecr, thiswasachievcd
largely through an across-the-board cut in nonrage recurren t expcnditureswithout an overall framework to pnooritzeespending. Low operations and maintenance
cxpcnditurcs affected every sector but particularly education, where nonmvage
recurrent expenditures are about 10 pe rcent of the wage cost Also, key e>penditureitenssuchasexportsubsidieswerc notpaid for, andarrcarsiis-vris the public
enterprise sector reemerged.

Box table 7.4 Governmentfinances, select

earsdfiscal 1982-92
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eluding offiial trarnsfers) expenenced a similar trend-froni 18.6 percent
to 7.9 percent of CDP during the same period. On average, thc internal and
external imbalances were reduced by half during the period. Yet stabilization, particularly in the fiscal area, remains fragile, and unless additional
structural reforms are now made to accelerate and sustain growth, imibalances will return.
F-zandalpeffonnance-The manner in which Senegal stabilized its fiscal
situation during the 1 980s raises serious concerns about die sustainability of
its achievements and the negative mnpact on competitieness and long-term
economic growth. As discussed in box 7.4, fiscal improvTement has not been
steady, nor has itbeen based on=real structural reforms, aclear indication of
the government'sstop-and-go adjfustmentpolicy!andlack: of commitment to
fiscal reform. Areview of the fiscal policy in Senegal highlightsseveral mtical issues. The first is the laclk of sustainable fiscal refonn. Senegal's poor
revenue mobilization-for example, the tax elasticity declined from -0.8 to
0.6 during the 1980s-has forced the adjustment program to work toward
reducing public expenditures, often priority expenditures.'7 This situaton
has become increasingly difficult to sustain, as evidenced by die recurring
fiscal crises. Nominallylowerfiscal defidtsin recentyearshavebeen achieved
trough arbitrary cuts in public spending (induding operations and maintenance expenditures and direct ex-port subsidies) and ad hoc revenue
measures in the absence of a balanced stucture between tax and nontax
revenue. If the current situation continues, the tax burden will hll increasingly on a smaller nunber of taxpayers, thereby encouragg attempts to
"informalize' their economic activities.
Another issue is the continuing conflict between efforts to mobilize revenue and efforts to promote growth. To finance its current expenditures,
Senegal continues to relyheavilyon windfall re-venues from petroleum (constituting 22 percentof total tax revenue) and rice imports. Relving so heavily
on petroleum revenue erodes Senegal's competitiveness (domestic petroleum
prices are tvo to three times world prices) and undermines the stabiliwt of
the revenue structure given the potential volatility of world oil prices. Thus,
tax administration efforts mtustbe improved and exemptions and fraud reduced: at less than 14 percenL of GDP. the current tax revenue in Senegal
compares poorlywith that in countries at Senegal's income level (the average for Sub-SaharanAfrica is about 1 6 percent, and for lower-middle-income
countries itis about 17 percent).
Finally, little progress in civil service reform means that the wage bill
continues to be a heavy burden on the country's limited resources." Given
the government's budgetary constraint, the wage bill must be reduced significantly, because resource savings must be generated to reduce the over-
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reliance on petroletmni revenue and to increase expenditures on botl basic
social scevices and the county's infrastructure, which is rapidly deterioratIcinegal
must increase the
ing. To enhlance its long-term growtlh potential,
share of investment in GDP. The second rcview of the World Bank's own
experience with structural adjustment shows that growth in the private sector is somewhat linked to increases in public investment. For nonwvage,
noninterest expenditures, efficiency and sectoral reallocation can certainly
be improved, but in the aggregate, die level of investmentachieved prior to
tie austerity year (1990-91) cannotbe compressed furtherwithoutadversely
affecting the econoniy..Eextenal secto. Allowing for debt relief-a major source of foreign exchange-financing-the balance of paynentshas registered surpluses in four
of five years from 1986 to 1990 due to an improved tradeaccounL The trade
deficit, which had deteriorated up to 1985, has since improved-particularly
in 1986, when prices for dle country's major imports (petroleum products
and rice) fell sharply. Yet, with the exception of phosphates, exports have
been stagnantor falling. Between ]982and 1990, Senegal's twYo keyex;ports,
fish and groundnuts, increased by only halfa percentage pointannually in
volume terms-a dismal performance19 Senegal's trade balance improved
because import compression was pursued, a policy that is no longer viable
lwiltiout adversely affecting long-term growth. The diversified export base
seeminglyachieved during the partial adjustmentperiodis- due more to the
fact that key traditional export items lost their momentun in recent years
than to a vigorous increase in nontraditional exports.
- Extemnalftnancingassistance. Because significant structurl progress has
notbeen made on the fiscal front Senegal continues to relyheaily on external budgetary financng (box 7.5). Senegal has received generous external
financial support from the donor community, with little interruption since
Independence. The amount of external support increased rapidly during
the 1980s, especially during the second half, and the terms also became increasingly fiavorable. It is difficult to assess the contribution of extemal financing to the overall performance of the economy during the 1980s. One
thing is clear, howeveri the increase in external assistance during the partial
adjustment period (1986-91) was associated with a slightly positive growth
in percapita income, an almostconstant ratio ofinvestment to GDP (despite
the flact that public investment is donor-driven), and high public consumption, particularly the -wagebill. H-ad itnot been for 'softC external budgetary
support-that is, the absence of conditionalities-Senegal would have had
to cutitspublicwage spending drasticallyin order to reduce its budget deficit while dampening inflationary pressures.
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Some government officials in Senegal view external budgetary assistance
as an "entiteinent" that can be cointed on for years to come or as a line
item in the budget.sinilar to tax revenue. In the past, the high level ofaid
impeded adjustment unintentionally. Large sustained flows of foreign aid,
with soft conditions, reduced political incentives to implement hard reforms.
For ex-ample, Senegal postponed real cianges in income and labor policy
in the agricultural rice sector and in petroleum taxation policy, and yet continued to receive quick disbur ements from the donor community. This assessment is also supported by the findings of the Berg (1990) study, which
found that large external inflows "reduced Senegalese political wil to mak-e
changes necessary foradjustment and slowed Senegalese political maturataon by allowing the postponement of hard economic and social dcloices."
Box 7.5 External assistance
Sentegal has been a favored country for the donors since Indepeidence, largely
for political reasons. For a long ime it has been one of the few democracies in
Africa. During thc 1980s, disbursment of official development assistance to
Senegal mnore'than doubled, reaching S641 million in 1991 (box table 7.5), or
about 12 percent of CDP. Not only did Senegal receive a much larger share in
per.capita terms tharn before. but, the gap between Senegal. and other Sub-Saharan African countries widened over time. Between 1980 and 1991, per capita
official development assistance (netof principal) wentzfrom $59 to S84 (S11 in
1990) for Seneg and from S20 to $37 for SubSaharan Africa. Senegal currently
receives external financial support from 27 donors, with France, the EEC, the
IDA,Japan, and tie United States accounting for the bulk. Of the official development assistance disbursement dulring the period under review, grants represnted abotL 50 percent, multilateral assstance 27 percent, and technical assistance 21 percent.L
Senegal's debthas stabilized in recentyears aftera rapidincrease between 1979
and 1983 and 1985 and 1987. The stock ofoutstanding public and publicly guaranteed debt reached $4.0 billion in 1987; after debt cancellation, it fell to S3.5
billion at thecnd of'1991, equivalent to 64 percent of GDP. Afterdebt forgiveness,

debt to bilateral and multilateral sources is now roughly equal. The structure and
terms ofSenegal's debthave also become more favorable. Mediun- and long-term
debtnow accounts for 90 percent of the total debtstock, and concessional loans
accountfor 55 percent. The avenge interestrate on all ncwcommitmentsfell from.
5.9 percent in 1980 to 3.7 percen tin 1991 while the average matunity grew from
twentyyears to twenty-nineyears. The avcnge grace period rose from six years to
seven years during the same period.
Between 1981 and 1991,80 percentofextemal financingwaschanneled through
the central goverment budget either for investment (21 percen t) or for general
budgetary support (60 percent). The latter became increasingly critical to adjustment during the second half of the 1980 s. Debtrelief, which is accounted forhere
as budgetary support,-averaged about $91 million annually, or 26 percent of total
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The study added that 'Senegal is not only aid addicted, but needs continuing high levels of support to ease die structural changes dhatwere postponed'
in die 1980s." The present study recommends that further adjustment support for Senegal be selective and conditional on the implenientation of upfront key policy measures. Over time, external assistance should shift back
to investment.

Front the standpoint of balance of payrnents, the increase in external
resources can be justified in principle on several grounds-to coInpensate
for the real costofadjustment, to ofTh-etithedeteriorating terms of trade, and
to-improve the level of reserves (that is, the operations account position).
The main objective is to mainitain badlyneeded imports to sustain economic
development. However, Senegal cannotreallyjustify thispolicystance, since

budgetary financing. Senegal has benefited from several rounds of rescheduling
by'bilateralcreditors (nineParis Club rcschedulings) and commercial banks (four

London Club reschedulings). Total debt rescheduling obtained by Senegal increased substantiaZly during the Spcial Program of Assistance period and, curnulatively, amounted to S910 million during the 1980s.
Box table 7.5 Offidal development assistance flows and budgetary
support, 1980-91
(US mfflorzsj
Budget finandng
Team oftrode GDP0tch
Officdi flows
(percent)
Yecr
&acs
Net
TA
Te
Lntied' Total (1980=100)
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
Annudcvemge
198D-85
1986-91

384.

366

122

1.0

-3.3

459
497
434
482352
690
760
641
751
1,034
720

416
472
408
444
331
624
672
601
710
821
641

118
103
99
115
92
122
131
131
132
180.
172

87
95
80
57
62
87
100
101
100
119
162

247
195
194
166
148
283
357
427
368
220
253

335
289
274
223
210
370
457
528
468
339
414

107
93
91
104
106
112
110
107
113
113
109

-1.2
153
21
-4.2
4.0
4.6
4.0-5.1l
-0.4
4-5
-1.2

435
776

406
678

108
145

76
III

190
318-

266
429

100
III

21
3.2

-

1

-

Percentage
change Ratio
of 1986-91
II.
S0
o o1980-85
76
67
34
46
67
61
Not avilabl.a. Project ncin.b. Indudng debt rief and finanring for baning rsbtnzctudrg and civil servie voluntwy departure prvgrarn.
Source; World Bankdala; OECD (1991).
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boih the trnns or trade and Ithe valuc or xnerclhandise expor-Is impronved arP

ter the pre-adjustunennL period.
Tlhe Caqitditivenessof th5econom. The compeitiveness of thze Senegalese

economy has notimproved during the adjtustient period. The rieal exchange
rate has appreciated significantly, and die cost of production lhas reimained
high. After declining from 1980 to 1985, real wa.ages and .alaries recovered
somewrhat during die partial adjustment peiod and remained incompetitivc
comparedwith other countries. In the industrial sector, Berg-and associates
(1990) observe, 'trhere has been a modest fall in real wages during recent
years. But ... thiis tendencyvlas not been st-ongenough to conv,ertSenegalese
industry fromtl a high-wvage to a low-wage sector."
Daza on factor costs in Senegal are scarce, niak-ing it diffictult to dr-aw

appropriate comparisons with other countries.. Nevertheless, thie findings
of recent studies indicate a substantial lack of competitiveness in Senegal.
This lackE of competitive advantage in Senegal is illustrated by the following examples:

* The average labor cost in the Senegalese modern sector is roughly
equivalentto theaverage civil seivice salary. Butitis 5G percentbhigher
-- than in Morocco, 60 percenthigher than in Malaysia, 70 percenthigher
thian in Tunisia, and 370 percenthigher thian in Indonesia. Public sector
wages in Senegal appear to be even further outofline when compared
with per capita GDP. Average public sector wages in Senegal are atmostl2 timnespercapita GDP (1987 data), higher than in C6te d'Ivoirt
(91 tint es), Cameroon (5.9 times), Morocco (4.8 times), Tunisia (3.5
times). and Ghana, Malaysia, and Mauritius (2 times). Cvil service
salaries in Senegal are 13 percenthigher than the averagein eightCFA
countries (Benin, Burkina Paso, Chad, Cote d'Ivoire, Mali, Niger,
Senegal, and Togo) and 430 percenthigher tlan in six non-GFA countLies (the Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Mauritania, Morocco, and Zaire;
Berg and associates 1990).
* Case studiesindicate that laborcostsare significantlyhigherin Senegal
than in higher-income countries. For example, labor cost in tde tunacanning industry (an important manufacturing activity in Senegal) is
100 percent higher than in Thlailand, and labor cost in the cement
industryis 40 percent higher than in France (Barbier 1989). Senegal's
share in die world mark-et of canned tuna exports declined from 12
percentto 2 percentbetween 1976 and 1990 in f-avorof Thailand,whidh
was a newcomer in the world market and which, unlike Senegal, was
taxed 24 percent to enter die European marker.
'In the tourism industry, whirt is second to the fibshing industry in foregn exchange earnings, the hotel occupancy rate dropped from 45
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percent in 1984 to 38 percent in 1¶l8¶lZ1.elow the lretnik-even point.
The cost of' tmiusm in Senegal C
comparles unavorably with that in
-Sencgal'scompeitors. such as Egypt4 the Ganil, Morocco, Se"clelles,
and Tunisia, lFinally, tlhe cost, of fiel and electricity necessary to pro*
duce a ion olcemeni.in Senegal is three tinwes tlhc level in France. Tlhis
disproportdonatc cost. is duio! in p;rll' to bligli domnestic energy costs, as
discussed ea.rlier.
Thie Erecitent changes in imnport.policyand sfbiscqutent.distortions sendi
the wrong signals to an already weakened and ulincomnpetitive indtstrial sector. Moreover, export subsidies, wvhichi are crritical for ofk:etting thc distortions in LIIe economyfriom highi prodtuction costs and an overvaluied exchange
rate, have not. been paid in recent. years due to the. fiscal crisis. Yet, soiiie in-

dustries did adjustt .a a more open economy,by restructuring and improving
their efliciency. Some firmls have increased their labor-productiity 'and
chranged tdc composition or thieir output. Througlh improved productivity1
the refornms have also led to a decline in prices.
*Thu supply

resmonse.

The cornerstone or tiC stabilization piogram in

Senegal has been thlc compression of d:emand, primarily througgh private
consumniption and investment. This contractionwas morepronounced in the
second lialrof the 1980s than in the firsthalf. Gross domestic investmentin
Senegal averaged 12 percent of GDP in 1982-85 and 12.8 percent in 198691, a ratio that is not conducive to growth -and wvhich does not compare favorably citherwith die average for Sub-Salaran Africa (15.5 percent of GDP)
or with what is required to prevent'the stock of capital from. deteriorating
(13 percent of GDP). Low private investment can be attributed to the st.ingent credit policies of the governmentand to economic stagnation. Despite
the significant improvement in tle fiscal position, the government continued to experience negative budgetary savings (tax revenue minus current
expenditures), necessitating large budgetary supportfrom external donors,
a situation that is clearly not ijable in the long run. Foreign savings (measured by the current account) were required to finance not only gross domestic investnent but also a large proportion of domestic consumption
duIing the 198Os. Sluggish growti in private consumption led to higher

domestic savings, which became positive in 1986 and now represent 8.8 percent of GDP. One of the most likely determinants of the increase in the sayings ratio is the positive real interest rates throughout most of dhe 1980s.
Notwithstanding the poor quality of national accounts, the average annual economic growth rate in the second half of die 1980s (3.2 percent) wfas
1.1 percentage points higher than in die first half of the decade. The SX
percent growth rate compares well with the long-term historical trend of 2.1
percent (196040), but is only slighdy higher than the population growtl
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ratre of 2.9 percenl.' Senegal's perl-foiriance dtiningitie firist.half ofrthl deearle 1%.iS an alyzed extensively in a 1987 Woxrld Ban CCl tcrylil
CeOflOifc in cniloranduri. GDl' growth was advcrsely ifrectied by the severe- drouighit of 1983-

84. Yet (lespite its relatively smnall share OODP, agliculture continuied io
haUVe a Illinljor im1pact. on overall growth thirought. its mitltiplicr effect on the
rest orthe economy. The performaince of tle real sectors ofrdie cconomryagriculture and miianufakcI.uling-is discussed in detail in thie ncXt section.
Is tie Seneg-alese economy now morc efficienL .nd cliver.sified than be-fore tie startofpartitl adjiistinent. Externa.l factors and vie-time lagmiiake
die quesdion of efficiency difficult to addrcss. Two indicaitols sield ligit on
this question: tie incremental capitl-output i-atio and dlie export growth of
die matnufacitLtaing sector. Tlic stgn;ation in diie rtio of investm-ient to GDP
from l986 to 1991wgas notaccomilpanied ly declining economic growthl

andin

tluss led to asteady imiprovement in tlie increiental capit-tl-uutput ratio. Tlic
five-year-lag increnientil capital-ouitpuit ratio went from an annual average
of 7.9 during Lhe pre -adjustmentperiod to 3.9 during the partial adjustment
period. This favorable trend coild be explained by Favorable weather conditions, excess capacity in many industries, and better selectivity in public investment projects. Yet it is unlik-ely that it can be sustained without major
replacements ofold eqtipment and machinely. Fo nianufacturing exports,
no hard evidence exists that theyincreased in anieaningfulwaybetween 1986
and 1991, due largely to the overvalued real exclhange rate and thieunreliability of tde export subsidy scheme. The elasticity of nontraditional
exports witlh respect to CDP is estimated to be lower during the partial adju,stnent period tlian during the first half of tie 1980s.
The structure of the economy has diversified little during the 1980s. The
share of the primary sector in GDP stayed tle same, with the decine in the
share of agriculture and forestry offset by the increase in the share of livestock and fishing during the second half of the decade. The share of die secondary sector increased by less than a full percentage point of GDP at the
expense of the tertiary sector during tlle same peiiod. The increase in the
share of the informal .sector in both manufacturing and services is, to a certain extent, a good indication of the large number of constraints still facing
tie fonrmal sector.
Sectoral outcomes
Between 1986 and 1991, agriculturalsedorproduction (including forestry,
livestock, and fishing) registered a modest increase of 2.3 percent annually,
due largely to favorable weather con-ditions and despite a decline in cultivated land. The production of foodecrops increased at a faster pace than did
the production of cash crops, due largely to die expansion of subsistence
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agriculture, internal trade liberllization, and favorable price differentials.
Prospects for the agricultural sector still depend on the real exdcange rate
policy, thle terms of trade [or cashi crops, and climatic conditions.
Production in die manufacttringsectorincreasedin real terms more rapidly in the latter half of the 1980s, due to a vibrant informal sector. Trade
liberalization, combined with the absence of progress toward real exchange.
rate depreciation, energy costreductions, and laborand wage liberalization,
has shifted the supply response from the formal to the informal sector. Rigidities in a more liberalized policy environment have led to-serious difficulties forlarge-scale firms that had previously benefited from protection against
imports and local competition. Overall, the manufacturing sector has been
partially restructured, widt medium- and large-scale indrstries still operating underprotection. Due partly to trade liberalization reversal and partly to
* dynamism of small-scale enterprises. Senegal has not experienced a major
deindustrialization as defined by the rapid shrinking of its industrial base.
And the shift from the formal to the informal sector does not provide a satisfactory base for Senegal's long-term growth and employment.
The publc en1teayise sedorhas shrunk, and it can reasonably be assumed
that its perfonnance improved at least as a result of the liquidation of
nonperfonning public enterprises. But more detailed information on individual enterprises is necessary to provide a definite answer to the question of
efficiency. While the public enterprise reform program has been moving
forward, much must still be done to achieve the government's objectives.
Despite stagnant and declining real per capita public ex;penditures on
education and health during the 1 980s, the primasy educationand basichekt
status in Senegal has improved slightly and regional differences have narrowed. In education, the government increased the number of teachers
through redeploymentand introduced major innovations in primary education,such as mixed-grade classes and double shifts, allowing classrooms and
teachers to be uLsed more efficiently. In health, resources have been reallocated toward primaryhealth care, private and donor financing has increased,
and the effectivene.Rs of preventive health services has been enhanced. Yet
theseachievements in social indicators are not only poorin comparison with
countries atSenegal's level ofmncome but, more important, are merelyshortterm gains that cannot be sustained given the current pattern and level .of
resource allocations to the social sectors.
The impactofadjustmentpolicies on varioussoiaigroupshasbeenmixed.
Overall, the rural-urban terms of trade have improved slightly in favor ofthe
rural sector-but the improvement is due more to the decline in urban income than to increases in rural income. The real income of public wage
earners dedined during the 1980s,-but less so among unskilled labor than
among skilled labor. Thus, the wage income distribution has become less.
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skewed. The scarcity of data makes assessing the impact of adjustment on
employment difflicult. It is estiluated that about 8 percent of total employment in the modem sector could have been lost since 1986, largely in the
modem manufactunng sector and the ciil service. Mostjob losses inmanufacturing came from the liquidation ofa few companies thatwould ultimately
have been closed with or without reforms. There is evidence that the loss of
employmentin the modem sectorwas offsetbyjob creation in the infonnal
sectorand to alesserextenthvsodal safetynetprogr-am. In sum, whilepov,erty
may have become worse in Senegal in the 1980s, there is no evidence, that
the cost of adjustment has fallen disproportionately on the poor.
Ai ctulture sedor. In contrast to most African countries, in Senegal the
agriculmre sector (including forestry, livestock, and fishing) accounts for a
modest share of GDP. (20 percent). However, agriculture employs about 60
percent of the labor force and provides a living for over two-thirds of the
population. It also accounts for a large-portion of foreign exchange eamings, with groundnut ex-port earnings ($110 million in 1991) ranking third
to fish ex-ports and tourism eamnigss. Although declining in relative importance, groundnuts account for about 60 percent of Farm cash income.
In the second half of the 1980s, agricultural production registered a
modest increase, of 29 percent annualy. In 'olume terms, foodcrop and;
cash crop production increased by 2.9 percent and 1.4 percent annually,
due largely to adequate rainfall. Acreage under foodcrop production has essentially stayed the same, whereas acreage under export crop production
has declined sharply (table 7.9). Increased production and a decline in acreage have generated high yields- an annual increase per hectare of 3.0 percent for foodcrops and 3.7 percent for export crops. The extent to which
the increase is due to improved inputs and technology is not known. There
is evidence that these factors could not have plaved an important role. For
example, fertilizer use, a key input, dropped from 75,000 tons in 19S0 to
25,000 tons in 1990.
Given the strong land popullation pressure, the total fodcrop area declined significantly on a per capita basis during the l9SOs, implying deteriorating labor productivity in the absence of technological improvement. In
per capita terms, cereal consumption declined from 242 kilograms before
adjustnent to 222 kilograms during. partial adjustment. While cereal production and cereal aid remained unchanged, cereal import. declined significandy. The decline in cereal imports (rice and wheat) seems to be consistentwith the emphasis placed by the government (through relative prices)
on the production of domestic cereals (millet, sorghum, and maize). It also
reflects a good harvest, as well as continuied controls on rice imports. The
declinein cereal consumption does not, however, mean a declinein per capita
food consumption, as Senegal is believed to have increased its fish and vegPublished by iRepository, 2021
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etable consumtiption quite considerably in recent years. Fish production increased on average by about 6 percent a year during the 19SOs. Data on vegetable production are notu-available, btit there has been a significant effort
on tde pat of tlle goverment, frners, and nongovernrenrl orgnizations
to increase the number ofwells in rural areas.
Table 79 Key agricultural indicators, 1980-91
Percentage ctange
Total
Annud

Annuwlaverag

1980-85

1986-91.

Total sector

259.8

308.9

18.9

Agriculture subsector
Agricut ral production (housands
Foodcrop

150.B

163.8

8.6

kdiCGtor

Pnrmarysector w*ue added
(consart 1987pres; CFAFbions);

2.9
1.4

oftons)
813.2

965.4

773.8

838.8

BA

1.2275
1.0t0.0

1,211.9
882.6

-1.3
-12.6

I 05.o
102.8

106J
1007

Value(US$miliors)
Vokrne (thousands ofrtors)

227.0
476.0

Food aid (thousandsoftons)'

Eport ps'
Totalroppedams (tosands of heacres).
Foodcrops.
Export crops'.

18.

2.9

1.A
-0.2
-2.2

Real producaeprces (1980= 100)
Foodcrops
Export crops'
Foot ikmport

.

E12

0.2

-2.0

-0.4

257.0
420.0

13.2
-11.8

2.5
-225

133.9

157.8

17.8

3.3

114.0
241.0
94.3
41.83
138.1
80.9
22.7

127.0
316.0
97.0
221.8
138.7
60.4
22.7

1 1.
31.1
2.9
-83
0.
-253

2.2
5.6
0.6
-1.7
0.1
-5.7
-0.1-

.

E-pxrt crops'
Value(US$millions)
Volurne(housandsoftons)
Internaltermsoftrade(l9B7= IOOY
Cerealpercapitadlogrars)
Production
Imports
Aid

Nominalprotecion woeffkientc
Millet (ower fleuve)
Maize (casamance)
Rice (upper fleuve)
Cotton (easten Senegal
Croundnuts (groundnut basin)

1.3
1.6
2.0
1.1
I 8

-03

Domesdc resotrce costse'
0.9
1.0
1.0
0.9
13

a.The secor incudes agriculure rvstodc. fshing, and foresry subsectors. Forthe agiculture subsector. the irst
per,dcnvers 1981-85.
b. USAiD dafa for rnil; sorghum, maize, nd rice paddy. These data differ from FA data, whkh indicate higher
production for rnilet and ;orghurn. According to FAO data, food producion awerages 855,400 tons for 1980-85
and 963200 for 1986-90. This represents a totl change of 12.6 percent, or 2.4 percent a year.
c- Oil groundnuts. confecfionery groundnuts, and cotton.
d. Rice, wheat, and other 6zodstuiL Volune relates onl to rice and wheat
c. FAO data covering cereals and rice paddy.
GDP deflators o the primary sector overthe secondary sector. The primary sector includesagriculture, ivestock,
ishing, and forcstry. The secondary sector incudes groundnut oil, mirin& conttruction, energy, and other.
g. CoefficientsmlcuaLted r)rDar using 1986 -87world prces.and sermi-interivetechnol3gy.
h. Ratios cacated for Dakar using 1988-89 world prices and semi-intensie tednofogy.
SourcJonesand Holerran (1 991).
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The shift toward foodcrops (primarily milletand maize) and awvay from
export crops (primarily groundnuts) was more pronounced in die second
half of the 1980s..The shift can be explained by the Favorable price differential benveen foodcrops and export crops due to policy measures undertaken
in die 1980s. While producerprices for foodcrops increased by 6.7 percent
in real terms in 198 90, producerprices for export crops increased by only
0.7 percent (table 7.9). This insignificant increase in producer prices for
export crops reflects the government's decision in 1988 to reduce the producer price of groundnuts from CFAF 90 to CFAF 70 per kilogram due to.
unfavorable world prices. UWithin the food sector, the ratio of millet to rice
prices moved only slightly in flvor of milletI:
Indicators ofproduction incentives and efficiency-nomniinal protection
co effcients and domestic resource cost-have been calculated byjonesand
Holleman (1991) for five major crops (millet, maize, rice, cotton,and groundnuts) for 1987 to 1989.21 The study condudes that, among the cerel, milet
and maize have a considerably higher comparative advantage in many producing areas than does rice, which receives more proteczion dtan necessary
to sustain the present level of production. 'et, given the overvalued real
exchange rate, millet and maize have barely adequate protection to sustain
production forlocal consumption in manyproducing areas. Ofthe cash crops,
cotton has a higher comparative advantage than groun uts, but receive
barely enough protection to mamtain production, vhereas groundnuts receive quite substantial protection. The most important finding is that far too
many resources have been devoted to irrigatedrice production, a sector that
still has to be reformed significantly despite several attempLs.
Industrid sector. The industrial sector value added (comprising manufactuning, construction, mining, and energy) was 24percenthigherin 198690 th-an in 1980-85, and its share in GDP rose from 17.0 percent to 18.2
percent (table 7.10). The manufacturing subsector, which currentlyaccounts
formore than twvo-thirds of the sector's value added, has experienced decelerating growth since Independence: 6.1 percent annually in 1960-70, 5.3
percent during 1970-80, and only 1.2 percent in 1980-85. The subsector's
growth can be attributed primarily to import substitution, which reached its
limit by the mid-1980s. Employmentin the manufacturing sector more than
doubled between 1960 and 1985 (3 percent annually), but most of the increase occurred between 1960 and 1975. Thus, by the mid-1 980s, the manufacturing sector had lost its momentum for growth and employment, for
several reasons.
Sectoral consti-ints were well identified prior to adjustment reforms: an
inefficientimport-substitution strategyin anoncompetitive environment that
was characterized by a cumbersome regulatory fiam eworrk, a distorted incen-
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tivesytein, assmallinternal market, and hiigh factor cost, particularlyforlabor

and energy. Tnese constraints were ex-acerbated by Senegal's inability to'resort
to an exchange rate adjustment policy, which proved to be crucial, particularlyin more recentyears wlen dte real exchange rate appreciated substantially. In 1986 Senegal cmbarked on a new industrial policy (known by its
Frenclh acronym, NPI), whose primaryobjective was to introduce amore competitive industrial structure and give tde private sectora greaterrole in growthi
and employment To improve the competitiveness ofSenegalese firms, the
govemment chose an internal liberalization strategy that sought to reduce
tde costs of key inputs, including petroleum and electricity.
Several factors make it difficult to assess tde impact of the adjustment
reforms on the performance of the industrial sector. tdhe reform program..
has been implemented only partially, the adjustment period has been too
- short, and external conditions have been characterized by a substantial depredation in the currencies of countries competing with Senegal.
Overall, manufacturing production was around 5 percentayear higher
in 1986-91 than in 1980-S5.Thisincrease is due solely to thevibrancy of the
informal sector, as supply shifted from the formal to the informal sector.,
Production in the modern sector declined by an average of five percentage
Table 7.10 Key industrial indicators, 1980-91
Indcatar

Annual average
198045
1986-91

-ecentage dcMhge
Tacal
Arinual

Industrilsector
Value added (CFAF bilions, in
constant 1987 prices)
Value added as a percentage of GDP
Employment
Menufacturng seaor
Producion index
Value added (CFAF bilions. inf
constant 1987 prices)
Value added as a percentage.of GDP
Employmentperffrni-ent)
Export subsidy (CFAF billions)
Wages as a share of cost of production
(peret)
Medium- and long-termn credits
(CFAF billions)
Effective protection rate (percent)

a. 1982-85.
b. 1986-89.
c. Defined as oil millng plus the categry bothcr.
d 1985.
e. 1987-89.

f. 1988.
g. 1990.
Source: World Bank data.
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204.1
17.0
40,447-01

260.0
18.1
34.886.01

100.1

95.1

27.8
6.9.
-13.7
-4.9

4.2
1.1
-3.6

-1.0

-144.3
110
35.681.0a
8.1 d

193.4
13.5
30.059.0k.
54e

34.0
12.5
-15.8.
-333

5.0
1.9
4.2
-7.9

8.2d

10. If

23.2

43

9.Ž'
98.0k

-22-3
-40.6

-4.9
-9.9

24.7d

165.0

-
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poinLs between 1982-85 and 1986-89, witlh production of the 30 major industrial products declining by 34 percent The industries that did well were
mining, chemicals, and energy-industries thatwere notafreected directly by
reforms. Yet thie perfomnance of the sector is more positive in tenns of tum-over. While-] 4 of 19 industries surveyed in 1990 showed negative tumoverin
the pre-adjustmentperiod, only 7 industries showed negative turnover in tde
partial adjustment period.
From 1986 to 1990 there was,a loss of about 5,600jobs, or 16 percentof
themodem sector's total employmenL Itcan be argued thatmostof the losses
wvere due to dle liquidation ofa few companies thatwrere bound to be closed
with or without adjustment reforms. Too, other evidence suggests that the
loss of employment in the modern sector was ofEset by job creation in the
informal sector. While there was an overall decline in investment levels-i 0
of 16 industries reduced theirinvestment and improved tleir capacity utili-'zation-7 of 16 industries had a capacity utilization above 60 percent. the.
level achieved in 1985.
The reform program established newf firms and closed nonperforming
ones. Although hard data are notavailable, the significantnumber ofprivate
projects approved by the government's regulatory agency 22 would indicate
that many Liums were created during the partial adjustment period, primarilysmall-scale ex-port-oriented agroindustries. Yet, between 1986 and 1989,
53 firms were closed, some of which reopened later on. An exanination of
the six largest ones reveal that over half of their assetswere boughtby similar
companies." Thus, somerestructuning ofthe industrial sector occurredunder
the reform program.
A 1990 World Bank survey (Parker and Steel .1992) of 63 enterprises
(representing at least 17 percent of the finns in the sector2 4 ) suggested that
small-scale enterprises are more dynamic thanboth micro and medium-and
large-scale enterprises.3 Rigidites in amore liberalized policy environment
have led to serious difficulties, particularly for large-scale finns that had at
one time benefited from protection against imports and local competition.
The survey shoved that small-cale enterprises may have in act compensated
for the dedine of large firms despite the weak demand growth in Senegal
since 1986. A substantial share of small firms have managed to increase output and profits. In addition, a high proportion of small-cale enterprises were
postreform creations, suggesting a relatively high rate of new investment at
this level.

To analyze the firms' adjustment responses more effectively, Park-er and
Steel divided the sample into three categories: firmLs that increased production, those that remained the same, and those that reduced outpUt. For each
of these categories, the sample is broken down further into firms adopting
the followingmeasures of response (orflexibilityffactors): an increase in im-
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ported input, a change in product mix, the purchase ofnew equipmen, and
the adoption ofan export-orientedistrategy (able 7.11). The table showrs that
manufacturing firms that expanded successfully after 1986 were relatively
flexible. The study also shows thatsmall-scale enterprises did prone to be more
flexible than others. Thus, while only 34 percent of the finns in the sample
increased theirproduction in 1990,50 percent of the small-scale enterprises
didcWhile 52 percent ofthe firms in the sample diversified their production,
57 percent of the smal-scale enterprises did; and while 52 percent of the
sample boughtnew equipment, 60 percentof thesmall-scale enterprises did.
According to the same. industrial sunrey, the main factor constraints
against production were low import prices (for 41 percent of firms in the
sample), excess imports (36 percent), and high domestic competition .(26
percent). Investment was constrained by high interest rates (89 percent),
limited access to credit (73 percent), and the high cost of inputs (54 percent). Moreover, the government's negative attitude toward the private sector remains a major obstacle to industial development (36 percent)W respect to the labor factor, the survey found that only5 percent of
\ith
all firms interviewed (1O percent for firms with 50 or more employees) believe that salaries for qualified workers are too high, and that 10 percent of
all firms (19 percent for firms with 50 or more employees) believe that the
labor force constrains their operations (Parlker and Steel 1992, annex tables
411-12). These findings are not surprsng, since labor regulations do not
* seem to be enforced except for well-established firms. Yet this argument
should not diminish. the importance of deregulating the labor mark-et, since
regulation is still a major deterrent factor for potential investors and constrains movement from the informal to the formal sector.
Although the reform of the financial sector has created a more solid
banking system and has restored confidence in it, Senegal's banks have become much more risk-averse and show a markled preference for short-term
trade-related lendingat the expense oflong-term investnentlending. Shortterm creditnowaccounts for 70 percentoftotallending-two-thirdsfor trade
Table 7.11 Distribution of flebility factors by production trend
Cnxdusbysa

pecentageafrescndents)

Producion
resonse

Inaeased output
Maintined output

Al

bIneased
mprted rw
matefissshare

pfodhctuzx

Bouehtnew
eqpmrnent

34
24

67
13

42
24

39
19

45
14
.. 41
10ao
23

Decreasedoutput

42

20

33

42

Tot
Number of respondents

100
63

10t
15

1a
33

100
31

Source Parkerand Steel (1992), annex 4.7.
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financing. Lending to industrial activities declined from 22 percent of total
credit in 1985 to less tlan 15 percent in 1990. Tle upshot of tlis trend is that
Senegalese-owned firms, especially small and medium-size ones, are finding
itmuch more difficult to getaccess to credit to finance long-term investuents.

In the formal manufacturing sector, domestic producers have been
unable to adapt quickly to the new competitive environmentin which prices
are deregulated and trade is liberalized. The overvalued real,exchange rate,
labor market rigidities, and high energy costs prevent them from doing so.
Foriimtance,labor co.sts rose firom 8.2 percent of the total cost of industrial
production in 1985 to 10.1 percentin 1988. While trade liberalization forced
some industrial firms to close:benween 1987 and 1989. several others took
advantage of the improved incentive .system to increase theirproductivity and
diversiIy their production.2? In sum, there is no hard evidence to show that
trade liberalization has led to major deindustrialization in Senegal. Yet supply has shifted from the fornal to the informal sector-weakening the base
for Senegal's long-tenn growth.
Publcent-rprise&Is thepublic enterprisesectornow smaller,andisitmore
efficient? The answer to the first question is yes. But while the reform program has been moving fonvard, much must still be done. Answering the
second question requiires more detailed information on individual enterprises.Thefewindicators available forselectedcompaniesindicate that, while
the internal management of public enterprises has improved, productivity
generallyhas noLl Since 1988 the implementation of key rforms has led to
qualitative improvement in the financial and management performance of
some key enterprises in the sector-for example, the power company
(SEn6lec), the port authority (PAD), and the railwvay authority (SNCS).
In the early 1980s S6n6lec became a sociaet nationa responsible for
operating and developing the power sector. Its maanaging board members
and managing directoruwere appointed by the government, and its developmentprojectsand tiaffmodifications requiredgovemmentappjval. In 1987
a set of corrective measures was embodied in a contract plan between the
govemr.nent and Senelec. These measures sought to impreve the financial
performance and management of Senelec. Some positve results were
achieved and Senelec's financial position improved. In particular, the con-:
trct plan helped identitr performance goals that can be measured and
monitored. Nonetheless, the contractplan has been disappointing: the payment by the government of electcity bills is still a problem and has led to
setting up cross-debt compensation operations between Senelec and the
administration; powver system facilities and customer management are still
very weak; and recent audits indicate daily management problems and the
absence of transparency in several financial transactions; These problems are
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thle managing director's responsibility, and their persistence shows thaL thdc
managing board has not assumed its role fuilly. Overall, the S6n6lec contract
plan has been slightly positive from the financial standpoint, bilt has shown
little improvementin managerial efficiency.

Contractplans have been signed between the government and PAD and
SNCS, clarifying responsibilities between the govemrnent and the two coinipanies. Both PAD and SN\GS have been transformed from Rablisscmentsjninbti d carac&M iAtdutshielet co1mmercialand regie, in to soci&A nadtonain. The new
structure has given management greater autonomy and has improved fisal
and economic performance. The companies now liave more freedom to
adjust taiff iates to meet their financial objectives. Yet the govermment has
not-lived up to its commitment to stop interfering in daily managemient (for
example, personnel and procurement) and to siphon off.the excess cash:
earnarked for heavynmaintenance opeati ons. One positive outcome of the
contract plans is improved transparency. Audits of contractplans examine
the companies' and the goveemment's compliance and mak-e interference
and mismanagement public.
Sodal sectors and incomt distlindikt.n Despite stagnant and declining real
per capita public expenditures on education and health during the 1980s,
most of the education and healtl indicators in Senegal have improved, although the quality of education and health care has declined (Berg and
associates 1990)- In education overall enrollment increased by one-third
betveen die first and second half of the 1980s; secondary and tertiary school
enrollmentincreased slightdymore rapidly than primaryschool enrollment,
and female enrollmentgrewrmore rapidly than male enrollment?7 Regional
differences have also narrow'ed ma:rkedly. The increase in students has beenmatdred by a parallel increase in the number of teachers, thus preserving
the student-teacher ratio. Yet most student perfornance indicators (dropoutand repetition rates) are at or near the levels found in 1980. In the health
sector standard indicators of health status indicate a marked improvemenL
in the 1980s. Life expectancy increased from forty-fiveyears in 1980 to forty.nine in 1991, while infanttmortalityr declined from 147 (per thousand live
births) to 81 during the same period. There has also been a sharp decline in
the morbidity rates for major diseases in the 1980s, attributed largely to a
successfulseries ofvaccination campaigns.The share of children immunized
rose from 17 percent to 70 percent during the period.
How can these positive achievements be reconciled with the decline in
sodal spending? In education teachers' salaries were restrained during most
of the 1980s, thus aIlowing more teachers to be hired. Teachers in administrative positions (estimated at 1,262 between 1985 and 1988, and somew%hat
lless than dtat in 1990 after the civil service was restructured) wtere redeployed
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to teaching positions. Major innovations were introduced in primary edtication, suchl aS ImiixedC-gr-ade classes and doulble shifts, allowing classrooms

and teachers to be used mor-e efficiently. In the health sector the reallocation orresources toward primary healtl care shtarply increased the number
of posts and health shutstu in the 1980s. Private and donor financing also
increased. User fees became m10ore commlion during the l91Os, spurned Iargely
by budgetary cuts. According to the 1993 public expenditure review, athe
strutcture of healtl sector financing has shifted auwAy from government
sources to non-governmental sources witl an increased contribution from
extermal financing." In 1989, 33.4 percent of sector funding was channeled
througlh the budget. 11.4 percent came from local funds (primarily modcn enterprises), 17.3 percent from external financing, and.37.9 percent
from private sources. Finally. increased. effectiveness of preventive health
services-die antimalaria program, maternal and child healtl care programs,
and the expansion program of vaccinations-has improved health status.
However, these achievements in social indicators are not only poor in comparison witlh cointries at Senegal's level of income but, -more important,
represent short-term gains tlat cannot be sustained given the current pattern and level of resource allocations.
Has Senegal reducedpovertyand protected the mostvulnerablegroups
ofsociety during the reformnprocessin the 1980s? Theabsence ofhousehold
income and expenditure surveys (which are currentlybeinggenerated) makes
answering this question difficult. However, it can be argued that the extent
ofpovertyin Senegal has, atbest, stayed the same, fortwo reasons. First, there
is no evidence of a substantial increase in per capita income, and thus employment.generation may have been limited. Second, the-adjustment program did not seek explicitly to reduce poverty, nor until quite recendyuwas it
targeted specifically at the poor. It is wvorth mentioning that per capita public resources to the social sectors have. declined during the 1980s.
Who won and who lost as a result of the refonn program? Overall, ruralurban terms oftiade have improved in favor of die rural sector, but basically.
because urban income has dropped- Raising real prices to agricultural producers was achie'ved only partially. Real producer prTices formillet, sorghum,
and ricewere 7 to 19 percenthigher in 1989 than in 1980, butproducerprices
for cotton and groundnuts, the main source of farin cash income, were 5 to
10 percent lowrer. Thus, the weighted real producer price for major crops
did not improve. Yet real consumer prices wvere 20 to 50 percent lower for
millet, rice (broken), and wheat, benefiting urban consumers during the
19SOs. The real income of public wage earners fell, with the income of unskilled labor (those paid at or near the legal minimum wae) declining less
than tde income ofskilled labor. Thus, the wrage income distribution became
less skewed during the 198Os.
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The impact of-adjustimient on employmiient is difficult to assess given the
scarcity of dat. It is estimated that 11,000 jobs have been lost sincc 1986:
some 700 froin bank restructuring (or 41 percent o r tc sector), 800 From
the liquidation of some public enterprises (about 3.5 percenL of the sector),
3,800 as a result of civil service reformi s (about 6 percenL or the number of
civil servantsjust prior to the adjustment), and 5,600 as a result of the new
industrial policy (16 percent of ihe modern sector employment). For the
bank-ing and civil service sectors, support in the fonn of project financing
helped mitigate die impact on those losing theirjobs-CFAF 5 inillion (tie
equivalent of thirty-ntwo months of salary) for bank job losers and CFAF 4.2
million (tlirty-eight months of salarv) for civil servicejob losers. While hard
data are unavailable, most of the separation pay was believed to be utsed for
consumption or debtrepayinent. Onlyasmall nikmber ofthose who lost their
job managed to reintegrate into other producti've econonmic activities.
In sum, poverty may have become worse in Senegal in the 1980s due to
stagnating per capita economic growth. The current poverty status. reflects
the internal adjtusmient strategy that Senegal chose to follow. Had Senegal
implementeditsadjustnentprogramfully-particularlyasubstantial depreciation-of the real exchange rate-per capitaincome would most likelyhave
increased, and povet would-have been reduced. But the cost of stabiLizadion and partial adjustment has also seemingly not rallen disproportionately
on the poor. As Berg and assodates (1990) note, 'The Senegalese experience.. .does not support the argument that the 'social costs' of adjusLment
fall most harshly on the poorest, either in its income distribution results or
n its predictions that social sector spending suffers disproportionately, with
long-term negative consequences for die poor."
Notes
The author is indebted to Bnian Ngo, a UWorld Bank staff member currently with the
Economic DevelopmnentLInstitute,who contributed to the sections on fiscal policy, monetary policy, and the banking sector.
l. For more discussion ofthe lobbiecs for and againstadjustmcnt see Ka and v-an de
Wralle, pp. 47-59: The government chose to avoid a frontal attack on these groups in
the early years of the PAML (rnedium-tenn financi-Al program) .Although it is true that
the public sector was hurt by the general deflationary trend, reforms of the civil serNice, education and the Labor.Code were not addressed in a sustained manner until
1987. The government seemed to have adopted the strategy of delaying the most difficult refornms and-front-loading the easy-reforms."
2. Competitiveness is mea.sured by the movement of relative prices. But the experience of newly industrialized economies shows that no simple definition of competiivenesswould suffice. The competitiveness of an economy is a function notjust of its
wages and prices (relative to other countriec), but also of nonprice factors in a changing and increasingly integrated worlI These factor. include the ability to absorb, u.se,
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and develop technology to reduce production costs, improve product quality, and
develop new products; and marketing strategy and arrangements covering such diverse
factors as packaging, sales netwvorks, and after-sales service.
3. TIC govermenrtwas an acive partner in tripartite annual bargainingwhereby
basic wage levels were determined for 27 industry groups (agriculture and domestics
were excluded). The governmentwas both an arbiterbetween the unions and employers and an enforcer of the wage agreements published by decree and applicable to all
employers, regardless ofwhether they participated in negotiations. Industrywage scales
* were set according to the minimum wage, which the government revises on an- infrcquent basis.
4.

hile bonuses and incentive paymentswere negotiated freely, the

"conven tion

collective," agreed to by the unions and the employers in March 1981, established the
* rights of workers to a wide range of additional benefits, whose calculation was defined
fairly rigidly by various factors, including .the basicwage and length of employment.
5. According to a 1986 surve cited by Svejnar and Terrel (1 988), average wages
for unskilled workers were about 20 percent higher than thc minimum wage, with the
nonwage element of remunera dton approaching 30 percent of total compensation. In
1985 the average annualwage and benefits in the civil service were about CFAF 2.86
nmillion-CFAF 0.725 million ofwhich (25 percent) were benefits.'
6. Nine measures were introduced inthe past three years: (1) a S percent increase
in customs duty tax (August 1989); (2) the introduction ofminimum assessed taxeson
imports (September 1989) and their extension to a much larger group of cornmodities (July 1990); (3) an increase in a numberofstamp duties (by between 50 and 100
percent) and an increased excise tax on cigarettes, alcoholic beverages, tobacco products, soft drinks, coffee, and tea (August 1990); (4) the introduction of an ad valorem
customs fee of 3 percent (August 1990); (5) a reduction in deferred customs payments
(1990-91); (6) a 5 percentincrease in personal income tax rates (October 1990) ,which
*waslater rescinded in the face ofstrong political resistance; (7) an mcrease in the rates
and coverage of stamp taxes and fees (August 1990); (8) the introduction of a tax on
sgar (March 1991); and (9) the.institution of a transaction fee of 5 percent on sales
of used motor vehicles and of 2 percent for new vehicles (March 199 1).
7. In view of its significance to determining monetary and credit policy, the development of Senegal's net external position warrants a brief description. The external
assets position began to stabilize in 1989 after suffering wide fluctuations in 1983-88
due to a marked detcrioration in the externalcurrentaccount betveen 1983 and 1985,
followed by significantprivatc capital outflows in 1987 and 1988. Consequently, Senegal's
negative position in the operations account reached a peak of CFAF 971.2 blillion in
June 1986. The deterioration of Senegal's external accounts through 1985 stemmed
from highimports, a direct reflection of the high level ofoverall demand. A significant
improvement in the external accounts began in 1986.
Mostof thisirnprovementcan be attributed to thepursuRitof strictmonetarypolicy.
The fiscal situation, which improved significantly from 1982 through 1987, deterioratedbetween 1987 and 1990. RCEAO's netclainms on the govemmentdcdlined sharply
in 1987. These developments reflect the availability of larger external budgetary assistance to support the country's structural adjustment program. Therewas also evidence
of effiorts to reduce net lending to the government, regardless of the statutory ceiling
in BCIEAO rules and regulations that limits total advances to the govcrnmuent to 20
percent of fiscal revenue collected in the previous year. This development was even
more notable if one considers the series of measures designed to curtail governmcnt
borrowingvia guariantees for borrowingbypublic enterprises from tihe banking-sector.
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8. These rates do not capture the impact of quantitative restrictions and IWSIMI1C.
thaLLv.Ilu added averageswerc 20 percent or thc value of final oltpiurs-thcywere also
based on prevailing nominal tariff rates for final goods and intermediate mnatcrials. If
one assuimes a larger value added ratio (say, 30 percent), then the average clfcCtivc
protection rateswould be substantially higlher: 235 percent'l 1985, 123 percenL in
1988, and 132 percenLin 1990.
9. In Lhe 1980s groundnut prices were raised three times and reduced twice, cotton raised three times, and rice raised thrce tines and partially reduced twice. At the
sameiC timc, the world prices of these tlrece commodities fell,
I0. Among the development banks, the Banque Nationale du Devcloppemcnnntdu
Senegal (or BNDS) was the country's largest bank in terms of total assets. The three
llargest banks in. terms of nongovernmcnt deposits arc associated with foreign banks,
prinarilyFrench banks; they are SGBS, BIAOS, and CICIS. The Union SEn4galaisc dc
Banquc (USB), in which thestate has a majorityshareholding, is associatedwith Frencl.
Credit Lyonnaiswhich exercises managerial control. The remaining banks are small;
most were created as specialized banks, for housing (BHS), industry and tourism
(SOFISEDT), and agriculture (CNCAS).
11. These studies addressed suchmajorpolicyissuesas indirectsubsidylevels, crossdebt, and special conventions or concessions.
12. A public enterprise sector review in 1977 led to a series of reforms supported
by the firstparapublic sector technical assistance project (PPTA1) . Atits completion in
1983, a second project (PPTA2) was initiated.
13. In addition to thesc two policy decisions, the govemment:also agreed to return to the private sector smnall and medium-size units in the productive sector and to
close units that werc found to be nonviable.
14. The process of cross-debtsettlementcntails identifying and verifiing the debt,
negotiating a settlement agreementbetween the concerned parties, and reflecting the
terms of the agreemen t in the books of the concerned parties. At the end of December
1989, total debts owed by 60 nonfinancial public enterprises to government amounted
to CFAF 57.4 billion, and debts owed by government amounted to CFAF 48.9 billion.
After the mutual cancellation of debts and write-ofE', and after enterprises were liquidated and privatized, total debts owed by public en terprises to government.dropped to
CFAF 5.6 billion (or 9.8 percent of the original amount) and debts owed by government to public enterprises dropped to CFAF 12 billion (or 2.5 percent of the original
amount). These remaining debts are being settled over a period of three years, with
only a few exception-s. About 80 cross-debt agreements among the public enterprises
themselves had been signed as of October 1991, and about CFAF 8 billion (representing 60 percent of total dcbt) had been settled.
15. Dakar emerged from being the capital of French West Africa with the best
trained civil servants in the region and the highest paid, as Senegal kept complete wage
pariy berween African and French employees. In the carly 1960s, the civil servants had
seven times the average income of peasant households and twice the wage of skilled
industrial workers (see Ka and van de Walle forthcoming).
16. See Rashid Faruqee (1993).
17. Tax elasticity is defined as the percentage variation in tax revenue expressed
in terms of changes in GDP, but excluding the impact of discretionary measures. Several factors accounted for the declinc in tax elasticity-but particularly the narrowing
of the tax base, reflecting a weak economy, and the '4 informalization" of the economy,
as the informal economy expanded rapidly away from the stagnating formal sector.
The reasons for tax variation include high tumover declining salaries in the formal
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sec-tor, low business profiLs, and adecline in imports, adversely .fecting tax collection.

18. Even in the absence orbudgcaly constraints, die civil sevice mustbe downsized
to improve itsefficicncy,given thaLScne-gal inheriLed a largeadministration fromwlen
Dakar was thc capital of the Frcnch West African colonies.
19. Amnong the main determinants of thc poor performance of these two export
items are the resource depletion and the aging fishing flect in the fishery subsector
and the keen vegetable oil substitution in the groundnut oil subsector.
20. TIlis isan avcragc ratc for the period between the last two population censuses
held in 1976 and 1988. For more recentycars, thcpopulation growti rate is estimated
at 3.2 percent.
- f 21. If the domestic price is higher than the border price due to cauEis or import
controls-thatis, if the nominal price coefficient is greater than one-then domcstic
producers benefit from protectionist policy. If the opposite is true, then the domestic
price is lower than the border pricc due to import subsidies or price controls-thus
implying the taxation of domestic producers. If the domestic resource cost is less than
one, the crop actity is using domestic resources effectively to generate or save a unit
of foreign exchange. This situation creates a comparative advantage, since thecountry
earns or saves foreign exchange through production.
22. In 1988 the government approved 59 projects totaling CFAF 8 billion, which
created 175 jobs for about $150,000 perjob.
23. These are BATA (shoes), ST (textiles), SAPAL (una),SARDINAPRIC (scafood), MAN UT.ENTIONAFRIGAINE (vehicies), and TREFILERIE DE DAKAR (cngineering).
24. This figure is based on the assumption that the number of modern industries
remained at its 1986 level of 367.
25. Scaleisdefined accordingto employmcnt microenterprises (1-9),small-scale
enterprises (10-49), and mediun- and large-scale en teprises (50 and more).
26.A 1990 sample surveyofSl manufacturingfirnsshowed dtathalfhad increased
their labor productivity and ehanged the composition of their output. Eighteen
nonprofitable firms were closed between 1987 and 1989, but sevcral of them have reopened under new ownership. Tie impact on employment has generally been negative, reflecting the stagnation of the sector and thchigh costof labor. Through improved
productivity, the reformns have also led to price declines in 2bout 75 percent of the
subsectors examined.
27. For instance, Berg and associates (1990) show thatproductivity measures fell
in frve key enterprises from 1980 to 1988. They are OPCE (post), SENELEC (electricity), SNCS (railways), SOTRAC (urban transport), and SONES (water).
-28. University enrollment has increased significan dy in the recent past, reflecting
in part the increasedlength oftimne hatstudents take to complete adegree. Due to the
clifficulty of finding employment after graduation, students prolong their university
schooling as long as possible. The University of Dakar is currently overcrowded, with a
1989 enrollmentof about 16,500 students, tmice its capacity.
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Tanzania: resolute action,
DariusMans

At Independence in 1961, Tanzaniawas one of the poorest countries in the
world, with a population of some 20 million people and the eighth largest
land area in Sub-Saharan Africa. Dependent largely on subsistence agnculture, the country had a small industrial base, and its base of educated and
trained pexsonnel was limited. Yet in the first six years after Independence,
its ecruomic growth surpassed 6 percentannually, favored bygoodiveather
and the absence of major externalshocks. In addition, its economicpolicies,
while movinggradually towardgreatergovernmentcontrol.werebasedlarg-1y
on market forces- The policy regime for trade and capital, movement was
largely nonrestrictive, and foreign investmentwas encouraged as a major instrument for development
In 1967 the government sought to increase the economic participation
ofindigenousAfricans by enacting theArusha Declaration, calling explidtly
for a socialist society. The government extended its control throughout the

economy by nationalizingall firms occupying the 'commanding heights" of
the economy-all the major commercial and financial institutions and some
private agricultural estates. Italso initiated a concerted program ofcollectivizing peasant farming and gave traditional agricultural cooperatives exclusive marketing rights, replacng private (mosdy Asian) traders. The government also made significant strides toward improving social senices,
particularly access to education and safe water. In the short tenn, the government's strategy paid off: donor assistance to Tanzania increased rapidly
during this period, real GDP grew atjust under 5 percent annually during
1967-73, and gross invesunent rose to more than 20 percent of GDP_ Yet
lurking behind these gains were several structural weaknesses-declines in
the productivity of public investment and in exports, dwindling domestic
savings, an erosion in prinvae sector confidence, an increase in foreign ex-.
change controls, and a significant black market in which the premium for
.352
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foreign cxchange rose to over 1o0 percent Then in the 1970s, Tanzania was
buffeted by a series of externzl shocks-quadrupling oil prices, a severe
drought in 1973-74, the break-up of the East African Community in 1977,
and the Kagern WAar with Uganda
By the early 1980s, economic decline and macroeconomic imbalances
were severe. Real GDP contracted eadi year from 1981 to 1983. The growth
in agriculturl output was an anemic 2 percent-vith that gain due to a
weather-induced expansion in food crop production that ofEset die continued fall in the output of export crops-industrial output fell by-15 percent
per year, and capacty utilization fell to less than 25 percent The country's
transportsyrstem and otherpublicsenices deteriorated tremendouslybecause
they could notbe maintained properly. The balance ofpayments continued
to worsen -with the poor performance in agricultunl and manuFacturing
exports. Scheduled deb t service on medium- and long-term debtas axratio ofexports-rose more than 50 percent, and external paymentarrears were substantial. Inflation rose significantly and continued unabated above 30 percent in die early l980s.
Cautious of the government's inability to implement projects and skeptical about itswillingness to address the heart ofTanzania's economic problems, foreign donor.s reduced their aid sharply after 1981. Consequently,
imports declined to the point at which they could no longer support the
economy, and widespread shortages of goods emerged. The severe imbalances.in the country'an d the restrictive exchange and trade system led to the
emergence of large parallel markets for both goods and foreign exchange.
In 1983 the government laundieda crackdown on bladc market activities,
undermining and demoralizing die private sector, paricularly Asian businessmen According to severalwriters, the crackdown also sought to counter
what was perceived to be a threat to state legtimacy (Maliyamkono and
Bagachwa 1990). Yet despite the large number ofarresrs and convictions, no
evidence was uncovered to chow any organized resstance to the government
Extceme shortages of goods in the shops continued.
Despite some tentative steps towvard reform with the structural adjustment program of 1982 to 1985, government reform measures had a limited
impact on severe internal and external imbalances and did not elicit the
external assistance needed from the donor communiy, primarily because of
inappropriate exchange-rate policies. With discontent growving, President
Nyerere decided not to continue as president, and at the end of 1985, Ali
Hassan Mwinyi was elected as his successor, width free rein to embarlk on economic refonr. What emerged was the economic recovery program, adopted
in rnid-1986.
The economic recovery program was based on an internal review of the
weak-nessesand shortcomings of the structuraladjustmentprogram, particu-
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larlv its;failure tO stimutilate: a significantssupply response or to generatemuclh

financial support from thie donor conmmunity. During dtie early l980s there
was increasing debate within die government, and more broadly, about the
failures of previous adjustment measures and tde deepening economnic cisis. Even thiough President Nyerere had steadfastly refused to even consider
exchange rate devaluation, university-based economists took die lead in helping to organize public debates involving a utide spectrum 'if societv on the
need for more structural reform; particularly on the issue ofjwlether the
:country should tum to the International Monetay Fund for help to restore
economic growth. Such discussionslhelped to build a consensus on devaluation, on the introdutction of the own-funds scheme whereby inporters could

innportgoods using dteirown foreign exchange onano-questie.ns-asked basi.s,
and on the need toacknoowledge and legitimize whatwas talingplace in large
gray marK-ets.
g
Since the initial phase of the reform program succeeded in helping to
- jump start the stagnant economy, the role of more refonn-minded technocraLs increased significantly by the late 198Os. This facilitated a shift of emphasis in the reform program toward die key issue of macroeconomic instability. Whilesome progress had been made in reducing the budget deficit, it
had become apparent that the reform agenda had to address the systemic
causes of the continuming instability, particularly through reforms at the
microeconomic level that had important macroeconomic linkagesAt the outset of the economic recovery program.. economic decisionmalking wms dominated by a political party that remained firmly -wedded to
iLs socialist principles and was primarily concemed with economic recovery.
There wuas no consensus on the need to move to a more liberal, markletbased economy. The back-ground, onrentation, hardened atitudes, and ingrained habits of those entrusted wihi implementing the reforms dearly
meant that the reform process would, atleast-initially, be difficult and slow.
For example, while the World Bank and other donors pushed for quicker
liberalization of agricultural export markleting, such change ras imposdible
to implement because of resistance from the politcally powerful leadership
of the cooperatives, which until recently were part of the ruling political
party. The debate invu ied a 'wide cros-s4ection of interest groups, including politicians, businesEsmen, and labor union officials, and was accompanied by IMF and World Bank efforts to help die government formulate dle
economic recovery program.
The initial economic recovery program document, whichwas presented
to donors at the 1986 consultative group meeting in Paris, provided a broad
outline of policies-but focused on committing to an exchange rate policy
that would completely remove the overvaluation of the shilling, and on
making efforts to dramatically improve producer prices for the main export
crops, miduding a willingness to reexamine agricultural markleting arrangePublished by iRepository, 2021
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-merits. These new dlirections receivecd br-oad d{onorl support at. theC conSIka',-tive grouip meeting.

Trlie firstspecific details of policy inder the economic recovery progrmn
were announced in dibci iudgetspccic onf19s6 and fonned the basis ola stndby rrangemenIwith tie IMFin Auigulst 1986. In December, die World Bank
rollowed wtitl a structural adjustment program to stippoIt. tie economliic

recoverv progr-am.i. Many otlier donors also sub.lsttantally increa,sed their assistance to Tanzania. In 1987 tie governmenuentered into a first stnictural
adjcustmeiint facility programii wvtiti tlc IMF, followed by)vasecond in l988 and
a tiird in 1990. The World B.anuk provided sectoral adjustment credits for;
industry. aigriciltuire, and financial sector refonus, whosc iinpleiienation
began in 1988, 1990. and 1991, respectively In 1989 the govemrnment embarkeed on die scecond phae oftlie economic recover-y program (called ecnomic recovery program II, or the economic and social action progranm)
which was largely a continuation of die macroeconomnic and structural reforms begun tinder the first economic recovei program but also sought to
address problems in the social sectors. At die end of die tlird structural
adjustment facilityprogram wdit the IMFin 1991. die government entered
into a three-ycir enhanced slructural adjustment Racility arrangement with
dte IMeto suppoit the second phase of de economic recovely program. Both
phases afthe economic recovery progrm have received substantial support
from the entire donor community.
The economiic recovery progrm has dramatically turned around economic performance in Tanzania. Economic growud has been restored (figure8.1). Exportsand dielevel ofinvestTnenthaveincreased.In addition, the
Figure 8.1 Real gross domestic product, 1979-91
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fiscal deficit. has fallen substantially, and die r.ate of inflation has lbeen recluced somtnewhat (table 8.1). Substantial progress ha.-s been made in addressing some or the inajor listorlions in the economy-tie legacy of nearly 20
yeans of socialist experinientition. Considering Tanzania's starting point, signiricant progress has been made in moving toworard a more liberal, marketbased economy.
Structural adjustment: lessons leamed
The Tanzanian economy is betteroff now than itwas before the refoirn prograin began. YetTamzania has not fully recovtered from its economir. crisis of
die mid-197Os through the mid-I980s. At tile start of tie reform program
the economy was plagued by an array of policy distortions and structural proW
lems, a deep and prolonged economic crisis, and a heavy ideological bias
against reform. In these circumstances, there is a temptation to argue tlat
policy measures to relieve capacity constraints can be implemented quiickly,
wlhile institautonallyintensinestructural reforms can only proceed slowly given
die time needed to develop, achieve consensus on, and implemenL them. In
retrospect, this thinking proved to be incorrecL Tlhree important lessons
emerge from this review of Tanzania's experiencewidth adjustment. First, even
Table 8.1 Selected indicators of economic recovery program
achievements

Indicator

;-

Average annual GOP growh in re teris
Average annual exportgrowt in real teris
Investment asa percent of GOP
Average annual inffaton rate
-12.1
Fscal defic as percent of GDP
Prirnarylfscaldeficitasa percentofGDP
Agriwtural producer prices as apercentage of
iritemajonal prices
Average annual appredaton of th real
exchange rate
Ceraal govenment deficit as a percent of GDP
Current account deficit.asa percent of GDP
GrossdornesicinvestmentasapercentofGDP
Gross domestic savgs as a percentage of GDP

Officia..

Incuding unoffial exports-

m~~~~~~&wric

.

-.

Preasiperd

yisisyears recovey period

1970-80

1981-85

98-91

4.6
0.1
20.1
14.0-

0.1
-10.4
143
31.0
98.6

4.0
5.6
31.6
25.7
7.0
3.9

64.5

72.5

59.0.

.2
12.1
10.1
20.1

16.1
9.4
5.8
143

-24.3
7.0

.,

.

10.4
10.7

as
31.6
-

1.0
13.3

Not ailabkit
a.Centr gvemrnent deidt on a check issued. befor grans , inciudinginteresL
b. Central govemmentdecit on a hecks issued, before grants basis, exdudirg inerest.
c.Unoicial expors are private transrers from abroad which are often used to fnance "own-finded' rnports.
SDrCeCWorld Bankdata; lMFdath BankofTanzania(1990).
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among the capacity-relieving, more policyintensive measures thatwvere implemented, dhe pace ofrefoum should have been faster. The analysis of some of
these shortcomtings suggests key' measures that now need to be taken. Second, given die importance orsome of tic more capacity-intensive structural
reforms to d ie success of hie overall reform effort, the'y probablyshloul d have
been addressed sooner. Since theywere not, diese refonns need to be expeditiouslvtimplemented.TThird, in thesequencing ofreforms, there is one critical area that has notyetreceived adequate attention:prnvatesector developmenL While this area has been parnally addressed during the economic
recovery progranm, it should have-been given greatcr pnority.
trAmong the policy-intensive reformis, one of the most important was
trade liberalization.. In this area a number of le.ssons- are dear from
Tanzia's expenence. Export promotion.should have been implemented
more vigorously, but it clearly was overshadowfed by a program to intensify
import liberalization. Import support programs financed by donors, particularly commodity import support, created distortions to the extent that they
were notpredicated on enstiring full collection of counterpart funds. Moreover, without sufficient action to move toward a market-determined and
unified exclange rate, Tanzania effectively had an ineffcient multiple exchange rate regime.
-Within the open general license program, several mistakes were made
in thesequencing ofreformn First, an effectivemanagementandaccountng
s.ystem forthe oper general license shouldhavebeen put.in place-whenthe
scheme was introduced, rather than six years after it began operating. This
delay only served to shak-e the confidence ofboth donors and importers in
the scheme. The second mistake deaLs with the negative list-a list of goods
that cannot be imported under the open general license. The government
reduced the size of the negative listwihout addressing the problems associated with exchange rae overvaluation and the ineffectiveness of the custonLs
department in minimizing inport tax evasion. This led to a run on open
general license resources that underrmned the program's credibility as a
marketmechanism forgettingaccess to foreign exchange,putlocalindustry
at a competitive disadvantage compared with imports, and faivored trading
over directproduction activities, induding exporting. Commercialization or
privatizadon ofcustomsand quick exchange rateunificationprobablywould
have been more effective than creating an open general license.
Among the structural measures, reform of the agricultural export market and the elimination of single-channel marketing needed to be imple
mented more quickly. These measures are absolutely essential (but not sufficient by themselves) to increase exports and improve macroeconomic
stability, since excessive creditwas granted to cooperatives and state markleting institutions to cover their large inefficiencies. Faster liberalization of ag-
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ricunural export marketingand reduction of implicit taxation ofagriculral
exports would also have boosted growth and helped to further alleviate poverty. Since the banLks have begun restricting credit to the cooperatives, there
is a. risk that the tight restrictions could result in farmers not being paid for
all their export crop production. This would leave them with real disincentives to increase or even maintain the production of major export crops.
While the legislative framewvork for liberalization of export crop marketing
is expected to be in place by the-beginning of fiscal 1994, new entrants in
this field require access to processing facilities which today are exclusively
in the hands of the cooperatives and take rime to establish. One of the shortcomings of the adjustment process was the failure to open agricultural marketing earlier and to let the cooperatives sink- or swim according to their
-ability to compete.
The losses of the parastatal sector were another inportant source of
macroeconomic instability that should have been addressed earlier in the
reform program. Refonu should have hardened the budget constraint for
parastatals, encouragedfree entyand exit in areas thathave been dominated
byparastataLs, and facilitated orderly restrucuring and privatizion. elays
in addressing parastatal reform have resulted in-mounting financial and
economic lossess and decliming asset values in the parastatal sector. Successful rehabilitation of a significant number of the parastatals would lead to
improvedproductivityand overall economicperformance. In addition, value
added would improve immediatelyif the parastatls that depend on substantial subsidies to survive were dosed.
Both parastatal and agriculuire market reform are also essential to the
emergence of good banking clients, and therefore to the future health of
the banking system. By hardening tie budget constaint, the financial sector reforms have played a crucial role in encouraging real side refomL Howvever, delays in reform of the agriculture mark-et and the parastatal sector
impose real side costs and ultimately threaten the success of the financial
sector reform program. Reform programs in these areas need to be implemented immediately.
Anothersource contributing to macroeconomic instabilityxrelates to the
priority given to private sector development The government's attitude toward the priate sector has evolved considerably from the late 1960s, when
the private sector wsas actively discouraged. Since 1990 the government has
provided various incentives to private investors, recognizing that limited
budgetary resources prevent the public sector from maintaining a dominant
role in the productive sectors of the economy. However the indigenous pnvate sector has been slow to develop, and there are growimg concerns over
a perceived 'AsianiztionH of the economy. This has become a major political issue, slowed progress toward privatization of commercial parastatals,
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and delayed the liberalization of the mark-eting of the major export crops.
It also has increased uncertainty on the part of the Asian business community, dampening their interest in malking long-term investments in the country. Greater attention should have been given earlier in the reform program
to strengthening indigenous entrepreneuship in particular, and the private
sector in generaL
Structual adjustment policies: the external environment

Inaddition to theinternal factors descibedabove, the extenal environment
has also affected the progress and outcomes of the adjustment programs.
Reasonably-good weatherhas helped the adjustment program, and external
aid has been vital) The high level of external assistance in the form of disbursements of balance of payments support, project grants, and debt relief
helpedreverse the severeimportcompression of theprereformperiod.Donor
financing has also helped the government sharply reduce bank borrowing
to finance the defcit. While there is some concern that donor financing has
been excessive and has forestalled adjustment, donors have often leveraged
their assistance to accelerate the government's action on several important
reforms. Yet the deterioration in Tanzania's terms of trade-which persisted
from the mid-1970s throughout the adjustment program because of a substantial decline in world coffee prices, and-weakw;vorld prices for other Tanzanian agricultural exports-reduced export earnings and widenedrdhe current account deficiL
Two important insttutional dimensions have affected the progress of
reform. First, limited managerial and technical capadtiesvwithin the govemment have often slowved the design and.implementation of reform. Second,
the consensus building approach to reform-although essential for building a sense. of goverment ownership-has occasionally delayed progress.
The legal framework-has also been an impediment at times. For example,
laws had to be repealed before reform could proceed in the finanial sector
and with foreign exchange controls. Much effort during the economic recovery program was directed at reducing legal constraints by repealing and
amending current legislation?2 Thle absence of an official land market and
lack of clarity on rights to, and transfers of, property have also affected the
ability of finn to respond to reforms and to investo
Despite the ebb and flow ofreform implied by these various factors, action
ha been resolute (see appendix 8A). The most apparent success has been
that the adjustment program and external support of that program have arrested the protacted economic decline of the prerefon; period. The economic recovery program has dramatically improved economic performance
in all majorsectors. For example, the agricultural sector, which-accounts for
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nearly half of CDP, has grown rapidly during the economic recovery program, after a growthv rate of less than die rate of grow%thi of the population
during the prcrcfoni pcriod. Too, the average annual5 percentgrowtl rate
in agricultural GCP during die economic recovery program is more than ntice
the iate of growth achieved in Sub-Saharan Afiicaduring die 1980s. The protracted decline of the industrial sector has been stemmed. Average annual
growth of industry from 1986 to 1991 was nearly 5 percent, compared to a
decline of the same magnitude fiom 1979 to 1985 (see appendix 8B for discussion of limitations of-national accounts data for industry). Capacid utiiization has also.increased, industial efficiency has improved, the industrial
sectoris diversif'inginto more efficientactivities, and manufactured exports
have increased substantially.
Prior to reforms, per capita consumption leveLs plummeted, and there
were widespread shortages of goods in the country. During the economic
recovery program, per capita consumption has increased eachyear. The rate
of investment has increased, -and.Tanzania's balance of payments position
has improved because iLs exportvolume has improved significantly. Despite
some slippages. the government has improved its macroeconomic mariagementby sharply reducing exchange rate overvaluation axnd by ending its use
of the domestic banling system to finance its budget defict. Inflation has
declined somewhat, thouLgh itremainswell above the-averagelevel of itstrading partners. In addition, the groundwork for a solvent, competitive financial system is being laid.
Data on the distributional impact of adjustnent are notoriously scarce.
However, the major beneficiaries of adjustment are. probably private u-aders, who have been able to capitalize on trading opportunities provided by
import liberalization, as wvell as on opportunities to evade taXesA4 Since the
exchange rate overvaluation has been largely corrected, exporters who operate through official markets, particularly producers of export crops, have
benefited from adjustment-so too have the private industial firms thathave
been able to manage their debt exposure in foreign exchanget, make their
domestic manufacturingimore efficient, and increase their exports. Itls precisely these firms that are expanding most rapidly. Itis also apparent that the
increase in per-capita consumption levelsandgreaterspendingpoweramong
consumers have rapidly expanded opportunities for entrepreneurs in the'
services sector. There also is some evidence that rural and urban poverty has
diminished somnewhat wvith the restoration of economic growth and lower
real food prices. Finally, economic liberalization has undoubtedly benefited
governmentagencies-whose-activitie-shad beenlimited by theneed to attend
to the demands placed on them by the earlier regime ofadministrative controls-most notably the central bank.
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Macroeconomic reform
Fiscalpolicy and mianagement
Prior to die earlier structural adjustment program, public finances were severelystrained. Pooreconomicperformance had reduced revenue as a'slare
of GDP during the late 1970sand early 1980s, particularly reveniue from sales
taxes on local maniifIacturing, where capacity utilization had fallen to less
than 25 percent. Nevertheless, total expenditures continued to rise. By fiscal
1979 the fiscal deficit reachedalmost 20 percent of GDP, anddomestic bank
borrowing to finance the deficit rose to nearly 9 percent of CDP (figure 8.2).
On the fiscal front, the most important measures under the structural
adjustment program of 1982-85 were a modest shift in the development
budget.toward agrculture and some increase in allocations for mainte-

nance, increased tax collection efforts and higher taxes on beer and cigarettes, and general cutbackls in budgetary expenditures to reduce the. overall deficit (figure 8.3). In addition, some 13,000 civil senrants, representing
less than. 5 percent of the civil service, were retrenched in 1985D but many
of those whose jobs were cut later found their way back-into the civil service.
The structural adjustment program also sought to improve exppenditure
monitoring and control.
By the end of the structural adjustment program in 1985, current revenue had declined by 17 percentin real terms, due primarily to a-decline in
income taxes accompanying the collapse of real income. Current expendiFigure 8.2 Budget deficit and bank borrowing, 1979-91
Percentageof GDP
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tures had fallen only slightly, while developinental expenditures, wlhicl accounted for about 25 percent ortotal expenditures, Cell by 21 percent, due
largely to a declinc in donor financing. ItwaLs also apparent tliat expenditure
control was inadequate, many projects were chronically underfunded, and
the bulk of donor fundswere notaccounted for in the budgeL-Byyfiscal 1985,
the deficit had fallen to 7.3 percent of GDP, yet deficit financing by the domestic banLkslwas still significant.
Wvith the economic recovery program, the governlent adopted measurens to increase revenue and reduce the growth of both current and developmenud expenditures. A major medium-term.objective was to eliminate
domestic bank financing of tdie budget deficit. Govermnent revenue was to
be increased by improving tde efficiency of tax collection, expanding the
tax base by raising the general level of economic activity, reducing overvaluation of the exchange rate, and taxing the self-employed using presumptive income estimation methods.
The economic-recovery program indluded several reformn measures to
these ends. Among the most important. was a switch in the focus of public
investmelntfromne vinvestments to rehalbilitation, particularlyrehabilitation
of the deteriorating economic and social infrastruaure. In addition, the
system ofindirectta-ationwas streamlined-customs dutiesand sales tax rate.s
wvere reduced, particularly on imports but also on domestically produced
goods. To improve revenue collection, the economic recovery program introduced preshipment inspection of imports by foreign firms for the purposes of customs valuation. Income tax razes were also reduced; corporate
Figure 8.3 Government revenue and expenditure, 1979-91
Millions of 1976 Tanzanian shtllings
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tax rates declined from 45 percent to 35 percent in fiscal 1993. Explicit:
parastatal subsidies were reduiced fromn an estimated 2 percenL of-GDP in
fiscal 1985 to less thman percent in 1991, limited piiiuaiily to subsidies ror
fertilizer amd lo specific major parastatals undergoing restructuring. A lhiring freeze was imposed on new recruitment in the civil scrvice, witlh certain
specified categories such as teachers and medical personnel exempt.
These measures improved fiscal management. The deficit as a percentage of GDP declined substantially (figure 8.2). And deficit financing by the
domestic banks showed as'ustained decline. Too, die ratio of tax reventues to
CDP rose to an estimated 23.5 percent of GDP by fiscal 1992, and budgetary
planning and management improved. 5 In fiscal 1993 tlie proportion of donor funding actually captured in the budgetwa.s suibstantially increased.6 In
addition, a three-year rolling plan fiamewvork is in the design stage, seeking
to put the budgeting and planning process in a nultiyear context consistent
wvith the overall macroeconomic program starting in fiscal 1994.
De.pite these improvements, several structural weaknesses in public finances remain. While some effort has been made to generate additional rev
enue and improve the quality of public expenditures and mechanisms for'
monitoring and controlling the budget, die budget still relies heavily on
donor financing? ShortFalls in donor disbursements due to concerns about
the pace of implementation and the accountability of donor resources have
in sever al years compromiszed the government's financial program. While die
introduction of economic criteria for project selection and an emphasis on
completing ongoing projects rather than initiating new ones has improved
public investmentprogramming, the development budget still contains too
many projects (more than 2,000). Many of these programs are severely
underfunded-inconsistent vith the objectives of the economic recovery
program-and probably not sustainable. The tax base continues to be extremely narrow.v Tanzania depends heavily on indirect taxes-particularly on.
domestic goods-for most of its revenue. Tax administration and enforcement are weak, as is tax compliance. While the tax revenue to GDP ratio is
high in relation to otherAfrican countries, GDP is underestimated by at least
30 percent, and collections could be enhanced if the widespread import and
income tax evasion could be reduced and a system of property taxation introduced. Moreover, quasi-fiscal or off-budget losses of the public sector lhave
also increased-even with the inprovement in central government. finances-due to poor cost recovery among utilities and parastatals and
mounting losses among the commercial parastatals, which by fiscal 1989 had
reached 8 percent of GDP.
Fiscal reform has been conctrained by weak administrative capacity and
inadequate payincentivesin the publicsectorgenerally-particularly the ciMI
service responsible for revenue collection. Examples of Tanzania's weak ad-
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ministrative capacity are numerous. The country hias limited capacity to
monitoi- budgeitay developmients tlhrouighout the year and to take correcLive action when necessary. Too, because the recurrent and developmcnt
budgets are prepared by two governlnent ministries (the treastury and planning commission), budget coordination hnas been weak. The development
budget is also essentially donor driven and determined. Fiscal policies cannot be executed properly because the key agencies lack effective management systems and tools. While donors. have occasionally helped .the government build capacity in. some parts of dte treasury and the planning
commission, muchimuststill be done to-improve organization, management,
and effectiveness in these areas.
But commitment to fiscal reformn is clear-particularly since 1990-as
evidenced by a sustained decline in reliance on domestic banks to finance
the debt. Althougli some.slippage occurred in fiscal 1993, domestic bank
financing of the deficit had been eliminated by 1992, and the government
has begun repaying the banking system for previous borrowing. The government has also demonstrated its commitment to fiscal reform by forming the
high-powered Presidential Commission of 'Inquiry into Public Revenues,
Taxation, and Expenditure. The commission has recently recommended
sweeping reforms in several areas. Some of these reforms were adopted immediately in the fiscal 1993 budget-for example, reducing direct and indirect tax rates in the expectation that improved tax administration and compliance would increase revenue yields. Yet, as noted earlier, the expected
benefits did not materialize, and many of the tax reductions thatwere made
were rescinded in the middle of the year.
Monetaey polic
In the late 1970s and early 1980s domestic credit expansion was driven by
the public sector's demand for credit Reflecting deficits in the fimancal
operations of the sector, overall domestic credit increased by 31 percent
annually from 1977 to 1982, compared with only 14 percent from 1975 to
1977. Bank credit to the private sector rose at only modest i-aLtes, due in part
to the dedine in economic activity and because credit to the public sector
crowded out private sector lending.
The major objective of the earlier structural adjustment program monetary policy was to limit money growith and overall credit expansion to 15 to
20 percentannually. It aso sought to gradually make real interest rates positive. Although the government did notachieve these objectives, they became
a critical part of the economic recoveryprogram, particularly in the economic
progams supportedby the IMF.Although deficitfinancing by domestic banks
declined during the economic recovery program, the credit being extended
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to public sector financing eant
rttla LIM1 targets on net domestic creditwere
consistently exceeded by fairly large margins (table 8.2).
Domestic credit increased by 43 percent annually from 1987 to 1989,
compared with programn targeLs of 32 percent during structural adjustment
facilities I and II. Thne bulk of iis girowti stemmed fromil die expansion of

credit to finance the deficit and from excessive credit to individual crop
marketing boards, particularly die National Milling Corporation, which had
enjoyed a monopoly in inarketing a vaiety of crops. Moreover, thie comniercial banks continued to accriue interest on most of their public sector
nonperfoiting loans, and were relying on their almost unlimited access to
credit from the Bank. of Tanzania for liquidity. The central bank could not
curb the rapid expansion of credit because it lack-ed supporting fiscal policies--butalso because the banking system-was highlymonopoliZed, effective
prudential reguations were absent, and bank supervisory capacityat the Bank
of Tanzania was weak (see section belowv on financial sector policies). The
central bank could not use one of the few tools at isL disposal, reserve requirements, because the banls often did not hold any deposits at the Bank
of Tanzania, but still ran large overdrafts.
In addition to excessive credit creation, the banking system was facimg a
severe crisis by the late 1980s. All commercial banks were highly inefficient
and insolvent. Consequently, a Presidential Commission of Inquiry into the
Monetary and Banking System was formed. Based on iLs report, and -agreements reached with the IMF in the context of the enhanced structural adjustment facility and the WAorld Bank's financial sectoradjustment credit, the
Table 8.2 Selected credit and monetary annual growth rates, June 1986June 1992
(preentoge iTaaer)
kemn

1986

t987

1988

1989

1990

1991

t992

Domesticassets(net)
Dornesticaedit
Cairmsongovernment(netf
Claims on other public enties
and private sector
Industial and commercial

23.2

25.3
275
S.1

46.8
52.3
53.3

47.6
34.6
10.4

27.7
21.5
4.9

6.3
14.6
-19.2

22.8

22.9
19.3
30.2

69.1

51.1

62,9

34.6

35.5

1.0

parastals

Selected marketing boards
Private sector
Cooperative unions
Morney and quasi-money

-

53.3

*f0.7

-7.8

68.7

27.9

0.4

-83.7

..

..

22.6

53.6

11.3

78.9
34.8

43.7
37.5

37.4
45.1

43.0
26.8

29.3
40.5

..

..

3.4

53.4

-3.7

..
..

149.3
20.2

17.7

1.S
3.0

Not availabLe.
a. Fronn June 1988 onwards indudes TSh 13,643 milion of overdrafts by the markeing boanS taken over by the
gaverrnent, TSh I9,022 million inoverdrafts of the National Miling Corporation with the National Bank of
Corrrnerce which were assured by the govemment in 1991192, and TSh 18,887 million in transfers to the loans
and advances realization trust made in June 1991

Surce: Bank of Tanzania and IMF staf estimates-
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government embarked early in 1991 on a far-reaching financial sector rcfonii programii thllat. hs lhad significant implications for moneary poliy. The
balance sheets ofthe banks have been cleaned up, and tlic Bank ofTanzania's
overdraft facility was. closed. A discouint policy was then in troduced to allow
the commercial banLs access to Bank ofThannnria's refinancing, buL the bank
discourages comimrcI'cial banks froml relying on borrowing friom it. The coninercial banks have now begun to extend credit on miore prudent terIms,
particularly to par-astitals and cooperative unions.
Current mionetary and financial sector reforn repr-esents an important
cotmitniiuent Lo reform that wa' absent in thc pasSL Concrete action has recently been taken to stein tde essentially automatic access to central bank
crediL for ti e commercial banks. In addition, fiscal management hias itnproved
to the extent tlhat, until thie slippage of 1992-93, past pressures on the banking .sstem to finance the deficit have been removed. The economicrecovery
program has enabled dile central bank to exercise more independence and
cany outitL role appropriately. The central bank-has curbed rapid monetary
expansion much more effectively, but it is still constrained by lo.sses due to
delays in collecting open general license counterpat funds from local banmks
(bos: 8.1). as well as losses from gold purchases and the monev creation inItherent in dle debt conversion progiamui.!

Box 8.1 Funding of the open general license
Funding for the open general license expanded rapidly after its introduction in
1987. While it was initially financed solely by the WMorld Bank, the African
Development Bank and bilateral donors have since joined. Many bilateraLs have
been shifting their balance of paynents.supportaw%ay from traditional commodity
irmport support to the open general license because of the poor record of
counterpart fund recovery by the ta Lsuty under traditional commodity import

support programs-an average cash cover collection rate ofonly 40 percentof the
amounts due, compared to the open general license design that requires all
counterpart funds to be paid to the treasury. (In practice, however, there have
been some problems with the flow of counterpart finds in the open general

license.) In addition, the government has been channeling increasing amounts of
its owun scarce foreign exchange earnings, after rmeeting its oil and debt service
payment obligations, into the open general license instead of allocating them
administratively; By 1991-92 the shares of total opcn general license financing
provided by of tlhe World Bank, bilateral donors, thcegovernment, and the African
Developmcnt Bank were 56, 28, 11, and 5 percent, respectively.
During 1991 and 1992 joint donor evaluation missions to Tanzania
uncovered major problemns with the accoun tingsystemsbeingused under the open
general license, in addition to importerconcerns aboutthe transparency ofaccess
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Financial sector reforni was initiated relatively late in the economiiic recovely
progriam, despite the early rccognition tliat weak-nesses with the biank-ing
system lIadI been a maIjor constr aint to growvtl. Piior to the reform program.
the banking system L%raexxtrcinely mnonopolistic, consisting ahmost entirely.
ofgovernment-owned financial institutions. nic total asets of the state-owned.
National Bank or Commerce, foined friom the nationalization of twelve
privateL banks in 1967, are 13 times largerthan those of the Cooperative Rural
Development Bank,, w hich is the only other coimnercial bank on the mainland.9 Competition in tliefinancial sector wtas precluded by sectoral specialization witlhin die commeicial banlks (for example, retail banking-at dle
National Bank of Conimerce and rural banking at the Cooperative Rural
Development Bank), geographic speacalization (in the case of thePeople's
Bank of Zanzibar), iaseries ofsector-specific financial institutions (thc houSing bank, savings bank, and development banks), and government prohibitions on die entry of new financial institutions.
Banking supervision by the Bank ofTanzaniawas completely inadequate
and failed to halt the deteriorating financial conditions of the banLk-s. Interestrates, which were k-eptlaigely negativein real terms until 1990, constrained

to open general license fuids. When the progrnn was introduced, insufficient
attention wuas paid to developing accounting systemrLs that would meet donor

requirement s particularlyaccounting for the counterpart undcsgenerated byopcn
general license dLsbursements. Fihscal 1992 audits demonstrated that while the
treasury received from the Bank of Tanzania the full counterpartvalue of foreign
exchange disbursed through the open generAl licens.e, about TSh 17 billion in
counterpart fuLnds was owed by the commercial banks to the Bank of Tanzania.
The rapid expansion of the open general license also outstripped the capacity of
thc Bank of Tanzania to adcquately manage iLt While it was designed to make
foreign exchange available on a first-come first-served basis, there was no
mechanism forensuring that, or forverifying that this principle was being strictly
adhered to. Moreover, the perception of a lack of transparency in the allocation
of resourceswmas exacerbated by periodic shortagesofopen generallicense funding,
in partdue to rapid expansion ofdemand and totheltumpynatureofdisbtursements
of donor monezy into the open general license. Due to concerns about the
transparency and automaiicity ofthe allocation of open general license resources
and accountability of the .system, in 1992/93 donor financingof the open gencral
licen.se dried up, pendingimprovemcnts in the management of the open generl
license in thesc areas.
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the mobili7ation of deposits. The structtire of interest rateswas strictly con-

trolled according to the sector and die size and mattrity of enterprises and
thus had litlde to do with how credit was -allocated. Financial institutions
granted credit largely Nwithout accounting for the repaynent capacity of
borroxwers. For example, -abouttwvo-tliirdsof all bank lending outstanding at
the end of 1987 went to cover die operating deficits of tie crop.mark-eting
parastatals. Moreover, weak credit systems and internal controls, slow couIt
procedures, and political influence limited the commercial banks from recovering loans or selling collateral. At the same time, the commercial banks
had almost unlimited access to Bank of Tanzania refinancing, stifling their
incentive to mobilize deposits and improve loan recoveries.
Thus Tanzania's financial system performed very poorly. Nearly all of
the financial institutions were insolvent, and most of their loans ws%ere
nonperforming. Given the extremely low capital base of most institutions in
the sectorand inadequate provisioning forbad debts, virtuallyall institutions
have a substantial negative networth. Recognizing these problems, the government established a Presidential Commission ofinquiryinto tle Monetary
and Banking System in 1988. After two years the Commission recommended
measures for enhancing the overall perfonnance ofthe financial sector.The
Commi.ssion presented its recommendations in 1990, calling for a-radical
restructuring of the financial institutionsand theirparastatal clients, and the
elimination of single channel marketing of agricultural exports.
Building on the findings of the commission, the government has begun
implementing wide-ranging financial sector reform-liberalizing interest
rates, strengtheningprudential banking regulations and central bank supervision, allowing the entry of private banks, and restructunng existing bans;.
These reforms are being supported bya W'orld Bank financial sector adjustment credit and the IMF enhanced structural adjtstment facility arrange-

ments. The balance sheets of the e&-;isting banks are being cleaned up:
nonperformingloans are being talken offthebooks ofthe commercial banks,
and remaining loan losses are being fully provisioned agaimstL Govemment
bonds have been issued to cover the provisioning requirements and to pardially meet the costs of recapitalizing the banks. This proce.ss is to be completedby October1993, to enable the banks to meet the tough new prudential guidelines on capital adequacy adopted from the Basel standards. In
addition, the National Bank of Commerce has begun to reorganize itself,
including initial steps at downsizing and automating its operations. Interest
rates also have been liberalized substantially,. so that the central bank can
now stipulate only a minimum deposit rate and a maximum lending rate.
Moreover, bankling supenvision is being strengthened, and overdraft facilities for the commercial bankrs have been closed. Fmally, atleast one interna-

Published by iRepository, 2021

https://ir.iba.edu.pk/faculty-research-books/13

Tanzania: resaiute action

369

tionally knovn bank that operated in Tanzania before 1967 is returning to
do major retail banldng and trade and invesunent financing. And although
the refonns were introduced only recently, preliminary indications are that
bankLs are making better banking decisions, are under less pressure to lend,
are extending less credit to parastatals and cooperatives, and are making more
credit available to the private sector (table 8.2). Yet as discussed in the section on macroeconomic outcomes, much more is still to be done.
Exchatige rate management

Until recently, exchange rate management has been a contentious issue
between the government and the Bretton Woods institutons. Evren in the
face of the severebalance ofpayments crisis of the late 1970sandearly 1980s,
the government totally resisted devaluing the exchange rate. Consequently,
the real exchangerate appreciated significantly. By 1984 a large parallel
market for foreign exchange emerged, with a prevailing exchange rate that
was reportedly eight times higher than the official rate. The 1984-85 budget
provided the first indication of a new pragmratism in the govermenes am
proach to economic managemen, a devaluation ofthe exchange rate by onethird- This initial adjustment of the exchange rate represented a major shift
in policy. The adjustment fell short, however, and the premium of the blackl
market rate over the official exchange rate continued to rise.
One of the cornerstones of policy reform under the economic recovery
program has been significant adjustment of the exchange rate. At the start
of the economic recovery program the government adjusted the nominal
exchange rate from TSh 17 per U.S. dollar in April 1986 to TSh 40 inJune,
and thengradually depredated the real exchange rate until 1988. By the end
ofJune 1988, the exchange rate stood at TSh 97 per US. dollar, more than
30 percent below the end-June 19.87 level in real effective terms- While the
exchange rate slipped somewhat in 1988 when the rate of nominal depreciadon fell significantly below the rate of inflation, the government soon got
back on trackwith IMF-Bank-supp orted programs to achieve a more realistic
exchange rate.'0 Adjustment continued, leading to a cumulative depreciation of the real effective exchange rate of more than 80 percent from 1986
to 1991, and the premium in the parallel mark-et-was reduced substantially
from its peak of 800 percent in 1985 to about50 percentinl 991 (figure 8.4).
Continued e-xchange rate overvaluation was due to the laclk of overall financal discipline and supporting macroeconomic policies.
After a major exchange rate study was completed by the Bank of Tanzania, anew Foreign Exchange Actwas adopted in early 1992. It provided
the legislative basis for the foreign exchange bureaus that.were introduced
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in April 1992 and was the regulatory framework with-in which the Bank of
Tanzania wsould operate. While the volume of transactions passing dirough
the bureaus was fairly limited initially, it increased substantially during the
year as the open general license dried up (box 8.1)." The government will
soon adopt such measures as an increase in export retention rates and an
increase in the volume of bureau trading. In addition, the exchange rate
prevailing in the bureau-s is being used to set the official exchange rate, with
the objective ofunifting the official and prevailing exchange rates by fiscal
1994312 Bureaus are playing a key role in the process of unilfing the exchange
rate, which depoliticzes the process of settinqg the official exchange rate,
which in the past had led to acrimonious negotiations with the IMF and the
World Bank.
Government policy on exchange rate issues has come a long way. The
government had-aiways made exchange rate adjustments very reluctandy.
Policymakers are now recognizing that the exchange rate shouId be mark-et
determined, and that adjustments are not substitutes for the more prudent
management of monetary and fiscal policies.
External trade beralization

The governmentresponded to the balance ofpayments crises ofthelate 1970s
and the early 1980s byintensifyjing trade controlsin orderto reduce imports.
For example, wiith the collapse of exports, a decline in aid financing, and
virtually no access to intenational credit in the early 1980s, imports fell by
40 percent in nominal terms by 1984. The government resorted extensively
Figure 8A4 Nominal and real effective exchange rates, 1980-92
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to quantitative restrictions. Tariff levels were also prohibitive. In the late 1970s.
and early 1980s, tde tariffstructure was relatively complex, althouigh the bulk
of imnports were subject to tariff rates ofzero, 20, 25, and 60 percent Flowever 15 other rates also applied, ranging between 15 and 200 percent Tne
lower rates applied primnarily to intemnediate and capital goods, while tde
higher rates applied primaily to consumer goods. Imports were also .subjected to sales taxes, With over 20 different -ates ranging from zero to 300
percent. These policies led to an extremely high (nearly 500 percent) average level of effective protection on domestic manufacturing and wide variation m effective-protection across industries. Moreover, the degree of protection enjoyed by an industrial firm was inversely related to its economic
efficiency. Several highly protected firms were economically inefficient as
measured by their domestic resource costs, and some important agricultural
activities had negative rates of effective protection.
Tanzania's adjustmentprogram has liberalized international trade, particularly imports. Tariffs have been reduced significantly, as have quantitative restnctions on imports. In 1984 the government introduced an "ownfunds" import scheme to deal with the severe shortages of goods in the
country. This action was independent of World Bank and IMF advice. The
"own-fund" scheme allowed individuals to import a specified range of consumer, internediare, and capital goods into the count using unoffcial
sources of foreign exchange. As agreed with the World Bank in the context
of its first stnictural adjustment credit, this list Was subsequently expanded
and todayincludes almostall good-s (with the exception of for example, firearmsand e.xplosi.ves).AfteriLtsintroduction, own-funded imports quicklygrew
to account for 40 percent of total imports.
The own-fundsL window helped arrest the decline of several sectors, including peasant agriculture, transport, and manufacturing, because it increased the availability ofirnports. At the same time, the own-funds window
helped dismantle the elaborate system of quantitative restrictions. Ownfunded imports exposed the industrial sector virtually overnight to a trade
regime inuwhich levels ofprotection fell dramatically. Average levels ofeffective protection for industry declined from an estimated 500 percent in early
1984 to about 150 percent in 1985, -and some firms effectively became
disprotected due to the exchange rate undervaluation and die evasion of
customs duties and sales taxes on owin-fund imports)35
The introduction of die own-funds scheme was followed in 1987 by the
introduction of the open general license Facilitywith initial funding by the
Bank. The open general license represented an important advance in foreign exchange inanagement by giving importers access on a first-come firstserved basis to foreign exchange for a few agrculture and transport sector
imports specified on a positive list The open general license played an im-
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portant role early in the reforrm program by encouraging some off-icial practices thatwere market-based rather than administrative. Based on agreements
nith the Uorld Bank, the list of eligible,goods under the open general license was gradually expanded over the next few years to encompass most
initermediate goods for agriculture, transport, and industry, in addition to a
wide range of capital goods. InJanuary 1991 the Bank pressured the governmentinto shifting to a negative listofgoods thatcould notbe imported under
the open general license and further increasing the number of goods that
could be imported. This negative list was again reduced in April 1992 in
consultation With theNWorldBankand the IMF.The currentlistcoversabout
20 percent of nonoil imports.
The open general license has been used increasingly since its introduction (table 8.3). Itaccounted for less than 1 percent of total import licenses
issued in its firstyear of operation. By 1991 it accounted for 27 percent because of the expanded range of goods eligible for importation under the.
facility and increased f unding (box 8.1).
In addition, the rising demand for open general license resources was
due to differences in the effective cost of imports across the various import
windows. For example, despite exchange rate overvaluation, open general
license imports were cheaper than owvn-fund imports because customs duties and sales taxes on own-fund imports could be evaded. Until fiscaI 1992
own-funded imports were not subjected to preshipment inspection. While
the government has recently moved subsntially toward unifying exchange
rates, the large premium on the, parallel foreign exchange market has.
prompted importers at times to favor the open general license over ownfunded imports. Although additional costs are associated with importing
through the open general license (for example, the cost of opening letters
of credit through an inefficientbanking system and the interestcosts incurred
Table 8.3 Import licenses issued under all financing windows, 1986-91
Saurceoffunds
Open ganeral ricense

Normalflee allocation
Import support
Loans, grants and
credits
Suppiter's credit
Bartertrade
Export retenion
Owvmsex&ange
Total

1986
-

1987
-

333.84
184.90

48336
122.59

199.28
153.88
1139
0.70
475.56
1359.55

287.8Q
6434
13.63
2.88
514.68
1,48930

1988

1989

1990

1991

49.70

167.50
533.41
203.63

309.97

46539

383.25
156.85

349.16
6330

54273
391.79
68. 18
30.00
10.06
5.42
8.12
19.29
638.59
484l.31
1,825.31 I1,83535

405.59
1298.
2.90
19.25
448.46
1,739.25

314.43
839
4.83
5.60
493.58
1,704.67

340.20
167.73

Not appicablet
Socute Impcrt Data andAnabtsCepartmentS Bank of Tanzania.
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while waiting for letters of credit to be conrminred), the open general license
often was a cheaper source of foreign exchange for imports than own-funds.
Aside from introducing own-funds in 1984 and a small open general license operation in 1987 on iLs own initiative, the governmentundertook ninost

of the subsequent stages or import libera!ization reluctantly-primarily reducing the size oftlie negative list on imports through tie open general li-

cense. Thie successive liberalizations were undertaken in response to pressure from tie Wrorld Bankand the-IMF. Thegovernmentintends to complete
the process of import liberalization by restrucrtiring the negative list to include only goods thatitwishes to control for healtlh and securityreasonsand
alimitedlistofluxurygoods. Thatsame listwould then beapplied toall import
windows, induding own-fund imports. This process would be accompanied
by a program to unify the exchange rate in fiscal 1994In retrospect the open general license was an important, intermediate
step toward exchange rate unification. However, reducing the negative list.
in the face of exchange rate overvaluation may not have liberalized trade
substantially, since nearlyall goods could be imported under the own-funds
scheme anyway. In fact it may have been counterproductive to the extent
that exchange rate overvaluation would merely insure greater demand for
cheaperopen general license resources, leading to their exhaustion, thereby
inhibiting the program from improving access to officially available fereign
exchange. Moreover, the implicit subsidy to open general license users also
effectively hindered thle development of foreign exchange bureaus, as importers waited in. the open general license queue for large import transactions ratler than going to the bureaus.1 4 Greater progress toward unification should have accompanied reductions in the size of the open general
license negative list. In addition, rather than relying solely on preshipment
inspection for improving the collection of import taxes, the government
should have implemented (and still should) a program for improving the
efficiency of the customs department.

It should also be noted that tade liberalization has included a substantial reductionin tariffs. In the context of theWorld Bank's industrial restructuring-and trade adjustmentcredit, the tariffand sales tx structure began to
be simplified gradually in 1988. By the 1992-93 budget, the maximum tariff
hadbeen icduced to 40 percent and duties on mostspare parts and intermediate and raw material imporLS were lifted (although, again, this decision was
rescinded at mid-yearbecau.se revenue collecions fell short ofexpectatons).
Sales taxes have also been significantly reduced and now range from 0 to 30
percent. In addition, to make tariffs binding and to improve revenue collection, the government reduced most duty exemptions and began using
preshipment inspection companies for assessing customs duties payable to.
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treasury. Neverthfeless, tariff evasion is still substantial, particularly for ownfunded imports).5

In conmpatison with imports, die liberalization of exports has been promnoted less vigorously. The own-funds sclhemlle introduced in 1984 obviously
encouraged exports (and perhaps even some.capital inflows), albeit unofficial exports. One ofthe more explicitmeasures to encourage official expoLts
was the export retention scheme. In 1986 a few exporters were allowed to
retain some of theirexporLearnings in order to importbasicinputs required
to sustain their operations. Retention ratesinitiallyvariedconsiderablyamong
exporters. In 1988 the government began to consolidate rates, wherebya 50
percent retention rate was applied to a large number of nontraditional exportsand 10 percent to traditisnal exports (exceptforafew firnms thatnegotdated belter retention rates with the Bank ofTarzania or had their projects
approved by tie Investment Promotion Center) . With the creation of foreign exchange bureaus, retention rates are again being reviewed with an eye
towvard abolishing surrender requirements on all nontraditional exports in
1993. In 1988 a duty drawback scheme was introduced, but administrative
difficulties, includingchronic underfundingin the governmentbudget, limited its effectiveness. Fmally, some progress has been made toward reducing
the bureaucratic red tape and costs involved in exporting, but cumbersome
exTportlicensing-and registraion requirements prior to the shipmentofgoods
make exporting expensive, particularly from border areas in Tanzania to
neighboring countries. Export financinghas been in extremely short supply, and the liberalization ofagricultural exportmark-etinghas been delayed.
Exchange rate overvaluation has penalized exporters.
In summary, trade liberalization has been a cornerstone of the economic
recoveryprogram. Actngon its own, the governmentimplemented the ownfunds scheme, conceived largely to bringin complementaryimports thatwere
urgently required to cover the widespread shortages of goor4s. Successive
measures to liberalize imports and in crease import competition were largely
donor driven, particularly reducing the size of the negative list The same
was true oftariffreformnuntil the pastfewyears, when the governmentbegan
reducing tariff rates based on relatively little analysis of their impact on revenue and levels ofprotection. Overall, the import regime has been very liberal and mnarket-oriented. This is true, despite exchange rate overvaluation
and the existence of quantiative restrictions from the negative list on the
open general license, because importers have taken advantage of the arbitrage
opportunities that exist across the various import windows. On the import
side, the effective exchange rate has been much closer to a market rate of
exchange, although the import regime continues to be highly segmented.
Conversely, exports have been highly discriminated against.
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Sectoral refonn
Price and mai*ct dereguldation&
In die agricultural sector, Tanzania's marketing systenm hlas been essentially
a compulsotry single channel system since tie niid-1960s, when primary illage societies were established as die only buyers orcrops, and asingle government body was the sole exporter or distributor of goods for local consumption. In fiscal 1974, this system was nmodified when the govrnment
created marketing autlhorities for each crop as monopoly exporters. It also
set producer prices for a-gicultural crops.
In the early I 980s, the government began to liberalize the marketing of
foodcrops, which, along with processing, transportation, distribution, and
storage, had previously been monopolized by the National Milling Corporadon. In order to ensure better and more reliable supplies oF foodgrains to
consumers at lower costs, dle governmentallowedcooperatives and individuals to marlketfoodgrains andremovedall restrictions on their transport These
changes signalled a more positive government attitude toward private firning and private markets. In 1987 die economic recovery program allowed
regional cooperative unions and primary societies to sell foodgrains directly
to private traders, although market outlets for firmers were still confined to
the primary soci :ties. In the following marke ting season, grain trade was fully
liberalized. The private sectornowaccounts formnore than 90 percent of the
trade. In addition, food selfsufliciency has improved dramatically because
foodgrin productdon has increased .substantially, and the real price of
foodgrains has dedined. Input distribution was also fonnally deregulated.
Less progress has been made toward liberalizing the marketing of agritultural export crops. The single channel monopoly remained virtually untouched except for the minor export crops, which were liberalized in 1987.
Until recently, the internal marketing of six traditional crops (tea, coffee,
cotton, cashew nuts, tobacco, and pyrethrum) was confined largely to thecooperatirve societies. Export markleting was handled largely tlrough
paastatal marketing boards, wiith the exception that private estates were
allowred to ex-port tea and sisal directly. InJuly 1990 the roles of the marketing boards for the main export crops changes They began to act only as
auctioneers or tender administrators, as agencies responsible for quality
control and market intelligence (for a fee), and as handling and forwarding
agents for the cooperatives.f7 In fiscal 1992 cashewmarketingwas fullyliberalized; the private sector was alloved to buy directly from the farmers in
competiton with the marketing board and the cooperative unions. 'While
cotton ginning capacityis exclusivelyin the hand.s of the cooperatives, nego-
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tiations between private companies and coopeIative unions have recently
been concluded for Ltwo joint venture ginneries-a:nd Gargill, the largesL
private cooperation in the world, has been given the go-allead to build a
ginnery in one oftlienmajorcotton growingareas. These ginneries hiave been
allowed to buy seed cotton and sell lint on their own account. Coffee exports
are auctioned by ilte government-owned Coffee Marketing Board. Since fiscal 1992, all coffee has been subject to intemnational auction by the marketing board. Until 199] the arrangement to secure financing for o'
0 Minporc
required tie directLsale of 40 percentof the exportcrop to predetermined
foreign buyers.
Price liberalization in the agricultural sector has been mixed. Accompanying the liberalization of the grain trade was a ciange in official pricing
policy. When limited competitdon in foodgraiin marketing was allowed in 1987,official prices became tle minimum prices to be paid to producers by the
cooperatives, and the official consumer price was eliminated. In fiscal 1991,
the minimum producer price system was replacedwith a system ofindicative
prices that guided. fiarners in negotiating sales. Actual foodgr ain prices paid
to farmers are now determnined by market conditions.
Export
crop pricing has been liberalized more slowly. Untiljustrecently,
the govermmentsetproducerplices without due regard forinternational price
trends, and kept producer prices Iow relatve to export plices, given the inefficiencies in the marketing system, thus creating a heavy implicit tax on
traditdonalagricultural exports. Since the economic recoveryprogram, producerprices have been keptbelow 60 percent of export prices, which is lower
than during the crisis period of 1981 to 1985, as well as below the average
from 1970 to 1980 (table 8,A).' 8
Until 1991 the government flxedproducer prices for export crops; thereafter, the govemmentswitched to asystem ofindicative prices-again, serving
merely as a guideline for negotiating prices with farmers. However, in n _V.V
cases these indicative prices were actually fixed prices to be paiu to farrners.
Even when theywere indicative, they often-bore little relationship to internationalprices. For example, theindicative price forcotton in February 1992 far
exceeded the world price under the prevailing exchange rate. Recognizing
that this policy was unsustainable, the government subsequently announced
a much lower price to be given to farmers ss al fist payment, with a second
payment to be made after farmers realized export proceeds."3 Previous pricing policies, exchange rate overvaluation, and little or no foreign exchanige
retention for traditional exports taxed traditional agriculture heavily. The
consequentfinancial losses of the cooperative unions-as the commercial banlks
-werebeing restructuredimposed majorfiscallomsses on the central bank,which
could not collect the funds ithad advanced for agriculture and had to provision againstlosses in the commercial banks' loan portfolios.
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Recognizing thc high cost or previous appr oacihes to pricing policy, tlc
government has bcguin to allow more flexible pricing in sonie cases. For
example, in coffee, the government has ceaLsed to announce the advance
payment to be made by the cooperative unions to farnners. Each union can
now decide how munch advance and total paymentS should be niade to faml.
ers. A recentreview of these advance payments shows a range of prices. Change
in the pricing policy was inevitable, becaus-.e government-annotunced advan ced payments to farmners were too hiighl in relation to the world price and
to existing marketing margins, causing serious financial difficulties for many
cooperative uit.ons.
In the industrial sector, the governiment has undertaken a major program to deregulate prices and markets. The structural adjustment program
had reduced price controls to only fifty locally manufactured product groups
and six imported product categoiies by fiscal 1984, and the economic recovery program accelerated this program of price decontrol. By fiscal 1989 pricecontrolled items constituted less than 15 percent of lie consurner price index weights, and many of die controlled prices were set according- to
international prices. Moreover, die large inflow of omn-funded imports increased pressure on domestic prices to reflect intemational prices. Consequendy, die government has nearly abolished all price controls.
Today only three prices are subject to price control: sugar; fertilizer, and
petroleum products. In 1989 the government embarkled on a program to
reduce the subsidy for-fertilizer progressi;vely ovrer flveyeats to not more than
20 percent-to improve input efFciency and encou-age the development of
alternative dis-tibution channei Today he subsidystands-atO4 percent, down
from 80 percentin fiscal 1991. For petroleum, domestic prices are adjusted
to reflect movements in international prices and currency fluctuations. Currently, domestic prices cover the cost ofimporms and distribution. For sugar.
pnces are contrlled in die absence of international standards, but the government only regulates sales of domestically produced sugar to die Sugar
Development Corporation-aparastatal that then sells locallyproduced sugar
and sugar imported by the govemment to local state-run distributors, which
in turn sell to consumers at artificially low prices.2 0 However, because more
than 50 percent of market demand is supplied by sugar that is imported
privately tlrough the own-funds.scheme or is produced domesticallyand sold
to the Sugar Development Corporation at free market rates rather tlan at
the controlled price, retailprices forsugarale marketdetermined, effectively
subsidizing traderswho buyatwholesale prices. For the 1991-92 budget, the
government announced its intention to decontrol the sugar price, but was
forced to rescind dhat policy because of opposition in parlianment
Along Nwitl liberalizing imports and prices, the govemm ent deregulated
dome.tic trade and the mark-eting of all imported and domestically produced
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indtlStrial goosls. In the early 9SOs, tIlhe wholesale triact: of more Ilian filt)y
goods w-as restricited to partstatal companies. By '1991 only sixteen goods
remained legally confined1n state ntraling comlpyanies. 1-lowever, in prtactice,
no goods are confiner I Itite state irading comrpanies lbecatise they cannot
meet tlhe deimandl, ;inrl legal restrictions are not enforced.
-In simniiurn1v, Plrice and marketing liher-aliztauion has procceededI Iuitch

nmorv slowly, in agriciiliture tian in industry. In indlistriy lite own-funds win*dow and ihe eniemergence of unofliciul nIarktsLihave in pr.actice ended price
controls and thie government's monopoly on the distribtihon orindiasjiial
pproduicis. In the agricuiltiure sector the transition rron a government-controlled single-channel system has been slow, starting writh the relative mtionopoly in grain malrrketing. Export crop miar-ketingr is more complicated,
since new faitcilities require considerable investment; tre lead time between
crop purchasc and finil receipt of exporL procceds is long and thus reqiriil es
considerable working capital to finance thc coo)perativeCunions or imiarketing boards thalt control processing. Whlile the government acknowledges
tllat die current C-xport market system for agricultture has become increasingly inefficient and chat ii.daLnpens prices, dlela,s payment to prodlucers,
delivers inputs inefficiently, and generates poor quality exports, it probablv
acted prematurely in allowing the cooperatives to become independent
before their-as. ts could lie privatized and thieir large arrears to the coinniercial banks cleared. It may take some tinme before tde entry of new firnms
generates significant competitirn.
Labor antd nT,age polity refornn
Labor and wage policy reform during thie adjusitnientprogrni hias been imnited essenitially to adjutnients in the minimumi wragce and initial efforts to
address civil service overstaffing. The governmnent sets the miinimnum wage
for,wage employmeint. By 1986 the minimtun wage was worth less tdana third
oHits level in 1970. In addlition to,wages. civil servanLs also receive monetaiy
allowa,nces of more than 50 percent of vwge remuneration. It has been estimated that the aven-ge civil servant's package of wages and monetary allowanres covers only about 40 percent of the expenses of a typical househo!d. 2 '
Tlle economic recovery program made sorme adjustments in die minimum
w-age, but they wvere substantially below rises in the cost of living. The entire
structure ofwages for civil servants is fixed unilaterlly bygovernment.Y The
govermnent also controls the wages of parastatal employees, althouglh the
electric poweer authority recently introduced a performance-based pay
scheme: with the recent elimination of goverrinent controls on compensation as part of the parastartal reform program, olier profitable parastatals
are proposing to increase wages substantially. Civil service salaries arec now
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suLtan dially belwcI

thlose in boah t(lie parasItattal sector and thc private sectLo r.
In thc public sector, real wages cleclined ais ihe
lgovernment attefhlpted to
maintain hiighi employllent levels in the fIce ofa shrlinking fiscal base. These

wage policies have encouraged public sector workers to seek outsidc sources

ofincomi

e, prompted gove nm ient. tnr-mnagcrs to toler-ate below-aver-age ef'forts

by employces, and led to ceterioa.ting service levels in tLhe public sector.
Witli eCeconomic recoveryp-ogr-ai, the donorconiiiiuniLylias focised

heavily on tde overstarffing and poor performance of the civil service. In 1985
the governmen t retrenched 12,760 employees, or about 5 percent of total
employmnent in the ci%il scerice. Nevertheless, because of inadequate controls on liiringand the government's policy ofrabsorbingrgraduates froti van- owis training institutions auttnnatically into tde civil service, about 14,000
employeeswere hlired, including manywhn lhad previously been laid of. The
civil sersvice continues to be significantly overstaffed

;

Low salaries and poor personnel management
two of die
Irekey reasons
forthe poorperfonnance ofthe dvil service. In slarp contra^estwihdlie early
1970s--len public sector worklers earned much more than employees in
tie private sector-many street-trading andinformal-sector activities now generate average earnings above those in many parts of the civil seivice, and salaries in the private sector are substantially highier. Thus the public sector has
steadily lostsome ofits mnost qualified people, withi civil service management
and perfornance stand-ards dedining significantly. Civil servants' performance is not evaluated regularly, and a system for dismissing poor perfomiers or rewarding good ones is absent Training and career development opportunities in the civil service remain extremclvlimited. All these Factors have
lowvered morale in the civil service and have adversely affected implementation capacity throughioutgovernient, particularly the pace of refonn in tdle
social sector,s.

Previous reform efforts were half-hearted. Donors have pressured die
government into putting together a comprehensive strategy for civil servicereform in which an estimated 50,000 excess workers from the civil service
will be retrencled (from more than 350,000 in 1991). tie mandatoryretirementage or55 will be enforced. personnel controLs and personnel management systems will be improved, pay scales will be refornied, and the civil service will be made more efficient, including a clearly defined, imluch less
ambitiousroleforgovernment Much oftherequired technical work has been
done, supported by donorassistance. In fact, the mandatoryretirementage
is already being enforced, and almost 3,000 civil servants have been retrenched. Despite the Fact tlat retrenchment is only thie first phase of the
reform program, the other large demands on die budget, inclulding tde costs
of financial sector and parastatal refon-n, are already constraining tlhese reform eff-orts. Budgetary constraints may also delay paymentrerfonn, which is
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an important complement to dle other reform measures needed to improve
tde effectiveness of government.
Public erntepriserefonn
Tanzania has developed a very large parastatal sector. In 1966 there were
about 43 parastatals, primaily in the electricity and mining sectors. By 1988
there vere 410 parastals as a result of the nationalizations of the late 1960s
and. early 1970s and the basic industrial strategy which established many
industrialparastatals.Today the governmenthas a controlling interest (typically 100 percent) in some 344 commercial parastatals, distributed across all
sectors of the economy.
-Abvout275 oftheseare commercialparastatals thatplayadominant, often
monopolistic, role in many key sectors. Manufacturing parasvatals account
for about 60 percent of total value added in the sector and they have monopolies in several majorsegmnents of the industrial sector-beer, cigarettes,
steel, and electric cables. The same is true in the services sector, including
the banking industry and the hotel sector, where the state enjoys a dominant
position. (Although significant new investment is now being made by the
private sector.) Today, the parastatal sector accounts for an estimated 25
percent of total wage employment and about 20 percent of GDP.
The financial performance of the parastatals is poor. According to the
TanzaniaAudit Corporation, the government auditorofparastatalaccounts,
netlosses aftertaxes butbeforeinterestpayments for commercialparastatals
was about 8 percent of GDP in fiscal 1989M This was a substantial increase
over the netprofitof 3.6 percent of GDP in fiscal 1984. Many parastatals can
barely cover salaries and are in large arrears-to the commercial banks and
the treasury-on loans they received forworking capital and fixed investment.
Recent studies show that more than 50 percent of parastatals are inviable
and require subsidies to continue operating. In 1991 only 43 out of 220 commercial parastatals surveyed were able to generate adequate revenue to service their debts fully.24 The chronic lossmaklers survive by running accounts
receivables primarily with other parastatals-particularly the utilities. They
also avoid paying the counterpart fund share of the eommodity import supportfunds t.heyreceive, aswellas theirpension fundcontributionsand taxes.
The combined value of these implicit subsidies to commercial parastatals
equalled about 5 percent of GDP in 1991.
For the past ten years, the government has periodically expressed concem about the poor performance of the parastatal sector. In 1983 a government commission identified gross inefficiencies in the sector, yet little action was taken to implement the recommended remedies. In 1987 another
high-level commission reported on the persistentlypoor performance of the
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parastatal sector and the need for refonn. Howecier, with the exception of a
substantial reduction in direct trewsury subsidies, little was done. In dte past
year, the financial sector reform has hardened the budget, constraint for

parastatals. The commercial banks have considerably tighLened their lending to parastatals. Additionally, in 1992, 104 loan accounts of nonviable
parastatals (including 27 accounts of commercal parastals) were transferred
to the loans and advances realization trust for recovery through liquidation.
From 1986 to 1992, about 20 parastatal divestitures took place, largely in agriculture and primarily on an ad hoc basis. About 25 additional privatization
deals have been in valious stages'of protracted negotiations due to the absence of consensus on privatization, an institutional fiamLework for privatization, and policy guidelines on handling such difficult technical issues
as valuation and parastatal debts.25
In 1992 the government announced a threefold plan: public service
organizations that had previously been classified as parastatals would be
declassified and incorporated into governmentdepartments; publicutilities
would remain as parastatals, butwould be subject to performance contracts,
and the entry of new service providers would be permitted in selected areas;
and aoll commercial parastatals would be eligible for divestment, at least in
principle. The Presidential Parastatal Sector Reform Commission was created to oversee the poliCv. Action on public service organizations has begun.
Under the public utility reform, performance contracts for the Tanzania
Railways Corporation and the Tanzania Posts and Telecommunications
Corporation have recently been prepared. Privatization of commercial
parastatals has accelerated, as the commission has begun to ex-pedite final
decisions and push ongoing negotiations forward. In addition, many
parastatal managers have begun to seil assets and find wvays to cut costs as
they face hardened budget constraints. Yet parastatal managers are still uncertain about what the new, rules of the game mean for them. Given the
centralized approach to parastaa reform, and the fact that itwvill.take some
time for the commission to builditsinternal capacityandimplementitsnaster
plan for privatization, there is the risk that parastatal managers and employeeswfll quietly engage in asset stripping-de fcto pnvatization-rather than
actively explore restructuring options from the shop floor.
Despite the obvious and serious nature of the problems of the pamstatal sector, it took at least ten years before a consensus and an action plan
for meaningful reform emerged. The reform progiam is too new to evaluate. However, several factors may impede the pace of pdvatization: the government is still reluctant to sell the few profitable parastatals, and in the absence of a social safety net for workers who would be released, the
government is reluctant to undertake the more extensive liquidations that.
may be inevitable.
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Social secturpolicies
In the years after Independence, Tanzania malde several impressive achievemnenLs in the social sectors. By the end-of the 1970s, Tanzania's basic needs
strategy had achieved mnany of its nmajor goals, and most social indicators
shoved improveement (table 8.4). These achievemenL- have also helped
build a level of national unity that is rare in Africa. HIowever, this massive
expansion in the social sectors has proved to be financially and administr-A
tively unsustainable. Even when quantitative targets were being met, quaitative weaknesses and imbalances emerged. For example, though many children in ulral areas were in sclhool, the standard of instruction was very low
because teacher training was poor and teaching materials were scarce. And
although Tanzania had developed an extensive netwvork of health care facilities, the quality of health care detenrorated because of chronic
underftinding, poorly trained and unmotivated health workers, supply shortages, and overcrowvded facilities.
Table 8.4 Selected social sector indicators: Tarzania and other lowincome countries, 196S, 1980, and 1987
kidicator

Dab caloric
supply
Primary
education
enrollment
(n percent)'
Secondary

1965

Tanzare
1980

1987

China andIndia
1965 1980 1987

Other bw-income counies
1965
1980 1987

1,832

2.051

2.192

2.001

32

104

66

83

100

117

49

70

76

2

4

4

25

32

41

9

19

26

43

52

53

51

63

44

50

54

138

101

104

114

-

149

..

98

2.100

2i980

8,130c t.,420 3,322 .1.710'

10,170

8.953

3250'

26,200 2.930 2.626

28.080

15.486 13.910

2.270 2.463'

1,976

2.050 2226'

education

enrollment
(inpercent)
Life expectancy

-

at birth
Infat mortality
rate (per
thousand
Iive births)
Popuba3n per

nurse
Popultion per
pysician

21.700 17.560

92

1.640

lt*t Accordig tt World Developrnent Report dcl-sicatdor, low-income countries comprise a tolai of4B
countries with an incore od$545 or less in 1988.
Not availaWe.
a.For 1986.
b.As a percentage of popuhtion inits age group. The total ferliti rate represents the number of chidren who
would be bom to a womran ifshewere to live to th! end oCher childbearing years.
c.For 1984.
Sorce: WorFd Bank data.
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In 1983 distict and liran councils were reestal)lishied in order to increase
conimnunity participation in service provision and reduce budgentay cosrs.
Thegovernment-also beLan to introduce very lowuserciharges forsonie social
senrices, despite the fact diat collections fall far slor-t of any sceious cost recovery. Sonic encouragementhasalso been given to nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) to support the social sectors. For examnple, 220 oartle 334
secondary schools are -now run by NGOs. 6 NGO involvement in the lhealth
sector is also expanding. With donor assistance, several special programs in
the social sectorswere introduced in the carly 1980s, including the essentialdrugs program and tde expanded program of immunization..
Writh the initiation of the cconomic and social action program in 1989,
the governmentacknowledged that the economic recovery program had to
incorporate social concerns, given the severe deterioration of the social sector. Some of the economic recovery program measures included efforts to
improve budget2ry expenditures for the social sectors- After allowing a precipitous decline in social services spending during the -secondhalfofthe 197 0s
and the early 1980s, the governmentwas able to stabilize and, more recently,
slighdyincrease real per capita expenditures on social services, altlouglh they
remain woefully inadequate.. In fiscal 1992 the government also adopted a
population planning policy including fmily planning and materal and child
health services. It also recendy approved a new primarv health care strategy
to improve the framewrork for senrice deliVery, as well as a master plan for
drug procurement, and implementation guidelines for improved district
health planning. These policies, though approved, have notyet been implemented. Moreover, low economic growth per capita has generated only ;imited employment and labor mobility. And Tanzania's social sectors are commig under even greater pressure due to the rise in incidence of AIDS and
other infectious dseases. Action is clearlynecessary but the responsible line
ministries are weak, and clear strategies for addressing the problems of the
social sectors have not been developed.
Outcomes of the adjustment program
Macroeconomic data for Tanzania are poor. More reliable and consistent
data series must be developed to give policymakers and analysts a better
understanding of economic developments in Tanzania. Nevertheless, the
available data confirm that the economic recovery program has made progress
in addressing many of the severe distortions that prevailed in the prerefornm
period. Exchange rate overvaluation has been reduced sharply, and the exchange rare is becoming more marketdeternined. The centl governienes
fiscal deficithas declined, and is now financedwithoutrecourse to local bank
financing (although it still relies heavily on foreign aid). The inflation rate-

Published by iRepository, 2021

https://ir.iba.edu.pk/faculty-research-books/13

384

ADJUSFMENr IN AFICA LESSONS FROM COUNTRYCASE S1UDIES

has declined from an average of 30 percent prior to the economic recovery
program to 20 percent, but because credit is not controlled, interest rates
have become positive, and the banking system is being restructured. Further
progress is difficult. The current account deficit has widened because imports have been liberalized, but the deficit has been financed fully by foreign
aid for the economic recovery program.
Progre.ss is also evident, tough mixed, forseveral keyindicators. On the
positive side, real GDP growth has averaged 4 percent after.years of stagnation and now exceeds the rate of population growth. Per capita consumpdionhas increased, andinvestmentlevels have recovered.Aftermalkingsome
adjustments, savings performance also appeas to have improved. While the
importshare ofGDP has increased, growth in importvolume has been relatively limited.:
Progress in several areas has been insufficient. Inflation is still unacceptably high. And while the level of investment has recovered and is now relatively high, it has yet to yield higher growth, due in part to investment inefficiency; Foreign aid mustalso be usedmore efficiendy.Though exmports grew
significantly in real terms in the first few years of the economic recovery
program-particularly the export of nontraditionalYproducts-they have
stagnated in the past twro years. Adjusted domestic savings have improved,
but they are far from adequate to support sus mined, rapid growth in Tanzania Savings must be increased by forcing public enterprises to stem their
losses, by reducing taxation on financial savings, by reforming the tax system, and by discouraging private consumption of luxuries.
Macroeconomicstability continuesto be elusive Evenifthe currentpolicy
frameworkl permits a sustainable growth rate of 4 percent per year, itwould
not allow Tanzania to reach the much higher levels of growth necessary to
reduce poverty. The next stage of refonns identified in the government's
policy fiamework paper must be decisive. The major priorites have been
identified:
* Uniting the exchange rate and tariffs, bringingunofficial exportsinto
official channels, and aggressively promoting exports.
* Getting credit growth under control.
* Implementing an action program to reduce the economic burden of
the parastatal sector.
* Completing che program to reformL the banking system, and thus restorng confidence in the system to help attract unrecorded private
savings and allocate and mobilize financial resources efficiently.
IImproving the mobilization of domestic resources for budgetary purposes.
These actions will facilitate the macroeconomic adjustments required to
sustain rapid growth.
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So fi., commitment to refonnl of the financial sector has been strong.
After tie commission's report was approved -by lthe president, tlhe government moved very quickly with initial implementation ofcompreliensive b.anking refonn program. lIowever, there are rour major issues that will have to

be addressed ir the reforms are to succeed.
First, thc proposals tllaL have been developed with hel help of consultants for restructuring the Cooperativie and Rural Development Bank and
the Tanzania Investmnent Bank did not go rar enough to ensure tIlaL those
institutions will. become comnpetitive. There is a risk tha.t the govermiient
may recapitaliz-e these institutions without adequ-ate assurances diaL dhie

kind of radical re%structuring required in those institutions will takeI place.
Privatization of the institutions will be an essential condition for turming
those institutions-around. Should it become impossible to find competent
private partners who can participate and help guide the turnaround, liquidation of the institutions may be preferable to putting in more govermuent

funds.
Second, the capacity to implement financial sector reform also needs to
be strengtened. In the Bank of Tanzania, banking supervision is still weak
and must be upgraded. There also are concems about the institutional capa.city Nwithin the treasury to implement its responsibilities in the reform
program, particularly the reform and restricturing of government banks.
Treasuryhas to ensure that the bail out of tde banks is accompanied by-a real
turnaround in their perfonnance.
The third major challenge is to restructure the clients of the banking
system. This will be essential to the growth of good banking clients in the
fiture. OthenrLse, pressures for directed credit will build again. The success
achieved in the liberalization of foodgrain marketing made it possible to
stem the excessive borrowing of die National Milling Corporation. How--

ever, the liberalization of agricultural ep ort marketing--including restructuring of the cooperative unions and primary societies-s needed to guarantee the success of financial sector reform- Similarly, while the banks have
begun to get much touglher on commercial parastatals and starve them of.
credit (a welcome change in bank behavior), this is not sustainable or desirable. A more explicit restructuring and liquidation of parastatals is re-

quired. As discussed below, programs to address these issues are just being
developed. and implementation will not be easy because of the vely organized and influential vet.-ed interests involved. Ideally, these real-side. refonns should have preceded, or at least more quickly accompanied, financial sector reform.
Finally, the commission recommendation that the National Bank of
Commerce be split to injecthealthy competition into the banking system must
be revisited.
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Internediatereszl.i APunong the mnost iniportant indicators of die chiange
in die government's inacroeconoomic policy slance diniing die economilic
recovery programn is thc real exchange rate, w*hichi hIaLS depreciated significantly (see table 8.1). Prior to tie economic recovery program, the audiorities were reluctant to move die exchange rate. Leftalone, itincreased byniore
than 100 percent between 1981 and 1985. Ais noted earlier, exchiange rate
refoirml has been dhe cornerstone ortdie economic riecovery progiramAiio re
active exchange rate policy reduced the real exchange rate by about 90 per-_
cent between 1986 and 1989, and stating in 1990 tie authiotrities adopted a
policy of inainmining a constant real exciange rtte.2 '

Box 8.2 Inflation
Official measures of inflation show that consumer price inflation has come dow-n
from wore than 30 percent in the immediate economic recovery program period
teabout20 percentsince 1990. Since then,ithasstayedatthatlevel. However, the
official statistics probably do not accurately reflect zctual inflation becauLse the
consumer price index is seriously out of date. It is based on expenditure weights
J
hotLuchold budgetst.-rey the population weightsare
obtained from thc 1976/7
based on the 1978 census; aznd the quality of theprice information collected for
the consumer price index survey has declined considerably as resources for the
collection of statistics decreased. Consequently, the official inflation stat, -tics may
understate the actual rate ofinflation, given the rapid increasc in mone creation.
During the economic recovery program the proximate cause of inflation
shifted from financing of thcgovemmentdcficitbyt hebanking.system tofin-ancing
of parastatals and the incfficient agricultural marketing system. Following recent
actions to strictlylimit commercial bank access tocentral bank credit and to grant
greatcr autonomy to the commercial banks, there is some evidence that the

commercial bankshave tightened up theirlending to cooperatives anrd parasta tals.
However, inefficiencies in agricultural marketing may lead to fi irtherfinancial losses
for the cooperatives and affect their ability to filly repay the reduced credits that
wcreextended to them thisyear. Moreover, in fiscal 1993 thegovemnientresorted
to bankl borrowing to finance the fiscal. deficit, due to a shorfaIl in expected
revenues. Central bank losses have also led to an expansion in the money s.upply.
To reduce inflation, financial sector reforms must bc complemented by

measures to address the underlying causes of inflation: rapid opening of the
marketing of all agricultlural exporLs to the privite sector, pnrdent frscal policies
and the elimination of central bank losses due to gold purchases, and debt
conversion. Otherwise, persistently high lerels of inflation will continue to fccd
expectations of exchangc ratc clepreciation and lead to continued ecotnomic
uncertainty in the private sector.
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Thle fiscal situattion in Tannrnia laLs zalso imn1proved datiing thLe Ieloim yeIas
(see tal)le 8.1)2 rlhe cent nil government buidget deficit as a percentage of
G) Pdeclinet fromt an a-vweiage orf 2.1 percent in die prerefomni periol to 7
percent etrween 1986 aind 1991, compared with 4.1 percent in Ugand;a and
4.5 percenLin Senegal-ato otierAftican nations ander-going aidjusunentn'
By fiscal 1991, the deficit hatd filen to 3.1 percenL ofrDlI. WhNile Tanzania's
deficit waL,s a bit highier thin Uganda's and Senegal's, the initial siwLation in
Tanzania was ssubstantiaillv orse and required greate adjtistmenL In aJddition toredu.cingtdie size ofrthe deficit, tlegovrcmientrelied farlesson bank
borrowing to finmnce the deficiL
The inflation rate had declined somewhat during tlic economic recovenr programn-from 31 percent in 1981-85 to 25.7 percent in 1986-91 (see
table 8.1). By tie end of fiscal 1992, Ltie rate ofconsunier price inflation had
Fallen to 19 percent.l-owrever, as wihd imiany odlier counties in Afric-aundergoing adjustmennt. Tanzania has had limited successin redudng the rate of
inflation from double-digit levels. This has been due to the inability of the
government to enfbrce strict monetary control (box 832).
The decline in die rate of inflation duting the economic recovery program has also affected real interest rates-but not the demand for crediL
Interest rates rose significan tly during the recovery progrm, despite the fact
that die government did not adjust nominal interest rates significantly between 1988 and 1991. Beginning in fiscal 1989, all deposiLand interestrates
became positive in real terms. However the high real-interest rates did not
significantly reduce the demand for credit because most bank creditwent to
marketing institutions, despite their poor creditworthiness. The extension
of this credit has also limited credit availability to the private sector. Interest
rate reform has had only a limited effect on mobilizing fresh deposits into
the banking system, given die lack of confidence in die still inefficient banking system and the availability of better hedges against inflation, including
real estate and, until recently, foreign exchange (Lipumba and Osoro 1991).
Prior to tle economic recoverr rrogram, Tanzania's current account
deficiLtwas large and-as with. many other countries undergoing adjustment
programs tlat have received balance ofpayment assistance from donors-it
widened during the economic recovery program (see table 8.1).
Longer-tern reslts.The full impact of tie programnmust bejudged by its
impact on CDP growth, investinent, saiPngs, imports, and exports. GDP
growth-in Tanzania has increased substantially duting the reform program.
Offical. statisics indicate tiatCDP grew from 0.01 percent annually in 198185 to 4 percent during the reform periodY The protracted decline in per
capitaincome from die inid-1970s to 1984was stemmed during dte economic
recovery program. As discussed in detail later, the agricultural sector has
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led the economic recovery, suipported by die industrial sector. nTe struc-

ttLre of Tanzania's final demand also has changed significantly. The slare of
consumption has increased substantially, with per capita consumption al*mostcatching tup to thie level that.was lost during the prolonged period of
economic stagnation. The offical figures show that the share of consumiption is vcry large, and that die share of savings is correspondingly low (table

-

8.5). Since consumlption is measured uas a residual in the national accounts,
iL also includes some private transfers-for example, illegal exports whicl
are esti;mated to be even larger than official exporL. ThIus, thie official fig-

ures for consuinpion oVlestate die increase in actual consumption and understate savings.
Investment-has risen substantially diring tie economic recovery proramn,
averaging nearly 28 percent of GDP. The share of investinent in GDP is very
higl in comparison with the GDP of other countries. But the efficiency of
investment is very low. One measure of that efficiency-an approximation
of the gross rate of return on investment-show.s that although iLimproved
during die economic recovery program, it is still abysmally low (figure 8.5).
It is considerably lower than that of many other countlies undergoing adjustment. Incremental capital-output ratios for Tanzania are aLso very high,
because die productivity of public investment is constrained by project delays and poor product design, and because of inefficient investment by die
parastatals in particular, where reforn has onlyjust begun. In addition, real
spending on machinery and equipment accounts for less than 20 percent of
total investmente
Private investment has risen substantially. By 1991 it had reached 26
percentofGDP, comparedwith only9 percentin 1984 (table8.5).The large
increase in private investmentis remark-able, since the commercial banks have
been forced to accommodate the credit demands of the public sector marketng boards,.uncreditworthy cooperative unionsand parastatals, and until
Table 8.5 Structure of aggregate demand, selected years
(hres of GDP)
Item

1976

Consurnmpon
Government
Private
Investment

79
16
63
23

Goveminent

l984

93
16
77
1 '

13

6

Private
Exports

10
22

9
7

Irnparts
National savings

24
21

-1
7

Foreign savings

2

8

SurwcTanzania (1992b).
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*

89
13
76
38
12
26
17
46
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Figure 8.5 GDP growth as a percentage of GDVGDP, 1981-90
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Source: World Bank data.

recently, the central government's borrowing requirements. Loans from the
banking system to the private sectoraveragedless than 2 percent ofGDP, thus
contributinglittle to thesignificantincreasein private investment. Conversely,
recorded private savings were only about 14 percent of GDP in 1992. Obviously a large unofficial financial market is financing the private sector.
National accounts data suggest that much of investment is financed by
foreign savings (table 8.5). Official stadstics indicate that the domesic saw
Thislow rate reflects significant dissavings in
ings rate is now extremely low.
the consolidated public sector, as well as low (and in some years negate)
official private savings. However, asjust noted, substantial sources of domestic savings are clearly not being captured in the offical statistics. While
Tanzania's savings rate was among the highest during the crisis years, it is
now one of the lowest.
Table 8.1 also showVs a second set of savings rates for Tanzania-calculated as domestic savings that include an estimate of unofficial exports (pri
vate transfers from abroad which help finance own-funds imports). While
the unadjustedfiguressuggest thatforeign aidhas almostentirelysubstituted
for domestic savings during the adjustment program, the adjusted savings
rate showrs that domestic savings have in fact increased from the prereform
period and continue to compare favorably with rates in the other countries
in the sample.
The ratio of imports to GDP increased substantially during the economic
recovery program (figure 8.6). The ratio for Tanzania is also very high in
comparison with the ratio ofother countries thathave generated higherrates
of growth. The Tanzania ratio is nearly three times that of Uganda, which
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hlaLS register-ed GDI' growtlh rltesCS t.h1at arC more than 50 percent higlier, and
is also suibstantially lhigh1e- thlan Chana's. Aniong the otlher Afiican adjusters, only Senegal. wlhichi receives even inore aid on a per capita basis, has a
comparable imilpoIrt to GDPiratio, and-its GDP growLIt rate is lower thlatn
Tanzaniat's. HIowever, while thie ratio ofimporLl to CDP is high, die: level of
Tanzania's imports in real sernus hals not increased substantially since the
ma.jor increase in fiscal 1985 firom ditle introduiction of tde own-funds import.
windowv: since Fiscal 1985. it has incrca!sed only by 2 percent and is still far
belowv its fiscal 1981 level.of 21 percenL
Exports have begun to recover (figure 8.7). From 1986 to 1990 tie ratio
of official exports to GDP averaged about 14 percent, up fronm an average of
only 9 percent from 1981 to 1985. It should be noted that these figures do
notinclude exports that do not pass throtuglh the banking system. Unofficial
exports, including gold, gemistones.,and agricultur al goods thatare smuggled
out of the country arc generally estimated to substantially exceed oflicalexports, altlough fin-n estimates of tlheir magnitude are unavailable. They
remain outside the bank-ing system because of persistent exchange rate devaluations. dlie igh administrative cost of exporting legally due to export
licensing and other bureaucratic requirements, price controLs, and in some
cases export bans in TanzaniaL While export prices increased slightly (2 percent), the volume of official exports in 1991 wvas 22 percent higher than in
1986. The recovery of exporus began during theinitialyears of the economic
recoveryprogram, due to asignificantincrease in nontraditional agricultur al
and manLufactured products. As discussed later, dhe exports of these prod-

Figure 3.6 Ratio of imports to GDP, and growth in GDP, 1985-90
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Figure 8.7 Ratio of exports to GDP, 1981-85 and 1986-90
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ucts nearly doubled, increasing from $86mrnillion in 1986 to $154 million in
1991. Howvever, in real tenns, total official exportshave stagnated since 1990,
and Tanzania's capacity to importbased on official export earnings has fallen
because exports have not increased enough to offset the substantial decline
in Tanzania's terms of trade.
Dependenceonforeignaid.Tanzania has long received a substantial amount
of foreign aid. During the economic recovery program, Tanzania received
nearly S6:billion of net foreign assistance in support of its adjutstment program.5 ' In nominal terms, this figure represents an increase of nearly 60
percent over net official development assistance received during the crisis
years. However, the real contribution of official development assistance to
growth is bestunderstood-when itisadjusted bychangesin the termsof trade,
thus capturing the net free foreign exchange made available by donors to
finance imports.5 ' NWhen official development assistance is adjusted as such,
average net real assistance to Tanzania during dle economic recovery prograin was only 9 percent above the average net transfers to Tanzaniak during
the crisisyears. Infict netreal official developmentacsistance per capita fell
during the econonmic recovery program.
While external assistance has been critical to supporting the economic
recovery program, particularly the balance of payment support tlhat donors
made available to Tanzania for liberalizing trade and financing the government budget, both donors and the government have expressed a desire to
improve the effectiveness of aid. For balance of payments support, which
accounted for about 1half of total foreign financing during the first years
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of tde economnic recovery program, conccm has been expressed about the
inadequacy of mechianisms for collecting counterpart funds generated by
that support. To the extent that Cull cashl cover hias not been collected, foreign exchange thlrougl balance of payments support has not been used
efficiently by importers.33 The effectivencss of project aid, wliich accounted
for more than 45 percent of total foreign financing during the economic.
recovery prog;ram, has been limited by delays in project. implementation
and inadequate counterpart funding. Projccts often tend to be donor
driven, inconsistentwith govemnient priorities, and a strain on limited government administrative capacities. Projects also have been affected adversely by the lack of a supporting policy framework within which to operate. Much of official development assistance also tikes the form of
technical assistance, the impact of which is difficult to assess.34 However,
it is generally acknowledged that teclnical assistance has often been misdirected and occasionally wasted, has not supported the development of
the government's own intemal capacity, and has not always been available
or timely enough to meet, the government's need for detailed technical
advice to implement polices.
There has also been some concern that external aid gives the government too much scope for delaying difficultbutimportantreforn. Nevertheless, donors have withheld or delayed financing on several occasions due to
the lack of progress on the policy front For example, the consultative group
meeting of 1989 was delayed substantially because the govemment failed to
adopt a more realistic exchange rate. The second tranches of each of the
World Bank's .sector adjustment credits were withheld because polic' conditions had not been met. In 1992 donorswithheld funding for the open general license pending improvements in find accountability, particularly the
paymentofcounterpartfunds from the commercialbanks to the central bank
(box 8.1). There has also been some concem that Tanzania's extreme dependence on aid could undermine the country's economic agenda-and selfreliance. Two major concerns: donors finance projects thhatare inconsistent
with government priorities, and the government looks to donors to solve
problems it must ace on its own.
Sectoral refomi
Irtdust?ialsector. After a rapid deindustrialization in the early 1980s due
to severe import compression, inappropriate economic policies, and pro
tracted economic dedine, a process of industrial recovery has begun. Manu6actured exports have increased and become a major feature of industrial
sectoradjustment. The policy environment has also encouraged the entryof
industrial finms and the expansion of efficient firms and has discouraged
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incilcient producers. In response to the improved incentive fraimework for
indust-y, investment in indistrial sec.o i-activities i-.asrisen significantdy since

tdie strtofdhe cconomnicirecoveryprogr-m. Yetdecisive action intist.lie taken
on several fironts Lo enable the induistrial sector to realize its full potentialreversing the poor performance of the parastatal enter-prises (whicht incluides
pprivatizing prorftable companies and liquidating clironic lossm akers), promoting the developmnent of the-private sector (including both indigenouis
entrepreneurs and Asian businesses), promoting indusatial exports, and
reducing unfair competition from imports due to tax eva-sion.

In die immediate prereforni-period, the mnanu facturingsector lad nearly
collap.sed-tlis afteranmajor import-sulbstitution drive led bystate investment
in the parastatal sector lhad genetated significant growth in die 1970s. Betveen 1979 and 1986, manufacturingGDP fell in real tenus eachiyearexcept
for 1984. By 1986 manufacturing GDP was only 30 percent of its 1979 level.
While other sectors also contracted, tle decline in the industrial sector ..ws
even more pronounced by 1986, when die contribution of cne manufacturing sector to GDP fell below 8 percent, comparedwithi 1£ percentin die mid1970s. Capacity utilization, wlhich had tiVsen to 75 percent by 1975, fell drasdtcally to only.25 percent by 1985.
Manufacturing GDP has begun to recover from the collapse of die early
1980s. Manufacturing GDP has risen significandy (23 percent from 1986 to
1991), although it has notfully recovered from the collapse of the ear ly 1980s
(figure 8.). Widi die exceptions of the initialyearof the economic recovery
programn and 1990, growth in real manufacturing hsL been positive each year,
and real manufacturing output often grew faster than total GDP. Ho %.ever,
Figure 8.8 Annual growth of GDP and real rnanufacturing GDP, 1983-91
Percent
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from 1986 to 1991, manufacturing GDP grew byjust more than 4 percent
annually, on par with the growtlh of total GDP. Consequently, according- to
national accounts data, manufacturing GDP continues to account only for
about 8 percent of total CDP.SNevertheless, industrial sector recovery and adjustment began in earnest
during the economic recovery program. For example, capacity utilization.
has improved. By 1991 virtually all or the key industries covered in official
industrial statistics had increased their capacity utilization to more than 50
percent, compared with only 25 percent in 1985. Sudc key industies as textiles, cemeni, and tires have increased their capaciy utilization to more than
70 percent) 6
There also is evidence that the efficiency of the industrial sector has
improved. AWorld Bankl review of the industrial sectorin Tanzania provideda benchmark assessment of the level of competitive efficiency-in the sector:
in 1985. It estimated that 37 percent:of die 118 industral activities surveyed
generated negative-value addedatworld marketprices. These inefficientfirms
survived-and in many cases even expanded their activities-because of
protection from competitive imports, price controls, and preferential and
subsidized access to credit and foreign exchange. Firms with short-run domestic resource costs of greater than one (65 percent of the surveyed firms)
produced more than half of gross output and used 74 percent of the total
foreign exchange thatwas allocated to the surveyed fimis.
A followup survey of the same firms in 1990 showed that firms- that bad
been operating relatively efficdently in 1984 increased output by 28 percent
from 1985 to 1990. Conversely, the production of-inefficient firms contracted by 22 percent over the period. The production of'the most inefficient finns-those with negative value added irn 1984-contracted by 28
percent (table 8.6). The more efficient firms also tended to be -more efficient users of foreign exchange, which as noted earlier, is being allocated
Table 8.6 Formal industr: efficiency, production, and foreign exchange
use
(perent)
ForeEn exchrig used
FlRns:eqlcen(1984)

.

Re1ativeIy effidenr (DRC less an 2)
Ineffiient (RC more than 2)
Negative value added

asshorecfprodton

Cumukztive production
tue increase (I985-90)

alue (average 1985-8)

+ 28
-22
-28

22
69
103

DRC-dorestic resource cost
a. Classifation of arrns' efcenry isbased on an anasis of the 1985 survey of 118 activities reporin on their
performance in 1984. A domestic resource cost of ls than 2 was used as relative ekfciency cut-df to aow for a
100 percet margin of error (the choice of a depression yr, infant industry coniderations, and so forth.) fin
'absoklely ineflcienf finm is deried as one that had negative value added in 1984.
Sowcei World Bank dat.
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Table 8.7 Exports, 1984-91
(mihons ofdolg-rs)

Export
Tmditional exports'
Mineras
Petroleum
producs
Manufactured
goods
Other
Nontaditional
exports
Total exports

-

1984

1985

t986

1987

1988

1989

1990

1991

268
34

196
n2

262
13

201
22

224
16

213
20

221
- 32

198
42

23

13

5

7

12

17

.16

7

33
31

33
21

39
29

63
54

73
48

105
60

99
73

63
42

120
388

90
286

86
348

146

149
373

201
415

219

-347

154
352

441

a.Traditional exports indude coffee, cotton. sisJ, tea- tobaco, and cashew nuts.
Source: Bank ofTanzania Opeions Report and Econorric Sufvey (various issus).

on a more market-detenmined basis with die emergence of the open: general license system.
- The exportperfornance of the manufacturing sectorhas aLso improv,ed.
Prior to the economic recovery program, manufactured exports performed
very poorly. In 1984 manufactured exports amounted only to about $33
million, compared w ith total export earnings of $388 million (table 8.7). By
1990 manufactured exports had tripled to $99 million, althoughin 1991 they
fell to S63 million. Nevertheless, the share of manuffactured goods in total
exports in 1991 was 18 percent, compared with 9 percent in 1984. Export
diversification has been a significant feature of Tanzania's economic recow
ery, and manufactured exports have played a major role in this process.:
Ex-xporting has become much more important for manufacturers in the
new economic enxironment From 198I to 1985, the rato of exports to gross
output contracted across all sectors. Since 1986, these ratios have recovered
in nearly all industial subsectors, and manyare now higher ta
ever (table
8.8). The recovey reflects a significartdedine in theantiexportbias ofeconomic policies in Tanzania during the adjustment program, and thus an
improvementin the profitability of exports. Consequentdy, several firms have
based their expansion plans on increasing exportsY Semboja and Ndullu
(1992) show that the recent export drive has been led by manufacturers who
are already well established in the domestic market and whose costs are lowv
by wsorld standards. In addidon, among the sample of finns they surveyed,
output growth has been much faster for exporters than for nonexporters.
The ownership structure of the industrial sector has also changed significantlv. Private industrial finns have expanded, while public sector firmns

have conracted.A 1990World Bank survey showed that more than two-thirds
of private firms increased production. Only half of the public enterprises
managed to do so, and the remainder ex-perienced a decline. Thus, it ap
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pears that die crucial determinants of firms' supply response to policy rcfonn have been economic efficiency, ownerslhip, and export orientaion.
A significant number of new fitms have entered the industrial sector
during tle economic recovery program. Three times as many new small-scale
finrs have been establishedin Dr es Salaam thanwere established throughout the country betveen 1967 and 1985. In mid-1991, die World Bank surveyed 131 industrial finns to ascertain how they have responded to the reforms; the survey revealed the economic significance of the substantial entry
of new firms in industry. More than 80 percent of the firms established after
1986 increased.their production, principally in response to what iey perceived as stronger domestic demand (table 8.9). By comparison, less than
half the finns established before 1980 were able; to increase their production. About 6 percent of firms established after 1986 reduced- their producnon, compared with nearly 40 percent for firms established prior to 1980.
The reason for the difference is that recent entrants tend to be much more
export oriented and more natural resource based. The more established producers contracted production because imports, domestic competition, and
input costs,-including the price oftforeign exchange, rose significantly during the economic recovery program.n
Another important indicator of the future direction of change in the
industrial sector is the investment pattern. Several studies of the growth in
total factor productivity at an aggregate level showed negligible levels-during the late 1970s through the early 1980s (Shaaeldin 1988; Ndullu 1986) . At
that time, levels of capadty utilization were low and fhlling. Tlhe technologiTable 8.8 Export orientation by sector. exports as a percentage of gross
output, 1980 and 1981-90
Sector

1980

1985

1986

1987

4988

1989

1990

Food nanuaturing
Tobacco manufacturing

8.0
51.0

4.0
44.0

4.4
431

2.7
54.6

8.8
38.1

22.8
45.4

13.4
49.7

Textieand garmem
Wood and wood products
Paperandpaperpoduss

14.9

5.5

17.4

21.5

29.9

0.9

3.0

4.7

23.5

172

Q6

1.9

7.1
2.3
1G.7

13.1

1.9

54.3

49.2

23.8

38.1

45.8

27.0

8.0

14.4

21.2

33.7

25.9

14.2

38.7

17.0

13.1

38.1

37.4

42.4

3.6

1.4

2.1

3.4

4.7

2.2

4.7

5.8
0.2
182

8.3
02
10.5

7.1
0.07
8.1

15.1
1.0
11.9

17.1
2"
18.0

32.0
4.1
23.5

29.8
9.6
25.9

Industrial chemicals and
petroleurn products

..

Pottery, dina, giass, nonerntalicproducts

Iron, steel, nonferous metals,
and fabricated metal products
Machinery, including electical
andsupplies
Trdnsport and equipment
Toal
.

Sournce GcoemmntrofTarewaia, Bureau of Statks.
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Table 8.9 Quantity adjkstment of industrial firms by size and age
QuantXy d4ustmentfwith reasons

_

Increaseinproduction
Stronger domestic de:nand
Foreign erhange inputs more
avatable
Changes in polies
Strongerexports .
Local raw materials more available
Devaluaionofexchangerate
labor more available
:
Other reasons
Dcrease inproduction
Moreimpcrtcornpetiion
More domesticcmpetition
Moe expensive imported inputs.
More expensive localputs
Weaker domesic demand
evaluaion of exchange rate
Ofter reasons
Nosignificantcharnge
.

.11

Firms by size .rms
All
Sndl
Large
rms
firrs
frms

Post1986 1960-85

PIe.
1980

60.9
39.8

66
52.3

58.1
32.1

812
71.9

68.1
36.4

49.9
27

5.5
23
2.3
1.6
1.6
-0.8
7
28.1
7.8
5.5
4.7
3.9

0
23
0
23
0
23
6.8
29.4
4.5
. 6.8
4.5
45
45
0
4.6
4.6

8.7
2.5
3.7
1.2
235
0
7.4
28.3
9.9
4.9
4.9
3.7
1.2
2.5
1.2
13.6

0
0
3.1
3.1
0
3.1
0
62
0
0
3.1
3.1
0
0
0
12.6

0
0
4.5
4.5
4.S

2.3
1.6
2.3

by 0go

9.5
4.1
1.3
0
1.3

0

0

18.2
22-7
9.1
0
9,1
0
4.5
0
0
9.2

6.7
39.3
10.8
9.5
4.1
5.4
2.7
2.7
4.1
10.8

Surce .Dutz and Frischtak (1992).

cal capability of industrial firms was limited, and investment in industry was

declining (net real investment in the manufacturing sector was falling at an
average annual rate of 6.7 percent from 1981 to 1985). Unfortunately, a
comparable data series on industrial investment for the period since the
economic recovery program is unavailable. But there are signs ofa recovery.
The results of a World Bank survey of investment behavior and plans of industrial firms showv that firms that have invested heavily in the past few years
tend to be export oriented and economically efficient. Nearly all of the private firms sampled plan to increase investment by more than 25 percent m
thenextthree to fiveyears.In addition, according to theinvestmanentpromotion center, a total of nearly $200 million in investments in industrial
prijects-rhe leading sectorforinvesrmentapprovals-have been approved
since 1990 (table 8.10).
While industrial sector adjustment has shown several positive outcomes,
change has not taken place as quickly as necessaq in other areas of the sector. First, the reform of industrial parastatals has been delayed. Since the losses
of the parastatal sector are substantial, the delay poses a senous cost to the
entire economy Moreover, indecisive action sends a signal to the private
sector that the playing field is not yet level, and in the meantime, the value.
ofparastatal assets erodes as managers become much more riskaverse in this
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Table 8. 10 A summary of projects approved by the Investment
Promotion Center between July 1990 and September 1992
Total
number
oftocdl
proj rts

Totat
number

number or

ofloregn

joint venture
prects

mimber of

13,479
5,747

93
19

12
13

28
17

133
49

13,489

14

8

18

40.

4,935
1,760
1,887
314
9
171
41,791

11
12.
2.
2
I
0
154

4
3
3
I
0
2
46

17
12
3
4

Tota

Totd
investnaent -aloymrent
generated
(US$)5
80,655,332 Industry
Tourism
36,374,790
Agriculture and
16,506,809
livestock
Natural
I 1,909,204
reurces
Transport
26,013,592
6,023,592
Mining
Construction
4,626,492
Technology -36,325
-441,167
SenAces
Total
182,587.30
Sourw

.

Total

pro,jcs
.

0
t00

Tow)
projects

.

32
27..
8
7
: 2
2
300

Investment Promotion Center.

period of uncertainty, and in some cases quiedy strip assets. Labor relations
continue to deteriorate,with arisingnumber oflockouts by the managers ofdisgruntled empIoyees of parastatals in financial distress.
Second, while some effort has been made to encourage the private sector, ithas not been aggressive.> In fact, the business environment continues
to stymie the private sector. Several policies and practices have perpetuated
uncertaintyand discouraged the private sector-the continued tolerance and
subsidization of parastatal losses, antiquated land-transfer policies and limited access to industrial sites, extensive regulatory and licensing obstacles to
the entry and exit of firns, a system of tax assessment and collection that
involves side payments and entrepreneurial harassment, inadequate court
procedures for commercial matters, an inefficieni banking system, and limitedand expensive credit to the private sector. These constraints have penalized the development of indigenous entrepreneurship in particular. The
govermment must take a more active role in identifying and addressing the
constraints facing the private sector-foremost, to establish an effective dialogue. Othenvise the business potential of indigenous entrepreneurs will
remain untapped.
Third, the industrial sectc r eforn has gotten exports moving again, but
Tanzania's export potential in manufhctured goods is not being achieved.
While export documentation procedures have been streamlined and initial
steps have been taken to unify the exchange rate, they must be fully implemented as quickly as possible. More focused and selective programs must be
established to improve information on exportmarket opportunities, the trade
infiastructare, and export financing. In addition, import tax evasion must
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-b addressed so thiat trading is not relatively more profitable than manufacturing (for export miiarkets in particular). This year some attempt is being
made to r eduice dtity evasion by iaving preshipmlent inspection companies
assess import Ltx liabilities to the treasury. HIowever, complementary incasures must be made to improve revenue collection by the customs department; tlereby improving the termns on wvhiich dlomestic industiy competes
with imports.
The agrculturalsector. Duiring the economic recovery program, agricultural performance improved substantially due to good weathicrand improved
economic policie5. Foodgrain producton doubled, food security improved
dramatically, and real food prices declined, all of wlhich helped consumers.
The volume of traditional agricultural exports has returned to precrisis levels, and cotton has increased to record levels. The growth of nontraditional
agricuiltral exports has been particularly impressive. Tanzania requires several measures to realize its enonnous agricultural potential: unifying the exchange rate, liberalizing exportmarkleting, reforming tie cooperatives, promoting private-sector ently into export markleting, and liberalizing input
distribution more effectively.
In the seven years prior to the economic recovery program, agricultural
performance had slipped badly after a-decade of rapid expansion. An increasingly overvalued exchange rate, deteriorating terms of trade for
Tanzania's agricultural exports, and growing scarcities of goods in rural areas dramatically altered the incentive structure of farmers. Moreover, an
increasingly inefficient government-controlled marketing system, disruptions in production patterns from the villagization program, and the crumbling physical infrastructure, all-contributed to the detenrorating environment ofagricultureY Agriculture gro;th averaged only 2 percent annually
between 1978 and 1985. Export crop production was particularly hard hitthe totalvolume ofe.xportsfellbynearly30 percentbetween 1976 and l985,
and agricultural export revenue fell from a peak of $426 million in 1977 to
$184 million in 1985.
The economic recovery program has arrested the deteriortion in agncultural performance, and a significant recovery of output is under way.
Agricultural GDP increased by 4.9 percentannuallybetveen 1986 and 1991,
more than double the growti rate in the preceding period. Growth in the
marketed output of food grains and export crops has been impressive. The
volume of food sales increased, by about 100 percent between 1983, when
marketing reforms began, and 1988.40 Increased food availability essentially
restored Tanzania's ability to feed itselfandby l990 virtually eliminated the
need for food imports, which had peaked at 402,000 tons in 1985. Sales of
traditional export crops (tea, coffee, cotton, cashews, pyrethrum, and to-
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bacco) increased by 68 percent between 1985 and 1991, with cotton sales
reachiing recor-d levels, and coffee, tea, tobacco, and clashew sales being restored to levels last recorded in tie early 1980s (table 8.11). Howevcr, sisal
and cashew nut sales still did not achieve the levels of tie 1970s, and coffee
and cotton sales are. still far below their potential.
Another indicator of the iinpact of the economic recove-ry program on
*agricultureproduction is the impressive turnaround in nontraditional agricultural exports. Because these crops were never included in the official
monopsonistic marketing channels, much of the turnaround can be attributed to reforms in foreign exchange management (exchange rate devaluadion and retention schemes). Overall, the value of nontraditional agriculLural exports increased fivefold since 1985,mwith stronggrowti recorded for

each of the nontraditional crop groups (figure 8.9)'.
Improved output of food crops is duein part to good weather in rhe early
years of the economic recovery program, but the renewed flow of consumer
goods to rural areas firom the trade reform also provided a powerful stimulus. Moreover, the gradual liberalization of food crop marketing since 1983
has improved the marketing efficencyand incentive structure ofproducers.
Farmers are now served by a multichannel marketing system dominated by
numerous small andmedium-scale (bothindigenous and Asian) tradersLwho
assemble, trans-port, and marlket staple grains in most urban centers. The
grain mark-eting parastatal, National Milling Corporation, which had accounted for nearly 90 percent of grain marketing, now accounts only for 2
percent of marketed supply. A recent study of this largely private system
suggests the emergence of an increasingly integrated marketing system that
linkfsmajorsupplyand consumermarkets throughout theyear- Private trade
Table 8.11 Official purchases of trditional export crops, 1980-91
(tous,nd metic tons)

Year
I1980
1981
19B2
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991

Coffee

Cattan

66.6
55.0
53.5
49.1
49.0
52B
41.5
45.7
57.3
53.2
55.9
58.0

175.0
133.0
128.0
140.7
155.1
IOB.2
216.9
253.7
191.7
113.5
147.0
261.9

Sxra. Wodld Bank Ta-ra
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(I 992a)

Prethnru
2.0
1.9
1.6
14
1.5
1.4
1.2
1.4
123
1.6
I.7
2.2

-

Tea

Tobocco

77.7
74.9
84.5
73.0
80.2
74.4
67.7
63.8
76.8
793
72-4
78.0

16.8
16.1
13.6
11.0
13.4
12.6
16.5
12.9
11.6
11.1
11.8
17.0

Cashen
56.6
44.3
33.0
48.3
32.1
19.0
16.5
24.4
[9.3
17.0
33:0
36.0
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Figure 8.9 Value of nontraditional agricultural exports, 1980-90
Billions of 1990 rShs (deflated by CPI)
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1982

1984.

1986

1988

1990.

Source: Tanzania Bureau of Statistics.

has improved food availability in almost all areas, lowered consumer prices,
and reduced overall maize marketing costs. An integrated maize trading
networknow exists, linking the major supplyand consumermarkets throughout the year.4 '

The increase in marketed output for food crops reversed a protracted
rise in the real price of food in the prereform period and generated a dramatic decline in real prices between 1984 and 1989. Poorweather conditions
in the 1990 and 1991 crop years increased prices again, but price levels are
stullvellebelow the levels of early 1980s (table 8.12). Given the large share of
conrsiunerbudgets thatgoes to food purchases, this decline in realprices has
substantialy benefited consumers.
The series ofdevaluations under the econormic recoveryprogram sought
to improve the terms of trade and incentive structure for exportproducers.
It did so for nontaditional exports, dramatically increasing the export of
these crops, even if from a small base. For nontraditional exports, exporters
could retain up to 50 percent of the foreign exchange and arrange exportL
through private marketing channels. But the situation for the producers of
traditional export crops was not nearly as favorable because the economic
recovery program refonned the marketing of traditioi.al export crops only
marginally. Producers were still required to mark-et their crops through
monopsonistic mark-eting channels dominated by inefficient cooperative
unions at the farmr level and government markleting boards at the point of
export.42 These insdtutions that absorbed the bulkc of the gains in the terms
of trade, leaving the incentive structure facing farmers little changed.
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TLhc terms of trade for boti prodticer-s and the inar keling agencies tice
clinedhby aboilt 50 percent. between 1976 andl 1984 (figigre 8.10). Witlh thie
real devaluations tdat began in 1985, tlde Lenus or tr-ade for the marketing
agencies reversed dramaltically, increasing by 110 percent beLiveen 1984 and
1988. The marketing agencies' monopsonistic positions allowed theml to
capture mnost of the gains from cxclange rate adjustinenL. Yet despite these
gains, thiemark-eting-agencies still relied hecavilyon tiesstate-owned bankin'g
system for overdrafts for crop purchasing. They rarely r epaid the overdrafts,
precipitating a criis,in tie banking sector in the late 1 980s that essentially
rendered lie bank-ing .system insolvent and helped cxpand the nioney sup
ply excessively. 4 1

The incentive structure for armers followed a muchi different pattem
after 1984. Producer terms of trade increased-initially by 28 percent in 1985,
but stabilized for producers of traditional exporLs thereafter. The growing

dispaityin the terms of trade betwveen the narketing agenciesand producers
led to a steady deterioration in die share of declining world market prices
going to fanners-by 1990 tlhe producers' share for traditional exports was
only about 40 percent
It is clear that the largest improvementc in marketing efficiency and
increases in mark-eted output occurred for crops whose private markleting
-channelswere most developed, such as maize, rice, and the nontraditional
exports. Moreover, the marketing of these crops was expanded without excessive reliance on formal credit For example, the trade in grains is limost
entirely self-financed by private trade; previously the National Milling Corporation required up to TSh 6 billion a.year in bank credit to finance crop
purchases.
Table 8.12 Open market consumer prices and real price indexes,

1980-91
Currentprdces (TShs per J
Maize
Rice
Be-rs

Year

1980
1981
1982

3.36
4.86
5.54

716
12.0
15.43

6.10
7.60
13.91

1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991

10.42
13.54
12.04
12.04
16.62
21.13
23.34
41.68
55.04

26.25
35.76
36.45
35.83
44.30
6138
7033
95.96
t24.02

19.62
31.45
32.15
32.17
43.03
63.78
76.01
96.46
112.80

.

a. Dellaled by consurner price indec.
S-urte: Van den Brink (I 992).
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IndeIes of real cppn
n
morket
pices ( 198 = 100
Rice
Beans
Maize

87
-OO
88
131 .
125
77
63
67
65
57
85
92

76
100
100

101
100
142

133
134
102.
76
72
76
69
79
84

157
186
142
108
III
125
118
126.
120
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Figure 8.10 Export crop terms of trade for marketing boards'and
producers, 1976-88
Terms of trade index (I976-t 700)
200-

Real exchange raw
150Marketing board
100- fPdCr\

:r

so

1975

1978

1980

1982

1984

1986

1988

Souree: Govemment-of Tanzania.

oFor the traditional export crops still subject to government control,
marketed output increased at a more modest pace, with production levels
far below potential. The incentive structure ror farmers of export crops.was
still poor, becauise tlley had to market thlrougli inefficientmonopsonists and
were burdened by poor marketing services, delayed payments, and erratic
input supplies. The government haLs occasionally soug1ht to increase official
prices for traditional exports so aS- to stimulate production-and these efforts, coupled withl an expansion or imports, explains the increases in the
marketed volutnes of traditional exports. But 'without market refoml to address inefficiencies in the single-channel marketing system, these attempts
merely exacerbated the- financial situation for marketing agencies and intensified the crisis in the banking system.
Cotton is illustrative. In 1985 the official price of cotton wvas raised by
nearly 20 percent in real ternms, and the supply response over the next three
years was substantial: production more than doubleid to about 220,000 tons
a vear. However, this surge in production overwhelmed dte marketing system, choked the processing and transport capacities of the cooperative
unions, and delayed paymnenLs to fhrmeas. The delaysin processingand transport also left the unions and marketing boards with large unpaid overdrafus.
In response the government allowed real producer prices to deteriorate, so
that by 1989 all of dle previous increase had eroded. Farmers responded to
the falling prices by shifting out of cotton and into rice, so that by 1989 production had slipped backl to 1985 levels.
The government again increased producer prices in 1991, -and farnmers
responded with a record crop of262,000 tons. But overdrafts to the cooperaPublished by iRepository, 2021
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tiveswent-unpaid. And as the financial sectorwas being refonned, tle banks
introduced stringentrequiremcn ts.for new overdralLs and extended less credit.
to the unions ror the 1992 season, thus leading to Iower pnrccs and more
delayed payments to famner.s.Thegovemmenttlen increased producer piices
substantially, to levels thatwere insustainable at ile prevailing exchange rate
and world market prices. Consequently, a two payment system went into offect-tlie first paymentwas about 20 percent below tie 1991 producer piice,
and.farners were promised a second payment (which it was not clear could
be paid considering world prices and tde likely path of the exchiange rate).
Farmers mlgigh reduce their cotton planting in Favor of rice nextseason, since
the private market for competing rice continues to function well.
Tanzania enjoys a strong comparative advantage in awide range of agricultural commodities (table 8.13). It is blessed witlh abundant land suitable
for expanding cultivation, and the yield potendal for most crops is muchi
higher than is being realized with existing tecinology. Several critical policy
and institutional issues must be addressed if Tanzania is to realize its enormous potential in agriculwre.. These include managing the exchange rate,
liberalizing the export markets of trditional agricultural products, reforming cooperatives, making inputs more accessible, improving the agricultural
Table 8.13 Ranking of agricultural exports, based on domestic resource
cost ratios
Praodct
Trodional
Coffee(Arabica)
Coffee (Robusta)
Cotton
Tea (outrower)

TCa(eSate)
Cashewnut (P)
Cishewnut (R)
Pyrethrum (C)
Pyrethrmrn(R)
Sisal (T)
Sisal (F)
Tobacco (flue)
Tobacco (fr)
Nontaditiond
Maize (MIlT)
Paddy (rice)
Beans.
Sirsimr
Cocoa

Finandci onalysis
Domestic rwource
cost ratio
R.anking
1.15
1.51
t.28
1.20

14
17
16
15

-0.66
0.84
0.68
0.67

13
.17
15
14

0.53
0.58
0.5

3
5
2

0.35
030

4
3

027

2

0.81
0.60
1.15
0.56
0.69
0.78

I1
7
14
4
8
10

0.41
0.31
0.76
0.36
0.40
0.44

8
4
16
5
7
9

0.95
0.77
0.59
0.42
0.91

13
9
6
1
12

0.60
0.45
0.37
0.23
0.65

11

Source Wodd Bank-Goverment of Tanzaniaa (1992).
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infrastructure and extension services, and increasing thle finding for agriculLural services.
First, despite aggressive exchangemae managementduring dic economic
recovery program, aci official exchlange rate is still overvalujed by 30 percent,
which isa direct tax on producers of traditional crops. The government must
move as quickly as possible 1o remove this tax by unifying the exchlange rate.
Provided steps ar c also taken to improve tle competitiveness ofexportmarketing, most of the gains from further devaluations would translate into
improved prices to producers..
Second, mor0c progress must be made toward liberalizing the export
marketing of traditional agricultural products. Allowing private traders to
buy from the farmers aind allowing prices to be market determined are essential for dismantling Llte monopsony of the coopeiative inions and im-

proving the profitability of export agriculture. The government las recently
decided to allow private traders to compete with the cooperative unions in
export marketing. However,implementing the new policy will require that
all export crop legislation be reviewed and revised to ensure its consistency
with the new policy; that the government's monitoring, regulatory, and fa-

cilitating functions be redefined; tdat marketing boards be limited to providing auction or tender services, quality control, market information, and
representation in international bodies; and that these new rules of the game
be disseminated effectively to all market participants. Such transparency is
important: if private traders do not understand the terms under wlich they
will operate, their entry into the market may be delayed.
Third, cooperatives must be refonned to ensure more efficienL export
marketing. The recently revised cooperative legislation is expected to help
foster diat reform. The current cooperatives were mandated by tle government, were essentially part of the official marketing system, and, until recent
declarations to the contrary, were under control of the party.44 As such the
unions typically did not represent their members' interests, nor were they
accountable to theirmembers. The new legislation seeks to give control back
to the members of the union and to reorganize primary societies into viable
units controlled by members. The primary societies would.then be free -to
assocate with secondary unions in away that best serves their interests. Primary societies may choose to associate with existing unions, market crops on
their own, or form new associations with new unions.
Financial sector reform is also creating pressure for reform of the cooperative unions. The debts of eight heavily indebted unions that have been
deemed inviable and not indispensable by the govemment have been-taken
over for liquidation by the loans and advances realization trust. However,
the capacity of the banking system to restructure the other unions is limited
because the collateral for most past loans to the -cooperatives was seasonal
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stocks, not productive assets. For new loans, the banks have tightened their
lending to cooperatives and insisL on greater guar-antees of repayment. Thus,
inaddition to measures to encourage tlhe reromi of cooperatives and greater
financial discipline, private sector entry into agricultural processing and
marketing must be promioted inore aggressively. Wliile the govermment has
decided in principle to allow inulticliannel marketing, it has reservations
about the capacity of the private sector to respond-a reflection of old ideological beliefs and the legacy ofpolicieswhiich discouraged private initiative.
The government's positive experience with grain trade liberalization and the
emergence of private tirade in cashews despite tlie difficult circumstances
indicate the capacity and interest of the ptrivate sector in foodgrain trade.
But export crop marketing is more conplicated because the processing
facilities forboth cotton and coffee are currently owned by tle unions or the
mark-eting boards. New private facilities vould require substantial investnment
capital.4 The lead time between crop purchases and final exportproceeds is,
long, requiring a large amount of working capital or financing to sustainpurchases. To generate domestic competition quickly, the governmentshould
have used its-influence over the unions to allow access forall marketparticipants to ginning and other processing facilities owned by die unions. However, because the unions have now been dedared private, the government
has less influence to affect that access. In retrospect, it was probably premature for the govemment to have ceded control oFthe unions before theywere
restructured. Now the main -avenue for effecting competition is likely to be
newv entries, which will take time.
Fourth. access to inputs must be made more timely. The input marketis
largely monopolistic, inefficient, and unresponsive to the needs of farmers.
Though nominally liberalized, the system continues to be dominated by
parastatal mark-eting boards, cooperatives, and in some instances, direct
government involvement in retail distribution. The private sector has been
slow to enter thir business, due pardy to the limited demand for inputs, particularly by growvers of traditional crops, w-hrose prices are depressed by the
marketing system and the unreliability of crop sales payments. Fertilizer is
the most important input, with an annual consumption of about 150,000
metric tons. Some progress has been made toward liberalizing retail trade,
with private firms haandling about50 percentof the volume. But-to complete
the liberalization of trade at the wholesale level, the gover. ment must elininate the remainingsubsidy on fertilizer, andwhile the subsidy is being phased
out, grve private importers greater access to the subsidy to improve wiholesale efficiency. Some progress was made on this front in 1992xwhen the
.Tanzania Farmers Association and a private importer were encouraged to
import about 40,000 tons of fertilizer.
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Fifth, the transportation infrastructure for agriculture and agricultural
extension must be improved. The rural road network has suffered the most:
by 1989 only 10 percent of the rural feeder roads were in good condition..
The poor state oftdie roads and the inadequate rail network have been major
bottlenecks to moving agricultural produce from the fields to the market.
Both the road and the rail networks are being rehabilitated witlh heavy support from the donor community. For the road network, the government has
received support from the World Bank and other donors in developing a
comprehensive strategy and plan of action to deal with the major organiza-.
tLional, management, and policy issues in the subsector. Plans call for prioritizing needs in the subsector, giving the private sector a greater role, defining the respective roles of the government and the. private sector, and
implementing key measures to ensure the sustainability of any majorinvestment that would be made in the network.
Finally, the funding of agricultural services must be improved. While
agricultural research and extension have received substantial support by:
donors, govemment counterpartfunding to complement donor projects has
been inadequate. Remuneration ofresearch worlkers has not been sufficient
to retain well-qualified staf, and the capacity of extensionworkers has been
limitedbecause low and declining government funding for the recurrent costs
of fuel, repair, and maintenance have hampered transport Current expenditures to support agricultural extension, excluding salaries, fell by almost
30 percent in real terms between fiscal 1986 and 1992.
Poverty. Prior to the economic recovery program, Tanzania was one of
the poorest countries in the world. Thus it is not surprising that, even after
six years of adjustnent, poverty continues to be widespread-about half of
the population is still below the poverty lineAl Even though- comprehensive
time senres data on changes in the extent of poverty are not available, there
is evidence that rural and urban poverty has diminished somewhat due to
the restoration of economic growth- In the rural-areas, adjustmentpolicies,
partcularly those pertaining to the exchange rate and agricultural marketing, have increased income and consumption. However, rural services induding infastructure, social, and other support services (such as agricultural
extension) have notimproved significantly in relation to the preadjustment
period. In fact some services-pnmary health care and education-have
deteriorated despite significant increases in government expenditures because demand for those services has increased, resources have been
misallocated, financial managementhas been poor, and strategies and institutional arrangements for delivering social services have been ineffective. In
the urban centers, economic growth and the explosion of infornal sector
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business activities have improved income and consumption. However, while
poverty is significantly lower in urban areas than in rural areas, the standard
of living among many of tie urban nonpoor is low. Alleviating poverty will
depend on tvo factors: the capacity of the economy to increase employment
opportunities for Tanzania's large and rapidly growing labor force, and the
creationand successful implementation of integrated sectoral strategies and
action plans in the social sectors.
Poverty is pervasive in rural areas: 59 percent of village households are
poor, and 90 percent ofTanzania's hardcore poverty is in rural areas. W=ithin
the rural areas, poverty is greatest in regions with low and intermittent rainfall, poor infrastructure, and pooraccess to markers-specifically in Kigoma,
Singida, Lindi, Dodoma, Ruk-wa,andRuvuma.Despite continuingweidespread
ruralpoverty, thereare good reasons to believe thatthe adjustmentprogram
has helped reduce it. Prior to the economic recovery program, rural income
had fallen significantly-by about one-half between 1978 and 1983 (Bevan,
Collier, and Gunning 1989)-. The economic recovery program has arrested
the dedine, and rural living standards have risen significantly. The income
of hrmerswho sell traditional export crops has inproved because their production has increased, despite the dedine in the share of exportprices they
receive. Fornontraditional crops, exportprices have improved considerably,
as has total production. Real income from the sale of maize and rice, whose
mark-ets have been -substantially liberalized, has increased during the econouincrecoveryprogram, despite initiallydedining real prices forfoodgrains
(see table 8-12)- Lower prices have also increased rural consumption, bolstered by the greater availability of consumer items, which largely dried up
with the severe compression of imports in the late 1970s and early 1980s.
Yet agricultural services and infrastructure for poor farmers have not
improved. As noted earlier, agriculmral extension has been affected adversely by the general erosion of civil service salaries and shortages of government financing, trained personnel, and transport facilities. These proW
lems were rampant well before the economic recovery program, but have
not improved under the program and in some cases have deteriorated further. Rural roads continue to be deplorable. Transport networksc for agricultural produce are inadequate and distributed unevenly throughout the
country. Consequendy, transport costs are very high, which together with
the unreliability of rural transport, discourages regional specialization in
agrcultural production within Tanzania and the development of export
trade with neighborng countries.
Average income in the urban areas is nearly four tnes greater than in
the rural areas. Despite declining minimum wages, average income in the
urbar. areas has increased because informal sector activities supplement
income from formal employment. 4 7 Urban consumption levels have aLso
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increased, due to lowerfoodgrain prices. However,byintemationalstandards,
urban households spendamuch higher proportion of their income on food,
suggesting that the standard of living is low even for households dassified as
nonpoor (table 8.14). Excluding the capital city ofDar es Salaam, 39 percent
of urban households Bill below the poverty line; in the capital, only 9 percent
are belowv the poverty line.
SiSodalsector.The secondphase ofthe economic recovery program focused

on improvng social services, particularly for the poor. In educadion, real
government expenditures dunng the economic recovery program increased
by 13 percent annually. Nevertheless educational services and indicators of
schoolachievementcontnue to deteriorate, paricularlyat the primary school
level. For example, while primaryschool enrollment rates have risen, so have
dropout rates-and the rate at which Tanzanian smdents make the transi-tion to secondazyschool is sfill one of the lowestin the worldi4 With the rapid
expansion of enrollment, the ratio of students to teachers has risen significandy. Teacher training institutes have not been able to keep up wvith the
expansion. The quality of'primary education also continues to be low. Many
graduates ofprimary school are illiterateand cannotpassbasiclanguage and
arithmetic exarinaions-due primarily to poor quality instrucion, large
class sizes, and a shortage of textbooks and other educational materials. In
some areas parents are disillusioned, and are questioning the utility ofprimazy schooling; some parents have even begun to withdraw their children
from primary school (Gooksey 1992). The govermment continues to control
educational curricula and teachers.

Much has been done to expand secondary school enrollment-From 1986
to 1991, local communities constructed 68 public secondary schools, which
are now being managed by the government. With government encouragement, 220 of the 334 secondary schools are now being run by NGOs. Nevertheless the percentage of secondary school enrollment among eligible students is among the smallest in the world, and at 3 percent is far below the
Sub-SaharanAfricaaaverage of20 percent. The quality ofthe average secondTable 8.14 Patterns of household expenditure
(petPawe shores)

Itern
Food
Clothing
Rentand udrr6s
Education
Health
Other
Sour= Ferreira (I 992); Warkd Banrkda
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ary school education is also low and continues to decline, as measured by
examination scores.
The increase in government expenditures on education has yet to be
felt, because of the growing demand for educational services, particularly at
the secondary level. In addition, resources appear to be mnisallocated within
the educational pyramid, with secondary schools' receiving a small share of
expenditures. Duiring the economic recovery program, primary, adult, and
higher education received more than 70 percent of current expenditures
allocated to education. Most of the remaining 30 percent went to support
large administrative overheads; only 10 percent of the educational budget
was for secondary education. An excessive share of Drinary school spending
goes to the Ministry ofEducation in Dar es Salaam. rather tian for primaly
teachers at the local level. But even within local govemments there is very
limited managerial capacity, accountability, and control over expenditures.
In some cases central government funds are abused. In -addition,local governments have not developed dte revenue base to complement federal-level
resources to improve access to and the quality of primnary education. Finally.
while expenditures have risen, they come from a very small base and are still
inadequate to meet the needs of the educational sector.
User charges have also been introduced in education, but slowly and
below the leveLs required to recover costs. For primary schools, the charge of
TSh 200 per pupil is too low to improve school finances. 4 ' Fees are collected
at onlya tird ofthe rate that theyshould be. Given the poor state of primary
schools, it has been difficult for the government tojustify increasing fees. To
encourage parents to pay the fees necessay to help support the recurrent
costs ofschools, the govermnentmust improve the quality of education and
revenue allocation. At the secondary school level, revenue ftom fees has
improved because collection is more stringent, and fees are rising-a fee of
TSh16,000 wfas recendy-approved byparliament This should help improve
costrecovery. The university does not impose a fee; students tend to be subsidized heavily, despite the fact thata umiversity education is a luxry. Recent
efforts to introduce cost recovery for university education met strong political resistance from stcdents The university was dosed temporarily, and a
decision was made to delay imposing user charges. In fact, student stipends,
which are financed through the budget, have since been increased.
Data on trends in the health subsector are very limited. The scarce data
available indicate that the major health problens i- Tanzania-malnutrition, malaria, and infectious diseases, including acute respiratory infections-continue to be severe and are on the rise. In addition, adult mortality and morbidity caused by the AIDS epidemic have increased at
alarming rates throughout Tanzania. AIDS has started to show a range of
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impacts, including a rising dependency ratio and greater pressures on die
health care systemn.YReal government expenditures on hcalth haetc bcgun to recover, growving at an annual trate ofimore than 15 percenL However, real per capita
expenditures remain below the levels of die 1970s and are inadequate in die
face of the large and growing demand for services. Moreover, funds arc
misallocated within the sector. Only 24 percent or tie total healtd budget
is allocated to primary healtl care, which is provided at the local level. Consequently, the number ofhealth dispensaries has not kept up with tdie pOptlation growth during the economic recovery program. As in dhe education
sector, local governments are poorly equipped to carry out the greater responsibilities that have been entrusted to them- They lack die managerial
capacity, accountability, and local revenue to provide primary health care
effectively.
Government spending on health care has been complemented by the
growth ofnongovernmenal and private health services during the economic
recovery program. Today-as much as 35 percent ofhealth services in Tanzania are provided by NGOs, primarily churches, which provide mostly cuIative services. There are also afew commercial health facilities, but theircharges
are high, and they serve primarily the high-inconme population. Health care
provided by the parastatals and the private sector account for an estimated
5 percent of health services. Services provided by the private sector are likely
to mcrease with the recent decision to allow private practice by government.
physicians after hours. 5 '
All govemment health services are free, with the exception of special
wardcs in government hospitals. Recognizing that government resources are
insufficient to allow the budgetary financing of health care needs, the govemment,talintroduce cost-sharingiin fiscal 1994 The governmentalso began
to address the recurring drug shortage in 1991; a national drug policy was
adopted whereby government central medical stores will be restructured
under a management contract, and government procurementwill shift to a
demand driven system.
Several of the major health problems confronting Tanzania-malaria,
diarrheal diseases, and respiratory infections-are dosely associated with
water, hygiene, and sanitation problems. Adequate water supply is also critical to freeing-women's energy for child care, familyproduction, andincomeearning activities. Water supply and sanitation services have not received
sufficient support. Prior to dhe economic recovery program, about half of
the rural population had access to an adequate water supply. However, operational and maintenance inefficiencies and a decline in donorfunding for
the subsector, which was not compensated for byhigher government spend-
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ing during the economic recovery program, have reduced tiat number to
25 percent Moreover, an estimated 40 percent ofall households mustspend
more than ]5 minutes to getwater. While government attention has recently
turned to water management, the government has been slow, to introduce
cost recovery measures, promote community participation byproviding training and tools, improve the supply of spare parts, and make appropriate technologies available-for example, hand pumps fitted onto hand-dug or handdrilled wells.52

Lessons: loolding to the future
Tanzania's adjustmnentprogam focused initially on economic recovery, rather
than adjustment Priority went to improving access to foreign exchange inorder to restore capacity utilization and to improve pricing signals for producers, including the extreme exchange rate overvaluation of the prereform
economy. Later, liberalization was also a vehicle forincreasing import competition. However in retrospect, it is clear that import liberalizadon has had
two main shortcomings: giving inadequate attention to promoting exports
to finance additional imports, thus forcing Tanzania to continue to rely on
aid, and not ensuring that counterpart fimds and import taxes could be
collected, thus creating distortions. The consequent multiplidty of effective
exchange rates undermined domestic competition. Imports were not used
efficiendy, and in some cases, domestic industry effectively became disprotected, favoring trading and discouragint the private sector from productive activities, including exporting.
The design of the refonn program 'was also influenced by how it could
be implemented institutionally. Exchange rate, tariff, and price reforms were
among the firstmeasures adopted. While all ofthese measures obviouslyhave
major economic and distributional effects, they are not difficult to implement bureaucratically. They require only that consensus be reached among
a few key officials-the ministers of finance and of industry and commerce,
and the governor ofthe central bank-, in consultation with the president Afier
agreement was reached at that level, implementation followed quickly by
administratve fiat
The next stage of reform in Tanzania requires significant structural
change, including a major restructuring of public institutions, such as the
civil service and parastatals. Civil service-reform is essential for downsizing
the government and enabling it to carry out essential functions more effectively and to enable the private sector to respond to marklet opportunities
and play a greater role in economic growth. The elimination ofsingle-channel marketing needs to be implemented quicldy because it is absolutely es-
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sential, althouglh not sufficient by itself, for increasing eXports and improving macroeconomic stability. Faster liberalization of agricultural export

marketing and reduction of implicit txation of agricultural exports would
have boosted growtl and helped to alleviate poverty. To the extent that this
was politically impossible, it would have been better to restructure the cooperatives to improve their efficiency and accountability before declaring them
pnvate, and hence untouchable, by the government.
Financial sector reform mtustbe complemented byaccelerated structural
reform. Tanzania's experience calLs into question whether structural reform
should have been carried out prior to financial sector reform. Since financial sector reform isjust underway, thejuryis stillouton this issue. However,
the evidence thus far suggesLs that early financial sector reform may play.a
critical role in the adjustnent process by providing significant pressure for.
real restructuring. Consequently, all actrs are increasinglyrecognizing that
a poltical decision must be made aboutwhether structural reform should
proceed quicldy, or whether financial sector reforms should be halted by
pressuring the banks to. lend amounts beyond levels they deem prudent.
Another important sequencing issue pertains to pnvate sector develop-.
menL WAhile some steps have recently been tak-en to encourage local and
foreign private investment, greater attention should have beeni given earlier
to strengthening the private sector, particularly indigenous entrepreneur.ship, including allowving entry to -all areas of economic activiry, improving
access to credit, lowering real interest rates and inflation, streamlining the
investment aDproval process, and improving the transparency of mx assessments and collections.
Finally, the reform program should have focused more strongly on social issues. The social sectors are in crisis. Demand for social services has
increased- while effcctive government strategies, institutional arrangements,
and doncrcoordination forimproving the delivery ofweater, sanitation, health,
and educatonal services have been absent Improved social services will be;
essential to reducing widespread poverty in Tanzania. The absence of a social safety net has also delayed the restructuring of the civil service and
parastatal sector.
Tanzania's experience shows the limits of macroeconomic policy reforms aimed at stabilization and price reforms if the necessary microeconomnic foundations are not in place. Reform of the parastatals and inefficient agricultural marketing institutions and systems, and deregulation of
the economy to fadclitate private sector entry and e3xpansion and the orderly
exit of unviable finns would have improved macroeconomic stability and
helped to generate the higher levels of growth that are needed to reduce
the nation's extensive poverty.
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Appendix 8AK Summary of Tanzania's policy reforms
Fiscalpolicy and management
Initialsituation.Persistently high fiscal deficits were financed by substantial domestic bank borrowing. There was inadequate control of expenditures, chronic underfunding, and too many projects in the public investment program; the planning system did not ensure efficient allocation of
budgetary resources; and the bulk of donor funds were not accounted for in
the budget
Policy reformsimpkrented Central government finances improved from a
deficit of 4 percent of GDP in fiscal 1988 to a surplus of 1.5 percent in 1992
and substantially reduced reliance on domestic financing of the deficiL
Monitoring ofrevenue and e-xpenditure has improved slightly preparation
of a three-year rolling plan to take into account the availabilitv of resources
-and intersectoral priorities has begun; and there is increased coverage of
donor funding of the budget.
Assmt
ofpogressofrforms Until the recent slippage, overall progress
in improving fiscal policy was good. However the budget is stiUl heavily reliant on donor financimg, the revenue base is extremely narrowr, tax administration and enforcement-are weak, and tax complianc&is low. While central
govemment finances have improved, quasi-fiscal losses have risen due to poor
cost recovery and inefficiencies among utilityparastatalsand the mounting
losses of commercial parastatals.
Monetary policy
Initialsituation.The Bankl of Tanzania had litde control over monetary
expansion, and commercial banks enjoyed almostunlimited access to Bankof Tanzania refinancing. Credit growth was excessive and fueled inflation
rates of over 30 percent from 1981 to 1985.
Policy reforms impkmenlec InJuly 1992 the Bank of Tanzania closed the
overdraft fi-cilities enjoyed by the commnercil banks Apenalty rate, set above
their maximum lending rate, has been established to discourage commercial bankl borrowing from the central bank-.
Assesmetofprogrss ofreformsI
The Bank-of Tanzania's ability to curb rapid
monetary expansion remains constrained by he absence of supporting fiscal policies; by central bank losses due to delays in collecting counterpart
funds from the open general license, gold purchases, and the debt conversion program; and until the financial sector reforn pnogram that began in
fiscal 1992, by excessive lending to parastatals and cooperative unions.
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Financialsectorreforms
Initialsituation.The bankingsystemwas dominated by state banks-highly
monopolized, inefficient, and largelyinsolvent Much bank creditwas directed
by the government to the public sector and cooperative unions despite their
credit problems. A multiplicity of interest rates was set by the governmenL
Policy 7eforams impklmntad New private banks are being encouraged to
operate. The balance sheets of the state-run banks are being restructured,
including removal of the worst-performing loans to a recovery tusL Bankls
have received increased managerial autonomy and the right to set their own
interest rates, subject to a minimum deposit rate set above the rate of inflanon and a maximum lending rate.
Assessment of pogress of rforms. Although reforms were introduced only
in 1991, preliminaryindications are that the banks are making better banking decisions, are under less pressure to lend, and are making more credit
available to the private sector. In additio'n, new private banks, inlduding some
major international banks, expect to begin operations in Tanzania soon.
While entry of new banks should continue to be aggressively promoted,
much remains to be done to restructulre the existing bank-s to ensure that
they will be able to compete and that the financal sector wsill not continue
to be dominated by one Iarge state bank. Long overdue real-side restructuring (of parastatals and agricultural exportmark-eting) will be essential to the
development of good bankng cients and the sustainability offinadcial sector reform.
Exchangerate managemncet

Initialsituation The black market premium for dollars reached 800 per-

cent in 1985. In the late 1970s export retention w-ras allowed on a very selective basis and under very restrictive conditions. The holding of foreign. exchange was illegal. All foreign exchange was allocated administrtvely.
Pol reforms iqlmented The official exchange rate was depreciated by
over 75 percenLin real effective terms from 1987 to 1992, reducing the premium to 20 percent at the beginning of 1993 An increased share of export
earningswasallowed to beretainedandused moreflexibly. Tanzanians were
allowed to hold foreign currency accounts. The degree of administratve
allocation offoreign exchangewas reducedwith the introduction of the open
general license and the foreign exchange bureaus.
Assessnt ofprogressofremform Previously, this had been perhaps the most
politically sensitive and contentious issue between the govemment and the
IMFPand World Bank. Today, the principle of moving toward marklet-based
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systems for the allocation of foreign exclhange and the determination of
exchange nates has been accepted by the government, and a plan for speedy
unification lhas been agreed uipon.
Liberalizationof internationta trade
InitialsituationLForeign exchange for imports was allocated administratively. Imports were subject to extensive quantitative restrictions and heavy
effective protection: import duty rates ranged from 0 to 200 percent with
additional sales taxes of up to 300 percent
Policy reforms implmented. In 1984 the owvn-funds import scheme was established, whiclh pernitted individuals to import most goods using unoffidal sources of foreign exchange. Import licensing became more nearly automadciwith the introduction of die open general license in 1987. Importers
also have access to a wide range of goods through the foreign exchange
bureaus. In several steps beginning in 1987-88, the maximum tariff was reduced to 40 percent and the number of tariff categories to fo' r Sales tax
rates on imports were also reduced to 0 to 30 percent
Assessmnt of progressofreforms. Significant trade liberalization has taken
place because of reforms in trade polces. The import regime has become
more liberal and market oriented, although it is segmented into numerous
wsindows. Exchange rate overvaluation and, in the case ofbalance of payments
support funds, a poor record of payment of local currency cover has effectivelysubsidized some-windows over others. More attention shouldhave been
given earlier to systems for ensuring die accountability and transparency of
the open general license. Import liberalization should have been accompanied by reform of the customs department and faster movement to unify
exchange rates. Measures topromote exportsshouldhavebeenimplemented
asvigorously andas earlyasreforms to liberalizeimports. Exporters of traditional agricultural exports have been discriminated against by the exchange
rate regime and by other means:
Ex-port retenuton wac allowed on a very selective basis and under very
re.strictive conditions.
* Nontraditional exporters were allowed to retain an increased share of
their foreign exchange earnings.
* Export registration and licensing requirements were lengthy and subject to substantial delays..
* Export documentation requirements were reduced. A duty-drawback
scheme was introduced in 1988 but has been limited in effectiveness,
owing to lack of funds and -administrative difficulties.
* There were single channel marketing arrangements for the export of
nearly all of the traditional export crops.
* Cashew nut mrarketing was liberalized in 1992.
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Liberalizationof riices and domncstic trade

Initial siteation. In the industial sector 400 goods were subject

to price

controls in the early 1980s, and wholesale trade in over 50 major coniniodities was restricted to parastatals. In the agricultural sector, producer prices
for traditional crops were fired by the govermniient and were only about 65
percent of world prices on averaim. Marketing of apicultural produce was
done through a single govemment channel.
-Policyrefom impleented. During the economic recovery program price
controlswere gradually eliminated on all products exceptsugar, petroleum,
and fertilizer. Subsidies on the latter twvo are gradually being phased out.
Almost-all goods for sale in the domestic market have been decontrolled.
Assesmsnt ofprogrs of reforms. Domestic deregulation was introduced in
tandem with successive measures to further liberalize imports andwas oftensimply a fonnal recognition of the de facto liberalization of domestic trade..
thatwas already taking place. Price controls on sugar have proven politically
difficult to remove. The successful early liberalization of foodgrain marketing was essential to demonstrate thatprivate markets could work and to provide quick and visible benefits from. refonr. Despite the high cost of past
exportpriciangand marketing policies, the marketing of traditional agriculoral exwportshasyet to be ful.lyliberlized, pardybecauzse of the political nature
of the cooperative unions. For export crops, in the last two years the govemment has taken initial steps toxward allowing markets to se tprices and toward
opening ex-portmarketing to competition.
Labor and wagepolicy reform
Inital situatiton. By 1986 the real minimum wagewas less than a third of
its 1970 leveL Despite several attempts at retrenchment, the civil service w%as
signifcantly overstaffed.
Pokcy r#orms implemeted The minimum wvage was increase d, but the adJustments were substantially below rises in the cost of living. Employment
guarantees to university graduates were abolished in 1991. In 1992-93 the
government introduced a hiring freeze in.the civil.service and announced a
program of retrenchment of .50,000 civil servants.
Assesment ofprogress ofreforms. Despite earlier half-hearted efforts at civil
service refonn, the govemment has recently formulatedan action plan aimed
at improving the performance and morale of the civil service and the overall
efficiency of the govemment, with retrenchment as only a first phase of the
plan. Clearly it is long overdue for the government to address these issues.
However, the budgetary costs ofpay reform and retrenchment, and concems
about the social and political costs of retrenchment, could slow implementation of civil service reform.
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Public enterprisereforns

Initialsitua&tion. ThlCerC wc:I-e over-300 commercial parastatals-accoun Iing for an estimated 25 percenL of total wage cmploymiient and about 20
percent of GDI-thatplatyed a dominmnl. role in inany sectors of li ceconomy.
Net losses of the secLor were equivalent to about 8 percent orGDP in 199091. Many industrial parastatals operated at negative value added with avelr
age capacity utilization below 25 percent.
Policy reforisiml/emented. A numiiiber of studies were carried ouit over the
years but little action ta.'ken until the creation of the Presidential Parastatal
Sector Reform Cominiss3on in 1992, whiclh developed an ambitious master
plan for privatization thatwas laterapproved by the cabinet.Alhandful of ad
hoc privatizations have been car-ried out over the lastfew years, involving primarily management contracts and joint venture arrangements for sonic of

'the smaller parastatals. Some of die major parastatal utilities have also entered into performance contracts.
Assessment ofprogress ofrefonrms. Despitc the obvious and serious nature of
the problems of the parastaral sector, it took at least ten years before a consensus and an action plan for meaningful reform emerged. The reform program is too new to evaluate. Nevertheless, there are a number of issues that
may slow the process of privatization, including the degradadon of many
parastatal assets after many years of poor maintenance,, the technological
obsolescence and poorlocation of many public sector enterprises, and a lack
of interest in many of them by the private sector. There is also some reluctance to sell the few profitable parastatals. In the meantime, losses in the
parastatal sector mount.
Socialsertorpolicies
initialsituation The significant progress made during the 1970s in ex-

tending access to water, sanitation, and health and education services had
eroded due to-rapid population growth, chronic underfunding by the government, lack of training and poor motivation of health work-ers, and shortages of supplies. Private medical practice was prohibited.
Policy reforisimplemted. Expanded education and health services were
provided through local self-help efforts assisted by the governmentand NGOs.
Restrictions on private practice bygovernmentphysicians-were removed.The
government adopted a policy statement on population growth.
Assessment of progressof reforms. Public expenditures on the social sectors

increased on a per capita basis during the second phase. of the economic
refonn program, but remain woefully inadequate. The government has yet
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to frilly integrate the social sectors int;o the adlustiene programn through
effective sirat.egies, instil,utional arranmgemcnts, andc action plans tlhat.imnprov,c
thc delivery of social services. Lack of piogress in the social sectorsla has been
a major issuc during the adjustment. peiiod.
Appendix 8B. Limitations of national accounts
data on the industrial sector
National accounts data on industrial CDP do not properly reilectindustrial
growth trends for two major reasons. First, thie national acconLts constnt
price estimates of tie growtl of formial sector activities in the industrial sector and the spotty series on capacity utilization are based on the output of
selected commodities by a number of tradiLional manufacturers. The coinmodities are spirits (Konyagi), beer, cigarettes, textiles, fertilizers, refined
petroleum products, cement, rolled steel,;corrugated iron sheets, dry cell

batteries, radios, sisal rope, aluminum sheets, and chemicals. With the exception of textiles, chemicals, and batteries, these are all products produced
byparastatals. In the case of textiles, even though the private sector accounts
for 40 percent of total output of the subsector,.the private sector accounts
for only 10 percent of total textile production in the output series used for.
the national accounts estimates. Capacity utilization figures are also biased
downwards because capacity utilization tends to be much higher among
pnvate firms. The same kind of pattern exists for chemicals, batteries, and
other product groups covered in the official statistics.
Consequently, official measures of formal sector output and capacity
utilization exclude a significant amount of activity in the private sector and
do not reflect the diversification of the industrial sector that has taken place
since the government embarked on the basic industrial strategy d-tat established import substituting industries in die state sector. Official data do not
include output of smaller, more dynamic private sector firms. In addition,
the output of finns engaed in manufactured ex-port activities is notcaptured.
Second, infonnal sector activities are poorly captured. The national
accounus estimates of their contribution to manufacturing output, is mechanically estimated to be one-third of the total value added of all manufac-.
turing establishments. Consequently, the estimates assume that the output
of the informal sector declined wivth that in the fonnal sector between 1979
and 1986. However, the informal sector rapidly expanded during the period in the face of the high rate of urbanization, the persistent economic
crisis, high rates of inflation, and declining formal sector employment opportunities. Consequently, national accounts estimates for industrial producdion are probably grossly understated.
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Notes
1. WhleC the delay and shortfall in rain in 1992 affected the availabiliyofpowcr fron
hydro resources throughout Southern Africa, in Tanzania they have not had as large
a negative impact as in other countries undergoing adjustrnent in Southern Africa.
2. A major effort is now underway to review all laws and revise legislation to remove the remaining impediments to reform in the business environment.L
3. The recentreporcofthe Prcsidential Commission on Land Reform is cxpected
to lead to decisions to introduce land markets and clarify property rights and tbe process of transferring ownership.
4. To the extent that recent measures to increasc tax compliance are successful,
the profitabilityof tradingshould decline and make production more attractive, which
will also help sustain economic growth.
5. However, in 1992-93 the fiscal deficitis projected to increase substantiallydue
primanrily to a shortfaUll of revenue-this because of over optimism about the revenue
yield from the substantial cut in indirect taes thatwas announced in the 1992-93 budget
(and rescinded six months later) and becausc of lower than expected inflows of balancc of payments support that adversely affected imports.
6. A high proportion of donor financing provided to Tanzania through the government is not captured in the budget because much large donor financing byp2sses
the budget-for example, techriical assistance funds and direcL project financing.
7. In the 1991-92 budgetfor example, 39 percent oftotal'recurrentexpenditures
and more than 90 percent of the development budget were provided by counterpart
funds generated by balance of payments supporL
8. Itis estimated thatcentralbanklosses in thefirstsixmonths of 1992-93 accounted
for 27 percent of the increase in broad money.
9. The People's Bank ofZanzibar,which isowned by the government of Zanzibar,
operates exclusively in Zanzibar..
10. The slippage during 1988, plus slow progress in agricultural marketing reform,
led to adelay in the preparation of the third struc tural adjustment facility program and
a consultative group meeting for Tanzania.
11. Based on the first sLx months of operations, the volume of foreign &xchange
sold through the bureaus is likely to be equivalent to about 20 percentLof total imports
of goods and services in 1992-93.
12. ByApril 1993 the average dollar exchange rate in the bureaus was about 30
percent higher than the official rate: the parallel market rate was less than 5 percent
above the bureau rate.
13. Beginning in June 1992, the government extended dte contracts of its
preshipnientLinspection agencies to includc customsvaluation and plans to involvc the
commercial banks in the collection of trade taxes.
14. Conversely, the bureaus probably were able to develop more quickdy because
of the unavailability of open gencral license resources during 1992-93, when many
donorswithheld open generallicense himds pending improvementsin accountingand
management
15. Initially, preshipment inspection was required forgoods valued at more than
$5,000 and only for goods financed through official sources of foreign exchangc. In
1991-92 preshipmentirunspectionwas extended to allgoodsvalued atmore than$5,000,
regardless of the source of financing. In 1993 the threshold was reduced further to
only $3,000, one ofthelowest in Africa, because the $5,000 limitmeant thatonly about
16 percent of the total value of imports was subject to inspection.
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16. In practicc, many traditional exporters-for example, coffee farmers-do noit
ytL have the right to retain any of the export earnings in foreign exchange.

17. While this major change in policy drastically reduced the credit requirements
of the crop autlioritics, the source of excess credit to cover large financial losscs, because of poor pricing policies and marketing inefficiencics, merely shifted from the
marketing boards to the cooperatives.
18. By 1990 the averagc had fallen to only 40 percent.
19. Yet farmers may not receive any second payment if, as is anticipated, world
market conditions and prices for cotton do not improve.
20. In September 1992 the government announced that selected priratc traders
would aLso bc allowed to enter this field.
21. The upper echelon of the civil service ai]o enjoys seeral-in-kind benefits (for
example, free housing, utilities, telephone, and transportL). IfWall these arc included,
the ratio of the highest level of compensation in the civil senice to the minimum wage
is estimated to bc ncarly 50 to 1.
22. Until 1992 the national labor union was an appendage of the political party
and had a limited role in wage determination. The formal link to the party was severed
thatycar as a-prelude to multipart politics.
23. Despite periodic admonishmnents from the parliamentary accounts committee
and the president, audits of many parastatal accounts are substantially behind schedule. As ofJune 1992, the accounts of 126 of the Tanzanian Audit Corporation's 281
clients were in arrears for one year.or.nmorc-due in part to excess demand on the
Tanzanian Audit Corporation's capacity to carry out the audits. Yet the more impor-.
tant source of the problem is that compliance with government requirements for the
timely submission of accoun s for audit continues to be quite unsatisfictory because of
weak sanctions.
24. The indebtedness ofparastatals, largely to the xcasury, amrounts toalrmostTSh
1 trillion.
25. For these reasons, litde progresswas made toward implementing the restructurng plans for three indusial subsectors (leather, textiles, and edible oiL') thatverer
developed by 1989-90 in the context of an adjustment crcdiL for industry that was
approved by the World Bank. Vith the reforms that began in 1992, these plans have
been implemented much more quickdy.
26.AI thoughonly5 percentof theschool-aged populatn goes tosecondaryschool,
the inabllityofthegovemmenttto meeteven theselimited demandsrequired thatstate
control be relaxed.
27. Sice 1992 the authorities have been moving the official rate so as to reduce
the premiumoverthe exchaige ratein theforeign exchangebureau.Thegovernment
is committed to unifying cxchange ratesby 1994.
28.As noted earlier, however, the budget deficit for l992-93 could be more than
7 percent of GDP.
29. The decline in Tanzania's primary deficit (excluding interest payrenLs) was
even more pronounced, filing from an average of-8.6 percent to 3.9 percentbetween
1986 and 1991.
30. Official measures of GDP significandy understate total economic activity in
Tanzania. In response to the economic decline of the late 1970s and early 1980s and
to distorted economic policicsand excessiveregulations, alargeunofficial or %econd,"
economy has emerged. By 1990 Malivamkono and Bagachwa (1990) estimate that
unofficial GDP had reached 30 percent of official GDP. The absence of time series
data makes it impossible to tell whether the largc unofficial economy leads to under-
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statement of both the growth rate and the level of economic activity.
31. Tauzania has also received aboutSI billion in debt reliefsince the economic
recovcry program.
32. As shown in Bacha (1992), nct real transfers are crucial to detcrmining the
sustainability of growdt and debt accumulation.
33. Cashcoverrepamnienton traditional commodityimportsupportprogrmsasha
been as low as 40 percenL But in the case of the open general license, a 1992joint
donor mission found that, whilc importers typIcally pay fiull cash cover to the commercial banks, the comnmercial banks have not turned all those funds over to the Bank of
Tanzania.-Thispractice posesan additionalproblem in that it is inherently inflationary
and undermines the government!s program to control creditmand achieve acroeconomic stability.
34 Estimates of the total amount of technical assistanc given to Tanzania are
difficult to obtain. It is biddy conjectured that it is on tie order of SW0 million' but
that may exaggerate slightly the actual amount received.
35. However, asnoted in appendix 8B, national accounts datasignificantly understate the real contribution of the industrial sector, due to the rapid growthofinfornal
industrial sector activities during the economic recovery program, and their limited
coverage of formal sector accMties
36. In 1992 many of those industries may have experienced significantly lower
growthand capacity utilization becauseofsevere power rationing throughout the country. However, donor fundinghasbeen organized to address the emergencysituation in
the power sectorand to bringon linesufficient new generation capacityin dte next few
years to mcet dte requirements of accelerated industial growth.
37. About half of all private firms surveyed in 1990 planned to raise the export
share of their total sales and significandy increase investmentin thcir manufacturing
facilities.
38.The mostimportantsteps taken to encourage private sectordeveopmentgenerally indude the measures to liberalize foodgrain marketing in 1987 and cashew nut
markcting in 1991, the adoption of a National Investment Promotion Policy in 1991,
the initial (but painfilly slow) steps to encourage pnvate participation in industrial
parastatals, and a decision in 1992 to allow private banks to be established again.
-39. Villagization,Mhich began in the early 1970s, sought to move the rural population into centrally located villages where essential services (health, education, and
water) could be pronided mor easily. Hawever, farmers hadliule incentive to improve
their productivity, were often moved long distances frm their customary plots, and
were required tocultivatevlllageplotson a continuousbasis, contnrbuting to declining
yields.
40. The firstgrain marketingreforntswere undertaken in 1984, when restrictions
were removed on the movement of grains by individuals across regional boun daries in
lots of500 kgor less. By 1987 all weight rcsurictio ns on interregional grain movementt
had been eliminated, and traders began to compete with the National Milling Corporation to supply urban ccnters. In 1989 the govcenment announced that the final obstacles. to .frmers'selling directly to private traders were being eliminated, essentially
liberalizing the entire grain tradingsystenm
41. H{oweter, as noted in the World Bank-Government of Tanzania Agricultural
Sector Review (1992), there is virmally no prnvate storage for seasonal arbitrage, and
the dependence of traders on existing transport capacities has left some food-deficit
areas virtually unserved by the market-
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42. Covcrnment reform oftraditional exportzcropswnasessenEiallylimited to changing the role of the marketing boards- Prior to reforns 1 the mnarketingboards were the
sole buyer of crops for exportc from the unions, and they required bank financing to
finance these purchases Reforms sought to transfonn the boards in to agents acting on
behalf ofthe unions in arrangingexports of their crops on a fee basis. The purpose of
this change wasA to climninate the need for double fmancing of the crop by the banks.
Cashew markcrtingwas the one taditional crop forw
which reformwent further, prMtAte
trade in competition with the unions was alloweda-as of the 1991 season.
43. Accumulated arrcars on crop marketing overdrafts totaled overTSh 66 billion
by the end of l99,l about 45 percent ofwhich was more than two year.s old.
44. The partys linkwith the cooperatitvs w assevered fiormallyin conjunction with
parliamentary approval of theCooperativeActof 1991,.swhichseeks to creategrassroot,
democratic, and cconomically viable cooperatives.
45.As noted earlier,a fcwjoIntventuresfornew processing f-icilitieshae reccently
been approved by the govcrnment.
46. The poverty and hard core povery lines have rccendy been estimated at TSh
46,1 73 and TSh 31,000 respectively- These figues, and much of the data on poverty
thatare quoted in this section, were taken from Ferreira (1993).
47. Ferreira (1993) shows that income from informal sector business and agricultural activities contributed 44 and 34 percent of total income of urban households,
respectively. In DaresSala;n, the rcspectri.e figureswere 8 and l percent. This shows;
tat many urban households, indcluding those in Dar cs Salaam, gcncrate additional
income from faming plots; they maintain.
48. Primary school cnrollment rates are still very low, particularly in rural areas
where more than 88 percent of the school age population does not attend primary
schooL Secondary school enrollment in the rural areas is also very low-only 3.5 percent of children younger than 14 have a secondary education.
49. However, with the addition ofal other school expcnses, indluding uniformsand exercisc books, primary schools can cost parents from fIt 4,000 to Tf;h 7,000 a
year, more than 10 percentof the annual income ofa minimum wage earner. By comparison, the centralgovernacnt's6contribution toprimaryeducationisaboutTSh4,000.
50( A 1991 WVorld Bank report projccts that the epidemic could reduce'the GDP
growth rate by 14 to 24 percent by theyear 2010.
51 Despite beingdeclarcdillegal in 1977, private medicine thrived in the face of
the health care crisis.
52. However, household .surveys have .shown that pcople would bc willing to pay.
for water (Whittingon 1988).
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Conclusions
Rashid Fansqee and IshratHusamin

A common theme that emerges from the record ofadjustment programs in
the seven case studies is thatAfiican governments are notyetmuch better at
managingmarketeconomies than theywereannanagingeconomies through
k'avy interven ion. The dtu-st of reformswas to change the role of governmer' to that of facilitator and catalyst in the mobilization and allocation of
resources, guide and helpmig hand-in the production and distribution of
goods and services, referee in esuring alevelplaying fieldforall economic
actors, and active and direct participant in redirectig publicspending to
spur growth, reduce poverty, and protect the environmenL The evidence of
the case studies suggests that the adjustmnentprograms in Africahave notyet
succeeded in reaching those objectives, notvithstandingsignificantprogress
in tat direction.;
There are, ofcourse, differences in the extent ofstate control and involvementin these countries stemming from their historicalIlegacies, the onentaton of their postindependence regines, -and the evolution of thinking and
practices in the countnes over time. But the string finding ofthe seven case
studiesis thatthe globalwind of change thatis redefining the role of the state
has notyet swept these countries, at least by contemporary standards
The need to build capacity
There is a basic dilemma in Africa. Economic reform curtails the powers of
- - the state through privatizaion, deregulation, the elimination of central planning, and a reduction in ihe publicwork force The ensuing uncertainy,lower
real wages, and lack ofjob security adversely affect the motives of civil servants, in some cases leading them out of public service But the remaining
tasks ofgovernment-the design, implementation, and operation of the structural adjusutent program, the maintenance and operation of a framework
427
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ofmacroeconamic policies that provide incentives to the private sector, the
resolution of infrastructural problems, and the mediation of conflicts in the
civil society-all demand scarce technical and administrative skills. If civil
servants lackmotivation, and there is a corresponding lack of technical and
administrative skills, economic reform haces enornous obstacles. This dilemma-and the frequent absence of strong development-oriented, visionaryleadership fullycommitted to economicreforms-greatly compound the
problems of implementation.
The administrative decay in Africa is rooted in the pervasive clientele
politics. It could be said of manypublic officials that they utreat their adinin'istraiveworkfxor their ruler as a personal service based on teir duty of obedienceandrespect" (Bendix 1962), notasaserv'ce to theircountryand fellow
citizens. Unless thereis afiundamentalrestructuring andprofessionalization
ofthe civil service in these countries, the prospects'for building implementadon capacity will remain bleak-whatever the pressures from outside.
The need to convert rents to resources

Another basic problem 'in much of Africa is that4 although the w'it of the
state runs large and the role of the state is all-pervasive and interventionist,
there is at the same time a paralysis or-breakdown ofgovernment authority.
Large informal sectors have emerged in almost all the countries, bypassing
and ignoring government regulations and rules. Smuggled goods are freely
available at prices cheaper than domestic substitutes. Scarce government
services are allocated by functionaries on the basis of political and famiIy,
connections, and bribes.
A major factor inhibiting the growth of business is the generous inflow
of smuggled goods allowed by customs officials, Swho collect rents for themselves rather thanimportduties for thegevemment. Domestic'industrieshave
to pay all kinds of taxes-for examnple, import duties on inputs and raw
materials, and taxes on sales profits and dividends. They also have to bear
thehighercosts ofineffcientpublicutilities. And theyfce harassmentand
pressure from local and state govemment officials. No wonder their costsdespite devaluations and the greateravaRabilityofimportedinputs-are less
competitive than those ofsmuggled imported goods, whose only duties and
taxes are the rents to customs officals. Re-export of illict imported goods
has become a thriving business among Ghana, Nigeria. andneighboring CFA
zone countries (box 9.1).
The growth of a large private sector has been snted i mostAfrican
countnes by the direct interventions of-and displacements by-the African state.But thevisile buoyancy ofagriculture and the urban informalsector
in almost all adjusting countries provides ample testimony to the entrepreneurialskills and capacities ofprivate economic actors. In several countriesPublished by iRepository, 2021
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such as Cote d'Ivoire, Kenya, and Nigeria-private actors are in the formal
sector, too. Thle state should nurture the growth and expansion ofa broadly

based private sector. But a distinction needs to be made between an unpro-'
duectfie rent-seeking private sector in which certain individuals or companies earn profits due to the favors and patronage of the government, anda
productive prvate sector in which individuals or companies compete on a
level playing field without special favors or concessions.
T1he need to broaden the support for reforms
The case studies documentth:at theadjustmentprogramsn m these countries,
except Nigenra, were conceived and formulated by a narrow group of technocrats and politicians without broad consultations with and inputs from
Box 9.1 The political economy .owheat-import bans in Nigeria
ln l986 Ngeria devalued the naira from N I to the dollar to N 4 and imposed a
ban on wheat imports. Despitc the ban on imports ofwheat, bread continued to
be available inbig cities in Nigeria, though atammuchhigherprice to the consumer.
Imports were rerouted through neighboring countries, whosc imports shot up,
exceeding domestic consumption.
The Nigerian consumer was paying this higher pnce, not as a dircct result of*
devaluation, butbecauseofadditionaltransportcosts (throughtheportofCotonou
ratler than through Lagos), thc margins of importers in Benin, risk premiums
andreturusto smugglcrswho moved thewhcatacross theborders,bribescollectcd
by border and customs officials, and payments by the flour mils to local
enforcementagencies (forkeepingouLoftrouble) .The results: costinefficiencies,
anetwclfiuarloss toNigeia, andcsubstatial transfers to asmallgroup of Nigerians
at the expcns of bread consumers.
The urban middle class-paricularly groups on fixed incomes (the main
consumers of wheat bread), whose real wages and salaries declined-attnbuted
the sharpjump in theprice of bread direcdy to the devaluation ofthe naira Butin
fct, the markctpriceofbread-before thedevaltation-hadalreadyrisen toreflect
the parallel xcchange rate that drove all transactions in Nigeria. The official
devaluationannounced in l986fsimplyrecognizedtisrealityandunified the official
and parallel market exchange rates without any significant pass-through effects
on consumerprices. This can be seen from the fact tiat inflation rates in the two
years after the 1986 devaluationwere lower than those for the preceding two years
(import shortages had given rise to higher inflation). But as the ban on wheat
imports diverted the source ofsupplicsfrom Iagos to Cotonou, and generated the
chain of additional costs described above, the consumer price of bread rose
substantially. True, there were unintended benefits to the economy, such as a
decline in the demand for wheat, substitution by other, cheaper food items, and
increased domestic production ofinaizc and otherlocal foods, but the consumers
resented the price rise and perceived this to be thedirect result of devaluation.
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others. There is clear evidence that open discussion, debate, and communication and interaction involving diverse groups are the only feasible ways to
effect acceptance and internalization of the programs. Trade union leaders,
in particular, have often made the point that if they are consulted about the
justification for nious policy measures and informed about the likely consequencesand objectives, they are in a betterposition to mak-ea constructive

contribution to both the diagnosis of problems and the prescription of soluktions. Ownersliip of the'refonn program should thus be broadlybased, rather
than the province of a fewv-for example, ownership by the government in
power or by an economic team comprising the finance minister, the central
bankgovernor, the adviser to the president, and their staffsi.To be effective, the reform program should also be caried out with a
shared sense of the direction in which the economy should move. Without
deargoaIs and objectves, theachievementofreform goals-with the concomitant need to mobilize support from disparate socioeconomic forces in the
country, such as private businesses, professionals, political parties, nongovernmental organizations, and students-andlabor unions-.would prove difficUlt
The assumption that extemal approval from donors or international financialinstitutionsuwill generate commitnentto economicreformisnotliklely to
prove true. Itis also possible thatoownership and commitient couldbe conofined to select elements of the adjustment programs, while ocher elements
that are not perceived to have popular support are neglected. Implementation mayvary under those dircumstances,with the noncontroversial elemenis
of the paclage moving fonhard rapidly while other elements are held up.
- - Diverse imterests and subgroups within the govement itself react differendy to vanous reforms. Public enterprise managers oppose reforn if it
involves dosing clown or retrenchment. Ministries charged with revenue
collection and fiscal balances respond favorably if a reform package adds
significandy to available budget resources. Civil servants respond negatively
to pay scale reform and cutbacks in employment levels; they might be deterred from opposing reform, however, if it lessened or removed the legal
restrictions on their private economic activities. The perception of fairness
plays a role, too, in acceptance of reform measures: in Nigeria in the early
years of adjustment, the military govermment imposed pay cuts on the m-il
tary, establishing ameasure offairness andcredibilityforthe overallprogramPrivate constituences often also respond differently to reform. The more
competitive industrial concerns, crippled by import restrictions and shortages offoreign exchange, mightsupport trade reform. Exp-oriented farmers might be direct beneficiaries of devaluation, while producers of domestic foodcrops might respondfavorably to pcingand marketing refomns. The
private sector operators dependent on the government's discretion to allocate foreign exchange, licenses, and the like wvould oppose the program.
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Farmers in general benefit from die shifting or resources from urban consumers to rtural producers. Otler, poorer urban groups, hit hard by budget
cutbacks, might be supportive iftargeted prograns provided diem assistance.
The politics ofrreform implementation, as illustrated by the experience
of the seven case study countries, confirm the need for ex ante impactanalysis and measures fror neutralizing antiadjustnent forces. In Nigerna the fal
tering commitment to adjustment and intermittent lapses in policy. iinplementation were the result of stiff opposition from the urban middle
classes-especiallyprofessionals, soldiers, and ivil servants-whOli had been

hitLhard by tie loss of implicitand explicit consumersubsidies forfood, tans.port,Eand imported goods. Their opposition became a main stumbling bloclk
to-further reforms.
The experiences of the seven countres spotlight the importance of appropriately handling the potential losers from reforns- including vocal
middle-class groups of professionals, soldiers, civil servants, andjournalists,
.students, he laborunions, industrialists, anduniversities-who are likelyto
be hurt by die liberalization and ensuing competition. It is a mistake to ignore them-or to repress them- They can contribute much to the developmentprocess, and they can have tremendous influence in organizing and
mobiling, public opinion.
Lessons about strategy, sequence, and pace
A vigorous debate continues on the appropriate pace and sequencing of
economic reforms.3 While specific country circumstances determine what is
appropriate, some general lessons can be gleaned. This section addresses
the issue, in light of our county study experences.
In formulating a strategy for implementing policy reforms, four related
sets of considerations need to be taken into account: the initial conditions at
the start of the adjustment processr the sequencing of economic refonns,
the political economy of the reform process, and the administrative capacty
to implement reformsOf the initial conditions, the most important is the state of the
economy. IHlo serious are the macroeconomic imbalances? Is inflation out
of control, and has the official exchange rate become grossly overvalued?
Has the formal sector collapsed completely (Ghana in the early l9SOs), or
is it sdll functioning, even if imperfectly (Cote d'Ivoire, Nigeria, and
Senegal today)? The source of the macroeconomic crisis must be considered: adjusting to external shocks may require different measures from
those to correct domestic policy errors (although many crises are due to a
combination of both fctors) . A third consideration is the initial degree of
policy distortions and underlying structural problems. The more distorted
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policies are initially and tlle more serious die underlying structural problems, the more decisive the actions required.
On the sequencing of economicreforns,.some reformsmustbe preceded
(or accompanied) by others if they are to yield economic benefits imniediately. There is likely to be little near-tertn economic benefit from reforms
implemented in the wrong order, and some reforms may be reversed or have
to be repeated if they are not accompanied by others (for examnple, trade
refonn without real exchange rate realignment, financial sector restructuring witlout restoring macroeconomic balance).
-The political economy oftthe reform process usually dictateswhether die
adjustment should be rapid-or gradual. Some countries nay have the political base to sustain reforms over-a long period and may find a gradual impro.vementin perfonnance satisfictory. Othergovernments, particularly new
ones (Ghana in the early1980s), may need to frontload the political pain of
adjustment by maling rapid refonns to take advantage of an initial wave of
support and generate economic benefits that-will help consolidate their
political support in the longer term. In economic tenns, however, more rapid
reforms (assuming that they are within the inplementation capacity of the
government and politically sustainable) are likely to be preferable to slower
ones because die benefits of adjustmentwill tend to be realized faster.
On the administrative capacity to implement reforms, some types of
reformsarecapacitysaving (thatis, theyreduce the demandsongovemment's
limited administrative capacity); others are capacity-using -and thus complicate economic management. This distinction applies both to different categones of reforms and to alternative designs of specific reforms. Across reforms, abolishing price controlsand foreign exchange allocation systems are
capaciy-saving, whereas privatization and civil service reform -are initially
capacity-using. Within reforms, replacing nonariff barliers and a highly
dispersed tariffstructure with asimple, single-rate unifonn tariff is capacitysaving, relative to introducing a new multirate tariff structure and gradually
phasing out excessive protection through declining import surtaxes. And
abolishing marketing boards is capacity-saving compared with trying to restructure and run the boards better.
Each reform and the entire reform program must be within the implementation capacit of the government Radical reforms (abolishingmarketing boards, adopting a uniform triff) may often be easier to implement
administratively than gradual reforms, but it mightbe tougher politically to
getdtemadopted. Capacisaving and capacity-using reforms affectboth core
iinistriesand the specific line ministries concemed. Although administrative capacity saved in the core ministries may be fimgible, it may or may not
be possible to use administrative capacity saved in one line ministry to help
implement reforms in other areas.
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One way to think about sequencing is to consider thlee inwrrelated,
overlapping groups of reforms that necd to be implemented in a logical
sequence (or simuilaneotisly) irtheyare to prodduce intended benefits in good
time. The firstgr oup of reforms comprises measures to realign relative prices
and improve the functioning of product and factor markets. Thc second
covers policies to restore financial balance and restructure the financial system. And tde third concerns reforms to create an enabling environment for
private secLor expansion.
Realigningrelativeprices and improvingthefunctioning of markets
Measures to liberalize and improve the functioning of domestic productand
factor (particularly labor) markets should precede the liberalization of exter.nal trade-both to facilitate a supply response when extemal trade is liberalized and to limit the inflationary impact of exchange rate realignment'
Realigning the real exchange ratc is the keymeasure forstimuladngasupply
response through promoting boti export expansion and import subsdtudon. It is essential to realign export expansion and importsubstitution, and
itis essential to do this before (orsimultaneouslywith)reforrisin trade poliLy.
Othenrise, the removal of nontariff barriers and the implementation of tariffreformuillbe difficult, ifrnotimpossible. Second-best trade policies (where
export subsidies and high tariffs substitute for exchange rate realignment)
by and large have not workled, for fiscal and administrative reasons.
Eliminating nontariff barriers (and replacing them with tariffs where
necessary) should proceed before (or simultaneouslywith) tariff reform, but
this has often received too little priority. To facilitate exports, countries should
eliminate export taxes, institute duty drawbackls, and simplify administrative
procedures, keeping in mind that the exchange rate and duty drawvbacks
should be the primaryprice incentives for promoting exports. Reducing the
dispersion of triff rates-while maintaining (or increasing) the average
effective rate to avoid revenue losses-requires as much emphasis on eliminating exemptions and raising low rates as on cutting peak rates. The real
exchange rate should be adjusted as necessary to offset the average loss of
protection from tariff reductions.
Coretingfinancial imbalancesand rstructuringthefinancialsystem
The goal here is to reduce or eliminate the fiscal deficit and impose a comprehensive hardbudgetconstrainton public enterprises. Governnentsponsored credit programs and lending by government banks also need to be
brought under control at the same time. All these steps need to precede (or
-beimplemented simultaneouslywith) a disciplined monetary policy. Other-
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wise, tie combination of fiscal laxity and tight monetary policy will squeeze
out the private sector and threaten tlhe solvency of the financial system. The
liquidation of nonviable enterprises and the redeployment of obviously excessive (and redundant) numbers ofgovemlent employees (through acrossthe-board reductions in force or thlrough abolishing entire agencies) should
also ideally start at this pointL
Monetary discipline and positive real interest rates need to be imposed
to-bring aggregate demand and supply into balance, reduce inflation, and
reduce the incentive for capital flight. Simultaneously, the most egregious
distortions in financial sector policies-sectoral creditallocations, preferenual interest rates for selected activities, lending margins that do not reflect
costs, directgovernmentand central bankintervention on behalf oflending
to favored clients-need to be eliminated.
The realignmentofthe real exclhange rate needs to precede therestructuring of the financial system to discourage new capital flightwhen liquidity
is restored and to expose problems in bank loan portfolios hat will result
firom restructuring the real sector. In restructuring the financial system, the
first priorities are to restore a functioning payments system and to assure
availability of the minimum credit needed to support a supply response as
the financial system is reliquified. Strengthened bank supervision, capital
adequacy, and bank restructuring; furnher liberalization of interest rate regulations; improved instruments of monetary management; and elimination
of controls on external capital flows-all these need to be put in place over
time as the economy and financial system recover.
Creatingan enablingenvzironentforpnivatesector expansion

The first steps here are to realign kIey relative prices-by depreciating the
real exchange rates, aligning prices ofmajor commoditieswit international
prices, introducing positive real interest rates, allowing real wages in the
formal sector to fall as required-and to restore macroeconomic balance.
Next is to -restore a functioning payments system and assure availabilty of
the minimum credit needed to support a supply response. Then begins the
long-term restructuring of the financial system.r
On the expenditure side offiscalrestrucuring, there is need early on to
provide for adequate public investment and other development expenditures-and to reduce or constrain public sector real wage rates and the real
wage bill if appropriate. It is also important early on to revive a reasonable
level of public investment-to precede the recovery in privte investmentand to initiate long-term civil service reform. On the revenue side, excessive
tax rates have to be reduced, the tax base broadened, and the tax structure
radonalized in order to raise revenues while also minimizing distortions and
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disincentives to private sector expansion. Measures must be iniLiated to improve the legal and regulatory framework and to signal a commniiment to

pursuing reforms on a sustained basis over the long term, including reforms
of the investnen t code, labor law, business law, competition policy, and die
judicial system. Finally, privatization of viable public enterprises must be
started, but for this to succeed, there must be an economic environment in
which private enterprises can expand.
- Widtin eacl of the above interrelated reform agendas, individual measures may be undertaklen simultaneously or in sequence depending on the
economic situation in the adjusting countryand the reform strategy. Actions
on the three overlapping reform agendas also need to be coordinated with
each other. For example, exchange rate realignment is the second step in
realigning relative prices, the fifth step in correcting financial imbalances,
andl the first step in creating an enabling environment Fiscal restrucmring
appears as the first step for correcting financial imbalances and the firstand
third steps for suppbrting private sector expansion. Note, too, that many of
the politically difficult actions required to generate a timely private sector
supply response need to come early in the adjustment process and thatlimits on implementation capaciyuril need to be taken into accountin designmg the various reforms.
Summary

Soundrnacroeconomicpolicies and stabilityare the cornerstones of sustainable economic development, and African countries need to pursue these
policies to respond and adjust to domestic and external shockls promptlyand to send credible signals to the private sector. The adjustment programs
neednotbe the extremes of eithershock therapyor the gradualistapproach.
A hybrid or mixed approach is most desirable, with some key reforms done
simultaneously, in one shot-and others following in an integrated, overlp
ping way. But the progranms should usually follow two phases from the viewpoint of implementation capacidtyAt first, the reforms should be capacitysaving; only with progress in these reforms should adjustment proceed to
capacityusing reforms. Because programs are more sustainable when posi-

tdve results are quickly evident, the first phases of the program should focus
on areas where results are quick. This also helps in enlisting support for the
total program-Also to be acknowvledged is thatthree difficultareas ofreformpublic enterprise reform, dvil service reform, financial sector reform-require more time to tackle. Given the dose relationships betveen import liberalization, public enterprise reform, govermnent finance, and fin-ancal
sector refonn, this whole set of reforms should be attempted simultaneously
and consistently. Import liberalization, if done too rapidly, will reduce the
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profitability of domestic firms competing with imports and thus affect their
ability to senice debt owed to the financial institutions. Public enterprises,
unless restructured and faced with a hard budget constraint, will continue to
create portfolio problems for their creditor institutions. The government
deficit, if not reduced sufficiently, wvill crowd out the private sector from
engaging in activities thathavte becomeviable under the new incentive structure. Fixing only one ofthese distortions aa atime is liiely to be of littlevalue.
In the end, it must be emphasized that these general lessons about the
sequencing and pace of reforns can help in the design of the broad outlines
of an optimal policy pack-age. But they cannot subsntute for country-specific
analysis. For the optimal package must be tailored to the specific circumstances of each country.
Notes
1. The discussion is drawn from Gulhati (1988).2. Laurence Hinkle provided draft inputs to this section.
-3.In cases of unregulated domestic monopolies, external trade in the specific
products concerned may also need to be liberalized initially to provide some comperidon for the monopoly.
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